RE: Pretty Please

I meant to add this comment to the earlier post, but it was either too long, or MT was having problems...

I served in Iraq as a Guardsman, so I read GEN Stultz's comments with great interest.

On the whole, GEN Stultz made some important points about Civil Affairs (CA), cultural differences, and so forth. I'm not sure, but I think he has some kind of personal agenda, because he mixes apples and oranges in the interview.

Clearly, the US Army can always learn new things when dealing with foreign cultures and tribal politics. And we are.

But the General needlessly conflates two entirely separate issues, that of treatment of Iraqi civilian populations and treatment of Iraqi soldiers during what could be described as basic training like conditions.

His statement that Iraqi soldiers would be offended by being yelled out is laughable in its separation from actual fact and reality. One of the unfortunate consequences of fascist like dictatorship -- and the kleptocracy that it bred -- as that military discipline was entirely replaced by naked power and fear. Iraqi soldiers knew the consequences of making decisions on their own, and doing anything other than exactly what they were told, and much they weren't.

They were often abused capriciously, and treated in ways that NO American or western military would tolerate. Worse than servants, they were often slaves to the whims and appetites of their senior officers, who themselves served at the complete pleasure and whim of the Baathist power structure, and especially, Saddam his sons and clansmen.

From what I saw, the NCO corps was non-existent, what few Sergeants Major or First Sergeants I saw or heard of were veterans of the Iran Iraq war with more holes and chunks missing (as in flesh blown or cut off) than you can imagine. They commanded respect to a degree, but they and their senior officers commanded through threats, intimidation, insult and corporal punishment. I suspect that still remains the most effective means of getting Iraqi soldier attention, although the "more soft" American approach is no doubt increasingly common for American trained Iraqi units.

That being said, I don't doubt that Reserve soldiers (and Guard as well) possess all manner of skills and work experiences that allow them to find other strategies for dealing with the challenge of changing attitudes, military culture, discipline, and other mission accomplishment. As a Guard First Sergeant, I took 160 soldiers to Iraq and back, most with some other job or career as their real job. The Army became their new job with Mobilization.

And yes, in that sense, we needed to reason more, explain, get buy-in, and otherwise use a more thoughtful and less forceful approach than many of our Active Duty counterparts (at least at first). That proved more effective, perhaps because few of our troops had been soldiers first, and our average age was over 35.

We never sacrificed discipline, or mission, but it sometimes took a few tries to implement unpopular decisions in peacetime/garrison/mob site -- In Iraq, that rarely happened and we lowered the boom immediately when it even came close.

But that describes how Guard leaders treated US National Guard soldiers. Americans have entirely different expectations than Iraqis, and that's really the point. The idea that Iraqi soldiers require anywhere near the amount of persuasion, respect, in fact any leadership style other than direct is contrary to my experience.

Again, I wonder at GEN Stultz's agenda with this interview; the idea that we're being too hard on the Iraqi Army is somewhat ridiculous.

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