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Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, who has been found dead in his cell in the detention centre at The Hague, had been on trial on war crimes charges since 2001
The indictment said he was responsible for "the widespread killing of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats".
LONDON, April 30 (Reuters) - Britain's first convicted war criminal was sentenced on Monday to one year in jail for mistreating Iraqi prisoners in a case that exposed senior commanders to accusations they had authorised abuse. Corporal Donald Payne was also kicked out of the army
When a Corporal...involved in the beating death of a single prisoner is described as a "War Criminal"...how do we now describe people who are responsble for things like genocide? Those who ordered the deaths of millions are now in the same category as a Corporal whose actions resulted in the death of one.
Saved cruisers damaged in battle. Delivered the goods on Iwo Jima. Broached on a beach, broken. Repaired, renamed. Rescued sailors and ships. Present when Andrea Doria sank. Rode "The Perfect Storm." Was called a "submarine"- but it wasn't.
Meanwhile, back in America, hard working newspaper editors were diligently ensuring that virtually none of these stories would appear in their headlines.
April 29, 1975. Flying refugees out of Saigon as the NVA rolls in:
"When we got on the ship, the South Vietnamese were landing helicopters right on the deck," said Stewart, remembering his actions during the operation. "We'd take the people off and push the helicopters over the side. They tried to land (planes) on the ship and the Navy would wave them off. Then they'd ditch the planes into the ocean and jump out and the Navy would fish them out of the water. It was very hectic."
The planners anticipated they would be moving about 100 people out of Saigon, but when it was over, they had relocated 1,373 Americans and 5,595 foreign refugees.
There came a point during the night when the order was given to only take American citizens because the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong were getting close to the DOA compound and American Embassy.
"I can't imagine what it must have been like to have to look at those people, knowing that if they were caught they'd probably be killed," Buckel said. "As good a feeling as it must've been helping the ones they could, there also had to be a little bit of guilt there too."
I'm proud and fortunate to be an American living in a 20th century society which enjoys more basic freedoms and more material wealth than any nation in the history of this earth. All of us can rejoice in the blessings we now have. Yet, I sense from my mail a great deal of worry and concern about the future of our country. This uneasiness seems to boil down to two conclusions which are drummed into our people from many sources: (1) We are gradually losing our free enterprise system to socialism; and (2) we are slowly, but surely, losing the cold war and will eventually live under communism.
Updated: * higlight change
The all is lost crowd has been babbling away for a very long time......sometimes one needs to just have faith that the product they are selling is a product people , given a choice want to buy.
A British soldier who has just returned from Iraq yesterday described the situation in Basra as "hopeless and lost" and accused the Government of "trying to save face" by keeping troops there.
<...>
He called on Tony Blair to withdraw troops immediately.
<...>
"We're coming into the end game as far as I'm concerned. We're losing around four soldiers a month and it won't get any better.
"They've even started attacking our base at Basra airport now they've got proper artillery guns. Once that's gone there's nowhere left."
Artilery guns?
Pte Barton said in the 18 months between the end of his first tour of Iraq and his return this year the pressure on troops had increased hugely. The "Iranian influence" had given insurgents increasingly powerful and new weaponry, he said.
For information only - a "Pte" is a Private in the British military. The opinions of such should be very much respected - it's rare for one to "make the papers" (much less headlines) and this one did. I'd like to hear from more.
A reasonable discussion on this topic would include examination of Britain's intentions regarding Iran (given recent history), an appreciation of their steadfast commitment to the war on terror, an acknowledgement of the political realities confronting Tony Blair at home, and a valid explanation of the difference between complete pacification of an area and the return of responsibility of that area to Iraq. One is the goal of coalition strategy, ("The tipping point in the war in Iraq will not come from killing off insurgents - it will be achieved by replacing the Americans who are killing them with Iraqi forces capable of doing the same." I believe someone once said...) the other is beyond our control. (See Virginia Tech, for example.)
Meanwhile, Haider Ajina writes:
Greetings,
The following is an article form ‘Aswat Al-Iraq or “Voices of Iraq” from Apr 26, 2007
Al-Shuaiba airbase back to Iraqis for second time in 48 years
By Malik Saadon
Basra, Apr 26, (VOI) – Forty-eight years has passed between the handover of al-Shuaiba airbase from the British forces to the Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) in 1959 and its handover to the 10th division of the Iraqi army two days ago. During these 48 years the map of the world has changed, many concepts, ideas and theories have evolved, disproving others that scientists previously held true, but man's will to remain free and to be the master of his own land has not changed.
The British forces on Tuesday handed over al-Shuaiba airbase, 40 km from western Basra, to the 10th division of the Iraqi army, after it having been a vital airbase for the British and Danish forces since 2003. A military parade was held during which the Iraqi flag was raised and the British and Danish flags were lowered in reference to the return of Iraqi sovereignty.
With the handover of al-Shuaiba airbase, the presence of the multi-national forces will be confined to two bases: the presidential palaces in central Basra, 550 km south of Baghdad, and Basra International Airport in the northwest of the city.
Al-Shuaiba airbase was first used by the British forces on March 9, 1915 after they won their battle against the Ottoman Turks in World War I, as part of what the British forces called 'The Mesopotamian campaign,' which means the campaign between the two rivers, referring to the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers.
"On November 6, 1914, the first British battalion of the 16th legion landed on Fao beach, raised the British flag and lowered the flag of the Ottoman Empire," Ali Jabir, a retired brigadier, told the independent news agency Voices of Iraq (VOI).
"Under the command of Sir A. Bart, the British forces on November 23, 1914 managed to occupy Basra and staged a military parade, to which foreign consuls and prominent figures from Basra were invited, to celebrate what they called 'the liberation of Iraq' from the despotism of the Ottoman Empire," Jabir continued.
Explaining the strong reactions to the British occupation of Basra, Jabir said that the situation turned upside down as soon as the occupying forces held sway.
"Despite serious conflicts at that time between the southern Iraqi tribes and the Ottoman government, which local residents considered their main enemy before the occupation, religious groups in Najaf called for fighting the new occupying forces," Jabir said. Muhammad Saeed al-Habobi, a well-known love poet in Najaf, was one of the Iraqi men of religion who called on people to join al-Shuaiba Battle, where the British forces were on the verge of defeat had it not been for their intrigue. According to Jabir, al-Habobi could not bear the shock of the defeat. "He fell severely ill and was bedridden until he died in Nassiriya on June 16, 1915."
After holding sway over all Iraqi provinces, the British forces started to build stable bases, among which was al-Shuaiba base. "In 1920, the Royal Air Force (RAF) set up a camp at al-Shuaiba where it deployed the 84th company, which was replaced in 1940 by the 244th company that fought the anti-colonial Rashid Ali al-Kilani Movement in World War II," a British media source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told the independent news agency Voices of Iraq (VOI).
"Our backs were bleeding severely under the scourge of the feudal system in Missan's rural areas. We could not afford to pay rent to the landlord of the land. My two brothers and I considered leaving and chose Basra as our destination. We arrived there after a five-day journey on foot," Hajj Hassan, one of the workers at al-Shuaiba base during the British occupation in the 1930s, who is now over 90-years old, told VOI.
"We were lucky that we were chosen by al-Karka, the Indian soldiers in the British army, otherwise known then as the Indian cavalry. They took us to a camp in the heart of the desert called al-Shuaiba. We worked there for several years: my brothers worked in construction and in the transportation of iron and I worked as a supervisor because of my ability to read and write," Hassan recounted.
"We were paid 14 rupees per week. A rupee is the standard unit of money in India, which was then equal to 60 Iraqi fils (1 Iraqi dinar = 1000 fils)," Jabir explained.
For more than three decades Basra's al-Shuaiba remained one of the most vital bases for the British forces in Iraq. After the July 14, 1958 Revolution, which put an end to the royal reign and declared Iraq a republic, al-Shuaiba airbase was handed over to the IQAF in 1959.
"In fact, al-Shuaiba airbase remained in service until the second Gulf War in 1991. It was heavily bombarded on January 17, the first day of the U.S.-led war against Iraq in the aftermath of the Kuwait invasion," Colonel Muhammad Saeed al-Mudhafar told VOI.
"Afterwards an air blockade was imposed by the United States on southern and northern Iraq," al-Mudhafar continued.
"After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, al-Shuaiba airbase was reestablished as a base for supplying the British forces. It turned into a vital and busy military base with more than 8,000 soldiers from 13 countries, including Britain, Denmark, Japan, the Czech Republic, Italy, The Netherlands, Bosnia, Spain, Estonia, Ukraine, Romania and the United States," al-Mudhafar said.
"In February 2006, the British forces decided to transfer their troops from al-Shuaiba base to the Basra International Airport," he added.
In March and April 2007, two British bases were handed over to the 10th division of the Iraqi army. The first base was in downtown's al-Saie neighborhood and the second was in Shatt al-Arab Hotel in northern Basra.
Haider's comments,
The above shows a slice of history about southern Iraq since WW1. As is evident from this hand over, Basra is gradually and surely heading towards taking over its own affairs. Basra province with its provincial capita Basra is Iraq’s second largest population concentration and includes Iraq’s second largest city. Basra province is 7,363 sq mi and has population of 2.6 million. This represents almost 10% of the population of Iraq and 4.5% of Iraq’s territory. Basra is oil rich and home to Iraq’s sea port.
As to operation ‘Rule of Law’, ‘Fardh al-Qanoon’ or what we know as the ‘Surge’. The spokes person for the Iraqi commander of the operation, General Musawi, stated that security in the capital Baghdad has improved substantially. Sectarian killing have been substantially reduced and bombing have declined measurable. He said "Before the commencement of the Fardh al-Qanoon plan, gunmen used to launch between 15 to 18 attacks every day, but now these attacks reached seven as maximum, the matter considered as a success to the security plan,". The boroughs in Baghdad of Al-Kargh, Al-Ghzaliah and Al-Yarmook are now in phase two of the operation. Phase one of operation ‘Rule of Law’ is purging boroughs from terrorists or out laws. Phase two is securing borough with portable barriers. Phase three is holding the ground and providing services to the residents. Phase four is returning those families who have fled. The last phase, phase five is turning over the security to the interior ministry.
Members of the U.S. armed forces are prohibited from speaking out against the war in Iraq. The Uniform Code of Military Justice limits what soldiers may say about political issues.
But as opposition to the Iraq war mounts, some service members are finding ways to air their opinions. Some are speaking anonymously while others sign a petition.
"You know this isn't really what we signed up to do. This isn't really what I believe America is about," an Army intelligence officer says, speaking from his base in Iraq.
Comments like this would land him in a military prison if he were identified.
Whoever wrote that line has never read the "letters to the editor" section of the Army Times.
That last claim is a load of horseshit, and reveals more about the purpose of NPR's story than its (uninformed) author probably intended. But it's an effective appeal to the ignoratti - and it establishes the mindset they want listeners to bring to the remainder of the piece.
Later the guy confesses to war crimes - indiscriminately shooting civilians. This actually would land him in military prison, but the author of this one would prefer you to believe it's his courageous speech that would end his freedom.
Anyhow,
Several months later, he was back in the United States and signed a petition calling for a withdrawal from Iraq. It's known as the Appeal for Redress, and all of the signatories are active-duty servicemen and servicewomen.
<...>
The Appeal for Redress enables service members to appeal to their congressional representatives to end U.S. military occupation in Iraq.
Listen to the NPR audio and you can even hear Jonathan Hutto "rail against the imperialist war against the working class". Yup - it's yet another free advertisement for the Astroturf campaign. You have to admit that Fenton Communications really knows their business - the PR campaign for this "grass roots" movement has been highly effective in getting attention for the front group (and hiding those behind it).
And given the time and resources of those various groups behind it (and despite Hutto's exaggerations) a miserable failure at collecting signatures. (If signatures are their purpose, that is, the failure doesn't seem to have dampened the media enthusiasm thus far.) An actual un-hyped, grass roots counter-effort, Appeal for Courage, has drawn more in just two months without any organized publicity campaign. One wonders if that's sparked a sense of urgency among the faithful...
But lo and behold - at the same NPR link above:
Lt. Col. Paul Yingling is an active duty commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Friday, he published an article in Armed Forces Journal entitled "General Failure." It charges Army generals with incompetent leadership of the Iraq war.
Gannett is certainly doing a fine job of pimping this glorified letter to the editor, too.
At least the NPR piece does clarify a few of Yingling's more vague original points. Responding to comments that the military is adapting to a fluid battlefield, Lt Col Yingling demonstrates a vice-like grasp of the obvious:
The Armed forces are trying to get better at counterinsurgency. But the measure of effectiveness - we will know we're succeeding when Iraqi civilians become safer. Until that happens we can't describe our efforts as successful.
In short, it's only after a strategy has been executed and concluded that we can determine its worth.
When asked if there are any Generals who meet his personal approval as leaders for the future he named Shinseki.
Say what you will of Lt Col Yingling, he has the most amazingly crystal clear hindsight I've ever seen.
*****
I see three distinct points of discussion on Lt Col Yingling's article and the suspiciously large and simultaneous amount of subsequent coverage it's gotten beyond the Gannet publication in which it first appeared.
2. Yingling's conclusion - congress must take more control over America's Generals. I find this disturbing, as congress is and has been very much involved in the process (recall the unanimous approval of General Petraeus as Commander, MNF-I for a recent example). Grim touched on that aspect here but I think that's just a start of a fine discussion. (Would more congressional control - exercised by Hillary Clinton and Trent Lott et al - over the past five years really have made a difference? Think about that...)
3. The subsequent coverage. I find the comments of my fellowMilBloggers (and hopefully my own input) quite worthwhile and exactly the sort of thoughtful, informed discussion one would hope would result from the original point.
I don't believe that last aim is shared by Lt Col Yingling. And I believe he might be somewhat disturbed to find himself sharing the radio airwaves and newspaper text with the Appeal for Redress crowd. Beyond superficial similarities I think the only commonality between the two is an obviously well-oiled publicity campaign going on behind the scenes - in one case hiding the real story and in another hammering the square peg of truth into the pre-shaped round hole of current (and immediate) political expedience.
*****
One last trip back to NPR's advertisement for Appeal for Redress:
The campaign is not without critics, including military bloggers...
That's all you get by way of balance. But I have to suspect that if the author is actually aware of any milblogger critique of the group, they are fully aware of the nature of that complaint, and chose not to include it in the report. Since it would completely derail the point I suspect the Fenton folks would be a bit upset if they did.
All done!
Call it all some considerations of the second draft of history, all relating to how we have conducted our military efforts in Iraq, how we’ve adapted, and where we stand now.
The mainstream media (MSM) delight in stories like this. They move from darling to darling, from one convenient message to another, and find ways to highlight and stress those particular threads of military commentary and opinion that supports their own biases, or the partisan aims of those they seek to assist.
I don’t want to insult or call into question the integrity of LTC Yingling, or impute ulterior motives to the particular timing of his article. I think Yingling accurately captures a strain of thought within the officer corps, particular for younger officers a level or two below those who have achieved the political stature of elevated senior rank. I say political because for those not as familiar with the world of the military, it may not be apparent the degree to which Generals and aspiring Field Grade officers by necessity excel as political animals.
I will certainly grant that, in hindsight, it will always be possible to find oppositional voices in military senior command who take positions contrary to those which ultimately prevail, and after the fact can seem deep wisdom indeed. Hindsight, after all, can always be measured as 20/20. I would even go so far to admit that a certain degree of hubris, institutional prejudices, vanity and pride underlay much military decision-making immediately leading up to our invasion of Iraq, and decisions in the first 3 years of executing the various components of our plans.
All that said I still have several big objections to his argument.
Bad results don’t necessarily indicate bad plans, or even bad decisions. Poor results are more often a failure of adaptability, not necessarily foresight. You can generally foresee all manner of possibilities, but leadership is a matter of making decisions, of choosing courses of action (COA) among alternatives. After the fact, it will always be possible to point at outcomes, and say, well, clearly, you should have opted for COA #2, or #3, or so on, rather than the one chosen.
Yingling describes the failures of Generals making decisions during the Vietnam War as inadequately preparing their forces for counterinsurgency. That may or may not be a complete picture of all that went on, and certainly doesn’t accommodate evolving thinking about Vietnam, that we may have won militarily but lost politically by giving way on PR and pulling out on the verge of victory. Sure, the results were disastrous, but was the disaster the fault of military operations, or the political decision-making that pulled US forces out, and then cravenly abandoned our allies in South Vietnam?
We fought a very tough and prolonged fight against a Filipino insurgency at the turn of the 19th century, and won against them, and the military created doctrinal components that were informed by those experiences. I think it reasonable that the US military was justified thinking they would prevail in Vietnam. Certainly, tactics and strategy could have evolved more, but the great unanswered question is what would have happened if we had held on longer, maintained support of South Vietnam? Our North Vietnamese enemies candidly admit they were near complete defeat and surrender shortly after Tet.
Again, we might grant Yingling his premise that the military didn’t exhibit sufficient foresight as the war in Vietnam continued, or didn’t adapt, or ignored warning signs and alternative courses of action. I don’t think it supports his conclusion, in any case.
I thought at the time and I think now that arguments by Administration detractors and in-house military critics that 300,000 to 400,000 troops would be needed to prevail in Iraq was a recipe for guaranteed paralysis. Say we ponied up that kind of force. How long would that big a force be needed to accomplish a “pacification” of the country? How many more casualties would the US have sustained with two to three times as many targets for IEDs and other suicide attacks?
How on earth does anyone think the US could implement that in the politics of the time? We’d see even worse conflict and obstructionism, only louder, more, and sooner. No, those kinds of troops levels would ensure that we would, in fact, choose not to go to war. That was the overriding intent of these estimates, anyway. Prove me wrong, but I think that would be perfectly logical based on the cynical Powell Doctrine. (We fight ONLY when we are certain of complete victory, not on necessity, nor on principle.)
If there is one truism in modern warfare, it’s that we don’t always get time and opportunity to choose a fight that is brought on you unexpectedly. We can’t always support or sustain overwhelming force, and we can’t control every eventuality or eliminate terror as PR and media tactic. Careful “pragmatists” like Powell and Shinseki would, by their doctrines, ensure we only take on boutique wars against very minor adversaries. That was the intent of Shinseki and others on this side of the argument, an argument for inaction and status quo. And the fatal fallacy of these arguments, are they don’t in any way answer what we face in AQ and similar global terror affinity organizations.
The example Yingling cites of Valmy is grossly inapt for our situation in Iraq. Valmy led to Jena because the Prussians did not see Valmy as a warning for what the future might hold, or their own vulnerabilities. You can argue that Secretary Rumsfeld (and the President) didn’t take a sober enough look at the security situation in Iraq, or change strategy, or prompt adaptation in the military. But you surely can’t view the surge, the substantive and impressive changes in strategy and tactics, and the orchestration of the surge by GEN Petraeus as an inability to reassess, and adapt.
Lastly, I find it incomprehensible that a military leader of advanced rank, a Brigade Deputy Commander no less, could thoroughly inform himself of ground truth in Iraq, and then honestly or accurately describe us on the verge of defeat, in any sense. We have difficulties transferring authority to Iraqis, building up their security forces (more so the Iraqi police versus the Army), and no one is happy with security, but this is not a military defeat.
We and the Iraqi forces we support have been unable to fully secure important population centers, and there are significant populations of potential adversaries not pacified. Terrorists are not fully eliminated nor prevented from conducting harassing operations. But this can be said about many places in the world. If a steady stream of foreign ideological suicides, or vulnerable innocents (children, handicapped, subjects of blackmail) can be kept available, this could be kept up indefinitely, anywhere in the world. It just happens that Al Qaeda wants to continue to focus on Iraq, because they believe they can thereby turn Americans against the war, with the help of the Democrat opposition and western media.
I wouldn't say anything against a gentleman from the 3rd Armored Cav. I do wonder about this idea, though: "To reward moral courage in our general officers, Congress must ask hard questions about the means and ways for war as part of its oversight responsibility."
Congressional confirmation procedures are something we've seen a lot of over the last several years. Does anyone really believe that these procedures ever, ever, ever even once, "reward moral courage"?
Let's say you want to be on the Supreme Court. Or an ambassador. Whatever. Does it help or hurt your chances if you've ever expressed strong opinions about any controversial topic?
Reward moral courage? That's the best way I can think of to make sure that no one of moral courge is ever considered for the post.
Yeah, a civilian friend read the paper, and now I just had to post on it. Hawk's got the importance right--if you think this article is as Important as the papers say it is, you're being played for a sucker unless the papers get to drive the momentum enough for people to riff on the article.
Funnily enough I don't see anything about information war in the good LTCOL's article. Where's the IW/PA/PSYOPS love?
Update: One more thing. Seems as though GEN Abizaid fits LTCOL Yingling's model for the modern general...
If one knows that it will be 3-5 years before handing off to the ISF is feasable...and the maximum sustainable rotation is 15 Brigades...does one immediately engage in a policy that will require 21-22 Brigades until the ISF is capable of assuming command...or does one engage in "economy of force" for three to four years?
I think it is important to note that the officer criticizing American generalship is doing so in the Armed Forces Journal, which (according to the AP story) is published by Army Times Publishing Company, which publishes all the Military Times newspapers.
Armed Forces Journal and its Web site, armedforcesjournal.com, are published by Army Times Publishing Company, a part of Gannett Company, Inc.
Although
Army Times Publishing Company is organized into three market sector groups to effectively cover the needs of the consumer and business-to-business communities served by its publications: 1. The Military Times Media Group, which publishes the Army Times, Navy Times, Air Force Times and Marine Corps Times newsweeklies;
2. the Defense News Media Group, which publishes Defense News, Armed Forces Journal , Training & Simulation Journal, and C4ISR Journal (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance); and
3. the Federal Times newsweekly.
So now you know.
Also at The Tank, Gregory S. McNeal found AP coverage of Yingling's article, which claims that
In February, the U.S. forces launched the Baghdad security operation, which calls for deploying about 28,000 additional American troops as well as thousands of Iraqi soldiers. Most will try to secure Baghdad.
Yingling welcomed the change, but suggested it is too little too late.
But it certainly looks like Gannett is pushing this story hard.
The AP story also shoehorns in a reference to the Astroturf campaign "Appeal for Redress":
But public criticism from an active duty officer is rare and may be a sign of growing discontent among military leaders at a critical time in the troubled U.S. military mission here.
An anti-war group, Appeal for Redress, says about 2,000 active duty personnel and veterans have signed a petition calling for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.
One of its founders, Navy Petty Officer Jonathan Hutto, has said 60 percent of the members have served in Iraq. There are about 1.4 million active-duty personnel in the U.S. military.
I guess it fits better than Abu Ghraib, but the AP story is an exceptional example of a disinformation campaign even without it.
A vibrant milblogging community in the People's Republic of China, where all manners of speech are closely monitored and controlled, may seem unlikely. Chinese milbloggers, however, have closely followed major defense and security developments both within China as well as abroad, from last summer's war between Israel and Hezbollah to China's anti-satellite missile test in January.
We must demand US Government money to keep ahead of the yellow peril!
Translations of Chinese MilBlogger names into English include Chinese Sword, Door of Green Dragon, Flying Flower Pursues Moon, Flying Fish, and Commanding Feather Eagle Wolf.
What Lex said. Seriously, go read it. It's of more general interest than you think. I mean, it's of interest to more than just Generals, and the general public should take a gander. You don't even need to review the source document or the WaPo piece first.
A few points, for info only, not directly related to the document or discussion thereof - though I will now quote it:
America's generals not only failed to develop a strategy for victory in Vietnam, but also remained largely silent while the strategy developed by civilian politicians led to defeat. As H.R. McMaster noted in "Dereliction of Duty," the Joint Chiefs of Staff were divided by service parochialism and failed to develop a unified and coherent recommendation to the president for prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion.
"Who is this H.R. McMaster"? You might ask (well, not you guys - I'm speaking to an imaginary generic reader here). "There are many answers to that question" I would reply, drawing your ire before quickly moving on.
Here's one: That would be Col H.R. McMaster - of late, the commander of the 3rd ACR. "What?" you might ask, "the same 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment whose deputy commander is the author of the article under review?"
Yes - but don't read too much into that. I don't know if they even served in the unit at the same time, nor is it my point. But under McMaster's command the unit gained some notice for achieving a certain level of success in their operations at Tal Afar in 2005-2006.
How did they do it? This was one of the keys:
The first step in this phase was to establish 29 patrol bases across the city. That, along with steady patrolling, gave the American military and its Iraqi allies a view of every major stretch of road in the compact city, which measures about three square miles. And that amount of observation made it extremely difficult for insurgents to plant bombs.
You see, instead of operating from big base camps and sending patrols and responding to emergencies, they moved into the neighborhoods.
Sound familiar? It's the new strategy being used in Baghdad - and why a "surge" of forces was needed. Back to the February, 2006 article quoted above, which concluded on a rather pessimistic note:
Nor is it clear that McMaster's example can be followed elsewhere by American commanders in the country. The biggest problem U.S. troops in Iraq face is Baghdad, a city about 30 times the size of Tall Afar. With the current number of American troops in Iraq, it would be impossible to copy the approach used here, with outposts every few blocks.
"Baghdad is a much tougher nut to crack than this," said Maj. Jack McLaughlin, Hickey's plans officer, who attended Robinson Secondary School in Fairfax, Va. Standing in the castle overlooking the city, he said, "It's a matter of scale -- you'd need a huge number of troops to replicate what we've done here."
"Amazing!" You shout. "A prediction of the surge - a year before it happened! Maybe an endorsement, even. Who wrote that?"
Well, in another amazing coincidence, the answer is Tom Ricks, who visited Tal Afar for the report, and who one year later also wrote the WaPo article covering the somewhat obscure Armed Forces Journal article by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, deputy commander, 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment, that we're discussing now. (But he was quoting a 3rd ACR guy then, too.)
But that's not my point.
But you might also enquire if it's a complete coincidence that "President Bush's security plan" is so closely modeled on McMaster's model from Tal Afar. The answer is no - that's definitely not a coincidence. After leaving the 3rd ACR...
Gen. David H. Petraeus, the new U.S. commander in Iraq, is assembling a small band of warrior-intellectuals -- including a quirky Australian anthropologist, a Princeton economist who is the son of a former U.S. attorney general and a military expert on the Vietnam War sharply critical of its top commanders -- in an eleventh-hour effort to reverse the downward trend in the Iraq war.
<...>
The two most influential members of the brain trust are likely to be Col. Peter R. Mansoor and Col. H.R. McMaster, whose influence already outstrips their rank. Both men served on a secret panel convened last fall by Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to review Iraq strategy. The panel's core conclusion, never released to the public but briefed to President Bush on Dec. 13, according to an officer on the Joint Staff, was that the U.S. government should "go long" in Iraq by shifting from a combat stance to a long-term training-and-advisory effort.
But to make that shift, the review also concluded, the U.S. military might first have to "spike" its presence by about 20,000 to 30,000 troops to curb sectarian violence and improve security in Baghdad. That is almost exactly what the U.S. government hopes to do over the next eight months.
"Wow - who wrote that?" You might ask, to which I would reply, that would be the work of Tom Ricks, who I'm sure needs no introduction to readers here.
Lt Col Yingling has read Ricks' book, too:
These leaders would later express their concerns in tell-all books such as "Fiasco" and "Cobra II." However, when the U.S. went to war in Iraq with less than half the strength required to win, these leaders did not make their objections public.
That would be "Fiasco" by Tom Ricks, as referenced in Yingling's Journal article. But that's not my point...
"But," (you might ask) "if Ricks is so in tune with what's going on, and if Yingling is a protégé of Col H.R. McMaster, and Ricks' an admirer, and McMaster's obviously had an integral part in the genesis of the strategy now in use, why would one write the conclusion
The hour is late, but not too late to prepare for the challenges of the Long War. We still have time to select as our generals those who possess the intelligence to visualize future conflicts and the moral courage to advise civilian policymakers on the preparations needed for our security.
...and the other write a news article - both implying or at least certainly not denying - that it's the current leadership in Iraq that's being referenced here? Why wouldn't they point out that they're referencing the leaders and strategies that were in place before General Petraeus - with much input from H.R. McMaster - was sent to..."
...and then I'd have to interrupt. One possibility is that the original article is on point, but somewhat dated. In fact (from the WaPo):
The article has been read by about 30 of his peers, Yingling added.
This implies a formal peer review process (as does inclusion in a professional journal) that might take a little longer than the sort we do here at MilBlogs on a daily basis. Then, after acceptance in the Journal, the story waits it's turn in the queue...
"Okay", you reply, "but why wouldn't Ricks point that out?"
To which I must admit "You got me there." Maybe because the Yingling piece is worthwhile, even though somewhat dated, and he has a larger point not directly related to Iraq today, and Ricks is an old contact, and he gets to make a splash with a story that bolsters his "military insider" credibility.
But that's just a guess. I also don't know why this:
Some younger officers have stated privately that more generals should have been taken to task for their handling of the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, news of which broke in 2004.
is in Ricks' story. It's got nothing to do with Yingling's, and appears to be an obvious seizure of an opportunity to hammer "Abu Ghraib" into any story that includes "Iraq". (And wasn't one General enough? Apparently not to "some".)
And that's the real point I was trying to make. And all your questions made this story 10 times longer than I thought it would be. See how you are?
Just received a copy of an email exchange between a reader and the Washington Post reporter who wrote the article about the 3rd ACR in Iraq. According to this account, The Washington Post has a copy of that letter from the mayor - and has since it was first delivered.
The original email:
Mr. Ricks,
I enjoyed your article about the 3rd Armored Cavalry in Iraq. I was pleasantly surprised to see anything with a positive tinge about Iraq from a major media outlet. One note, your description of Mayor Najim Abdullah Jabouri's dissatisfaction with the 3rd Armored's rotation out of Iraq doesn't leave reader with the knowlege of overwhelming gratitude he has for our troops and what they have accomplished. A letter from the Mayor to Col. McMaster can be found here: http://www.mudvillegazette.com/archives/004167.html
I hope you will consider printing this letter as an addendum to your article so the American people can see a first hand example of the gratitude of Iraqis that have recognized the sacrifice and dedication of our troops.
The reply:
Thanks for writing. I likewise found pleasure in finding something good to write about in Iraq--beleive me, I have looked.
Yes, the mayor gave me a copy of the letter when I had lunch with him. But one thing Americans have done in Iraq is take things too much at face value. Read between the lines of the letter: The mayor is indeed grateful to the 3rd ACR, but he also is threatening to quit because it is leaving.
best,
Tom Ricks (in Taji)
At first I thought it was because Ricks wanted to downplay exactly how successful the Tal Afar operation was. But now I know it's because he's smarter than the average American, and can filter the information they receive into the form they need.
"Are you serious?" You might ask. To which I reply: "Don't call me Shirley."
You guys saw that too? I guess it's what all the cool kids are talking about.
For my own part, I thought that while the LTC made some good points, he was being a little hard on the elephants. Flawed assumptions were exposed, and poor decisions revealed, but only in retrospect - they were none of them "no-brainers."
And the COIN strategy that we have settled on is risky, frankly - we expose more troops in smaller numbers to a 360-degree threat axis. The fact that this the only strategy with good prospects for success now doesn't mean that it was blindingly obvious before.
More here, if you're interested.
"I think the case can be made that the ground commanders in Iraq before Gen. Petraeus lacked imagination and the ability to change tactics"
Agree that the case can be made. But...
The hour is late, but not too late to prepare for the challenges of the Long War. We still have time to select as our generals those who possess the intelligence to visualize future conflicts and the moral courage to advise civilian policymakers on the preparations needed for our security.
WASHINGTON - Hours before the House of Representatives narrowly passed a $124-billion bill to fund the war in Iraq, the commander of the multinational forces there delivered a classified briefing to Congress.
<...>
But at dueling Democratic and Republican news conferences after Petraeus' closed-door meeting with the House, it seemed as if the members had attended different briefings.
Yup.
The General was clear on many points - including this one: "I have, as you know, in fact tried to stay clear of the political minefields of various legislative proposals and so forth..."
The Deputy Commander of the 3rd ACR has an article in the new Armed Forces Journal that makes some interesting points, even though the Washington Post tries to stretch them into something they might not be. From the conclusion of Lt Col Yingling's article:
Iraq is America's Valmy. America's generals have been checked by a form of war that they did not prepare for and do not understand. They spent the years following the 1991 Gulf War mastering a system of war without thinking deeply about the ever changing nature of war. They marched into Iraq having assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future would look much like the wars of the past. Those few who saw clearly our vulnerability to insurgent tactics said and did little to prepare for these dangers. As at Valmy, this one debacle, however humiliating, will not in itself signal national disaster. The hour is late, but not too late to prepare for the challenges of the Long War. We still have time to select as our generals those who possess the intelligence to visualize future conflicts and the moral courage to advise civilian policymakers on the preparations needed for our security.
Expect this article to make a big splash through this weekend, and then be forgotten by the national press after they learn, to their surprise, that an active duty officer can say something controversial and not be thrown into the stockade. While there will be those who say that Lt. Col. Yingling is bucking for his stars early if a Democrat wins the White House in '08, I think the case can be made that the ground commanders in Iraq before Gen. Petraeus lacked imagination and the ability to change tactics.
Soldier's Dad already responded here to Senator Obama. I posted some related thoughts over at Dadmanly.
Here's an excerpt:
Senator Barack Obama says that we are "one signature away from ending this war," making the remarkable statement in the first debate of democrats for the 2008 Presidential Election.
Not to be outdone in the visualize peace exercise, Senator Hillary Clinton repeated her promise, that "if George Bush doesn't end the war, as President, I will."
A central assumption of both of these naive positions is that the US fights "George Bush's war" in isolation. If we weren't there, nobody in Iraq would be blowing people up. If we weren't there, Iraqis would work out there differences. If we weren't there, terrorists would stop being terrorists, or at least, go on to unidentified other targets elsewhere in the world, but in places that we just don't need to worry about either.
You almost get the feeling this is all some made-up war, dreamed up on some ranch in Texas. Heck, the only reason Iraq has erupted in "civil war," to hear Surrender Democrats tell it, was out of spontaneous anger and hostility towards the US presence.
Readers of analysis that is actually informed by facts and reality, of course, know that both Iran and Al Qaeda have gone to extreme lengths to try to ignite a civil war between Sunnis and Shia in Iraq, but they have failed, in places, spectacularly, as we are seeing evidence of now. Sunni tribes and major leaders are turning against Al Qaeda. Shia have exercised amazing restraint in recent months, holding back from serious reprisals against Sunnis, not falling for the bait when terrorists attack Shia sites and neighborhoods. Al Qaeda has even taken to attacking former allies who now line up with the Iraqi Government, further alienating themselves from the Sunnis in Iraq.
People who really want to know what's happening in Iraq, read MILBLOGS, and consult experts like those at Strategy Page, or listen closely to what GEN Petraeus tells us. Not so Congressional Democrats, who skip out on briefings, grossly distort what he says, and declare that if the GEN shares any good news, he's lying.
Still, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) did not attend. It was not clear where she was Wednesday afternoon. Aides did not return calls Wednesday.
<...>
“I think the speaker’s got better things to do, frankly,” agreed Rep. Jim Moran (D-Va.). “They didn’t say anything they haven’t said in public.”
The Republicans probably scheduled the thing on Nancy's face lift day on purpose. - and that's cruel.
But here's what I wondered - who's this "they" Moran is talking about? It's an odd choice of word - sort of impies an "us vs them" thing. If it was a briefing given by Republicans I'd understand it - but this was General Petraeus.
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has fallen from a 38 percent
positive rating in February to 30 percent positive now. Well over half
(56%) of adults currently view her job performance in a negative light,
compared to just 45 percent who did so in February. Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid has also dropped. In February, 23 percent viewed him positively
while 47 percent viewed his job performance negatively. Currently, over
half (52%) see his job performance in a negative light while just 22
percent gives it positive ratings.
The stats may not play much at the Democratic Underground...but they will cause great concern in the Halls of Congress. To be in ones job for all of 90 days an find yourself in to 20% bracket in approval ratings is not a good sign for the Surrender in Shame caucus.
So here's the bottom line: In politics, popularity is relative. The parties are judged not by themselves, but in relation to each other. The president doesn't look so good. But if the Congress doesn't look so good either -- then the president isn't in such bad shape.
One is reminded of a joke from President Reagan illustrating this reality of comparative politics: Two men are walking in the woods, and they see a bear coming toward them. The first man quickly puts on his running shoes. The second man says, "You can't outrun that bear." To which the first man responds, "I don't have to outrun the bear -- I just have to outrun you!" Speaking of outrunning, it's already apparent, early in 2007, that the Democrats not only inadvertently have helped Bush but, in addition, have given the Republicans good arguments for their holding on to the White House in 2008.
and one more quote from a famous Speech**Rough Lnguage warning***
"Men, this stuff that some sources sling around about America wanting out of this war, not wanting to fight, is a crock of bullshit. Americans love to fight, traditionally. All real Americans love the sting and clash of battle. You are here today for three reasons. First, because you are here to defend your homes and your loved ones. Second, you are here for your own self respect, because you would not want to be anywhere else. Third, you are here because you are real men and all real men like to fight. When you, here, everyone of you, were kids, you all admired the champion marble player, the fastest runner, the toughest boxer, the big league ball players, and the All-American football players. Americans love a winner. Americans will not tolerate a loser. Americans despise cowards. Americans play to win all of the time. I wouldn't give a hoot in hell for a man who lost and laughed. That's why Americans have never lost nor will ever lose a war; for the very idea of losing is hateful to an American."
"Iraq is, in fact, the central front of al Qaeda's global campaign."
"As I mentioned, we generally in many areas -- not all, but in many areas -- have a sense of sort of incremental progress. Again, that is not transmitted at all. Of course it will never break through the noise and the understandable coverage given to it in the press of a sensational attack that kills many Iraqis."
Q: You say that Iraq is now the central focus of al Qaeda's worldwide effort. Are you saying that al Qaeda in Iraq is now the sort of principal enemy of the U.S. forces stationed there?
A: I think it is probably public enemy number one.
Q (Off mike.) What would be the -- in your assessment as a military man, what would be the consequences on the ground in Baghdad if the United States was to pull back from its security mission in the capital by the fall, withdraw its forces, say, to the forward- operating bases in the capital and maybe withdraw from Iraq by the summer of '08? I'm not asking you about congressional legislation, about timelines. I'm asking you for your military assessment of the effects on the ground if the U.S. were to end its security mission in Baghdad in the fall, in terms of insurgent activity, the vulnerability of the population and sectarian violence.
GEN. PETRAEUS: I have, as you know, in fact tried to stay clear of the political minefields of various legislative proposals and so forth...
My sense is that there would be an increase in sectarian violence, a resumption of sectarian violence, were the presence of our forces and Iraqi forces at that time to be reduced and not to be doing what it is that they are doing right now.
Q (Off mike) -- progress are less than obvious to a person in the United States, much less Iraq or Europe. Is it possible that these things could improve while spectacular bombing attacks still occur in parallel?
GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, I think first of all -- look, I think you have to be realistic and acknowledge there is going to be a continuation of some level of sensational attacks. In an environment where to prevent those, you know, the Iraqi and coalition forces have to protect everything and they only have to attack one thing, some of that is going to happen.
...And actually, to be fair to the Iraqis, I mean they're an exceedingly resilient people. I actually the other night was talking to one of your colleagues from The Washington Post and talked about this idea that there is -- you know, we feel this incremental progress; it's very difficult to demonstrate. In fact, the progress is interesting, because it's a negative. It means nothing happened, in most cases. In other words, there were not sectarian murders. Whether that is newsworthy before it goes on for several weeks is obviously arguable.
But anyway, so what I asked was, "Hey, come on, it's about dusk, let's go -- we'll fly around the city a little bit." And we flew around. And so -- I mean, it was unbelievable.
This is a day in which I think there was a car bomb in Iraq, some of Iraq’s seven million citizens were affected by that, but you could not have told that from what we saw over the city. There were three big amusement parks operational. I'm talking about, you know, roller coaster kinds of -- these are not just a couple little merry-go-rounds in small neighborhood parks. Restaurants in some parts of the city were booming. Lots of markets were open. The people were on the street. There were -- there had to be a thousand soccer games ongoing. They're watering the grass in various professional soccer fields -- the soccer leagues.
You know, all of this is actually so foreign, I think, in the mind of most people who see the news and of course do see that day's explosion or something like that. And actually there is a city of seven million in which life goes on, and again, citizens are determined to carry on with their life.
Today, members of al Qaeda, extremist militias and Sunni insurgent groups seek to destroy what Iraqi leaders are trying to build. Political parties with ethnosectarian interests, limited governmental capacity, and corruption add additional challenges, and exceedingly unhelpful activities by Iran and Syria, especially those by Iran, about which we have learned a great deal in the past month, compound the enormous problems facing the new Iraq.
The situation is, in short, exceedingly challenging, though as I will briefly explain, there has been progress in several areas in recent months despite the sensational attacks by al Qaeda, which have, of course, been significant blows to our effort and which cause psychological damage that is typically even greater than their physical damage.
Iraq is, in fact, the central front of al Qaeda's global campaign and we devote considerable resources to the fight against al Qaeda Iraq.
We have achieved some notable successes in the past two months, killing the security emir of eastern Anbar province, detaining a number of key network leaders, discovering how various elements of al Qaeda Iraq operate, taking apart a car bomb network that had killed 650 citizens of Baghdad, and destroying several significant car bomb factories. Nonetheless, al Qaeda Iraq remains a formidable foe with considerable resilience and a capability to produce horrific attacks, but a group whose ideology and methods have increasingly alienated many in Iraq.
This group's activities must be significantly disrupted, at the least, for the new Iraq to succeed, and it has been heartening to see Sunni Arabs in Anbar province and several other areas turning against al Qaeda and joining the Iraqi security forces to fight against it. That has been a very significant development.
The extremist militias in Iraq also are a substantial problem and must be significantly disrupted. There can be no sustainable outcome if militia death squads are allowed to lie low during the surge only to resurface later and resume killing and intimidation.
There have been some significant successes in this arena as well, including the detentions -- detention of the heads of the Sadr secret cell network, the Iraqi leader of an explosively formed projectile network from Iran, the former deputy minister of Health and his facility protection security force brigadier, who had effectively hijacked the Ministry of Health, and a national police officer accused of torture, with several of these detained by Iraqi forces.
Sunni insurgents and the so-called Sunni resistance are still forces that must be reckoned with, as well. However, while we continue to battle a number of such groups, we are seeing some others joining Sunni Arab tribes in turning against al Qaeda Iraq and helping transform Anbar province and other areas from being assessed as lost as little as six months ago to being relatively heartening. We will continue to engage with Sunni tribal sheikhs and former insurgent leaders to support the newfound opposition of some to al Qaeda, ensuring that their fighters join legitimate Iraqi security force elements to become part of the fight against extremists, just as we reach out to moderate members of all sects and ethnic groups to try to drive a wedge between the irreconcilables and the reconcilables, and help the latter become part of the solution instead of part of the problem.
<...>
Indeed, while some Iraqi forces remain a work in progress, there should be no question that Iraq's soldiers and police are fighting and dying for their country, and a number of them have impressively shouldered their part of the burden of the fight against al Qaeda and the other enemies of the new Iraq. To help them progress, we have steadily been increasing the number of transition teams, the train and equip effort, and steadily strengthening the partnership programs between our forces and Iraqi elements.
Q&A
Q You say that Iraq is now the central focus of al Qaeda's worldwide effort. Are you saying that al Qaeda in Iraq is now the sort of principal enemy of the U.S. forces stationed there? Before it was Shi'a groups. And do you see that al Qaeda in Iraq -- do you see any evidence that it is linked internationally to bin Laden? How many foreign fighters are actually there?
GEN. PETRAEUS: First of all, we do definitely see links to the greater al Qaeda network. I think you know that we have at various times intercepted messages to and from. There is no question but that there is a network that supports the movement of foreign fighters through Syria into Iraq.
It is something we can, you know, keep some track of in a broad way. Obviously, when we can get the final 50 meters, if you will, we then take action against it.
It is clearly the element in Iraq that conducts the sensational attacks, these attacks that, as I mentioned, cause not just horrific physical damage -- and which, by the way, have been increasingly indiscriminate. Secretary Gates noted the other day that al Qaeda has declared war on all Iraqis, and I think that that is an accurate statement. They have killed and wounded and maimed countless Iraqi civilians in addition to, certainly, coalition and Iraqi security forces, and they have done that, again, without regard to ethnosectarian identity.
That significance of al Qaeda in the conduct of the sensational attacks, the huge car bomb attacks against which we have been hardening markets, hardening neighborhoods, trying to limit movement and so forth -- those attacks, again, are of extraordinary significance because they can literally drown out anything else that might be happening.
As I mentioned, we generally in many areas -- not all, but in many areas -- have a sense of sort of incremental progress. Again, that is not transmitted at all. Of course it will never break through the noise and the understandable coverage given to it in the press of a sensational attack that kills many Iraqis.
So this is a -- you know, it is a very significant enemy. I think it is probably public enemy number one. It is the enemy whose actions sparked the enormous increase in sectarian violence that did so much damage to Iraq in 2006, the bombing of the Al Askari mosque in Samarra, the gold-domed mosque there, the third holiest Shi'a shrine. And it is the organization that continues to try to reignite not just sectarian violence but ethnic violence, as well, going after Iraqi Kurds in Nineveh province and Kirkuk and areas such as that, as well. So again, I think a very, very significant enemy in that regard.
Q May I formally ask you: What is your assessment at this point? Do you believe that the central government of Iran, Ahmadinejad himself, perhaps, is, number one, aware of this, supporting it, directing it? What is the central government involvement? Could this level of activity possibly take place without the Iranian leadership knowing about it?
And just as another point, do you see any involvement beyond EFPs? Are they now involved in these spectacular suicide car-bomb attacks?
GEN. PETRAEUS: I don't think we have found a link to the spectacular car-bomb attacks, which we believe are generally al Qaeda and elements sort of connected to al Qaeda. Typically, in fact, still we believe that, oh, 80 to 90 percent of the suicide attacks are carried out by foreigners. That's a network, again, that typically brings them in through Syria and is again a major concern and certainly a hope that Syria will crack down on the ability of people to come through their airport and so forth and then be brought into Iraq.
With respect to how high does it go and, you know, what do they know and when did they know it, I honestly cannot -- that is such a sensitive issue that -- and that we do not -- at least I do not know of anything that specifically identifies how high it goes beyond the level of the Qods Force, Commander Suleiman. Beyond that, it is very difficult to tell -- we know where he is in the overall chain of command; he certainly reports to the very top -- but again, nothing that would absolutely indicate, again, how high the knowledge of this actually goes. So --
Q: ...And secondly, your recommendations in September, are you willing to countenance the idea that you may have to say to the president, this is not working, we should pull troops out, or are you more likely to say things are not going well, here are the adjustments and strategies we need to make?
GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, on the latter one, I mean, I have an obligation to some wonderful young men and women in uniform, and a lot of civilians, by the way, who are serving in Iraq and who deserve a forthright assessment from the folks at the top about the situation on the ground, and that's what I'm going to provide.
Q (Off mike) -- progress are less than obvious to a person in the United States, much less Iraq or Europe. Is it possible that these things could improve while spectacular bombing attacks still occur in parallel?
GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, I think first of all -- look, I think you have to be realistic and acknowledge there is going to be a continuation of some level of sensational attacks. In an environment where to prevent those, you know, the Iraqi and coalition forces have to protect everything and they only have to attack one thing, some of that is going to happen. I used the analogy the other day of Northern Ireland, which some of you are very familiar with and in which for some decades there was a level of violence that actually the Northern Ireland citizens learned to live with, really.
And actually, to be fair to the Iraqis, I mean they're an exceedingly resilient people. I actually the other night was talking to one of your colleagues from The Washington Post and talked about this idea that there is -- you know, we feel this incremental progress; it's very difficult to demonstrate. In fact, the progress is interesting, because it's a negative. It means nothing happened, in most cases. In other words, there were not sectarian murders. Whether that is newsworthy before it goes on for several weeks is obviously arguable.
But anyway, so what I asked was, "Hey, come on, it's about dusk, let's go -- we'll fly around the city a little bit." And we flew around. And so -- I mean, it was unbelievable.
This is a day in which I think there was a car bomb in Iraq, some of Iraq’s seven million citizens were affected by that, but you could not have told that from what we saw over the city. There were three big amusement parks operational. I'm talking about, you know, roller coaster kinds of -- these are not just a couple little merry-go-rounds in small neighborhood parks. Restaurants in some parts of the city were booming. Lots of markets were open. The people were on the street. There were -- there had to be a thousand soccer games ongoing. They're watering the grass in various professional soccer fields -- the soccer leagues.
You know, all of this is actually so foreign, I think, in the mind of most people who see the news and of course do see that day's explosion or something like that. And actually there is a city of seven million in which life goes on, and again, citizens are determined to carry on with their life.
"To suggest that there's any neighborhood in this city where an American can walk freely is beyond ludicrous. I'd love Senator McCain to tell me where that neighborhood is and he and I can go for a stroll."
Which got so much attention that no one paid any attention to what else Ware said regarding people in Baghdad:
Of course, people take notes of the domestic politics back in D.C., in the United States...
People are still dying in the dozens every single day...
Do you think anyone enduring that is paying attention to artificial deadlines that are going to get vetoed by the president? And even if they were to pass through the legislative process, would only serve al Qaeda and Iran, America's enemies? No. People are focusing on the near game, Wolf.
You see. It's not the president's policy Democrats aren't supporting, it's General Petraeus' policy!
This is something we've seen for months now and it really rankles. It's a weird way of turning civil-military relations on its head, and then kind of spinning it around. Petraeus is a general. He's supposed to follow orders from the country's civilian leadership. If Bush outlines a policy, Petraeus is supposed to carry it out. The fact that Petraeus is backing it, however, doesn't then become an additional reason for further elements of the national political leadership to also back it.
You see - Bush wrote that counter-insurgency manual.
(I knew that when I saw the word "nukuler" on page 5.)
And I suppose it's Karl Rove and Dick Cheney who are Petraeus' real advisors, not these guys.
"Ignoratti" explained: Tired of trying to determine if an author is ignorant or just believes his audience is, I've determined the term "ignoratti" applies to both types, and their readers.
I believe this description also applies: manic, obsessive, poorly educated (some for over 14 years) and easily led.
In his press conference this morning, General Petraeus spotlighted one indicator of success with the new "surge" plan-- the increased presence of forces in new Combat Outposts throughout Baghdad, and the "increased operational tempo" are beginning to produce significant results, specifically, a 2/3rds reduction in sectarian murders in the city.
Desires of the Human Hearts is a two part photo essay that gives a detailed look at how Coalition soldiers are accomplishing these results.
In the face of daunting odds and clear obstacles, the soldiers from the I-4 Cavalry out of Ft Riley Kansas (some of whom are depicted in the attached photos) begin the process of transforming an abandoned but barely disturbed Christian College facility into COP Amanche, their home base for the foreseeable future. In a three day span, where they barely rest, the soldiers stay focused on their mission and do not miss any opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to returning some sense of security and normalcy to the neighborhood.
