Continue reading "Triple Re: Generalship "

Here's one: That would be Col H.R. McMaster - of late, the commander of the 3rd ACR. "What?" you might ask, "the same 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment whose deputy commander is the author of the article under review?"

Yes - but don't read too much into that. I don't know if they even served in the unit at the same time, nor is it my point. But under McMaster's command the unit gained some notice for achieving a certain level of success in their operations at Tal Afar in 2005-2006.

How did they do it? This was one of the keys:

The first step in this phase was to establish 29 patrol bases across the city. That, along with steady patrolling, gave the American military and its Iraqi allies a view of every major stretch of road in the compact city, which measures about three square miles. And that amount of observation made it extremely difficult for insurgents to plant bombs.

You see, instead of operating from big base camps and sending patrols and responding to emergencies, they moved into the neighborhoods.

Sound familiar? It's the new strategy being used in Baghdad - and why a "surge" of forces was needed. Back to the February, 2006 article quoted above, which concluded on a rather pessimistic note:

Nor is it clear that McMaster's example can be followed elsewhere by American commanders in the country. The biggest problem U.S. troops in Iraq face is Baghdad, a city about 30 times the size of Tall Afar. With the current number of American troops in Iraq, it would be impossible to copy the approach used here, with outposts every few blocks.

"Baghdad is a much tougher nut to crack than this," said Maj. Jack McLaughlin, Hickey's plans officer, who attended Robinson Secondary School in Fairfax, Va. Standing in the castle overlooking the city, he said, "It's a matter of scale -- you'd need a huge number of troops to replicate what we've done here."

"Amazing!" You shout. "A prediction of the surge - a year before it happened! Maybe an endorsement, even. Who wrote that?"

Well, in another amazing coincidence, the answer is Tom Ricks, who visited Tal Afar for the report, and who one year later also wrote the WaPo article covering the somewhat obscure Armed Forces Journal article by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, deputy commander, 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment, that we're discussing now. (But he was quoting a 3rd ACR guy then, too.)

But that's not my point.

But you might also enquire if it's a complete coincidence that "President Bush's security plan" is so closely modeled on McMaster's model from Tal Afar. The answer is no - that's definitely not a coincidence. After leaving the 3rd ACR...

Gen. David H. Petraeus, the new U.S. commander in Iraq, is assembling a small band of warrior-intellectuals -- including a quirky Australian anthropologist, a Princeton economist who is the son of a former U.S. attorney general and a military expert on the Vietnam War sharply critical of its top commanders -- in an eleventh-hour effort to reverse the downward trend in the Iraq war.
<...>
The two most influential members of the brain trust are likely to be Col. Peter R. Mansoor and Col. H.R. McMaster, whose influence already outstrips their rank. Both men served on a secret panel convened last fall by Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to review Iraq strategy. The panel's core conclusion, never released to the public but briefed to President Bush on Dec. 13, according to an officer on the Joint Staff, was that the U.S. government should "go long" in Iraq by shifting from a combat stance to a long-term training-and-advisory effort.

But to make that shift, the review also concluded, the U.S. military might first have to "spike" its presence by about 20,000 to 30,000 troops to curb sectarian violence and improve security in Baghdad. That is almost exactly what the U.S. government hopes to do over the next eight months.

"Wow - who wrote that?" You might ask, to which I would reply, that would be the work of Tom Ricks, who I'm sure needs no introduction to readers here.

Lt Col Yingling has read Ricks' book, too:

These leaders would later express their concerns in tell-all books such as "Fiasco" and "Cobra II." However, when the U.S. went to war in Iraq with less than half the strength required to win, these leaders did not make their objections public.

That would be "Fiasco" by Tom Ricks, as referenced in Yingling's Journal article. But that's not my point...

"But," (you might ask) "if Ricks is so in tune with what's going on, and if Yingling is a protégé of Col H.R. McMaster, and Ricks' an admirer, and McMaster's obviously had an integral part in the genesis of the strategy now in use, why would one write the conclusion

The hour is late, but not too late to prepare for the challenges of the Long War. We still have time to select as our generals those who possess the intelligence to visualize future conflicts and the moral courage to advise civilian policymakers on the preparations needed for our security.

...and the other write a news article - both implying or at least certainly not denying - that it's the current leadership in Iraq that's being referenced here? Why wouldn't they point out that they're referencing the leaders and strategies that were in place before General Petraeus - with much input from H.R. McMaster - was sent to..."

...and then I'd have to interrupt. One possibility is that the original article is on point, but somewhat dated. In fact (from the WaPo):

The article has been read by about 30 of his peers, Yingling added.

This implies a formal peer review process (as does inclusion in a professional journal) that might take a little longer than the sort we do here at MilBlogs on a daily basis. Then, after acceptance in the Journal, the story waits it's turn in the queue...

"Okay", you reply, "but why wouldn't Ricks point that out?"

To which I must admit "You got me there." Maybe because the Yingling piece is worthwhile, even though somewhat dated, and he has a larger point not directly related to Iraq today, and Ricks is an old contact, and he gets to make a splash with a story that bolsters his "military insider" credibility.

But that's just a guess. I also don't know why this:

Some younger officers have stated privately that more generals should have been taken to task for their handling of the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, news of which broke in 2004.

is in Ricks' story. It's got nothing to do with Yingling's, and appears to be an obvious seizure of an opportunity to hammer "Abu Ghraib" into any story that includes "Iraq". (And wasn't one General enough? Apparently not to "some".)

And that's the real point I was trying to make. And all your questions made this story 10 times longer than I thought it would be. See how you are?

But I do know why Ricks did this last year

Just received a copy of an email exchange between a reader and the Washington Post reporter who wrote the article about the 3rd ACR in Iraq. According to this account, The Washington Post has a copy of that letter from the mayor - and has since it was first delivered.

The original email:

Mr. Ricks,

I enjoyed your article about the 3rd Armored Cavalry in Iraq. I was pleasantly surprised to see anything with a positive tinge about Iraq from a major media outlet. One note, your description of Mayor Najim Abdullah Jabouri's dissatisfaction with the 3rd Armored's rotation out of Iraq doesn't leave reader with the knowlege of overwhelming gratitude he has for our troops and what they have accomplished. A letter from the Mayor to Col. McMaster can be found here: http://www.mudvillegazette.com/archives/004167.html

I hope you will consider printing this letter as an addendum to your article so the American people can see a first hand example of the gratitude of Iraqis that have recognized the sacrifice and dedication of our troops.

The reply:

Thanks for writing. I likewise found pleasure in finding something good to write about in Iraq--beleive me, I have looked.

Yes, the mayor gave me a copy of the letter when I had lunch with him. But one thing Americans have done in Iraq is take things too much at face value. Read between the lines of the letter: The mayor is indeed grateful to the 3rd ACR, but he also is threatening to quit because it is leaving.

best,
Tom Ricks (in Taji)

At first I thought it was because Ricks wanted to downplay exactly how successful the Tal Afar operation was. But now I know it's because he's smarter than the average American, and can filter the information they receive into the form they need.

"Are you serious?" You might ask. To which I reply: "Don't call me Shirley."

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Continue reading "Re: Re: Ware "

I'll quote this from a San Francisco Chonicle editorial on Pelosi

So here's the bottom line: In politics, popularity is relative. The parties are judged not by themselves, but in relation to each other. The president doesn't look so good. But if the Congress doesn't look so good either -- then the president isn't in such bad shape.

One is reminded of a joke from President Reagan illustrating this reality of comparative politics: Two men are walking in the woods, and they see a bear coming toward them. The first man quickly puts on his running shoes. The second man says, "You can't outrun that bear." To which the first man responds, "I don't have to outrun the bear -- I just have to outrun you!" Speaking of outrunning, it's already apparent, early in 2007, that the Democrats not only inadvertently have helped Bush but, in addition, have given the Republicans good arguments for their holding on to the White House in 2008.

and one more quote from a famous Speech**Rough Lnguage warning***

"Men, this stuff that some sources sling around about America wanting out of this war, not wanting to fight, is a crock of bullshit. Americans love to fight, traditionally. All real Americans love the sting and clash of battle. You are here today for three reasons. First, because you are here to defend your homes and your loved ones. Second, you are here for your own self respect, because you would not want to be anywhere else. Third, you are here because you are real men and all real men like to fight. When you, here, everyone of you, were kids, you all admired the champion marble player, the fastest runner, the toughest boxer, the big league ball players, and the All-American football players. Americans love a winner. Americans will not tolerate a loser. Americans despise cowards. Americans play to win all of the time. I wouldn't give a hoot in hell for a man who lost and laughed. That's why Americans have never lost nor will ever lose a war; for the very idea of losing is hateful to an American."

All done!

Continue reading "General Petraeus "

Excerpt:

Today, members of al Qaeda, extremist militias and Sunni insurgent groups seek to destroy what Iraqi leaders are trying to build. Political parties with ethnosectarian interests, limited governmental capacity, and corruption add additional challenges, and exceedingly unhelpful activities by Iran and Syria, especially those by Iran, about which we have learned a great deal in the past month, compound the enormous problems facing the new Iraq.

The situation is, in short, exceedingly challenging, though as I will briefly explain, there has been progress in several areas in recent months despite the sensational attacks by al Qaeda, which have, of course, been significant blows to our effort and which cause psychological damage that is typically even greater than their physical damage.

Iraq is, in fact, the central front of al Qaeda's global campaign and we devote considerable resources to the fight against al Qaeda Iraq.

We have achieved some notable successes in the past two months, killing the security emir of eastern Anbar province, detaining a number of key network leaders, discovering how various elements of al Qaeda Iraq operate, taking apart a car bomb network that had killed 650 citizens of Baghdad, and destroying several significant car bomb factories. Nonetheless, al Qaeda Iraq remains a formidable foe with considerable resilience and a capability to produce horrific attacks, but a group whose ideology and methods have increasingly alienated many in Iraq.

This group's activities must be significantly disrupted, at the least, for the new Iraq to succeed, and it has been heartening to see Sunni Arabs in Anbar province and several other areas turning against al Qaeda and joining the Iraqi security forces to fight against it. That has been a very significant development.

The extremist militias in Iraq also are a substantial problem and must be significantly disrupted. There can be no sustainable outcome if militia death squads are allowed to lie low during the surge only to resurface later and resume killing and intimidation.

There have been some significant successes in this arena as well, including the detentions -- detention of the heads of the Sadr secret cell network, the Iraqi leader of an explosively formed projectile network from Iran, the former deputy minister of Health and his facility protection security force brigadier, who had effectively hijacked the Ministry of Health, and a national police officer accused of torture, with several of these detained by Iraqi forces.

Sunni insurgents and the so-called Sunni resistance are still forces that must be reckoned with, as well. However, while we continue to battle a number of such groups, we are seeing some others joining Sunni Arab tribes in turning against al Qaeda Iraq and helping transform Anbar province and other areas from being assessed as lost as little as six months ago to being relatively heartening. We will continue to engage with Sunni tribal sheikhs and former insurgent leaders to support the newfound opposition of some to al Qaeda, ensuring that their fighters join legitimate Iraqi security force elements to become part of the fight against extremists, just as we reach out to moderate members of all sects and ethnic groups to try to drive a wedge between the irreconcilables and the reconcilables, and help the latter become part of the solution instead of part of the problem.
<...>
Indeed, while some Iraqi forces remain a work in progress, there should be no question that Iraq's soldiers and police are fighting and dying for their country, and a number of them have impressively shouldered their part of the burden of the fight against al Qaeda and the other enemies of the new Iraq. To help them progress, we have steadily been increasing the number of transition teams, the train and equip effort, and steadily strengthening the partnership programs between our forces and Iraqi elements.

Q&A

Q You say that Iraq is now the central focus of al Qaeda's worldwide effort. Are you saying that al Qaeda in Iraq is now the sort of principal enemy of the U.S. forces stationed there? Before it was Shi'a groups. And do you see that al Qaeda in Iraq -- do you see any evidence that it is linked internationally to bin Laden? How many foreign fighters are actually there?

GEN. PETRAEUS: First of all, we do definitely see links to the greater al Qaeda network. I think you know that we have at various times intercepted messages to and from. There is no question but that there is a network that supports the movement of foreign fighters through Syria into Iraq.

It is something we can, you know, keep some track of in a broad way. Obviously, when we can get the final 50 meters, if you will, we then take action against it.

It is clearly the element in Iraq that conducts the sensational attacks, these attacks that, as I mentioned, cause not just horrific physical damage -- and which, by the way, have been increasingly indiscriminate. Secretary Gates noted the other day that al Qaeda has declared war on all Iraqis, and I think that that is an accurate statement. They have killed and wounded and maimed countless Iraqi civilians in addition to, certainly, coalition and Iraqi security forces, and they have done that, again, without regard to ethnosectarian identity.

That significance of al Qaeda in the conduct of the sensational attacks, the huge car bomb attacks against which we have been hardening markets, hardening neighborhoods, trying to limit movement and so forth -- those attacks, again, are of extraordinary significance because they can literally drown out anything else that might be happening.

As I mentioned, we generally in many areas -- not all, but in many areas -- have a sense of sort of incremental progress. Again, that is not transmitted at all. Of course it will never break through the noise and the understandable coverage given to it in the press of a sensational attack that kills many Iraqis.

So this is a -- you know, it is a very significant enemy. I think it is probably public enemy number one. It is the enemy whose actions sparked the enormous increase in sectarian violence that did so much damage to Iraq in 2006, the bombing of the Al Askari mosque in Samarra, the gold-domed mosque there, the third holiest Shi'a shrine. And it is the organization that continues to try to reignite not just sectarian violence but ethnic violence, as well, going after Iraqi Kurds in Nineveh province and Kirkuk and areas such as that, as well. So again, I think a very, very significant enemy in that regard.

Q May I formally ask you: What is your assessment at this point? Do you believe that the central government of Iran, Ahmadinejad himself, perhaps, is, number one, aware of this, supporting it, directing it? What is the central government involvement? Could this level of activity possibly take place without the Iranian leadership knowing about it?

And just as another point, do you see any involvement beyond EFPs? Are they now involved in these spectacular suicide car-bomb attacks?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I don't think we have found a link to the spectacular car-bomb attacks, which we believe are generally al Qaeda and elements sort of connected to al Qaeda. Typically, in fact, still we believe that, oh, 80 to 90 percent of the suicide attacks are carried out by foreigners. That's a network, again, that typically brings them in through Syria and is again a major concern and certainly a hope that Syria will crack down on the ability of people to come through their airport and so forth and then be brought into Iraq.

With respect to how high does it go and, you know, what do they know and when did they know it, I honestly cannot -- that is such a sensitive issue that -- and that we do not -- at least I do not know of anything that specifically identifies how high it goes beyond the level of the Qods Force, Commander Suleiman. Beyond that, it is very difficult to tell -- we know where he is in the overall chain of command; he certainly reports to the very top -- but again, nothing that would absolutely indicate, again, how high the knowledge of this actually goes. So --

Q: ...And secondly, your recommendations in September, are you willing to countenance the idea that you may have to say to the president, this is not working, we should pull troops out, or are you more likely to say things are not going well, here are the adjustments and strategies we need to make?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, on the latter one, I mean, I have an obligation to some wonderful young men and women in uniform, and a lot of civilians, by the way, who are serving in Iraq and who deserve a forthright assessment from the folks at the top about the situation on the ground, and that's what I'm going to provide.

Q (Off mike) -- progress are less than obvious to a person in the United States, much less Iraq or Europe. Is it possible that these things could improve while spectacular bombing attacks still occur in parallel?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, I think first of all -- look, I think you have to be realistic and acknowledge there is going to be a continuation of some level of sensational attacks. In an environment where to prevent those, you know, the Iraqi and coalition forces have to protect everything and they only have to attack one thing, some of that is going to happen. I used the analogy the other day of Northern Ireland, which some of you are very familiar with and in which for some decades there was a level of violence that actually the Northern Ireland citizens learned to live with, really.

And actually, to be fair to the Iraqis, I mean they're an exceedingly resilient people. I actually the other night was talking to one of your colleagues from The Washington Post and talked about this idea that there is -- you know, we feel this incremental progress; it's very difficult to demonstrate. In fact, the progress is interesting, because it's a negative. It means nothing happened, in most cases. In other words, there were not sectarian murders. Whether that is newsworthy before it goes on for several weeks is obviously arguable.

But anyway, so what I asked was, "Hey, come on, it's about dusk, let's go -- we'll fly around the city a little bit." And we flew around. And so -- I mean, it was unbelievable.

This is a day in which I think there was a car bomb in Iraq, some of Iraq’s seven million citizens were affected by that, but you could not have told that from what we saw over the city. There were three big amusement parks operational. I'm talking about, you know, roller coaster kinds of -- these are not just a couple little merry-go-rounds in small neighborhood parks. Restaurants in some parts of the city were booming. Lots of markets were open. The people were on the street. There were -- there had to be a thousand soccer games ongoing. They're watering the grass in various professional soccer fields -- the soccer leagues.

You know, all of this is actually so foreign, I think, in the mind of most people who see the news and of course do see that day's explosion or something like that. And actually there is a city of seven million in which life goes on, and again, citizens are determined to carry on with their life.

All done!

Continue reading "Ignoratti "

"Ignoratti" explained: Tired of trying to determine if an author is ignorant or just believes his audience is, I've determined the term "ignoratti" applies to both types, and their readers.

I believe this description also applies: manic, obsessive, poorly educated (some for over 14 years) and easily led.

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