1. Building International Support The United States has the ability to bring a great deal of credibility and substantive incentives to nations not yet committed to Iraq's reconstruction and success. Along with Iraq, the United States should initiate an aggressive effort to find and nurture support from Iraq's neighbors - as well as key regional and international states and international organizations - with the resources available to influence the outcome in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States and the Iraqi government should invite states to join the effort to resolve the crisis in Iraq as part of an International Select Iraq Support Initiative (ISISI). The initiative should under no circumstances be open to nations suspected or known to be overtly or covertly engaged in actions leading to instability in Iraq. Invitations should be contingent on the agreement of both the US and Iraq, as well as other states taking a leading role in the rebuilding of Iraq. Initial invitations should include: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Australia, and Poland – as well as unofficial representation from the UN, WTO, and the World Bank.

RECOMMENDATION 2: Each nation taking part in the International Select Iraq Support Initiative should be offered diplomatic, economic and/or defense support from the United States and other members. In return, each should offer their national resources to aid in debt relief, reconstruction, security force development, arming and training, and - most significantly - the development of organized professional public and judicial service capabilities necessary to a credible Iraqi government.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The United States should in every way encourage such nations to establish and commit to the defense of Iraq against external threats posed by the jihadiyun ideology, Iranian influence and instigation of sectarian violence and weapons proliferation, Syrian trafficking of weapons or persons participating in the insurgency and other foreign attempts to destabilize Iraq. This should include both incentives – economic and diplomatic – as well as disincentives for states not a party to the ISISI.

RECOMMENDATION 4: Under no circumstances should the ISISI - or any other group of nations expressly aligning to support Iraq - be open to all nations or to organizations not actively and substantially capable of fulfilling its obligations. The United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League and other international bodies should be consulted and engaged where they can assist in resolving the individual interest of independent nations – such as Turkey's concerns relating to a strongly autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, or the greater issues relating to the jihadiyun threat to Islam and non-Muslim peoples.

This section goes on to detail precisely and directly what should be required of Iran and Syria. Also, among our 40 recommendations, you will find that, rather than recommend personal desires of seeing a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and manhandling it into a non-existent Iraq War context, we have chosen to redirect those efforts into a far more important and directly related endeavor in a section titled "Winning The War At Home."

It is not a quick read, nor do we promote it as perfect or bulletproof. We openly acknowledge and stay within the bounds and limitations of our own expertise, access and understanding. However, at the same time we do not feel unqualified to submit the input that we have assembled. We believe that good ideas are not limited to or requiring the traditionally accepted pedigree. To that end, we hope that - agree or disagree with specific conclusions or recommendations - this document can serve as an example of how the average American citizen can contribute constructively to our war efforts in this conflict.

For those MilBloggers and MilBlog readers inclined to consider the Achieving Victory in Iraq report, your review and feedback would be greatly appreciated.

At the time of Abu Ghraib, press reports indicated President Bush's anger at being surprised by the press frenzy, even before the New York Times put the story on the front page for months on end. Recently Secretary Rumsfeld mentioned--at his last town hall meeting--that the worst day of his time as Secretary was when Abu Ghraib came out. I don't know what was going on at CENTCOM but I remember the monomania on the story (as indicated in your timeline) and that can't be good for focusing attention. This kind of turmoil rocks back a leadership team and makes it less effective--and thus the story's hyping, as an information fire, killed many people. (Although imagine the reaction of telling Mapes or Hersh of the blood on their hands!)

Bottom line: The leadership team needs to be hardened to this stuff. It needs to be able to fight through loud but small scale scandal. No scandals are best, yes, but be able to fight hurt in the information sphere or more will die.

The other thing that is worth mentioning is the small scale of the actual bad actions was irrelevant in terms of inflaming sentiment because there was one heck of a force multiplier with pictures and status as newsy entertainment. This is a good reminder of the statement that "any reason will do" to cause riots in Algeria, as one wag put it.

I'm definitely punching above my weight here, but that's my $.02...

-- -- --

...the Article 32 hearing (in which evidence is presented, witnesses are called, and the decision to pursue court martial is made) in the case against Sergeant Frederick was convened.

I [Mary Mapes] got about a dozen photos on Friday, April 9. In Dana's tiny office in New York, we sat grimly and looked at picture after picture. Dan [Rather] came rushing in from across the street and the three of us looked huddled around the desk, flipping through the photographs silently. Jeff Fager and Patti Hassler came to Dana's office to see the pictures and had the same reaction we did. They just stared.

"The Army had the opportunity for this not to come out, not to be on 60 Minutes," he said. "But the Army decided to prosecute those six G.I.'s because they thought me and my family were a bunch of poor, dirt people who could not do anything about it. But unfortunately, that was not the case."

The prison abuse story also pushed Sadr's rebellion to the back pages. MajGen Dempsey had backed Sadr and his bruised militia into a corner in Najaf. Instead of arresting him, the Iraqi politicians agreed to let him go free. The reason they gave was that the Coalition could ill afford to make him a martyr at a time when the Arab press was showing the Abu Ghraib pictures as proof that Americans were the oppressors in Iraq. Sadr was allowed to leave Najaf and resume his plotting, with the warrant for his arrest abated.

More supporting details here, here, and here. (But don't let that stop anyone from commenting without reading them...)

She was acting purely on instinct, wanting to do everything in a mother's power to protect her son. "I'm here to get what I can," said Ho, who is from Honolulu. Dark hair pulled back. Dark eyes that moisten when she speaks of her son. Soft voice. "I'm going to put it out there."

When someone makes to punch you and you flinch, that's acting on instinct on instinct. You don't travel 3000 miles across the country, flanked by "seasoned lobbyists," to engage in a concerted political effort.

On the Hill, Ho handed out information packets. She passed around photos of Watada, who is taller, fuller of face than his mother, but shares her smile.

Not only does he have them pearly whites that only the pure of soul and spirit possess, but Ehren Watada is also a certified sooper-genius:

Her son "based his decision on facts," she said. He studied the war in Iraq and decided it was illegal. He tried to resign and leave the service with dignity, but the Army wouldn't let him. He asked to be shipped to Afghanistan; his request was denied. He was offered a noncombat position in Iraq; he said no thanks.

Y'know, I've studied the facts and have decided that Carrot Top is the greatest actor of the past 30 years. We do get one obligatory paragraph on page 2 outlining the basics of the case against Watada:

Piek said, "He joined the Army and swore an oath, and that includes following the orders of the officers appointed over him. His unit was placed in a stop-loss category, which meant that everybody currently in that unit would deploy. You don't get to pick and choose, especially if you are a junior officer, which places you get to go to."

Pretty much covers it doesn't it? But wait, there's more!

To Watada's attorney, Eric Seitz, the situation is more complicated. "The United States talks out of both sides of its mouth," he said. "We've prosecuted soldiers in other countries for following orders to commit war crimes. But God forbid you should use that refusal as a defense in this country."

I hate to break it to Seitz and other lefty donkeynuts, but the act of deployment is not a war crime.

Again and with feeling: The mere act of deploying, even in service of an "illegal" war, is not a war crime. The war might violate international law (it doesn't), but for the soldier, merely setting foot in country is not a war crime. What they order you to do while over there may constitute a war crime, ex: "put this baby on a spike!" (h/t Eddie Izzard), but other than that, just being there isn't a war crime. But Mama Watada nevertheless got kind of the cold shoulder:

...congressional staffers were polite and receptive. She came at an inopportune time, she was told several times. Congress had adjourned for the holidays and there was not much time before the court-martial.

Even Democrats are realizing that promoting mutiny within the armed forces might not be that wise a political move. And for those that want to taste their lunch again on the way up, there's this:

Though Watada's father did not serve in the military, several uncles were in World War II. One of his uncles was killed in Korea. Another relative was in Vietnam. "There is a history of service in our family," he said.

"Selective service," indeed.