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September 20, 2006

Replacments for the Facilities Protection Service

[Soldier's Dad]

by DJ Elliott, IS1(SW), USN(Ret)
The Facilities Protection Service (FPS) is an undertrained, ill-equipped, militia-inflitrated and uncoordinated force of 144,000. The FPS as it was originaly formed and trained was intended as a quick way to put "boots on the ground" and it has grown to a size greater than the Iraqi Army. They were unvetted personnel (officialy under MOI) under 27 different commands (ministries) that were given five days training, a pistol and a uniform. They are nothing more than rent-a-cops and they operate as 27 seperate para-military armies (militias) without adequate supervision, training or control. However, this force is in the process of re-training, reorganization, resubordination, vetting and redesignation that has been ongoing since the Fall of 2005.

Continue reading "Replacments for the Facilities Protection Service "

On 20 Aug 2005:
"In Taji, Iraqi soldiers completed a Strategic Infrastructure Battalion "train-the-trainer" course. The 90 graduates will go on to serve as instructors at an Iraqi Army training base."
Those personnel were members of 4th IA Division (4IAD). The Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIB) receive the five week Iraqi Army (IA) Basic Training but, do not get the IA's follow up training. Instead they are partnered with a US or 4IAD Bn for field training, formed into Brigades (Bde) and transfered out to other areas. The personnel have already received specialty training from the ministry FPS that they belonged to previously. At approx 3400 personnel per 5-week class they are training 30-34,000 Strategic Infrastructure personnel per year (approx 12-15 Bdes). Training of SIBs is centered at Bayji and is the collateral responsibility of 4IAD (AOR-Salahaddin, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah provinces). At the current rate of training, the FPS will be replaced by SIB trained personnel by the end of 2010 (five year plan).
By 20 Jan 2006, per Multi-National Force-North (MNF-N) Brief:
"one strategic infrastructure brigade, 14 strategic infrastructure battalions..."
were in MNF-D Area of Operations (AOR). Yet the 17 Feb 2006 Quarterly Report only said (pg19) that:
"The U.S. Government is working with the Government of Iraq to improve infrastructure security, including the seployment of special Iraqi battalions along key supply and pipeline corridors and hardening of vulnerable infrastructure."
The 26 May 2006 Quarterly Report to Congress said (pg41):
"MNSTC-I expanded the train and equip mission from 4 to 11 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) on 29 Mar 06."
I believe that the quarterly report was only counting the SIBs at Category 3 (C3) and above while MNF-N was counting formations still in field training (C4). Also, the five-sided rubber-room (Pentagon) was probably only counting those units that Multi-National Securty Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) was funded to support. The remainder were on the Iraqi's budget. Since the trainers are Iraqi Army and the IA can provide used (hand-me-down) vehicles as they receive replacement HMMWVs and wheeled Armored Personnel Carriers (DZIK3/OTOKAR/Cougar), this is not a big problem for Iraqi Ministry of Defense/Ministry of Interior. Much cheaper than fixing bombed infrastructure.
As of 06 May 2006, (LTC Loomis, MNF-N Public Affairs Officer):
"There are 20 strategic infrastructure battalions in Iraq, 14 in our division area of operations. I believe they were established as a security force initially under the Ministry of Oil, then were transferred to the Ministry of Interior, and shortly before we arrived came under the Ministry of Defense for command and control. Partnership relationships between U.S. units and SIBs began with our arrival last fall. We have two strategic infrastructure brigades in our area of operations. I'm afraid that I don't know what the total count of strategic infrastructure brigade headquarters is across Iraq, just the two with which we are working."
The other six SIBs equal two other SI Bdes sent outside MND-N's AOR. Yet only 11 SIBs were listed by 26 May 2006 Quarterly Report to Congress. I am estimating that the Quarterly Reports are only counting SIBs that are Category 3 (C3) or better (and US funded) while MNF-N is including the SIBs in-training (C4) and Iraqi Government funded.
29 August 2006 Quarterly Report listed 11 SIBs (pg41):
"MNSTC-I expanded the train and equip mission from 4 to 11 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) on 29 Mar 06."
While later in the same report indicated an subsequent increase to 17 SIBs authorized (pg53): "17 SIBs being trained and equipped". Only one SIB was noted as C1. Remainder were at C2/C3. MND-N Brief (8 Sep) indicated 14 SIBs and two SI Bdes in MND-N AOR.
As they train them up, the Bdes/SIBs are reassigned to other areas. The majority of the SIBs in 4IAD AOR are in-training (C4). Those outside of 4th IAD AO are partnered, in-lead or independent (C3/C2/C1). Additional SIBs beyond 17 are apparently funded by Iraqi MOI/MOD vice MNSTC-I. The following SI Bdes and SIBs have been noted in reporting (all dates 2006):
- 1st Strategic Infrastructure Brigade:
Loc Bayji Feb, not reported in press/release since, Bn count unknown.
- 4th Strategic Infrastructure Brigade:
Loc Bayji Jul,
Probably the "4th Bde" from Salahaddin reported reinforcing Baghdad (Aug).
1st Bn is only Bn identified with 4th SI Bde (Jul).
- 5th Strategic Infrastructure Brigade:
Loc Kirkuk Feb, not reported in press/release since, Bn count unknown.
- 8th Strategic Infrastructure Brigade:
Loc in 4th IAD AO Aug.
2nd Bn is only Bn identified in press release with 8th SI Bde (Aug).
- Unknown assigned SIBs:
1st SIB: Loc Kirkuk Feb 3rd SIB: Loc Tikrit Mar
5th SIB: Loc Dibbis Apr 7th SIB: Loc Northern Salahaddin Feb
9th SIB: Loc Tikrit Apr 10th SIB: Loc Balad Mar
11th SIB: Loc Mushada/Bayji May (9 IAD OPCON)
12th SIB: Loc Bayji Jul 16th SIB: Loc Dawra May (6 IAD OPCON)
18th SIB: Loc Kirkuk Aug 20th SIB: Loc Bayji May

I have not seen any reported reduction in training. SIB personnel are not counted as MOD or MOI (they are FPS) and only funded/trained battalions are counted. I estimate that there are 8-10 Strategic Infrastructure Brigades. Brigade numbering appears consecutive and 1st, 4th, 5th, and 8th Bdes have been reported. Each SI Brigade composed of 2-3 SIBs (Security Bns) and a Bde Special Troops Bn (HHC, HSC, Engr/EOD, Scouts, ESU). A total of approx 24-32 Bns is in the Strategic Infrastructure Force that is replacing the FPS personnel guarding the Oil Infrastructure.
This is just the start. The MNF-N (8 Sep 2006) brief indicated that they were expanding from Oil (MoO) to Electrical Infrastructure (replacing FPS in Ministry of Electricity):
"In addition to our forces partnering with the SIBs improvements have been made over the past year to safeguard critical infrastructure. Key oil facilities are more secure due to the increased physical hardening of these facilities. Walls now protect electrical plants and oil refineries, where before there were either none or inadequate protection. Valves up and down the many pipelines are being hardened, creating a less vulnerable system.
The Iraqis know this is their future. They have now created repair teams capable of rapidly moving to a site and conducting repairs once a line ruptures. The capabilities continue to improve.
Iraq recently resumed crude oil exports from the northern fields for the first time since the autumn of 2005. Crude oil production for the second quarter improved 18 percent to 2.2 million barrels per day, and exports improved by 20 percent.
Coalition and Iraqi army forces joined together to add multiple powers, outposts and headquarters structures, thus increasing the presence of security forces along the Baiji-to-Kirkuk and the Baiji-to-Baghdad power lines. All together, these efforts have doubled the electrical power available to Baghdad from the north and have allowed 7.6 million Iraqis to receive power."
Also, there have been press reports of possible expansion into guarding Mosques and shrines in place of Ministry of Culture in place of FPS (Azzaman, 6 Sep 2006):
"The government plans to set up new battalions of Special Forces to guard holy shrines in the country, according to a cabinet minister."
Compared to the FPS "rent-a-cops" currently guarding these sites, SIBs would look like Special Forces. The major difference in these Bdes/SIBs from the Iraqi Army is the repair and ESU (firefighting) elements built in as part of the training and the limited offensive training provided. The majority of a Bde/SIB mans static positions with "technical" mounted Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) at Bde level that includes the technical support personnel. The SI Bdes are composed of two static Security Bns in fixed positions up and down the lines (Oil/Elec) and at the stations (Oil/Elec/Shrines) with QRF and technical personnel in the middle for command/control, armed response, repair, firefighting, EOD, Engineer, medical and supply support. They are simular in structure to Iraqi Border Guards (with ESU/Techs added). QRFs are equipped with handown armored pickup trucks (technicals) and 6x6 trucks from the Iraqi Army and armed/trained as light Infantry (AKs/LMGs). The SI Bdes/SIBs have insufficient vehicles and training for mobile operations except for the QRF elements. Where SIBs are stationed subordinate to IA Bdes, the IA provides the QRF elements.
I estimate that the initial replacement plan for Ministry of Oil FPS is completing (8-10 Bdes) and that the Ministry of Electricity and Ministry of Culture are now the emphasis due to the targeting of the Insergency/Terrorists on the electrical (MNF-I Brief 14 Sep) and religious sites. As this continues, the 27 ministries' FPS will be replaced with MOI's SIBs. Operational control and training of SIBs will remain with IA until MOI training and command/control capability improves. This also consolidates internal security under MOI (eliminating the 27 competing Ministries' FPS) and provides for proper vetting to prevent hostile inflitration.
These are not "Commandos" but, they are an improvement over the "rent-a-cop" Facilities Protection Service they are replacing. The SIBs provide internal security static guard troops that free up the Iraqi Army and National Police for QRF and national defense. They also provide a potential reserve mobilization pool of static defense troops for any armed conflict (50-75 Security Bdes). The conversion of 144,000 FPS to this caliber is one of the many untold (un-sexy) unfolding success stories of the formation of the Iraqi Security Forces.

Refs:
Quarterly Reports to Congress
http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/Iraq_Reports/Index.html
6 Sep 2006 Azzaman Press
http://www.azzaman.com/english/index.asp?fname=news\2006-09-06\kurd3.htm
20 Jan 2006 MNF-N Brief
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=886
8 Sep 2006 MND-N Brief
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3716
14 Sep 2006 MNF-I Brief
http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5573&Itemid=30

All done!

Posted at 1855Z

Bluegills on guard for you

[Eagle1]

The thin bluegill line on duty for you.

Posted at 1552Z

Islamic Terror Groups Uncovered in South Korea

[GIKorea]

Those who have been stationed in Korea can attest to the amount of third country nationals from Islamic countries that work in difficult labor jobs in Korea. With the amount of Muslims workers in Korea combined with the number of US military installations in Korea, it really was only a matter of time before the radicals would try something and it is good to see the South Korean authorities were ready:

Since 2002, the National Intelligence Service has investigated 107 suspects in connection with six cases involving Middle East terror organizations, the agency said in a report to a legislator made public yesterday. The intelligence service, according to Representative Won Hye-young of the Uri Party, said South Korea has not escaped involvement with terror attempts by radical Islamist groups. According to the report, the service learned in May 2005 that an Iranian organization linked to Hezbollah, named by the United States and a few other nations as a terrorist organization, had been involved in wire transfers of cash amounting to about 60 billion won ($63 million). The transfers had been disguised as trade transactions; it was not clear from the report if the money had been raised in Korea or had been routed through this country in an attempt to disguise its origins. One Iranian was sentenced to a year in prison here for violations of Korea's financial transfer laws. In May 2004, the report added, the spy agency learned that people linked to Jemaah Islamiah, another Islamist group, were arriving in Korea to set up a base of operations here. Eight Moroccans were denied entry and turned over to Moroccan intelligence in October. One Korean-American suspect was cited in the report; the agency said it and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation in March 2003 jointly tracked down a 30-year-old man affiliated with a Pakistani terror group. He was deported to the United States, where he received an 11.5-year sentence after being convicted of being a member of a terror organization and having received paramilitary training.

Posted at 0756Z

Time Magazine: Scare-Mongers?

[Bubblehead]

You may have read about how the newest issue of Time is trying to convince readers that recent Navy "prepare to deploy" orders may be a precursor to war with Iran. It turns out that there's a much less scary explanation.

Posted at 0505Z