Haditha: Signal to Noise (II)

(Continuing a discussion begun here.)

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The Calm Before the Storm

Returning to our chronology of events.

Even after Time Magazine broke their story in March, scant attention was paid by other media outlets - perhaps in part due to Time's contention that "The available evidence does not provide conclusive proof that the Marines deliberately killed innocents in Haditha".

The day after publication of the Time story, a similar atrocity was claimed by residents of the town of Ishaqi. It too was hardly noted in the media, perhaps due to the absurd aspect of some of the claims (Americans had handcuffed and executed 11 people from one family, ranging from a 75-year old woman to a 6-month old baby, then burned their vehicles, killed their farm animals, and blew up the house to cover up the crime) and when the story was effectively debunked by Iraqi police just two days later it also faded completely. (It would return briefly to prominence once the Haditha story "caught fire" - but with the more outlandish details purged.)

The Haditha story itself would be noted briefly again on April 7, when two of the officers in command of the unit involved (along with a third from another company not relative to the Haditha incident) were relieved by Maj. Gen. Richard Natonski, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division:

Marine Corps spokesman 2nd Lt. Lawton King said Natonski relieved the three of command because he lacked confidence in their leadership, based on their recent deployment to Iraq and a series of actions by the battalion.

We covered those developments in a larger piece here.

Then, on May 17,

Rep. John Murtha, an influential Pennsylvania lawmaker and outspoken critic of the war in Iraq, said today Marines had “killed innocent civilians in cold blood” after allegedly responding to a roadside bomb ambush that killed a Marine during a patrol in Haditha, Iraq, Nov. 19.

Murtha (a House Armed Services Committee member) had been briefed on the still incomplete investigations by DoD officials.

All bets were off, and now months of media silence could be used to the advantage of those who'd been scooped by Time. The story was suddenly "new", and the passage of tme since the original story broke could even be used to enhance the "cover-up" claims against the Marine Corps. While Murtha could be accused of influencing an ongoing investigation, he would instead be credited for exposing it and the Haditha story to the light. (At a minimum, he had assured that much future coverage of the story would include favorable references to or quotes by him, along with his picture.⁽⁴⁾)

Open Season

Reporters scrambled to make up for lost time. Officially the DoD could say nothing about the incomplete investigation, but quotes from "senior Defense officials who spoke only on condition of anonymity because the investigation was not yet completed" detailing the results of the investigation became common. And several news agencies interviewed Haditha residents who were willing to share their accounts (first-hand and otherwise) of the "cold blooded massacre". Some of those subjects were also quoted in the original Time story.

But as their stories were repeated, flaws began to appear.

(More to follow - note that comments will be "off" until completion of this post.)

Notes follow.

Notes:

4. Murtha: While Mr Murtha's opinions of the war in Iraq are subjective and open to debate, his abuse of facts to support them is not. A couple brief examples from a recent appearance on CBS News' Face the Nation (transcript in pdf) include claims that "...only 30 percent of the people [of Iraq are] getting water" and "We've lost almost 20,000 people in this war".

Both are broad exaggerations. If 70 percent of people in Iraq weren't getting water, they would die within days - and a check of the State Department Reports he cited as source reveals no water shortage of the sort he describes. And the number of "lost" can't be supported without including the number of wounded troops whose injuries were minor enough that they could return to duty within 72 hours. (Updated numbers can always be found in this pdf.) There are many other examples, but this post is not about Jack Murtha. However, it seems the congressman has rarely stated a fact on Iraq that he didn't feel needed to be exaggerated to make his point, and it's likely that his cold blooded killers comment may have been either a personal opinion/understanding of the results of the incomplete investigation, or another exaggeration for some unknown desired effect.

Haditha: The Accused Speak

The other side of the story, from The Washington Post:

Marine Says Rules Were Followed
Sergeant Describes Hunt for Insurgents in Haditha, Denies Coverup

A sergeant who led a squad of Marines during the incident in Haditha, Iraq, that left as many as 24 civilians dead said his unit did not intentionally target any civilians, followed military rules of engagement and never tried to cover up the shootings, his attorney said.
<...>
[Staff Sgt. Frank D.] Wuterich's detailed version of what happened in the Haditha neighborhood is the first public account from a Marine who was on the ground when the shootings occurred. As the leader of 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon, Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, Wuterich was in the convoy of Humvees that was hit by a roadside bomb. He entered the house from which the Marines believed enemy fire was originating and made the initial radio reports to his company headquarters about what was going on, Puckett said.

Read it all. The actual comments are by the Marines' lawyers, who are relating what the Marines told them.

The accounts given are actually consistent - on the broader story - with reports from Iraqi civilians (houses were entered, non-combatants were killed). But the Devil's in the details, as they say, and in this case (as with most such cases) that's where divergence occurs.

The issue will indeed be settled by a determination of whether the Marines followed rules of engagement for the circumstances. Two questions that are key to that issue are 1) did they correctly assess the situation and 2) did they respond appropriately to that assessment. On-the-scene decision makers have broad latitude to act in response to attack (this is not to imply they can shoot children with reckless abandon), must rely on training and experience to do so (the Marines had both), and obviously can't pull out an instruction manual to determine what to do in any combat situation.

It's worth noting that there are two investigations ongoing into events at Haditha, and that this report addresses both. The first is to determine what happened, the second to evaluate if a "cover up" followed. Obviously, initial reports that civilians were killed by the IED were wrong - but initial reports more often than not are wrong.

The "cover-up" investigation is complicated in that it involves individuals who were not on the scene (one of whom was the company commander of the Marines who were), and the potential for miscommunication as a story is "up-channeled" through multiple levels. According to the attorneys quoted in the Post:

Kevin B. McDermott, who is representing Capt. Lucas M. McConnell, the Kilo Company commander, said Wuterich and other Marines informed McConnell on the day of the incident that at least 15 civilians were killed by "a mixture of small-arms fire and shrapnel as a result of grenades" after the Marines responded to an attack from a house.

McConnell was relieved of his command in April for "failure to investigate," according to McDermott. But the lawyer said McConnell told him that he reported the high number of civilian deaths to the 3rd Battalion executive officer that afternoon and that within a few days the battalion's intelligence chief gave a PowerPoint presentation to Marine commanders.

"It wasn't a situation that dawned on him as the captain of Kilo where it was like, 'Okay, guys, we need to conduct a more thorough investigation,' " McDermott said. "Everywhere up the chain, they had ample access to this thing."
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Marine Corps public affairs officers reported that the civilians had been killed in the bomb blast, a report that Puckett [the attorney representing Wuterich in the ongoing investigation] believes was the result of a miscommunication.

Another question to be answered in the investigation and possible court martial (and apart from the "cover-up" charge) is whether commanders were negligent in failing to further investigate the deaths. In hindsight this may seem obvious, but the determination must be made based on information available at the time. The statement that Captain McConnell was relieved for that cause may not be completely correct - earlier reports indicated he - and his commander - were relieved by Maj. Gen. Richard Natonski, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, "because he [Natonski] lacked confidence in their leadership, based on their recent deployment to Iraq and a series of actions by the battalion." (A third officer was relieved at the same time for unrelated reasons.)

The story is complex, and this is certainly not the first case where accounts of various parties conflict, or in which the accused maintain their innocence. Regardless of the feelings or opinions of others watching the story unfold, the task of determining the need for a trial (court martial) in this event falls to investigators. And if such is the outcome, the determination of guilt or innocence will be made by a panel formed for that purpose.

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Related/previous:

Capt. James Kimber, who was in command of another company nearby:

But that day, at about the same time, Iraqi insurgents attacked all three Marine companies patrolling in the Haditha area--one of them commanded by Kimber. He said he could hear over his radio the shots being fired during a running gun battle in Haditha. "They weren't just Marine weapons. You can tell from the sound," he said.
<...>
On the radio, Kimber said, he heard the report from Haditha of the blast from a roadside improvised explosive device, or IED, and the death of one Marine there. He also could hear an unfolding gun battle.
<...>
Most puzzling, Kimber and a Marine colonel said, was the fact that neither of them heard about shootings at Haditha through the Marine rumor mill or in complaints from the Iraqis with whom they had frequent interaction.

"Marines talk," Kimber said. "I'm surprised it didn't get out that way. I'm just hoping that Marines didn't do this."

Kimber also comments on ROE training:

"This was a huge thing that we hit on in our training," he said, "that this was not Fallujah. That there are going to be innocent people here. If you don't win the battle for the people, you're not going to win the counterinsurgency fight."

Martin Terrazas, father of Miguel Terrazas, who was killed in the initial IED blast:

Miguel Terrazas' father, Martin, said the Marines his son fought with told him that after the car bomb exploded the Marines took a defensive position around his son's battered vehicle. Insurgents immediately started shooting from nearby buildings, and the insurgents were using women and children as human shields, Martin said he was told.

The Marines shot back because "it was going to be them or" the insurgents, Martin said of what his son's fellow Marines briefly described to him.
<...>
Terrazas said he has met with many from his son's unit who told him they did only what was necessary to survive. He wouldn't say when he spoke with them.

"Those Marines just did their job," he said. "Some of these kids were saying, 'We have to live with it'."

A comprehensive chronological review of the still developing story (and the many inaccuracies, rumors, and misconceptions surrounding it) can be found here.