Air Assault!

Somewhere south of Baghdad:

Yusufiya, Iraq is a predominately rural area approximately 600 km in size. Canals perforate the fields of okra, cucumber, tomato, eggplant, and potato. Orange groves and date palms are also abundant along the Euphrates which bounds the western edge of the region. The farmlands host a relatively dispersed and uneducated population, which in Iraq means: favorable conditions for hiding insurgent soldiers and weapons caches. Because of Yusufiya’s proximity to Baghdad, terrorists used the city for staging attacks in the city at large.
<...>
The day before Operation SARATOGA the Task Force was tense. Often dust clouds or aircraft maintenance issues cancelled Air Assault missions at the last minute—scrapping weeks of planning. And like all missions, the soldiers would venture out into potentially hostile territory. Final preparation included cleaning machine guns, helicopter loading practice, and rehearsal of medical evacuation procedures. And the Americans were unsure if Abbas would fulfill his commitment to ride along. Years of military rule have given Iraqis a healthy distrust of the military.
<...>
And the next morning the weather cooperated. Kazmarek received confirmation that the mission was a ‘go’ and at 0540 Four UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, under the call sign ‘Smuggler 16’ checked in over the radio. The first lift of soldiers took their seats and the helos lifted off. Barely five minutes later, as the sun broke across the Euphrates river valley, the Blackhawks touched down in a fallow field in Yusufiya. Almost 50 American and Iraqi soldiers fanned out across the farmlands.

Their mission? Restore electricity to a remote village.

"Humanitarian aid implemented by the US military in Iraq is reinforcing stability and quickening the peace", writes Captain Steve McGregor, recently returned from a 14-month deployment with Task Force 3-187, 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). "One area of Iraq this is particularly noticeable is Yusufiya, where Task Force 3-187 was able to completely transfer their area of responsibility back to Iraqi control."

Although not addressed as such, there's much discussion of wolves, sheep, and sheepdogs therein, too - along with contrasting pink vs grey responses to challenge.

The saturation of Yusufiya by 3-187 prevented “disaster tourism,” a concept described by Alex de Waal. De Waal observes that aid workers and journalists tend to over-estimate famine in Sudan because of a “combination of factors, including visiting at the worst times of year, visiting famine camps, where the worst suffering is to be found, and meeting the most destitute, combined with a failure to understand coping strategies…” For 14 months the Task Force patrolled the poorest slums of Yusufiya and the relatively wealthy land-owning neighborhoods as well. They understood local needs from a comprehensive perspective.

The Army possesses and develops better leaders than the aid community. As an institution the US Army relies on national service academies, Officer Training Courses, leadership schools such as Ranger School, and real-world experience, to develop leaders. Aid organizations as well as the US Department of State need to reevaluate how they prepare their staff for austere environments and the rigors of nation building or consider military exchange programs.