Sons of Iraq

From the Christian Science Monitor, via Danger Room - headline: Sons of Iraq made Iraq safer. What's their mission now?

A good question, that. Now that everyone's "awakened", what shall we have them do? The sub-headline - "The US military is trying to transition 103,000 Iraqi neighborhood guards into steady work" - seems like the right answer to me*.

But the careful reader will see a subtle difference between that statement and this one from within the story: "US commanders would like to transition 100 percent of SOI into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) as soon as possible." That 100 percent claim stands out as a bit odd in a report that includes this:

The US is also trying to push SOIs into the commercial sector with the Joint Technical Education Reintegration Program (JTERP), a fledgling initiative that will provide paid vocational training in fields like carpentry and plumbing. And the US has created the Adhamiya Civil Service Corps, a collective of workers that can be hired by local contractors.

Transitioning to the ISF may prove difficult, as the story also explains that "As of May 31, only 17,000 (about 15 percent) of the SOI had joined the ISF" even though "SOI members receive $300 a month from the US, a small amount even by Iraqi standards (low level Iraqi Army soldiers make roughly double)."

There's little by way of explanation beyond speculation as to why that might be so (but this is Iraq, so that's understandable). But I would speculate that (in simplest terms) one reason among many is that in Iraq (as in America), not everyone who's willing to defend their neighborhood is willing to defend their nation. There's nothing particularly wrong with that, but as threats diminish the need for the intense neighborhood watch does, too, and the pay for service rendered becomes increasingly difficult to justify (or increasingly similar to "protection" of a different sort). But this is also true of the larger Iraqi Army, and as justification for neighborhood watch groups declines the justification for a large standing army falls, too.

But there's no denying the need to gainfully employ the guys at the end of the road with the AK47s. For a while the SOI pay is valid. For a while beyond that it may be necessary. But there's another race ongoing in Iraq - another battle to be won. Coalition forces are well aware of this, and have shifted emphasis since the start of this year from combat to "non-kinetic" operations - rebuilding infrastructure, reviving an economy, and creating opportunities for the people of "post war" Iraq. Expect the pace of rebuilding to increase as foreign firms come seeking their piece of the action now that doing so involves significantly less risk than it did one year ago (thanks in part to those guys at the end of the road with the AK47s, who by the way would like to speak with the construction supervisor, if you please...) The positive upward spiral is nascent, but real, and acceleration is more than just likely.

Meanwhile, the guys at the end of the road seem to have established a 300-dollars-a-month comfort zone - and military service isn't the only thing they're avoiding at this time:

But, if initial interest is any indication, the Army may have a difficult time. Only about 10 percent of SOI in Adhamiya have applied for the JTERP program, says Capt. Gus Giacoman, ISF coordinator for 1-2 SCR and from Spring Lake, North Carolina. He says the jobs lack prestige.

"It's the Arab honor," says Captain. Giacoman. "Now, they have that honor of 'I guard the neighborhood' ... and you've got to find ways to let them keep it."

More on rebuilding programs:

While America Slept (Part Three)

MilBlogs TV - Episode One (Iraq, 21 Jul 08)

*At least, partially right. While its in the interest of the US military to get these fine folks gainfully emloyed, I'm not sure its their mission. (But as has been the case in Iraq for five years now, I suppose someone has to do it - and that's another topic worthy of discussion...)