The Tempest

Greyhawk

Miranda:
O wonder!
How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world
That has such people in't!

Prospero:
'Tis new to thee.

- Shakespeare, The Tempest

*****

In comments through the (currently ongoing) While America Slept Series, recently embedded Iraq reporter Nathan Webster and I have been discussing the relative merits of the troop increase ("the surge") and the recruitment of local citizens (Awakening Movements, Sons of Iraq, Concerned local Citizens groups, former insurgents, and a host of other names - your choice - I'll use any and all below) in the fight to stabilize Iraq.

I think this comment is a reasonable statement:

To propose that any of these deeply intertwined developments would have brought us to where we are today without the influence of the others is wrong. In fact, it's absurd. Better analogies probably escape me just now, but it seems akin to arguing whether your car's engine or transmission deserve the credit for your last trip.

I can add a couple of others - whether the offense or defense wins football games, or whether the guitar or drums matter more to a band. There are those who are willing to enter such arguments - I'm not among them. (Nor is Mr Webster, I should add.)

But those who follow politics are aware of the argument that "the surge" was unnecessary and pointless (or, in the extreme, a "failure") because of the rise of Iraqis (usually this argument is limited to the Anbar Awakening movement - with similar success in other areas being ignored) against militias, insurgents, JAM, or al Qaeda (again, your choice). Those who make this argument also tend to see the Awakening Movement as something that sprang forth from the sands (in spite of US presence in Iraq - or even because of American failure to pacify the region) in the late summer of 2006. (I'm not aware of anyone anywhere arguing that the "citizens" movement didn't contribute to success in Iraq. If there are such voices please let me know.)

Hopefully my position on the Iraqis or Americans debate is clear from the above. If not, the short answer is both. For those seeking a long answer, I've been working on another ongoing (though overdue for update) series here called Genesis that describes in greater detail the parallel development of both trends.

That said, the Genesis series may be a bit complex (and lengthy) for some. With that in mind, I will attempt to present a shorter timeline on the development of the "awakening councils" alone here. The staunch defenders of the "surge wasn't needed" argument will probably be surprised to discover whose point of view they currently embrace.

*****

"What's past is prologue." as the bard wrote. This is a brief overview of developments that did not occur in isolation from others (a few references to concurrent events are included for some historical perspective on what the mainstream narrative on Iraq was at the time). For additional details and links to source material see Genesis.

*****

August, 2004 (The Washington Times):

Other parts of the U.S. government, including the State Department and CIA, have also been holding secret meetings with Iraqi insurgent factions in an effort to stop the violence and coax them into the political process, according to U.S. government officials and others who have participated in the efforts.

The military plan, approved in August 2004, seeks to make a distinction between Iraqi insurgents who are attacking U.S. troops because they are hostile to their presence, and foreign insurgents who are responsible for most of the suicide bombings -- which have killed more than 1,200 people in the past couple of months -- and whose larger political aims are unclear.

February, 2005 (Michael Ware/Time magazine):

"We are ready," he says before leaving, "to work with you."

In that guarded pledge may lie the first sign that after nearly two years of fighting, parts of the insurgency in Iraq are prepared to talk and move toward putting away their arms—and the U.S. is willing to listen.
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Pentagon officials say the secret contacts with insurgent leaders are being conducted mainly by U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers.
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Hard-line islamist fighters like Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda group will not compromise in their campaign to create an Islamic state. But in interviews with TIME, senior Iraqi insurgent commanders said several "nationalist" rebel groups—composed predominantly of ex-military officers and what the Pentagon dubs "former regime elements"—have moved toward a strategy of "fight and negotiate."

June, 2005 ( The London Times):

AT a summer villa near Balad in the hills 40 miles north of Baghdad, a group of Iraqis and their American visitors recently sat down to tea. It looked like a pleasant social encounter far removed from the stresses of war, but the heavy US military presence around the isolated property signalled that an unusual meeting was taking place.

After weeks of delicate negotiation involving a former Iraqi minister and senior tribal leaders, a small group of insurgent commanders apparently came face to face with four American officials seeking to establish a dialogue with the men they regard as their enemies.

The talks on June 3 were followed by a second encounter 10 days later, according to an Iraqi who said that he had attended both meetings.

June, 2005 (Fox News Sunday):

CHRIS WALLACE: Let's start with these reports of these direct meetings between U.S. officials, including allegedly a representative of the Pentagon, and insurgent commanders. Did they happen, and, if so, what did they accomplish?

RUMSFELD: Well, the first thing I would say about the meetings is they go on all the time.

Second, the Iraqis have a sovereign government. They will decide what their relationships with various elements of insurgents will be. We facilitate those from time to time.

And if you think about it, there aren't the good guys and the bad guys over there. There are people all across the spectrum.

There's the government, people who strongly support the government, people that are leaning and not quite sure what to do, people who are leaning the other way and not quite sure what to do, and then insurgents and people who oppose it, which is a mixture: There's the jihadists, there's the Zarqawi group, there are criminals, there's the Sunni Baathists who would like to take back the government.

Meetings take place all the time...

WALLACE: But let me just ask you about this one specific idea. Is there an effort -- you talk about the spectrum of groups -- to try split off the homegrown insurgents from the foreign fighters, the Zarqawi group?

RUMSFELD: Well, sure, my goodness, yes. The first thing you want to do is split people off and get some people to be supportive.

In that same interview, Rumsfeld dismissed calls for additional troops in Iraq, stating that the Iraqis were the ones who would ultimately defeat "the insurgency":

I can understand some people would say, "Oh, there ought to be more," or, "There ought to be less." General Abizaid and General Casey are absolutely convinced, and said so publicly, that they would worry if there were more U.S. forces there, because it would require more force protection, more support troops, more targets, a heavier footprint, a more intrusive occupation force that would further alienate Iraqi people from the coalition forces and what they're trying to do.

Second, the implication of the question was that we don't have enough to win against the insurgency. We're not going to win against the insurgency. The Iraqi people are going to win against the insurgency.

January, 2006 (USA Today):

"Now you actually have a wedge, or a split, between the Sunni population and al-Qaeda in Iraq," said Maj. Gen. Richard Zahner, deputy chief of staff for intelligence for multinational forces in Iraq. "It poses a significant crossroads for these groups as they look at where they head."

The U.S. military cited incidents of insurgent infighting in a rare public description of a split:

• At least six ranking members of al-Qaeda in Iraq have been assassinated by Sunni insurgents or tribal gunmen in separate incidents since September, Zahner said. The killings are usually in retaliation for al-Qaeda's role in violence, such as the execution of local police officers, he said.

• In Ramadi, in western Iraq, he said, armed clashes have erupted between local Iraqi insurgents and al-Qaeda operatives in recent months. At least one high-ranking al-Qaeda member, Abu Khatab, was recently run out of Ramadi by insurgents loyal to the local tribe.

• Near the Syrian border, members of the Albu Mahal tribe, which attacked U.S. positions as recently as March, have lately been pointing U.S. troops to al-Qaeda hideouts, Zahner said.

Iraq's national security adviser, Mouwafak al-Rubaie, also said there is a rift in the insurgency, calling it a "a major step forward in our fight against terrorism."

February, 2006 (The Christian Science Monitor):

Sunni Tribes Turn Against Jihadis

Sheikh Osama al-Jadaan, head of the influential Karabila tribe in Sunni Arab-dominated western Iraq, is more politician than traditional sheikh these days. He's given up his dishdasha and Arab headdress for a pinstripe suit with a silk handkerchief in his breast pocket.

He's also turned away from supporting Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi and other foreign fighters in Iraq. "We realized that these foreign terrorists were hiding behind the veil of the noble Iraqi resistance," says Mr. Jadaan. "They claim to be striking at the US occupation, but the reality is they are killing innocent Iraqis in the markets, in mosques, in churches, and in our schools."
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"The local insurgents have become part of the solution and not part of the problem," US Army Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch told reporters at a press conference last week.

February, 2006 (The London Times):

Sunni Leader Killed For Joining Ceasefire Talks

A SUNNI tribal leader was murdered in the Iraqi city of Ramadi a day after taking part in talks with American and Iraqi officials aimed at curbing violence there.

Sheikh Nasser Kareem al-Fahdawi, head of the al-Bu Fahad tribe and a physics professor at Anbar University, was shot by insurgents opposed to the talks in late December.

March, 2006 (The Washington Post)

Iraqi Tribes Strike Back At Insurgents

Tribal chiefs in Iraq's western Anbar province and in an area near the northern city of Kirkuk, two regions teeming with insurgents, are vowing to strike back at al-Qaeda in Iraq, a Sunni Arab-led group that is waging war against Sunni tribal leaders who are cooperating with the Iraqi government and the U.S. military.

March, 2006 (Reuters):

Most Americans see Iraq civil war as likely: poll

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Eight in 10 Americans believe that recent sectarian violence in Iraq has made civil war likely, according to an ABC News/Washington Post poll released on Monday.

June, 2006 (Time Magazine):

The objective of Maliki's "national unity" policy, strongly backed by U.S. ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, involves trying to draw the Sunnis, including some mainstream insurgent groups, into the political process.

While all this was ongoing, coalition forces were capturing al-Qaeda members (often on tips from Iraqi citizens) and gaining intel that ultimately led to the June attack that killed Zarqawi.

June, 2006 (Mudville)

Coalition forces kill Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi

BAGHDAD, Iraq – Multi-National Force-Iraq Commanding General, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., announced the death of al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi in the following statement during a press conference with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad June 8:

“Ladies and Gentlemen, Coalition forces killed al-Qaida terrorist leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and one of his key lieutenants, spiritual advisor Sheik Abd-Al-Rahman, yesterday, June 7, at 6:15 p.m. in an air strike against an identified, isolated safe house.

June, 2006 (Mudville):

The recently released letter from a senior al-Qaeda "advisor" to al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (captured in the aftermath of the strike that killed him) confirms the strained relationship between the factions of the terrorist organization.
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It's not the attacks on Sunni Muslims that concerns the al Qaeda leadership - its just the priority of the attacks, and in the eyes of the senior leadership Zarqawi has misjudged the urgency. There will be plenty of time later to deal with Sunnis who disagree with al Qaeda's goals, as the author assures Zarqawi:
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In short, work with them now, kill them last.

August/September, 2006 (Mudville. Note: While now considered "conventional wisdom" the events described in this passage were ignored by American media as they happened, and this story was broken right here in the Mudville Gazette):

A first publicly-released message from Abu Hamza al-Muhajir — also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri - the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi's replacement as leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, made brief headlines in the western media late last month.
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Muhajir brands his growing (and increasingly bold) Sunni opposition "traitors", demands they make a very public "repentance", and gives them until the end of Ramadan to do so. While the full translation of Muhajir's speech is not currently publicly available, one brief excerpt can be seen here:

"I say to those traitors in this blessed month, the month of pardon and forgiveness," al-Muhajir wrote, "that we are declaring a general pardon for all of them, forgiving them for our blood that was spilled by your hands and your treachery. We welcome you once again. Return to your religion and homeland before we defeat you, and you will have peace and security. We will not touch you but with kindness. You must first declare your sincere repentance in front of your tribes and families and inform us by whatever means, lest we make a mistake [and kill you]. You should put your hands in the hands of your brothers and sons, the mujahideen, for peace and security to return to our homes and expel the invader and to expel the occupier from our midst in this blessed month"
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Iraq's al-Iraqiyah Television interviewed Shaykh Abd al-Sattar Abu-Rishah, chieftain of the Al-Bu-Rishah tribe in al-Anbar the day following the release of Muhajir's message:

Asked about his response to Al-Muhajir's statement about giving a pardon to the chieftains of Iraq, he says: "I do not know what kind of authority he enjoys. Is he a prophet? Did he receive a messenger from God to give us a pardon? Are we criminals like him? Are we killers like him to be given a pardon? Or did we ask him for pardon? On the contrary, he should ask us for pardon, because he killed Iraqis, Sunnis and Shi'is. Who is he? He is only an inferior criminal. We should not grant him a pardon."
<...>
Sheikh Sattar al-Buzayi summoned other tribal chiefs last week for a war council at his fortified home in Ramadi, the teeming, scarred capital of Iraq's Anbar province, desert heartland of the Sunni Arabs.

There was a bountiful feast of beef and rice, and a vow of unrelenting battle against the common enemy -- al Qaeda.

"We have to form police and army forces from among our sons to fight these al Qaeda militants," Buzayi, who says the militants murdered his father and his brother, told Reuters.

"We have now entered a real battle. It's either us or them."
<...>
Sunni tribal leaders who have vowed to drive Al Qaida out of Iraq's most restive province met the Shiite premier on Wednesday, marking what Washington hopes will be a breakthrough alliance against militants.

Sattar Al Buzayi, a Sunni shaikh from Anbar province who has emerged in recent weeks as a leader of a tribal alliance against Osama Bin Laden's followers, said he and about 15 other shaikhs had offered their cooperation to Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki.
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"This is admired and respected by all Iraqis. We are fully prepared to back your efforts," said the prime minister.

November, 2006 (The London Times):

While the world’s attention has been focused on Baghdad’s slide into sectarian warfare, something remarkable has been happening in Ramadi, a city of 400,000 inhabitants that al-Qaeda and its Iraqi allies have controlled since mid-2004 and would like to make the capital of their cherished Islamic caliphate.

A power struggle has erupted: al-Qaeda’s reign of terror is being challenged. Sheikh Sittar and many of his fellow tribal leaders have cast their lot with the once-reviled US military.

They are persuading hundreds of their followers to sign up for the previously defunct Iraqi police. American troops are moving into a city that was, until recently, a virtual no-go area.
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The US military wooed the sheikhs over what one US officer described as “hundreds of cups of chai and thousands of cigarettes”.

November, 2006 (Mudville):

Sunni Leader Urges Arab Nations Not To Back Iraq's Shiite-Led Government

A prominent Sunni religious leader is calling on the international community to end its support for Iraq's Shiite-led government.

Otherwise, he says, Iraq's escalating sectarian violence will spread throughout the Middle East.

The sheik, who heads the Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq, lives in Jordan.

But...

Sunni sheiks from Iraq's volatile Anbar province have denounced a powerful Sunni cleric as "a thug" for supporting the al-Qaida terrorist group.

The Anbar Salvation Council, a group of sheiks formed to resist foreign militants in Iraq, also denied accusations by cleric Harith al-Dhari that it was cozying up to the Iraqi government in exchange for money, the New York Times reported Sunday.

"We, on behalf of the Anbar tribes council, say to Harith al-Dhari: If there is a thug, it is you; if there is a killer and a kidnapper, it is you," the Times quoted Sheik Abdul Sattar Buzaigh al-Rishawi as saying.

November 2006 (Mudville):

Close Air Support to the Anbar Salvation Council

Al Qaeda terrorists attacked the Abu Soda tribe in Sofia Nov. 25. In response, Coalition Forces provided support to the Abu Soda’s fight against Al Qaeda.

“The American’s have come to the aide of the Abu Soda tribe. They have understood the dire situation [that the Abu Soda are currently battling the Al Qaeda], because [the Americans] see it as a fight against a common enemy,” said Sheikh Ahmed, Sheikh of Abu Resha.
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This is big. Remember al-Qaeda's threat to kill the "renegade" Sunnis after Ramadan? Since the tribes "have given their men to the Ministry of the Interior to serve as Iraqi Police" and the coalition has given significant resources in support, they're going to have a tough time delivering.
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Earlier this month, in Washington, Senator McCain called for more troops...

December, 2006 - Anbar, as described in American media:

The U.S. military is no longer able to defeat a bloody insurgency in western Iraq or counter al-Qaeda's rising popularity there, according to newly disclosed details from a classified Marine Corps intelligence report...

The Marines' August memo, a copy of which was shared with The Washington Post, is far bleaker than some officials suggested when they described it in late summer.

Janury, 2007 - President Bush announces "the surge" (Mudville)

Our military forces in Anbar are killing and capturing al Qaeda leaders, and they are protecting the local population. Recently, local tribal leaders have begun to show their willingness to take on al Qaeda. And as a result, our commanders believe we have an opportunity to deal a serious blow to the terrorists.

March, 2007 (Mudville):

Q (Through interpreter.) (Name inaudible) -- from Al Hurra. Could you confirm to us, please, that there is a dialogue between the American officials and the Mahdi Army militias and some armed groups like the Islamic Party in Iraq?

GEN. PETRAEUS: In an endeavor like this one, the host nation and those who are assisting it obviously are trying to determine over time who are the irreconcilables and who are the reconcilables. And they're on either end of the sectarian spectrum, of ethnic spectrums, political spectrums and so forth. And of course, what the government is trying to do, what those supporting the government are trying to do are to split the irreconcilables from the reconcilables and to make thepart of the solution rather than a continuing part of a problem, and then dealing with the irreconcilables differently. And that is certainly what the government of Iraq is doing and what those who are supporting the government of Iraq -- what the coalition is also doing, in very, very early stages.

The rest, as they say, is history.

*****

But let's review the words of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld from June, 2005:

"And if you think about it, there aren't the good guys and the bad guys over there. There are people all across the spectrum.
<...>
"Meetings take place all the time... The first thing you want to do is split people off and get some people to be supportive.
<...>
"I can understand some people would say, "Oh, there ought to be more [troops]," or, "There ought to be less." General Abizaid and General Casey are absolutely convinced, and said so publicly, that they would worry if there were more U.S. forces there, because it would require more force protection, more support troops, more targets, a heavier footprint, a more intrusive occupation force that would further alienate Iraqi people from the coalition forces and what they're trying to do.

"Second, the implication of the question was that we don't have enough to win against the insurgency. We're not going to win against the insurgency. The Iraqi people are going to win against the insurgency."

The next time you hear someone arguing that the Salvation Councils saved Iraq and that McCain's additional troops weren't needed, point out that they're claiming that Rumsfeld was right, that his plan worked - and ask them why they didn't support the former SecDef so staunchly and vocally when it mattered.

Politics makes strange bedfellows: Political interests can bring together people who otherwise have little in common. This saying is adapted from a line in the play The Tempest, by William Shakespeare: “Misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows.” It is spoken by a man who has been shipwrecked and finds himself seeking shelter beside a sleeping monster.
- The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition. 2002.

*****

For more details on the above see Genesis.

For another comparison/contrast of news coverage of the Awakening Councils vs al Qaeda battle, see Decap Attacks.