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No - not yet.
But I believe this article is the most accurate, fact-based, and level headed assessment of the situation - both current and historical - in Iraq as I've ever read.
As far as predictions for the future, few sane people would make them without acknowledging a degree of fallibility. But given the current course of actions these seem reasonably optimistic - though chaos theory along with the sum total experience of human history indicate some surprises await. And while the author's depiction of Sadr is debatable* the remainder of the brief is cold hard fact.
Well worth the read.
*He spent 5 weeks embedded with Sadr forces in 2005 - whether this experience left him with an excessively favorable disposition towards the cleric is anyone's guess. His report on that trip is subscriber only.
(Hat tip: Instapundit)
Added thoughts: The conventional wisdom here on the ground is that Sadr's "ceasefire" is a reality - explanations for that vary. It should be remembered that a similar proclamation was issued by the cleric earlier this year - at the beginning of the surge. Arguments were made (and still can be advanced) that his tactic would simply be to wait out the surge and then unleash his troops. Others speculate that Sadr's control over said troops is limited at best - that assumption can be supported by the general lack of cease-fire over the intervening months.
Cease-fire or no, we are continuing to pursue members of the Jaish al Mahdi (Sadr's Mahdi Army, commonly referred to as JAM, pronounced just like the stuff you spread on bread) and the battle against whatever is left of al Qaeda in Iraq goes on - we are very much still at war. But indirect fire attacks (mortars and rockets fired over the walls by small teams that vanish before impact - the preferred method to "confront" US troops) have dropped, and beyond that American casualties are down even as more soldiers spend more time in the streets. (Coincidence?)
It's likely that an increasing percentage of the "opposition" brought in (or buried) as we increase neighborhood patrols and operations will be the local trouble makers referenced in the linked report above. Barring our withdrawal, at some inevitable point they will get the majority of our combat focus in Iraq. (The day that majority becomes sufficiently overwhelming might also be called VI Day - you figure it out...) Alignment of groups and individuals throughout Iraq is ambiguous, shifting, and exceptionally difficult to determine by Iraqis, let alone US forces. So the possibility exists that that point at which local thugs with no larger alignment - ideological or otherwise - become the predominant "foe" in Iraq may pass without our immediate knowledge. But as al Qaeda crumbles, other local and regional Sunni and Shia groups join the "concerned citizens" effort, and the Sadr faction takes long overdue consideration of a political future the possibility of passing that point grows with each day.
Don't get me wrong, I'm not declaring victory. I am saying that the race to a tipping point - something we've discussed here throughout this year - may have been won. (Caveat: runners can always be tripped up near the finish line...)
I'll close, however, with a repeat of what I said yesterday: ...Lailat ul-Qadr - the "Night of Power" - the key point in Ramadan commemorating Allah's revelation of the Koran to Mohammed, is still to come. If we pass that point without anything "newsworthy" happening - then we can talk.