Recruiting

The Government Accountability Office (formerly the Government Accounting Office) recently released an in-depth report on recruiting in the US military. The entire document is a worthwhile read for those concerned with the issue. You can find it here. Much of its content is devoted to demographics of the military - apologies to those looking for that topic here; maybe a follow-up post will address it. (You can read a news report on that topic here, in which the data are used to respond to yet another demand from Representative Charles Rangel, D-N.Y to reinstate the draft.)

What we will examine here today are the challenges that confront (or confound) military recruiters revealed in this report. In a nutshell, 58% of age-eligible youths can't meet entry-level standards for health, education, aptitude, and other requirements - and are thus ineligible to serve. According to an Atlanta Journal Constitution report on the GAO study:

The total number of those ineligible was about 14 million, leaving only 10 million qualified. But of those, the report said 6 million go to college, leaving only 4 million potential recruits.

2B. Achieving Enlisted Recruiting Goals: Youth Ineligibility

DOD researchers have estimated that over half of U.S. youth aged 16 to 21 could be ineligible to join the military because they cannot meet DOD or service entry standards (9). DOD accession officials stated that inability to meet medical and physical requirements accounts for much of the ineligibility among youth.

- DOD Directive 1304.26 establishes the educational, aptitude, medical, and moral character standards for entry into the military, as well as other standards such as those for age, citizenship, and number of dependent children (10).

- Many youth are ineligible because they cannot meet DOD or service standards for:

- education, as indicated by DOD's preference for accessions with a high school diploma;

- mental aptitude, as indicated by receipt of an acceptable score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test;

- physical fitness, as indicated by the absence of certain medical conditions and the ability to perform the physical challenges of military training; and

- moral character, as indicated by few or no criminal convictions or antisocial behavior.

The services may use more rigorous standards than those prescribed by DOD and create additional standards for areas not covered by DOD.

- Senior officials are allowed to issue waivers for some standards. Comparing data for 1991 to those for 2000 shows that the extent to which certain types of waivers were issued to enlisted accessions changed. For example, the number of moral waivers appeared to have declined, while physical and other types of waivers appear to have increased (11).

Notes:
9 National Research Council, Attitudes, Aptitudes, and Aspirations of American Youth; DOD, Overview Report June 2003 Youth Poll 5, December 2003, p. 71.

10 If married, a recruit can have no more than two dependents under age 18. If unmarried, a recruit must give up custody of dependent children.

11 National Research Council, Attitudes, Aptitudes, and Aspirations of American Youth, briefing fig. 4-9.

2B. Achieving Enlisted Recruiting Goals: Youth Ineligibility and Educational Standards

(Due to oversized images you may need to scroll down to view remainder of post)

All of the services except the Army have educational standards that exceed DOD's standard of having at least 90 percent of accessions possessing a high school diploma (see table 23).

- The Navy and Marine Corps standard is 95 percent, and the Air Force's educational standard is 99 percent.

- Recruits with an alternate educational credential such as a general educational development high school equivalency diploma or a certificate of completion may be assigned a lower enlistment priority because DOD's research shows that holders of an alternate educational credential are less likely than high school diploma graduates to complete military training and their initial obligation.

- DOD educational standards reduce the number of youth eligible for recruitment because DOD requires that at least 90 percent of recruits have a high school diploma, but only 71 percent of all high school students graduate with their class (12). Higher rates of high school completion may be reported in the Current Population Survey and other research, but in addition to high school diploma graduates they include high school equivalency and general educational development diplomas for adults 25 and older.

- In 2002, 52 percent of Hispanics graduated from high school compared to 56 percent of African Americans and 78 percent of Whites. However, of the youth who graduated from high school in 2002 only 40 percent of Whites, 23 percent of African Americans, and 20 percent, of Hispanics had the skills needed to attend a 4-year college (13).

- Most high school graduates qualified for college actually enrolled and this upward trend in college enrollment, both immediately after graduation and in the decade after high school, potentially reduces the number of youth interested in becoming enlisted personnel (14).

Notes:
12 Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Public High School Graduation Rates and College-Readiness: 1991-2002, February 2005.

13 National Research Council, Attitudes, Aptitudes, and Aspirations of American Youth, briefing fig. 4-11.

14 National Research Council, Attitudes, Aptitudes, and Aspirations of American Youth.

2B. Achieving Enlisted Recruiting Goals: Youth Ineligibility and Aptitude Standards

Although DOD requires that at least 60 percent of recruits be from AFQT Categories I-IIIA, the services require that 63 to 77 percent be from Categories I-IIIA (see table 24).

- The number of potential recruits available to enlist is less than the size of the youth population as a whole because DOD can generally access no more than 4 percent of its recruits from those with the lowest third of all AFQT scores.

- The percentage of new recruits scoring at or above the 50th percentile of the AFQT is higher than it was before the AVF (see table 25).

2B. Achieving Enlisted Recruiting Goals: Youth Ineligibility and Medical Standards

Medical conditions result in DOD drawing recruits from only a portion of the overall youth population. DOD research suggests that at least 26 percent of youth have a medical or physical condition that could make them ineligible to join (15).

- DOD officials told us that medical and physical conditions, such as those shown in table 26, were the top reasons youth are ineligible to join the military.

- The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported that as of 2002, about 12 percent of children under 18 years of age had been diagnosed with asthma.

- The National Center for Health Statistics found that obesity among 12-19 year olds increased from 6 percent in 1974 to 16 percent in 2002.

- The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported that the percentage of 5-17 year olds for whom an antidepressant was prescribed or provided tripled from about 2 percent in 1994 to 6 percent in 2000-2002 (16)

Notes:
15 DOD, Overview Report: June 2003 Youth Poll 5, December 2003 p. 72.

16 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Chartbook on Trends in the Health of Americans, p. 63.

2B. Achieving Enlisted Recruiting Goals: Youth Ineligibility and Moral Character Standards

- The number of potential recruits available to enlist is less than the size of the overall youth population because some youth with criminal records or evidence of antisocial behavior will be ineligible to enlist (see table 27 for standards). Researchers at the Army's Center for Accession Research said that about 2 percent of the 17-21 aged population who are qualified for service in the Army were ineligible because they have been incarcerated.

- Illegal drug use is a moral character condition that might result in some potential recruits being disqualified to enlist.

- In 2000, about 25 percent of high school seniors said that they had used an illicit drug in the previous 30 days (17).

- A recent study reported that about 39 percent of high school seniors, about 31 percent of sophomores, and about 15 percent of youth in their last year of middle school reported having used illicit drugs in the previous 12 months (18).

Notes:
17 National Research Council, Attitudes, Aptitudes, and Aspirations of American Youth, briefing fig. 4-16.

18 National Institutes of Health, National Results of Adolescent Drug Use: Overview of key Findings 2004.

2A. Recruiting Overview: Active Component

- AC enlisted accessions

- Each year for fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the AC accessed approximately 176,400 to 183,000 nonprior-service enlisted recruits.

- More of these accessions joined the Army than any other service:

- 39 to 43 percent joined the Army,

- 22 to 27 percent joined the Navy,

- 17 to 20 percent joined the Air Force, and

- 16 to 18 percent joined the Marine Corps.

- In fiscal year 2004, all active components met their goal.

- AC officer accessions

- Each fiscal year from 2000 through 2003, about 17,500 to 21,500 officers were accessed into the AC.

- The percentage of officers accessed by each service is as follows:

- 30 to 34 percent joined the Army,

- 31 to 37 percent joined the Air Force,

- 22 to 29 percent joined the Navy, and

- 7 to 9 percent joined the Marine Corps.

- In fiscal year 2004, the active services accessed over 16,400 officers to active duty. Only the Air Force, with its shortfall of 12 percent (comprised mostly of medical specialty direct appointments), missed its commissioned officer recruiting goal that year (3).

- Active duty officers and enlisted personnel are required to be available to serve for 8 years, although some of that service may be in a reserve component.

Note:
3 Statement of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, David S.C. Chu, before the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee, April 5, 2005, p 20.

2A. Recruiting Overview: Reserve Component

- RC enlisted accessions

- Each year for fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the RC accessed about 118,000 to 153,000 enlisted personnel.

- More of these accessions joined the Army National Guard and Army Reserve than any other service.

- 40 to 44 percent joined the Army National Guard,

- 25 to 32 percent joined the Army Reserve,

- 10 to 11 percent joined the Navy Reserve,

- 6 to 7 percent joined the Marine Corps Reserve,

- 6 to 7 percent joined the Air National Guard, and

- 5 to 8 percent joined the Air Force Reserve.

- In fiscal year 2004, the components accessed about 118,000 enlisted personnel to the RC, and all components except the Army National Guard and Air National Guard met their goal.

- 41 percent joined the Army National Guard,

- 28 percent joined the Army Reserve,

- 10 percent joined the Navy Reserve,

- 8 percent joined the Air Force Reserve,

- 7 percent joined the Marine Corps Reserve, and

- 7 percent joined the Air National Guard.

- One difference between AC and RC recruiting is that the latter relies heavily on recruits who have prior military service. An official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs told us that currently, about 63 percent of the RC has prior military experience. For example,

- In fiscal year 2003, 52 percent of Air National Guard accessions had prior military service (4).

- In fiscal year 2004, at least one-quarter of Marine Corps Reserve recruits had prior military service (5).

- Historically, about 25 percent of active duty servicemembers leaving the Air Force enter the Air Force Reserve, accounting for a significant portion of Air Force Reserve accessions (6).

Stop-loss is a policy instituted by the services that requires military personnel to remain in the service beyond the end of their obligation (7). Because it reduces the number of prior service recruits available to join the RC at a given point in time and because many entering the RC have prior military service, stop-loss has been cited as a factor particularly affecting the reserve components' ability to meet recruitment goals.

- The Air Force was the first to issue a stop-loss in the aftermath of the September 11th attack, although this has since ended.

- The Army is the only service with stop-loss currently in effect, and the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel testified in April 2005 that, during January 2005, the stop-loss program affected 12,353 servicemembers in the Army's active and reserve components. The Army's current unit-based (rather than being driven by occupational specialty) stop-loss policy for its reserve components has remained continuously in effect since it was instituted in 2001 (8).

- Although the reserve components rely partly on recruits with prior military service to meet their recruiting goals, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness noted in April 2005 that because of high AC retention, increasing percentages of RC recruits had no prior military service and that "approximately 50 percent are now expected to come directly from civilian life."

Notes:
4 Statement of Lieutenant General Daniel James III, Director, Air National Guard, before the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee, April 13, 2005.

5 Statements of Lieutenant General Dennis M. McCarthy, Commander, Marine Forces Reserve, before the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee on April 13, 2005, and Lieutenant General H.P. Osman, Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, United States Marine Corps Reserve, before the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee, April 5, 2005.

6 Statement of Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, Chief of Air Force Reserve, before the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee, April 13, 2005.

7 Stop-loss authority is provided by 10 U.S.C. -12305. For a description of the services' implementation of stop-loss after September 11, 2001, see app. VI in Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues, GAO 04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004).

8 See GAO 04-1031.

2B. Achieving Enlisted Recruiting Goals: Performance in Fiscal Years 1995 to 2004

- Figure 5 shows that over the past 10 years, the AC has met its enlisted recruiting goals more frequently than the RC.

- Except for 2 years in the late 1990s, a period of low unemployment and economic expansion, the AC met its recruiting goals.

- The RC did not meet its goals for 6 of the past 10 years.

- DOD researchers reported that events, such as the war in Iraq and increased operational tempo, have made meeting recruiting goals more difficult.

- In April 2005 testimony to the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs said that although the RC was having difficulty meeting its recruiting objectives, reserve reenlistments in fiscal year 2004 were slightly higher than in previous fiscal years.

- Also, the components typically start a new fiscal year with youth who have already signed enlistment contracts and have agreed to delay entry into the military until a later time. Overcoming monthly recruiting deficits may require that components acquire recruits from the delayed entry program. The reduction in the size of the delayed entry program may result in insufficient numbers of recruits being available in future months.

When noting that among all AC services only the Army missed it's recruiting goals for 2005 we should also note the percentage of Army recruits among all military recruits. Since 2000, 39 to 43 percent of all active duty military recruits joined the Army - roughly the equivalent of the Navy and Air Force percentages combined. Likewise, though not considered in the study, the Army's failure to reach it's recruiting goal in 2005 must be kept in the context of its increased end-strength for the year (+20,000). Meanwhile, in raw numbers, the Army recruited 73,000 new troops this year (estimated). Previous year's totals were 77,587 in 2004 and 74,132 in 2003. With very little change (and no trend) in raw numbers, the percentages of recruits/eligibles would be a more significant number than recruits/goal. Those figures aren't available at this time - though I'd guess they likewise haven't changes by any statistically significant amount.

Army retention is high - and this impacts reserve component recruiting (as noted here previously). A "double whammy" for their efforts as they compete for the same recruits, who now more than ever know that a reserve commitment can be every bit as demanding as an active duty tour - and perhaps less predictable.

The Army does face a recruiting challenge - in no way are we claiming otherwise here. But the real solutions require real numbers, which are not quite what the media have been presenting to the public recently. This does a great disservice on a vitally important issue - if public perceptions and discourse are to have any impact on public policy, it's crucial that said public be well informed.