Hey Greyhawk!
The "Ankle Biting Pundits" Link is broken..gets a "404" error.

This problem is not a new one. GH, I agree with your comment that there haven't been many wars since the Cold War, it's just that strategic inertia on the "view" of the forces on hand and their employment that tend to carry on.

"The Army in Vietnam" by Krepinivich used to be required War College reading. His basic premise was we took a central European, armor heavy mentality to the jungles of Vietnam. He did a fine job of explaining it. So, what's old is new again.

From my own Navy Surface experience, I know the last great sea battle was held Oct 25th, 1944. While I served from 76-96, "we," the guys with black shoes, still were sort of spoiling to fight the great Mahanian sea battle, or at least be there to do a modern day Trafalger. The reality was, the submariners, and the brown shoes were going to be the lead in the fight, and we surface guys would have something to do, but in actuality, it may have been more to mop up, or rescue the CV sailors who took the brunt of the AS-4/5/6s and SSN-3/12/19s from the Soviet Naval Air Forces (SNAF) and surface and sub units. I'd also observe from my reading of military affairs, there most likely some Navy Officers who still think surface ships are "where it's at" for the next big shoot 'em up and I'm the dinosaur who had the "blue water Navy" attitude...

Col Harry Summers wrote "On Strategy: A Critcal Analysis of the Vietnam War" to frame the conflict under the priciples of Clausewitz.

His second book in the "series," was "On Strategy: The Gulf War". In this work, he described how the middle grade and junior officers, who had slogged thru the rice paddies, used that experience to redistribute the fighting force of the Army (in particular) between the active duty, USAR and NG units, so as to invlove the entire nation. Two names came up in his writing: Powell and Schwartzkopf as some of those who worked for this. It's that "will of the people" concept from Clausewitz they so masterfully engaged.

All these books are worth the read, if anyone is interested in seeing how the old seems to become the new, over and over, or you could even say it the other way around. Col Summers shows there will be a lag in coming to grips with the real warfighting for the GWoT, and I believe shows how the agents of change are the very men and women who are wearing "railroad tracks" and gold oak leaves at this very moment at some FOB or FSB.

ROCs and POEs and all sorts of requirements will have to be redone, and it will take some of the pointy end of the spear guys getting assigned to the 5 sided funny farm and then having what it takes to step up and begin presenting their ideas, otherwise, we're sort of screwed. We will need the more senior officers and civil servants in high places to listen attentively and take on board those ideas whose time has come and the re-direct the procurement and training "machinery" to be aimed to support that. That's a lot of the inertia to overcome, not the people's mindset, but the logistics train to produce the right weaponry and support equipment to make it happen. Contractors, particularly ones who used to be flag/general ranks, out there will be stumping to keep building what was "normal" to them, and major industry player are using these people to keep the $$$ flowing based on the "status quo."

Solid leadership will save the day, when everyone gets the op order and rogers up for the plan....

I think the criticism of Franks is partially fair. Sure, Afghanistan went well, but there is a significant group of people -- I believe Wayne Downing was one of them -- who argued for a less conventional approach to removing Saddam, one that may, in retrospect, have been more effective.

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While I have no military training or experience to judge by, I found Gen. Franks book very interesting. It described the process of moving from total focus on Afghanistan to breakneck planning for Iraq starting with a 10 year old battle plan (to scrap). Every one was under tremendous pressure, and it seemed that convention was not the rule of the day at all, from an outsider's perspective.

Leave it to the right wing to blame the ongoing military failure in Iraq on Bill Clinton.

Willy;

Great job on your "counter" assessment Were you there at the end of the Cold War to see the depletion of funds, so the Great Society legacy of LBJ could continue?

Define failure as you will, but come back in 20 years and reevaluate your comment. I suspect you'll be eating some crow, just like those MSM guys who editorialized against the Marshall Plan and the rebuilding of Japan...

History, it's what's happened, not what you think it should be.

Curt, I don't expect you to believe me, but I'd like to be wrong because I think the cost of Bush's failure will be enormous, and will be paid by his opponents and his supporters alike.

I love your question: "Define failure." I've been hearing more and more comments like that from the right wing. It will be interesting to watch them try to claim success in Iraq.

p.s.: The opposition to the Marshall Plan came from the Republican right-wing. Read your history.