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Glenn says (or links or quotes) everything I would have on the "Dumpster Diver" story.
No wait, here's more! The desired image the reporters on this issue want to evoke in your mind is one of American troops at the mercy of terrorists, going into a hail of bullets and rockets (think Fallujah) sans protection. That is the popular vision of Iraq in the media, even though that level of violence represents the situatiuon in a tiny part of this country. If combat is the destination of these troops, and if what the young man says is true, then somewhere someone didn't get the memo. That "someone" was not Don Rumsfeld, nor was it President Bush, who in fact wrote said memo. Who "someone" was should be found out. Believe it or not, between Congress and contractors and the Pentagon and delivery systems and grunts in the field there are some weak links in the military supply chain (stifle those gasps!) and that is as inevitable as it is inexcusable.
Yes, it would be satisfying to see some incompetent clown shown the door as a result of this episode, and that might happen, but the system is big beyond any single human's ability to control (yes - even the President of the United States!) the odds of anyone guilty being punished are about equal to the odds of some scapegoat getting the shaft. It's also likely that "someone" won't be found, because it's possible that "someone" doesn't exist.
Ignoring for now the slogan chanters and political partisans, there are a few key points to keep in mind. I will now try to explain to you why this whole situation seems dramatic to those outside looking in and complaining, and less so to those who are doing the best they can to fix the unfixable.
An anonymous quote worth knowing: "The U.S. military has always been perfectly trained and equipped to win the last war".
This painful truth was probably never more evident then in 1990-91 when virtually every piece of equipment in the inventory had to be re-painted from German forest green to a Saddam-inspired tan. The task was accomplished though, and U.S. forces made short work of what was until then the world's 5th largest army.
So for now, at least, enough of a shred of American "can-do" attitude and perseverance survives to ensure that the truism stated above remains only a minor inconvenience. As further evidence of our ability to improvise, adapt, and overcome, when 'bunker-busting' bombs were needed in the first Gulf War they went from drawing board to the desert in approximately 17 days, arriving "too hot to handle" by the waiting ground crews.
A bit of evidence to the contrary though, (or support to the "last war" theory), could be the current state of affairs in Iraq. Many argue that the military proved to be an irrestable invasion force (per 1991 doctrine) that was completely unprepared for the resulting chaotic lack of surviving government infrastructure and the insurgency that has been an often-deadly thorn in the side of progress here. But add that progress is now made in a political/military balancing act (see Fallujah, April through November) and few (none of sound mind) would fault the military completely for any shortfalls.
But here a second painful truth comes into play. "No plan survives first contact with the enemy." It's one of Murphy's Laws of Combat, though Mackubin Thomas Owens relates the actual origin of the phrase here, giving the original quote from Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the Prussian general staff some hundred-plus odd years ago. Von Moltke is often credited with the paraphrasing of his actual quote that is more commonly used today. But given this rule, it's often amusing to hear criticism of the Iraq conflict that includes the phrase "didn't have a plan..." for war, peace or otherwise.
By all means, lets make the supply system better, faster, and more flexible - but lets do so in a way that gets us ready to win the next war. But a caution to those who cry out urging the military to remake itself to fight the current Iraq war, whether by re-defining the role of the Guard/Reserve or other large-scale force structure efforts: Be certain you aren't demanding that the U.S. military strictly adhere to painful truth number one above. In other words, to start preparring now to win the conflict in Iraq - a conflict that will soon be winding down. (See Owen's piece, and imagine the current situation as paralleling the allied approach to the Rhine.)
On the other hand, to those who think that planning now to win the Iraq war is a problem, I offer painful truth number two, which just shows that painful truth number one doesn't matter.
As long as the paragraph about "can-do" attitude and perseverance above remains true. That, by the way, was the key point of the whole discussion. But you knew that when you read it, didn't you?