Lessons

Some time back I was asked about steps being taken to counter low-tech improvised explosive devices in Iraq. Here's partial answer, from the Washington Post's details on "lessons learned" from the troops departing Iraq. (Warning: graphic discussion of violence in the linked article.)

As the insurgency in the Sunni Triangle was heating up last fall, Lt. Col. Steve Russell was dealing with a new wave of attacks in which bombers were using the transmitters from radio-controlled toy cars: They would take the electronic guts of the cars, wrap them in C-4 plastic explosive and attach a blasting cap, then detonate them by remote control.

So Russell, who commands an infantry battalion in deposed president Saddam Hussein's home town of Tikrit, mounted one of the toy-car controllers on the dashboard of his Humvee and taped down the levers. Because all the toy cars operated on the same frequency, this would detonate any similar bomb about 100 yards before his Humvee got to the spot. This "poor man's anti-explosive device" was "risky perhaps," Russell writes in a 58-page summary of his unit's time in Iraq but better than leaving the detonation to the bombers.

Emphasis added to the following:

As one of the biggest troop rotations in U.S. history gets underway in Iraq, with almost 250,000 soldiers coming or going, the seasoned units that are leaving are doing their best to pass on such hard-won knowledge to their successors, in e-mails, in essays, in PowerPoint presentations and rambling memoirs posted on Web sites or sent to rear detachments. And in the process, these veterans of Iraq have provided an alternate history of the Army's experience there over the past nine months -- one that is far more personal than the images offered by the media and often grimmer than the official accounts of steady progress.

Taken together, these documents tell a story of an unexpectedly hard small war that has been punctuated by casualties that haunt the writers. At the same time, they show how a well-trained, professional force adjusted last year to the first sustained ground combat faced by U.S. troops in three decades, relearning timeless lessons of warfare and figuring out new ones.

An "unexpectedly hard small war"? Packed with amazing revelations (the people of Saddam's home town hate us) the stories from the troops will be used to justify "quagmire" claims from many of the same folks who predicted hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions of refugees.

And with a decidedly different set of lessons learned, here from one of those "memoirs posted on Web sites" is Arkhangel, ("I'm a soldier in the U.S. Army. Currently, I'm in the eighth month of a scheduled year-long rotation in Iraq.")

Yet, we based virtually all our planning on the best-case scenario, and refused to plan for the worst-case scenario. This became more and more obvious the higher you ascended the Pentagon's chain of command. For example, it wasn't until early August that the highest levels of command admitted that we were fighting a guerrilla war--even though we had already lost more men than in the Bosnia and Kosovo operations combined by that point.

And it wasn't just the guerrilla war...it was thinking that Iraq had a far more modern infrastructure (it doesn't); it was thinking that the population would embrace us (they haven't; in fact, they can't stand us, except for those who work for the occupation authorities, and even there, opinion is decidedly mixed); it was hoping that other nations would pitch in to help us, even though we had offended most of the world with our actions throughout the past two years (Kyoto, the ICC, and the build up to war only being a few examples)...I could go on, but the conclusion is simple and inescapable: we were banking on hope, rather than reality, to see us through. And you can't do that. Hope is not a plan.

Not sure who Arkhangel's "we" are, but I doubt he actually was one of the planners of the war. But for a soldier in Iraq (which claim I do not dispute), Arkhangel's thoughts on our progress there seem to draw more on feelings (to which he is absolutely entitled) without any cited facts supporting his statements. (Or with a careles disregard of facts: Bosnia and Kosovo were bombing campaigns; hard to lose soldiers in those.) Though thoughtful and informed, most of the claims could have been lifted without question from any lefty blog. The same tone is used when discussing the situation in Afghanistan.

And like the lefty blogs, the Bush hate shines through loud and clear.

Still, Arkhangel offers the first evidence I've seen yet from a military person that the Iraq mission is an unjustified failure. And he's certainly in a better position than I am to judge. I suppose only time will tell.

Although from the military vantage point I think the toy car remote control is a more useful lesson learned.

Hat tip: Tacitus

UPDATE: From the WaPo story: "We had to learn the hard way," Capt. Daniel Morgan, an infantry company commander in the 101st Airborne Division, writes in an essay that is rocketing around military e-mail circles.

Perhaps it is, but it's also an Army Times story available here. Long, but worth the effort. Should be required for those readying for downrange. Excerpt:

An explosion rocks the vehicle in front of you, throwing soldiers onto the street. You see the vehicle rise up onto two wheels before settling and rolling to a stop. AK-47 fire and RPGs are heard almost simultaneously. Your soldiers stagger about trying to shake off the effects of the concussion. Some fire wildly in different directions because the cracking of the AK-47s are echoing off the buildings, so you cannot pinpoint the direction of fire. The battle drill says to clear the kill zone, but you have competing priorities. First, you have casualties that need to be secured, assessed and stabilized. Second, if you run, you won’t kill the enemy or deter them. You must fight back and hopefully kill them. Do you stay in the kill zone and fight?

This happened to my soldiers and me. Sadly, this has happened to my company and me on several occasions in various forms. On this day, I lost a platoon sergeant and it was a devastating experience to many soldiers. He is alive but when I got to that truck he was a pile of blood and matter. His leg was completely blown off with shrapnel wounds all over him. He stayed there as we secured everything, trying to still lead his soldiers. We fought back that day, killing one suspected enemy and detaining two more. This reaction occurred due to rehearsals, AARs, aggressive leadership at every level, and discipline.