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The Mudville Gazette is written and produced by Greyhawk, the call sign of a real military guy currently serving somewhere in Iraq. Unless otherwise credited, the opinions expressed are those of the author, and nothing here is to be taken as representing the official position of or endorsement by the United States Department of Defense or any of its subordinate components. Furthermore, I will occasionally use satire or parody herein. The bottom line: it's my house.

I like having visitors to my house. I hope you are entertained. I fight for your right to free speech, and am thrilled when you exercise said rights here. Comments and e-mails are welcome, but all such communication is to be assumed to be 1)the original work of any who initiate said communication and 2)the property of the Mudville Gazette, with free use granted thereto for publication in electronic or written form. If you do NOT wish to have your message posted, write "CONFIDENTIAL" in the subject line of your email.

Original content copyright © 2003 - 2009 by Greyhawk. Fair, not-for-profit use of said material by others is encouraged, as long as acknowledgement and credit is given, to include the url of the original source post. Other arrangements can be made as needed.

Contact: greyhawk at mudvillegazette dot com

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« June 2010 | Main | August 2010 »

July 30, 2010

Should the military get a free pass?

[Greyhawk]

I say yes.

To clarify, that's a free pass to Blog World and New Media Expo in Vegas:

A free pass to the military track at this year's Blog World and New Media Expo (http://blogworldexpo.com) is being offered to all members of the Armed Forces. The free pass not only provides access to the military track panels on Thursday 14 October, but to the exhibit hall and evening events for the entire conference.

"The military secures our freedoms, including our ability to blog about any and all topics," says Blog World CEO Rick Calvert. "Social Media has changed the way we all communicate in our personal and business lives and the military is no exception. Blogs and social networking tools have been a godsend to Military personal deployed half a world away from their loved ones; allowing them to communicate with their families easier than ever before. Many of them (and their spouses) also generously share their experiences on their personal blogs, giving civilians a much deeper understanding of the level of sacrifice our men and women in the armed forces make for our freedoms. It is truly our honor and pleasure to provide them this free pass."

Rick's a good guy, and he's never failed to put on a hellofagood show. I look forward to spending some time with him again this year.

NOTE: A little birdie has told me that the illustrious Greyhawk has agreed to be the host/MC for the military track at Blog World...

Yup. It's going to be fun. (And "evening events" are just a small part of that...)

I've got a few more upcoming announcements, too. There are several reasons I've spent little time in Mudville lately - mostly because multiple other projects are moving from idea stage to reality. Stay tuned... (but meanwhile, sign up for the Expo.)

Posted at 1429Z

Quatto no quitto:

[Greyhawk]

"The return of the crazy monkey".


Posted at 1354Z

Dirty Deeds (Done Dirt Cheap)

[Greyhawk]

The Telegraph:

The Taliban has issued a warning to Afghans whose names might appear on the leaked Afghanistan war logs as informers for the Nato-led coalition.

In an interview with Channel 4 News, Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman, said they were studying and investigating the report, adding "If they are US spies, then we know how to punish them."

The warning came as the US military's top officer, Admiral Mike Mullen said that Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks, may already have blood on his hands following the leak of 92,000 classified documents relating to the war in Afghanistan by his website.

For months the Taliban have been able to assure the people of Afghanistan that the US and its NATO allies are headed for the exit as fast as possible. That was never a difficult task - they've got numerous quotes from the American Vice President (and a few from the President) to support their claims. The military's "deeds not words" response ("They will judge us by our actions. ... What they [Afghans] are really judging is not our rhetoric... We should contest enemy propaganda about timelines and stress that we will help them in long term partnership. We have to prove that with our actions, not just our words...") to that is valiant* (and the only way to avoid verbally "disagreeing" with the civilian leadership) - but expect the Taliban to do some deeds of their own to back up their words (quoted above) in the near-future, too.

Make no mistake - the Taliban's "warning to Afghans whose names might appear on the leaked Afghanistan war logs as informers" is directed to a much wider audience than that. Even before the Wikileaks dump the point of their message was simple, clear and effective: don't cooperate with them - they won't be here long enough to protect you. Now that's reinforced with another: they can't keep a secret. It would be tough enough to counter those messages if they were lies - unfortunately they aren't.

The slope of the uphill battle just got a lot steeper.

*****


*A couple of illustrations - one:

In the village of Abdul Ghayas in Helmand Province last month, for example, a local resident exasperated two Marines when he told them that he was nervous about helping with their plans for a new school out of fear that the Taliban would retaliate after the Americans went home next year.

"That's why they won't work with us," Cpl. Lisa Gardner, one of the Marines, told a reporter traveling with the unit. "They say you'll leave in 2011 and the Taliban will chop their heads off. It's so frustrating."

Later in the day, Corporal Gardner and the other Marine, Cpl. Diana Amaya, reported the villager's reaction back at the base. Lance Cpl. Caleb Quessenberry advised them on how to deal with similar comments in the future. "Roll it off as, 'That's what somebody's saying,' " he told them. "As far as we know, we're here."

A senior American intelligence official said the Taliban had effectively used the deadline to their advantage...

It's obviously dangerous for generals to refute the Vice President of the United States - for young corporals it's impossible.
And two:

"It's a tough task, made more difficult because the locals question the Marines commitment to stay and fight."


"They don't want to trust us because they don't think we're going to be here for the long haul."

Good luck, kid. You'll need it.

I doubt these guys think "Bradass87" is a hero.



Posted at 0937Z

July 29, 2010

Leaker ID'd

[Greyhawk]


No surprise:

Investigators have found concrete evidence linking Pfc. Bradley Manning with the leak of classified Afghanistan war reports, a U.S. defense official said.

To paraphrase General Petraeus (speaking on another topic), let me tell you how this ends:

As for probable outcomes, these seem likely:

  1. Wikileaks launches a big fundraiser for Manning's defense (possibly w/t-shirt sales)
  2. They give some of the money to an attorney to represent him
  3. He's found guilty and spends years in prison

Step one appears to be done, with a goal of scoring $200,000. (Not sure about the t-shirts, though.) If it all works out, the wikileak's crew could make more money of this than they did on the snuff porn film and other documents they (allegedly ;)) received from Manning in the first place.

More: yes, Bradley, this will not look good on your performance report:

Watkins, Manning's friend, told Wired.com that Manning was very good at his job and struggled with the decision to leak the Iraq video.

"By doing that, he put his career in imminent danger," Watkins said. "He had put a lot of work and effort into doing his job well and is very good at what he did. To do this, and to get caught, basically kills any chance of career advancement.... It's not something career-wise and personal-wise that you necessarily bounce back from."

Manning told Lamo that he wasn't so much afraid of getting caught and facing the consequences of his actions but "of being misunderstood, and never having the chance to live the life I wanted to."

Back to the first story for an oh by the way:
Because of the focus on civilians who may have aided Pfc. Manning, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department have been brought into aid the investigation, which is being led by the Army Criminal Investigation Command.

I wonder if Assange had direct contact with Manning... (Wired says "Julian Assange had offered him (Manning) a position at Wikileaks.")

And more: speaking of leaking, it seems like everyone involved in this story is leaking all over everyone else... and wow - "never having the chance to live the life I wanted to" apparently means something very different from what I thought.



Posted at 1400Z

July 28, 2010

Wanna know a secret?

[Greyhawk]

...or "Let's take a data dump!"

The wikileaks document dump, day three: is it over yet? As yet no smoking gun, no "hide the decline" - not even anything as moderately outrageous as a "call Rush Limbaugh a racist, set him on fire, throw him through a plate glass window and laugh while he dies of a heart attack" quote. In short, compared to the various document data dumps big media has mostly ignored over the past year, this one - the one that rolled out with a global light and sound show complete with bells, whistles and special features tailored to the British, German, and American markets - is pretty much lame. (And let's face it, 90k+ soulless sitreps just don't have the public attention draw that viral video snuff porn does in the first place.)

So interest fades... but again it's only day three of the public viewing. Somewhere, as you read this, people are still poring over the documents. Some are just curious (and discovering a whole new level of boredom). Others are bad guys, looking for new ways or reasons to kill people. But aside from the merely curious and the purely evil we have the truly righteous - journalists, new media and old, (and a few congressional staffers, too...) hoping against hope to discover that elusive smoking gun that will at last confirm... uh, something. Something to get them some attention newsworthy, that confirms something (everything, even) that they've been warning people about forever but no one would listen. Some might find their something - but one by one most will give up (many already have) and share with us their conclusion that the sheer bulk of the documents confirms everything they've been saying (and everyone else has been ignoring) all along...

If so, they shouldn't feel bad - the New York Times, the Guardian, and der Spiegel all had access to the document database several weeks in advance of the lesser world, and their best and brightest came up similarly empty handed. Each has already offered their triumphant first drafts of the bottom line from the last paragraph. There actually is a revelation there, but thus far it hasn't dawned on many, in part because it's the opposite of what they desperately hoped to confirm: compared to climategate there's really not much hidden about the broader conduct and issues surrounding the U.S. military activity in Afghanistan. True, we can at long last look upon many of the classified (a term now exposed as less sexycool and more clerical than most people ever imagined) and previously unseen small parts of a whole - but that, we might rightly conclude upon examining the stockpile, is analogous to actually seeing the nails and lumber we always suspected were in the framework of our homes - or the many nuts and bolts connecting the steel and rubber and plastic that altogether make up a car - and declaring that at last we've got proof of the existence of houses and cars. (Sure, we've seen many of those parts before, and the mechanics have assured us they were all there - but who can trust 'em?)

The wikileaks dump couldn't have come at a better time for journalists. Many have just had large chunks of their own super top-secret database exposed to the light of day. You might have heard about that story - but if so it probably wasn't from them. The very people who decide that emails exposing the machinations of scientists providing crucial global warming data to governments (data that informs decisions on national security - among other things) aren't noteworthy (beyond a quick dismissal and an expression of concern for internet-based violations of personal privacy) but that a general's expressed disdain for taking a phone call from a civilian counterpart is a constitutional crisis threatening the very foundations of our Democracy would probably rather you not know to what degree those decisions are coordinated. Small wonder they'd welcome the Wikileaks distraction - and invest heavily in it. There must be something there - after all, doesn't everyone behave exactly as they do?


Posted at 1750Z

July 26, 2010

The Theatre of War

[Greyhawk]

Today in history: July 26, 1897, Lt Winston Churchill - home on leave from India, gives a political speech. Not just any speech - it was his first ever:

If it were 'pardonable in any speaker', the local newspaper reported Churchill as saying, 'to begin with the well-worn and time-honoured apology, "unaccustomed as I am to public speaking", it would be pardonable in his case, for the honour he was enjoying at that moment of addressing an audience of his fellow countrymen and women was the first honour of the kind he had ever received'.

He had hopes for a political career after his military service, and with that in mind he was addressing members of the local Primrose League (an organization co-founded by his father), and speaking primarily on the various parties' approaches to a workman's compensation act then before Parliament. He favored the act, and the security it meant for men engaged in dangerous tasks. He assured his listeners that "the British workman has more to hope for from the rising tide of Tory democracy than from the dried-up drainpipe of radicalism" - then finished with a flourish:

"There are not wanting those who say that in this Jubilee year our Empire has reached the height of its glory and power, and that now we shall begin to decline, as Babylon, Carthage, Rome, declined. Do not believe these croakers but give the lie to their dismal croaking by showing by our actions that the vigour and vitality of our race is unimpaired and that our determination is to uphold the Empire that we have inherited from our fathers as Englishmen," (cheers) "that our flag shall fly high upon the sea, our voice be heard in the councils of Europe, our Sovereign supported by the love of her subjects, then shall we continue to pursue that course marked out for us by an all-wise hand and carry out our mission of bearing peace, civilisation and good government to the uttermost ends of the earth." (Loud cheers.)

Stirring perhaps, optimistic indeed - but certainly the finest hour was yet to come.

Having accomplished that mission, he went to Goodwood for the races. But still unknown to Churchill at the time, the very day he was enduring this experience, war had erupted in India - along the mountainous Afghan frontier.

On the evening of the 26th, Lieutenant Rattray went over to Khar as usual to play polo. Just as the game was ended, he received a letter, brought in haste by two sowars, from Lieutenant Wheatley, the other subaltern at Chakdara, warning him that a great number of Pathans with flags were advancing on the fort. He at once galloped back at full speed, passing close to one large gathering of tribesmen, who for some reason of their own took no notice of him, and so reached the fort in safety, and just in time. Formidable masses of men were then closing in on it. He telegraphed to the staff officer at the Malakand reporting the impending attack. Immediately afterwards the wire was cut by the enemy and the little garrison got under arms.
Even as the fighting intensified, the telegraph brought the news from the edge of empire swiftly to London:

Whitehall reacted by announcing that a field force of three brigades would put down the uprising. It would be led by General Sir Bindon Blood.

Churchill was standing on the lawn at the Goodwood races, enjoying balmy weather and winning money, when the report of this decision buzzed through the crowd. He was electrified. On meeting Sir Bindon at Deepdene the year before, he had extracted a promise that, should the general take the field again, Winston would join him. Churchill had three weeks of leave left, but he instantly wired Blood, reminding him of his pledge, and caught the next boat to India, the S.S. Rome, leaving behind, in his haste, a batch of new books, his polo sticks, his pet dog Peas, a Primrose League badge old Mr Skrine had lent him in Bath, and, of course, a sheaf of bills.

Politics could wait.

A bit.

"The tale that I have to tell is one of frontier war," he would eventually write...


Posted at 1900Z

Heads will Roll

[Greyhawk]

Mother Jones:

The other interesting data are notes from what the military calls KLEs--key leader engagements. Military officers, as well as officials from State, USAID, and other agencies regularly meet with important players in a war zone to get their take on the situation. Often they're dull and tell the interviewers little they didn't already know; sometimes, though, they give insight to "atmospherics"--how Afghan locals feel about US forces or the Taliban. Many of these key leaders take their lives into their hands; from my experience in Iraq, I know that numerous Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds with high standing among their tribes--and among our enemies--took time to brief US officials, often to dish dirt on crooked or violent elements in their vicinity. If they were ever outed as collaborators with American forces, they'd be as good as dead. And Wikileaks has 16 pages of secret military KLEs with individuals and groups in Afghanistan, spanning six years. No names are redacted.

I doubt Julian Assange will lose any sleep over a few coolies getting their heads sawed off. (Hell, if he's lucky, he'll even get copies of the videos - then he'd have something people would actually want to see.)

The Mother Jones story, by the way, provides one of the better overall descriptions/assessments of the wikileak's document collection I've seen. Most of those documents are reports saying "this might be something" - some of which might sound exciting, most of which were determined not. Noah Shachtman has a good example here.



Posted at 1335Z

News from the shelter (2)

[Greyhawk]

The New York Times:

The New York Times, the British newspaper The Guardian and the German magazine Der Spiegel were given access to the voluminous records several weeks ago on the condition that they not report on the material before Sunday.

And with that several weeks head start, they were able to come up with... nothing, really. Maybe they're holding off on delivering something newsworthy, but so far I've seen much hype and no news. (Actually, there's one exception - but as far as I can tell no one else has noticed it, more on that later.) The headlines read like ad copy for the latest greatest movie ever made, but when I read the stories themselves I realize I've seen it before. Spiegel, the Guardian, and the Times are all making a valiant effort to hype what they've got - but so far that's not much.

Their worse than anyone ever knew (Times headline linked above: "View Is Bleaker Than Official Portrayal of War in Afghanistan") and first time ever we've heard about the war from troops on the ground angles aren't just patently false, they're the same things said about Iraq almost every time a soldier was quoted in a story just a few short years ago.

de rigeur
Greyhawk/October 30, 2007

Or: "How many media reports on the failure of the media to report the horrors of Iraq will we need to see before realizing the magnitude of their failure?"

Stray thought. A quote from a recent WaPo piece:

"This is a dangerous place," said Capt. Lee Showman, 28, a senior officer in the battalion. "People are killed here every day, and you don't hear about it. People are kidnapped here every day, and you don't hear about it."
<...>
The American people don't fully realize what's going on, said Staff Sgt. Richard McClary, 27, a section leader from Buffalo.

"They just know back there what the higher-ups here tell them."

I've discussed the broader implications of the piece elsewhere, but wanted to point out something specific (and specifically annoying to me) here. Whenever the media takes a break from broadcasting the horror/quagmire/failure/mistake/death toll that is Iraq and instead publishes a quote from a GI that they will insist supports their view of Iraq as horror/quagmire/failure/etc., the story will invariably include a quote from said GI to the effect that the media doesn't ever report what a horror/quagmire/failure Iraq is. This may even be in the stylebook. If not, it's an unwritten but inviolable rule*. And apparently there's no limit to the number of times some people can hear/read that without catching on.

While reasonable people can argue the degree to which Iraq is any of those things, it's absurd to argue Americans are ignorant of the issue due to some failure of the media - an absurdity compounded when included in the latest in a long line of stories arguing an extreme view. One is entitled to his or her opinion, but not to his or her own facts.

*Greyhawk's rule of media reports from Iraq: Whenever using a GI quote to support the view that Iraq is every bit the disaster we say it is, always include a quote implying that said GI resents the media failure to report it as such.

Afghanistan is not Iraq - among the differences, the news coverage isn't as extensive. There are multiple reasons for that, including a confluence of people really don't care (this was true in '07, too) and reporters really don't want to bash the president (a more recent development). But for those few who want the news, it's available, and while milblogs from the front have dwindled to a small handful there are more (and better informed) bloggers (the term is increasingly less accurate) doing good analysis of events than ever before. Ed Morrissey named one in summing up the wikileaks "treasue trove" pretty well here: "it's the Long War Journal, only less detailed."





Posted at 1148Z

News from the shelter

[Greyhawk]

Spiegel:

Never before has it been possible to compare the reality on the battlefield in such a detailed manner with what the US Army propaganda machinery is propagating. WikiLeaks plans to post the documents, most of which are classified, on its website.

Britain's Guardian newspaper, the New York Times and SPIEGEL have all vetted the material and compared the data with independent reports. All three media sources have concluded that the documents are authentic and provide an unvarnished image of the war in Afghanistan -- from the perspective of the soldiers who are fighting it.

I am not responsible for damage to your monitor if you were drinking while reading that.



Posted at 1137Z

Once an Eagle

[Greyhawk]


Available for pre-order: Once An Eagle - the television miniseries adaptation of Anton Myrer's classic novel.


I've read the book, but don't even remember this being on TV. (But I've ordered it!)




Posted at 0826Z

July 25, 2010

General McChrystal Retirement

[Greyhawk]

"I have stories on all of you, photos on many, and I know a Rolling Stone reporter...."


This is frustrating. I spent a career waiting to give a retirement speech and lie about what a great soldier I was. Then people show up who were actually there. It proves what Doug Brown taught me long ago; nothing ruins a good war story like an eyewitness.

To show you how bad it is, I can't even tell you I was the best player in my little league because the kid who was the best player is here tonight. In case you're looking around, he's not a kid anymore.

But to those here tonight who feel the need to contradict my memories with the truth, remember I was there too. I have stories on all of you, photos on many, and I know a Rolling Stone reporter. (Laughter.) (Applause.)

More below, including quotes from Winston Churchill* and Steven Pressfield*. (And anyone who can do that is alright in my book. Or my blog...)



Posted at 1345Z

July 21, 2010

The right to lie

[Greyhawk]

Since I've considered the issue before writing - and thus am late to weigh in, you've probably already heard this news: "A federal judge in Denver has ruled that the Stolen Valor Act is "facially unconstitutional" because it violates free speech..."

Disclosure: I was the first person to publicly expose much of what's known about the background of the defendant in this case. That said, we're going to ignore the specific defendant in this discussion - but note there's no denying he had committed the crime with which he was charged. ("...falsely representing himself to have been awarded a Purple Heart on four different occasions in 2006 and 2009, and falsely representing that he had been awarded a Silver Star on one occasion in 2009.") Likewise, there's no denying that what he did was against the law. At issue is the question does the law (the Stolen Valor Act - SVA) that criminalizes those actions violate First Amendment protections? And it's not an issue on which we should allow our opinion of any individual accused to intrude.

I'll pause here for my own confession: I don't believe lying about having medals should have been criminalized. (Think "dude telling lies in a bar to impress girls" here.) Public humiliation, scorn, and other associated results of exposure seem like sufficient punishment to me. (And hey, gullible marks sometimes need to learn life's lessons the hard way...) However, I didn't feel strongly enough about that to register any objection to the bill when it passed in 2006. And I know that a significant number of my fellow vets disagree with me on that point, they feel genuinely aggrieved, so frankly I tend to yield to them. The SVA was passed (by unanimous consent in the Senate, and by voice vote in the House) with overwhelming support from veteran's groups, and signed into law by the President. I'm not the kind of person who needs a law to prevent me from claiming undue honors - I didn't do so before 2006 and still won't - but I have no problem with the existence of this law. (Though it's a law that - regardless of your thoughts or mine on the matter - was begging for a court challenge on First Amendment grounds.)

But when I first read Judge Robert Blackburn's decision granting the defense's motion to dismiss I found I wasn't in full agreement (or comfortable, even) with statements like this:

"The social approbation that attends those who would attempt to bask in the reflected glory of honors they have not earned demonstrates that the people of this nation continue to revere our brave military men and women regardless of - or perhaps even more so because of - false and vainglorious attempts to appropriate such accolades."
But that concern aside, I did hear fife and drums welling up in my imagination when I read this powerfully-stated (and persuasive) opinion.
I have profound faith - a faith that appears to be questioned by the government here - that the reputation, honor, and dignity military decorations embody are not so tenuous or ephemeral as to be erased by the mere utterance of a false claim of entitlement.

If you didn't hear echoes of the voice of famed TV jurist Oliver Wendell Douglas (or the big screen's Eric "Otter" Stratton) when you read it then you're probably younger than me. However, that's an appeal to emotion, not to established law.

And no matter how old you are, you - like Judge Blackburn - would be hard-pressed to find direct precedent in this case.

The only other court that appears to have addressed the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act relied on a similar rationale in rejecting a defendant's First Amendment challenge to the statute. (See id. App, Exh. A (Order Denying Defendant's Motion To Dismiss, United States v. Alvarez, CR 07-1035(A)-RGK).)

Judge Blackburn didn't accept that decision, and was thus forced to turn to more tenuous and ephemeral precedents. (One of which - Stevens - even includes the quote "[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.") But we can indeed "see" the Alvarez decision here. Excerpt:

On July 23, 2007, Defendant Xavier Alvarez ("Alvarez" or "Defendant") falsely claimed to have received the Congressional Medal of Honor. Defendant made the statement while introducing himself to the Walnut Valley Water District Board as a newly elected director. According to a digital recording of the meeting, he stated, among other things: "I'm a retired Marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I got wounded many times by the same guy. I'm still around."

Mr Alvarez argued that his lie (" I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor") was protected political speech under the First Amendment. But in his case U.S. District Judge (Central California) R. Gary Klausner ruled:

Here, this Court is presented with a false statement of fact, made knowingly and intentionally by Defendant at a Municipal Water District Board meeting. The content of the speech itself does not portray a political message, nor does it deal with a matter of public debate. Rather, it appears to be merely a lie intended to impress others present at the meeting. Such lies are not protected by the Constitution.

Bold emphasis added. And there we have a simple truth, a statement of fact.

We do have something that could be called a limited "right to lie" now, as Judge Klausner acknowledged - by way of explaining why Alvarez doesn't merit that protection:

The statute is narrowly written to proscribe deliberate false statements concerning a very specific subject matter: the receipt of military decorations or medals. As such, the statute does not suppress legitimate political speech. Moreover, the statute does not risk chilling public discourse. Whether one actually received a military award is easily verifiable and not subject to multiple interpretations; thus, there is no danger that the statute will discourage truthful statements about military service or any other matters.

But Judge Blackburn, having acknowledged the earlier decision, dismisses it.

And here we arrive at another question - much broader than "is the Stolen Valor Act Constitutional?" or even "should lying be illegal?" We must now ask, "do Americans have a Constitutional right to lie?"

My answers to those three questions in order are yes, no, and no. But - pending appeal of both cases - we may soon all have the right to lie. (Others may not see it coming... I am not so sanguine.)

(The discussion continues here...)



Posted at 1639Z

July 19, 2010

Little Meg

[Greyhawk]

Lt Churchill, from 1897, describes something you won't see modern NATO troops in Afghanistan doing any time soon: "Many officers who were married brought their wives and families to the camp among the mountains, and the whole place was rapidly becoming a regular cantonment."

Among those calling the fort their home, Colonel (commander of British and Indian troops at Malakand) William Hope Meiklejohn's four-year-old daughter, Meg.

megm.png

Meg, according to this BBC report, "was in the garrison throughout the siege in the scorching heat of the high summer of 1897. She would almost certainly have been killed by the tribesmen - not renowned for taking prisoners - if it had fallen."

"We are attacked by fanatics almost every night," wrote Col Meiklejohn in one of his daily letters to his wife.

But even though he was responsible for the fort and the surrounding military outposts, he still found time to reassure her that their young daughter was safe and well.

But it was Meg's nanny who was responsible for writing to Mrs Meiklejohn about their daughter's safety.

"My dear Mrs Meiklejohn, just a line in a hurry to let you know that Miss Meggie is quite well, covered in prickly heat... But do not worry a bit about your dear baby girl, you must know that we are quite safe," the letter said.

"In retrospect, her nanny may have understated the seriousness of the situation," Mr Tottenham told the BBC News website.

More Malakand photos from the BBC here.

And more details on the second day of fighting around the Malakand fort from Lt Churchill below.



Posted at 1852Z

Though the road goes ever onward...

[Greyhawk]

Welcome home, welcome home...

The terminal at Bangor, Maine airport changed little in the 360 days between my deployment and homecoming transit stops. We stepped off our charter jet after 16 hours of overseas travel from Kyrgyzstan via Bucharest, finally setting foot on U.S. soil. A line of Vietnam and Cold War era veterans stood waiting for us as we walked through the gate. They greeted us with a warm applause and extended their hands. "Welcome home, Lieutenant," each said to me with bright, shining, grandfatherly smiles...

And the young warrior walked on to confront the endless age-old questions about the longer road ahead. Read the whole thing - and welcome Rajiv Srinivasan home.




Posted at 1126Z

Returned to sender

[Greyhawk]

Marjah re-cap, short version (or follow the storyline beginning here): Marines move in to pacify Helmand Province district, Taliban (much aided by US government 'strategic communications' efforts emphasizing departure) stick around - believing Marines can't convince the population they'll stay long enough to matter. They keep themselves busy planting IEDs and occasionally exchanging gunfire with Marines.

Meanwhile, into this 'pacified' region the civilians then deliver their 'government in a box.' The first thing out of that box? Ta-dah! - a new governor:

The newly appointed top official in Marja, Abdul Zahir Aryan, is the Afghan face of the American-led military offensive. As the lone government representative in this town, he stands at the center of the next phase of the battle: the fight to build an Afghan government that is more attractive than Taliban rule.

But Zahir, who goes by Haji Zahir, arrived at this position after a tumultuous personal history that American and Afghan officials have not publicly disclosed. During more than a decade living in Germany, Zahir, 60, served four years in prison for attempted murder after stabbing his stepson, according to U.S. officials.
<...>
Zahir said he hopes to have about 50 people eventually working in the Marja government, including representatives from the central ministries. His office has been approved for seven staff members -- including an administrative assistant, cook, maid, and driver, though for the moment he relies on U.S. and British civilian advisers, along with the Marines.

"I think things are going well. The people are happy," he said. "They have a new and honest government."

Old news, that. Here's the new news:

Officials on Wednesday confirmed that the government representative in the troubled southern district of Marjah had been replaced, barely six months after a major NATO military offensive to retake the area from the Taliban.

Provincial spokesman Daoud Ahmadi said Abdul Zahir has been replaced as district chief as part of a "reform procedure." He would not say if Zahir was removed because of continued instability in Marjah. The southern farming town -- much like the current Kandahar push -- was intended to be a showcase of good Afghan governance after combined Afghan and international forces expelled the Taliban, but authorities have struggled to consolidate their control.

Hodges, the American commander, said Zahir was ousted for refusing to take a qualification test required under Afghan law. He said he did not have details but suspected the test requirement was waived when Zahir was first recruited as district chief.



Posted at 0732Z

July 17, 2010

Change

[Greyhawk]

I've got some good news and some bad news...
The good news? Obama.
The bad news? Petraeus.
At least, that's how I suspect it's explained in some style guides..

One week ago the news from Afghanistan was Karzai opposes Petraeus on village militias. At least, "according to U.S. officials." Senior US officials, even. (Forced to guess, I'd guess they were civilian officials in Afghanistan - but that's still a guess.)

Four days later: "Afghan President Hamid Karzai has approved a program that will set up local police forces in towns and villages where the Taliban are attempting to infiltrate and intimidate the population."

That quick turn is good news.

But speaking of quick turns, the Post's coverage last Saturday (bold highlights added) began with "As he takes charge of the war effort in Afghanistan, Gen. David H. Petraeus has met sharp resistance from President Hamid Karzai to an American plan..." And shortly following that: "The U.S. initiative was developed under Petraeus's predecessor, ousted Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, although Petraeus has been a strong supporter of such programs."

Wednesday's better news in the Post opened by introducing another key player - one whose name was absent from the previous gloomy coverage: "In a welcome step forward for the Obama administration's beleaguered war strategy, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has approved a U.S.-backed plan to create local defense forces ..."

That's Obama administration, to be sure. But if positive trends continue that reference will be shortened.

(That aside, there's a fundamental truth that should be of primary consideration on the topic of arming the locals: if we don't do it, someone else will. With that in mind, Small Wars Journal's Tribal Engagement Workshop is a great resource for in-depth examination from multiple points-of-view.)


Posted at 1114Z

July 15, 2010

Monkey Update

[Greyhawk]

Speaking of breaking stories, here's what's happened with the Taliban monkey tale since we first revealed the phony toy gun photos last week.


"Maybe the terrorists should stick to monkey bars..." Did I really just hear that on CNN?

But I got a good laugh from that story on Monday - and from Jeff Shogol's "Rumor Doctor" Stars and Stripes coverage the same day.

By Tuesday, Jeff had obtained what appears to be an unaltered version of the full color picture, which we already know dates back at least to 2007. But an even better catch is this gem of a quote:

A spokesman for the Chinese Embassy defended the coverage by People's Daily on the Taliban monkeys.

"It's above question that the Chinese government strictly regulates that Chinese media organizations must report truthfully, objectively and fairly by obeying professional codes and standards," said Wang Baodong in an e-mail.

That probably works in China. For the rest of us, there's Google.



Posted at 1642Z

Speaking of hiring veterans...

[Greyhawk]

No doubt there's some sort of explanation for this... Hill exempts self from veterans' law:

A new report showing that Congress has largely exempted itself from a law that aids post-military employment for vets had lawmakers and veterans groups roiled Wednesday.

The report, by the Office of Compliance on the state of the congressional workplace, urges Congress to apply the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act to its own hiring habits. While the law provides veterans with prioritized opportunities to land government jobs, veterans who apply for jobs with the Architect of the Capitol, U.S. Capitol Police, the Congressional Budget Office and some support positions in the House and Senate do not receive this affirmative-action-type boost, potentially preventing veterans from getting jobs.

I've got to agree with the Duncan Hunter quote from the story: "Veterans are some of the most qualified individuals joining the work force today, possessing quality leadership, training and know-how."

To that I'll add my own: the question any company in America should be asking isn't "golly - should we hire vets?" It's "how soon can you start?" (And if you're a business owner, my subtle warning: if you don't ask the right question, your competition will.)

Obviously that warning doesn't apply to Capitol Hill.



Posted at 1516Z

Alex Horton - "the Dude" goes to VA

[Greyhawk]

Here's a bit of news of interest to the milblogosphere and veterans everywhere: Alex Horton will soon be starting a new job with the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Milblog readers will recognize Alex as the author of Army of Dude, for me one of the few must-read blogs during the surge in Iraq. I was there for the surge too, but couldn't offer much public insight into what I was doing (boring) or what I knew (classified). Alex, on the other hand, was far from boring. He was the voice of Joe - the guy who told you what he saw and thought - from his location at the exact spot where the pointy end of American policy drove deep into the... er... sands of Babylon. If you've read his deployment awards post you know exactly what I mean. I finally met him in person at the Milblogs Conference in '09 (hey - we even went to the White House together...) and he's an authentic good guy - we've stayed in touch.

I'm very happy but a little surprised to hear he's going to the VA. This is the obviously outspoken and straight-shooting guy who took them to task last year over the new GI Bill, and while that got a response (and directly led to improved efforts to make the system work better and faster) his efforts couldn't have endeared him to everyone in the department - hence my surprise.

As for happy, well, it's a smart choice. Perfect, even. Here's a guy with established credibility, who can reach out and connect to a new generation of young vets, and who's obviously familiar with the "new media" way of doing just that. And his concern for fellow vets is authentic - after he'd tamed the system himself, Alex followed up his own experiences regarding the GI Bill with a great blog post aimed entirely at keeping others from getting tangled in much of the red tape he did.

So - kudos to the folks at the VA. The best damn choice they could have made was probably not the easiest - but any military veteran (certainly including those of the latest generation) knows it never is. I'm looking forward to seeing Dude in his new role - one that will involve blogging and other public communication - and I'm sure I'm not alone in that.

Congratulations Alex - here's hoping your new digs are more comfortable than Diyala, your new "customers" are more helpful than the locals there, and your new allies are a bit easier to work with than the 1920's...

...and that you never lose the voice of Joe.



Posted at 1450Z

Along the Sacred Road

[Greyhawk]

More combat action from Lt Churchill in a moment, but first, a brief description of the terrain where our battles took place:

The outpost, surrounded by soaring mountains on all sides, was isolated and hard to defend. "It felt like we were living in the bottom of a Dixie cup," one of Brown's soldiers said.

The "Dixie cup" reference probably gave it away - that's actually a modern description of Camp Keating, which (until it was abandoned following a Taliban attack last year) "along with two other outposts," was

...intended to help patrol and oversee the stretch of the Pakistan border. U.S. officials were concerned that the nearby mountain passes were being used by militants to infiltrate Afghanistan and set up for attacks.

Obviously that shouldn't be confused with a similar mountain outpost at Wanat, "a base that was surrounded by high ground and could only be supplied by helicopter..." abandoned after being attacked by the Taliban the year before Keating. Both those locations were situated several miles west of where the fighting described by Lt Churchill took place over 100 years earlier, and we can be certain that at the time young Winston wrote (in his milblog prototype) of battles surrounding three forts on the Afghanistan frontier in 1897, he had never heard of a Dixie cup.

*****

Lt Churchill reports:

The Malakand is like a great cup, of which the rim is broken into numerous clefts and jagged points. At the bottom of this cup is the "crater" camp. The deepest cleft is the Malakand Pass. The highest of the jagged points is Guides Hill, on a spur of which the fort stands. It needs no technical knowledge to see, that to defend such a place, the rim of the cup must be held. But in the Malakand, the bottom of the cup is too small to contain the necessary garrison. The whole position is therefore, from the military point of view, bad and indefensible.
"At the time this story opens, the young Lt adds, "the Malakand South Camp was an impossible place to put troops in. It was easy of access. It was cramped and commanded by neighbouring heights." But in spite of that, the British Army accomplished the impossible, and filled the fort to overflowing. This "necessitated the formation of a second encampment"...
This was close under the north outer edge of the cup. It was called for political reasons North Malakand. As a military position it, also, was radically bad. It was everywhere commanded, and surrounded by ravines and nullahs, which made it easy for an enemy to get in, and difficult for troops to get out. It was, of course, of no strategic value, and was merely used as a habitation for the troops intended to hold Malakand, for whom there was no room in the crater and fort.
Sketch Map of the Malakand Positions
(Click image for larger version)

Not far away sat another outpost - Chakdara:

From the Malakand the signal tower of Chakdara can be seen eight miles away to the eastward. Thither the broad graded road runs like a ribbon across the plain. Seven miles from the Kotal Camp, it crosses the Amandara Pass, a gap in a considerable underfeature, which juts from the southern mountains. After this it turns more to the north and leads to the fortified bridge across the river. I invite the reader to remark this road, for it is historic. It is not only the route by which the Malakand Field Force was able to advance, but it is the very reason of their existence. Without this road there would have been no Malakand Camps, no fighting, no Malakand Field Force, no story. It is the road to Chitral.

Here then, at once, the whole vast question of frontier policy is raised. We hold the Malakand Pass to keep the Chitral road open. We keep the Chitral road open because we have retained Chitral. We retain Chitral in accordance with the "Forward Policy."

malakand1.png

At the bottom of the map above (depicting what is now known as the AF/Pak border region - click for larger version) you'll see the railroad - the line marking the edge of civilization. In the center, about 1/3 of the way up, Malakand and Chakdara, and, at the northern extreme, Chitral. The western most dashed line is the infamous Durand Line - like the forts, a very new feature to the British at the time. Unlike the forts, it was not visible to the local residents. The Durand Line was a key component of the "Forward Policy" - about which Lt Churchill initially has this to say:

I am thus confronted at the very outset of this book, which was intended to be devoted chiefly to the narration of military events and small incidents, with that wide political question, on which the keenest intellects in England are in doubt, and the most valuable expert evidence in India is divided. The reader must not think me pusillanimous or weak if I postpone the discussion of so great and controversial a matter till a later chapter...

We'll be getting back to the narration of military events and small incidents shortly, for now we'll offer a one-sentence summary of the author's thoughts: "Dynamite in the hands of a child is not more dangerous than a strong policy weakly carried out." Events to this day support that observation.

But that has no immediate impact on the adventure about to unfold - following a last glance at the map. The dotted line weaving it's way northward through the center is the "road" deemed critical to British interests.

The road is maintained and protected by the tribes through whose territories it passes; but the two principal points where it might be closed are held by Imperial garrisons. The Malakand Fort guards the passage of the mountains. Chakdara holds the bridge across the river.

So, consider the above to be the answer to the question why - an answer that begs the follow-on question: why? - which would in turn beg another, and so on until no action could take place.

And the old military axiom ours is not to reason why was not so old in Lt Churchill's day.

*****

The evening prior to the initial attack, a warning was sent to the Malakand camps: "At 9.45 a telegram from Chakdara--which got through just before the wire was cut--reported that large forces of Pathans were rapidly moving towards the camps."

Of Chakdara Churchill wrote "The garrison of the place consisted at the time of the outbreak of twenty sowars of the 11th Bengal Lancers and two strong companies of the 45th Sikhs, in all about 200 men, under the command of Lieutenant H.B. Rattray."

On the evening of the 26th, Lieutenant Rattray went over to Khar as usual to play polo. Just as the game was ended, he received a letter, brought in haste by two sowars, from Lieutenant Wheatley, the other subaltern at Chakdara, warning him that a great number of Pathans with flags were advancing on the fort. He at once galloped back at full speed, passing close to one large gathering of tribesmen, who for some reason of their own took no notice of him, and so reached the fort in safety, and just in time. Formidable masses of men were then closing in on it. He telegraphed to the staff officer at the Malakand reporting the impending attack. Immediately afterwards the wire was cut by the enemy and the little garrison got under arms.

That night saw the first assault on Malakand, as previously described. But from there, the next morning, a detachment of cavalry was ordered to reinforce the (now cut-off) garrison at Chakdara...


Posted at 1116Z

July 13, 2010

Kids today... too violent for the military?

[Greyhawk]

I've read (and believe) studies demonstrating the majority of American youth are unfit for service based on physical fitness or education levels, criminal records (some related to violent acts) and other considerations. And I've seen unrelated claims that exposure to violent media - movies, games, music - serves to indoctrinate youth into some sort of "military mindset."

But I believe this is the first time I've encountered this intriguing thought: the military should take steps to reverse some of that media conditioning:

Applied ethics indoctrination for new soldiers may be even more important today than in the past because of the need to differentiate between societal and military professional views on the use of violence. In much of the Western media to which young soldiers are exposed, such as action films, video games, and 'gangster rap' music, violence appears justifiable as a means of advancing personal interests or demonstrating individual prowess. In contrast, the Law of War as well as the military's code of honor justifies violence only against combatants.

To inculcate soldiers with a determination to use force with discipline and discrimination, NATO militaries should emphasize collective rather than individual ethics education. Collective education and training helps soldiers understand that the institution and their fellow soldiers expect them to exhibit a higher sense of honor than that to which they are exposed in popular culture.

That quote is so new that (for now, at least) Google won't reveal its author - someone with authoritative knowledge and experience on soldiers, training, strategy and tactics, doctrine, and pol/mil interrelationships re: conducting war.

But I'll link the whole thing later. For now just wanted to see if there were any reactions to the idea expressed.



Posted at 1324Z

Hey Ladies...

[Greyhawk]
I am looking for a Long term Relationship - United States
My name is cj grisham, i am 37 years I'm seeking a United States Woman for Long - Term
i am cj grisharm,US ARMY,37 ...

Also soldier is sexyboy like musics, too. He love you long time.



Posted at 1239Z

July 12, 2010

The Attack on the Malakand (II)

[Greyhawk]

"No moment could have been less fitting: no man more disinclined." So Lt Churchill describes the crisis suddenly confronting Britain's Viceroy in India in the wake of a bloody uprising by Pashtun hill tribes in the Afghan border region. With so many other difficult issues at hand, he was suddenly confronted with the cruel inconvenience of war...

It was only natural that the Viceroy, himself, should view with abhorrence the prospect of military operations on a large scale, which must inevitably lead to closer and more involved relations with the tribes of the Afghan border. He belonged to that party in the State which has clung passionately, vainly, and often unwisely to a policy of peace and retrenchment. He was supported in his reluctance to embark on warlike enterprises by the whole force of the economic situation. No moment could have been less fitting: no man more disinclined. That Lord Elgin's Viceroyalty and the Famine year should have been marked by the greatest Frontier War in the history of the British Empire in India, vividly displays how little an individual, however earnest his motives, however great his authority, can really control the course of public affairs.

pashtunattack.jpg

The Council were called upon to decide on matters, which at once raised the widest and most intricate questions of frontier policy; which might involve great expense; which might well influence the development and progress of the great populations committed to their charge. It would be desirable to consider such matters from the most lofty and commanding standpoints; to reduce detail to its just proportions; to examine the past, and to peer into the future. And yet, those who sought to look thus on the whole situation, were immediately confronted with the picture of the rock of Chakdara, fringed and dotted with the white smoke of musketry, encircled by thousands of fierce assailants, its garrison fighting for their lives, but confident they would not be deserted. It was impossible to see further than this. All Governments, all Rulers, meet the same difficulties. Wide considerations of principle, of policy, of consequences or of economics are brushed aside by an impetuous emergency. They have to decide off-hand. The statesman has to deal with events. The historian, who has merely to record them, may amuse his leisure by constructing policies, to explain instances of successful opportunism.

Readers in our modern, enlightened era are no doubt shocked to read a young army officer's public commentary on civilian leaders and affairs of the day. But while his book was published under his name (even though he was still in the service) almost immediately following the events it describes, it's worth noting that Churchill's original dispatches from the front appeared anonymously ("by a young officer") in British papers.

But we have jumped ahead in the telling of the tale - and landed square in the midst of the boring old stuff no one cares about today. So, lets return straightaway to our young warrior/guest blogger's account (previous entry here) of the fighting that precipitated such an unwanted distraction...


Posted at 1303Z

July 10, 2010

The nfaked and the dead

[Greyhawk]

I'm shocked, shocked I tell you, to learn that someone could fabricate a story about a troop killed in Iraq. (Especially in an academic setting.)



(3... 2... 1...)

Oh wait...

...no I'm not.



Posted at 1727Z

Warriors, guns and monkeys

[Greyhawk]


monkeyholdinggun.jpg

Oh noes! Forget about ROEs and withdrawal dates - here's real troubles brewing for General Petraeus and our boys at the front:

pdailymonkeys.jpg

Afghanistan's Taliban insurgents are training monkeys to use weapons to attack American troops, according to a recent report by a British-based media agency.

Reporters from the media agency spotted and took photos of a few "monkey soldiers" holding AK-47 rifles and Bren light machine guns in the Waziristan tribal region near the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The report and photos have been widely spread by media agencies and Web sites across the world.

That report is from People's Daily, "the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) ... As the CPC's mouthpiece, the newspaper generally provides direct information on the policies and viewpoints of the Party." - so you know it must be true.

They point out that the development of the Monkey Soldier is an asymmetrical response to the capitalist oppressor, implicitly in accordance with the revolutionary tactics first developed and employed by Chairman Mao.

In a sense, the emergence of "monkey soldiers" is the result of asymmetrical warfare. The United States launched the war in Afghanistan using the world's most advanced weapons such as highly-intelligent robots to detect bombs on roadsides and unmanned aerial vehicles to attack major Taliban targets. In response, the Taliban forces have tried any possible means and figured out a method to train monkeys as "replacement killers" against American troops.

But they also reveal that Americans were launching evil monkey terrorist schemes against the oppressed masses the firstest:

Ironically, the initiators of "monkey soldiers" are the Americans. Between the 1960s and the 1970s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) trained massive "monkey soldiers" in the Vietnam War and dispatched armed monkeys to dangerous jungles to launch assaults on Vietnamese soldiers. Today, the Taliban forces have given the American troops some of their own medicine.

However, they refuse to acknowledge the work of Mike Yon, who recently revealed that NATO forces were using monkey PAO officers.

They do include a quote from an anonymous American official: "An American official responded that the Taliban forces have started training "monkey soldiers" after suffering heavy losses, implying that they have exhausted their tricks." But obviously, they'll say anything to support their cause, no matter how ridiculous.

While the latest account doesn't include any of the "photos of a few "monkey soldiers" holding AK-47 rifles and Bren light machine guns in the Waziristan tribal region" an earlier People's Daily report does.

pdailymonkeys2.jpg

And using Google we at The Mudville Gazette were able to determine that the internet contains even more pictures of monkeys holding guns.

Like this full color example from 2007:

redtip.jpg

Love the red plastic tip.





Posted at 1113Z

July 9, 2010

Who was on first?

[Greyhawk]

Daniel Bennett: "So yesterday on Twitter I asked a question: when was the first official U.S. military blog started?

By 'official' I meant blogs that were started as deliberate public affairs exercises on behalf of a branch of the services, or individual units as the corporate, the professional, the governmental, the NGO and the military began colonising the blogosphere.

He started a good conversation, to which I can only add... well... nothing. Blogs by the GI Joes? That I know. "Official" blogs? Not so much. But with input from folks who do know (see comments at the link) he's making a list.

I do recall at least one epic fail at outreach that happened before the good folks who subsequently made a go of it got rolling - but that's another story. I also know there were junior PAO troops blogging (on personal blogs - here's one fine example, see also here) from in-theater before anything on that list was online. (I don't mean that as a knock on anyone's efforts. This certainly wasn't the first time in history the guys in the trenches were ahead of Big Army in the innovation department.)



Posted at 1958Z

Survivor: Afghanistan

[Greyhawk]

Bill Ardolino, from Afghanistan: "Of all the factors influencing ISAF counterinsurgency effort in Musa Qala, one of the bright spots is the presence of respected, relatively effective local security forces that stand as a viable alternative to the Taliban."

Bill reports the police in Musa Kala are more respected by the American advisers than is generally the case throughout much of Afghanistan. "Above all, their relative competence stems from the will of one man, District Police Chief Haji Abdul Wali, who is more commonly known as 'Koka'."

From his photo, he appears to be a formidable man. Here's his bio:

A former mujahid, Koka joined the Harakat-e-Inquilab-e-Islami (HII, or Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) in 1981 after his father and two brothers were killed by Russians. A major element of the Afghan resistance early on in the Soviet-Afghan conflict, HII was particularly influential in northern Helmand under the leadership of Mullah Nasim Akhundzada (Alizai). Koka himself fought the Soviet forces and remained otherwise active with the party until 1990. He later joined Jeemiiat Islami (Society of Islam) in 1996, and waged war against the Taliban with the support of Iranian intelligence. His war record against the Talibs involved a string of battles and several defeats, brief evacuation to Iran by the Iranian Secret Service, and then flight to Pakistan. He eventually returned to live in Musa Qala, and even briefly switched sides to join the Taliban in their fight against his former allies in Jeemiiat. This odd mutability was a consequence of local custom - he'd struck a deal to take the place of his brother, who had been conscripted into Taliban service. At the time, Taliban conscription campaigns were particularly acute in northern Helmand, including both Musa Qala and Kajaki districts, and even Maiwand district in neighboring Kandahar.

After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Koka rejoined the Jeemiiat, and served as Musa Qala's police commander in 2001 -2002. His tenure ended when he was arrested by NATO forces for lying about the whereabouts of the district governor, who was wanted for questioning about suspected ties to a known terrorist. Koka was released after being incarcerated for 14 months at Bagram. He returned to find his home village again at war, weathering constant attacks by the Taliban, and he soon rejoined government service to fight his old enemies and brief allies. Following the conclusion of Operation Snakepit, the joint ISAF-Afghan operation to drive out Taliban forces occupying Musa Qala, Koka was reappointed as the Musa Qala district police chief in December 2007.

Switching sides is not unusual for Afghan leaders - in fact, it's a survival mechanism. You'll find few alive today with any long-term experience who haven't checked that particular block on their resume - or who wouldn't likely do so again.

But that's true of those on either side of the conflict in Afghanistan. From the NATO point of view that should be seen as both a concern and an opportunity - get enough men of influence to our side and we win. Fail at that and we fail the larger mission. The key word is "enough" - which also means "not all." As in Iraq, the race is to a tipping point, beyond which success is assured to that side achieving it first.

Can that be us? Yes, though we certainly begin the race at a disadvantage - we are the foreign element. (Example: We'd consider one of our own who'd switched alliances that frequently as untrustworthy, with good reason.) But after that biographical introduction, Bill's report is an interview with Koka, and from that there's insight to be gained. Consider his concept of what it would take to succeed militarily in Afghanistan (a prerequisite to further success) to be virtually the same as what it would take to keep him on our side. Obviously the idea of reaching that tipping point first (or perhaps just being perceived as the side most likely to) is an essential element. That framework offers some idea of how we should listen to what this man says - as it will contribute to our understanding of what our fundamental approach to the task at hand should be. From Koka's responses I get the following two points as crucial: don't be afraid to kill the enemy, and stop talking about leaving.

Shocker, right? But that's my interpretation - obviously your conclusions may vary. But to see if that's so you'll have to read the whole thing. (I'll add that I've seen many such quick-visit interview/profiles done with local-level Afghan leaders - but few that have offered any real food for thought, and none done this well. Kudos to the LWJ crew, who are raising the bar for such efforts.)



Posted at 1352Z

Blogtalk

[Greyhawk]

My friends CJ, Troy, and Marcus with the latest episode of You Served Radio:

Andrew Lubin is an embedded reporter and a former Marine. He is freshly back from his 5th embed in Afghanistan. He was on You Served Radio right before leaving so now he is joining us again upon his return to give our listeners a fresh perspective on what is happening in the front lines of the war on terror. Mark Dolfini is also a former Marine and has been Standing for the Fallen to raise funds and donations for Soldiers' Angels Germany. He'll be on to talk about his service and Standing for the Fallen which culminated in a 24 hour stand on 4 July.


Much good stuff to hear here. Andrew's "after action report" from his Afghan embed is comprehensive and informative, covering perceptions of troop moral, the Afghan people, communications infrastructure (or lack thereof), media relations in the wake of the Rolling Stone fiasco, ROE, definitions of "victory" and a host of other issues. (Rachel Maddow in Afghanistan, even.) Mark Dolfini should be a familiar name to milblog readers, but this opportunity to hear from the man himself is welcome and shouldn't be missed.




Posted at 0938Z

July 8, 2010

New tenure/new tenor

[Greyhawk]

Stars and Stripes: "Petraeus to clarify, not alter, warfighting rules in Afghanistan"

Here's a key point:

Gross said confusion in the field over the existing tactical directive, which seeks to lessen civilian casualties by specifying when force can be used against Taliban insurgents, has resulted in some soldiers feeling as if they are fighting a war with their hands tied.

"I think troops just felt they couldn't do anything," Gross said. "That's just not the truth."

There have been reports of commanders in the field adding restrictions that further limit troops, which prompted Petraeus to order a review of warfighting procedures. Gross said the new directive will tell commanders not to add rules.

The General is addressing the complaint leveled by the actual groundpounders...
The rules handed out here are not what McChrystal intended - they've been distorted as they passed through the chain of command - but knowing that does nothing to lessen the anger of troops on the ground. "Fuck, when I came over here and heard that McChrystal was in charge, I thought we would get our fucking gun on," says Hicks, who has served three tours of combat. "I get COIN. I get all that. McChrystal comes here, explains it, it makes sense. But then he goes away on his bird, and by the time his directives get passed down to us through Big Army, they're all fucked up - either because somebody is trying to cover their ass, or because they just don't understand it themselves. But we're fucking losing this thing."

...and addressing that complaint is a good thing. He's already given a hint of what's to come in his first message to the troops:

Protecting those we are here to help nonetheless does require killing, capturing, or turning the insurgents. We will not shrink from that; indeed, you have been taking the fight to the enemy and we will continue to do so. Beyond that, as you and our Afghan partners on the ground get into tough situations, we must employ all assets to ensure your safety, keeping in mind, again, the importance of avoiding civilian casualties.

There's a more than subtle shift from General McChrystal's tactical directive in the words "Protecting those we are here to help nonetheless does require killing, capturing, or turning the insurgents." That signal shouldn't be lost on lower level commanders - those whose interpretation of the scriptures actually matters.

It won't put an end to the eternal problem of misinterpretation of rules (see also here, here and here) and will do nothing for those more distant observers whose understanding of 'ROEs" is inversely proportional to their willingness to complain about them on others behalf.

Added: if you want to evaluate tenor of statements, ponder that General Petraeus' motto for Iraq in 2007 was "hard is not hopeless." Compare that to this quote re: Afghanistan last fall - "...it is, I think, accurate to observe that, as in Iraq in 2007, everything in Afghanistan is hard, and it is hard all the time."

*****

Previously:

More Tunnel Vision

Rules of Engagement in the Age of Obama



Posted at 1019Z

Postscript

[Greyhawk]

Sean Naylor, Army Times: Sources: Rolling Stone quotes made by jr. staff.

The impolitic comments that torpedoed Gen. Stan McChrystal's career were "almost all" made by his most junior staff -- men who "make tea, keep the principal on time and carry bags" -- who had no reason to believe their words would end up in print, according to a staff member who was on the trip to Europe during which the comments were made.

There's a good breakdown therein of who exactly is credited with what quotes in the Rolling Stone article - a mix of named and unnamed (or vaguely described) sources, something Hastings' work has in common with virtually any similar piece filed in the history of war.

But before pressing on with this discussion I'll revisit my comment from the day:

...General McChrystal apologized for the article (which he's rumored to have reviewed and approved - though that task may have actually fallen to another...) at the same speed he does for errant rocket attacks in Afghanistan. (How fast is that? Sometimes too fast... but that's another story...) Certainly that apology doesn't aid the General's defenders (or people who notice the actual truth in the matter) in their cause.
For the record, here's that apology:
I extend my sincerest apology for this profile. It was a mistake reflecting poor judgment and should never have happened. Throughout my career, I have lived by the principles of personal honor and professional integrity. What is reflected in this article falls far short of that standard. I have enormous respect and admiration for President Obama and his national security team, and for the civilian leaders and troops fighting this war and I remain committed to ensuring its successful outcome.

So, if you like your stories simple - end of story.

But, if you're interested, the Army Times' piece sounds plausible on all points. Including an additional detail about that review

In his June 22 appearance on "Morning Joe," when asked if McChrystal's staff had known "this was coming for some time," Bates, the Rolling Stone editor, answered, "Yes."

"We ran everything by them in our fact-checking process, as we always do, so I think they had a sense of what was coming, but this was all on the record and they spent a lot of time with our reporter, so I think they knew that they had said it."

These comments infuriated those at ISAF headquarters in Kabul. Army Times obtained a copy of the questions that Rolling Stone's fact-checker sent to ISAF headquarters, along with Boothby's replies. None of the questions discusses the controversial aspects of the article, nor are any of the quotes that cost McChrystal his job included.

Boothby resigned as fast as McCrhystal apologized - but those questions and answers have since been published in the Washington Post. There are numerous valid issues raised by events of the day, but to imply or conclude from that bit of fact-checking that McChrystal and company had any foreknowledge of what was in the article is absurd beyond any point of debate. So, if there's any outrage on their part regarding Bates' claim that "We ran everything by them in our fact-checking process, as we always do, so I think they had a sense of what was coming" - it's justified.

And pointless. Once again, for emphasis: "I extend my sincerest apology for this profile. It was a mistake reflecting poor judgment and should never have happened..."

And by way of explaining the "apologize first" approach:

[ISAF spokesman LtC] Sholtis said that "arguing about the merits of the article would have seemed like we were trying to protect or excuse ourselves rather than acknowledge our mistake. That may have not been the best PR strategy, but it was the approach consistent with the character of General McChrystal."

Which is admirable. And the General's apology was adequate for the content of the actual article.

But adding further fuel to the fire - the Rolling Stone story itself hadn't been released yet - and the public's perception of its contents was shaped by descriptions in other media accounts that blew it far out of proportion. In this case all that combined for a story that General McChrystal and his staff were a lot of drunken, insubordinate frat boys whose self righteous delusions of superiority and invulnerability led them to give a thumbs-up to a story that portrayed them as drunken, insubordinate frat boys with delusions of superiority and invulnerability. Then, once declared to be the leader of a group of drunken, insubordinate frat boys with delusions of superiority and invulnerability the General responded with the equivalent of "yeah - my bad."

All of which happened before the article was available to the public - of which 99% have not and will never read said article. For those in the other 1% (and I'm sure that includes anyone who's read this post), the Army Times piece represents a critical companion piece to the original. (Or postscript, as my title implies.)

Added (hat tip N.S. Webster): "Rolling Stone writer lands McChrystal book deal."

The book, untitled at this point, will be published by Little, Brown, and promises, according to Publishersmarketplace.com, "an unprecedented behind-the-scenes account of America's longest war," with an unfiltered look at the war, and the soldiers, diplomats and politicians who are waging it.

The marketing folks have probably already asked: can they get Lady GaGa on the cover?



Posted at 1002Z

July 6, 2010

The Attack on the Malakand

[Greyhawk]

Enough jaw-jaw, let's turn to war-war... Our latest dispatch from young Lt Churchill describes the actual action - combat in the mountain-rimmed valleys on the Afghan frontier. There, far removed from halls of power wherein their fates are so often determined, young men earned glory:

THE DAY AFTER the meeting with the elders of Yaka China, Yarnell and John could hear insurgents trying to pinpoint where Kearney and his men were. The helicopters had moved us to a ridge line, about 8,400 feet high, straddling the Korengal and Shuriak Valleys. The insurgents used the deep caves, boulders and forests as hideouts and transit routes between Pakistan and Afghanistan. We could hear someone who called himself Obeid saying he'd do whatever the Yaka China elders decided -- whether to cooperate with the Americans or take revenge. By evening the elders had apparently reached their verdict. It was fight time...

As we waited for dusk to get back to the KOP, we all knew the insurgents were nearby, eyes on Kearney, eyes on the soldiers down in the valley. Even nightfall was no comfort because the full moon was floodlighting the Korengal. I returned to the KOP by helicopter with Kearney, while 1st and 2nd Platoons had to make the long trek back on foot. As soon as 1st Platoon set off, the insurgents struck with a devastating L-shaped ambush. All Kearney could do, back at the KOP, was calm his boys on the radio, get in the medevac and invoke the gods of war. The Apaches, Slasher and Bone dropped bombs all night. The soldiers and insurgents were so close that when Slasher, the AC-130, flew in, the pilot coordinated not with the JTAC but with Sgt. Roberto Sandifer, the platoon's forward observer, who at that moment was under fire watching one of his guys die.

Around midnight, 1st Platoon filed into the KOP, eyes bulging, drenched in sweat, river water and blood. They were hauling the belongings of Mohammad Tali, a high-value target. Specialist Sal Giunta had killed him.

The next day I climbed up to the KOP and found Specialist Giunta, a quiet Iowan lofted into a heroism he didn't want. His officers were putting him up for a medal of honor. Giunta told me the story of that night, how they'd barely moved 300 yards before they were blasted. Giunta was fourth in the file when it happened, and he jumped into a ditch. He couldn't figure out why they were getting hit from where Joshua Brennan and baby-faced Franklin Eckrode should have been leading up ahead. He knew it must be bad, but as he leapt up to check he got whacked with a bullet in his armored chest plate. It threw him down. They were taking fire from three sides. He grabbed some grenades: "I couldn't throw as far as Sergeant Gallardo. We were looking like retards and I decided to run out in front of the grenades." He found Eckrode with gunshot wounds. "He was down but moving and trying to fix his SAW" -- a heavy machine gun -- "so I just kept on running up the trail. It was cloudy. I was running and saw dudes. Plural."

He couldn't figure out who they were. Then he realized they were hauling Brennan off through the forest...

Wait - apologies to the reader - that account is not from Lt Churchill - it's a more recent report from the region.

Let's begin again - as you may recall from the conclusion of the last installment...

Suddenly in the stillness of the night a bugle-call sounded on the parade ground of the "crater" camp. Everyone sprang up. It was the "Assembly." For a moment there was silence while the officers seized their swords and belts and hurriedly fastened them on. Several, thinking that it was merely the warning for the movable column to fall in, waited to light their cigarettes. Then from many quarters the loud explosion of musketry burst forth, a sound which for six days and nights was to know no intermission.

The attack on the Malakand and the great frontier war had begun.

...and there we left off. So, without further ado, here's more from Lt Churchill:

Posted at 1756Z

More Tunnel Vision

[Greyhawk]

Newsflash: restrictive ROE are getting our troops killed. Here's a report from NCOs on the front:

In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a "time-sensitive target acquisition mission" on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse -- namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.

Of course, that's not a newsflash - it's a blast from the past. Not the ancient past - it's not a complaint against the marplots of 1897 - in this case the front was Baghdad, and the year was 2007. We (I was there, too) were in the middle of a long, hot summer (in more ways than one). General Petraeus' scheduled brief to Congress on progress was a few short weeks away - planned for sometime around September 11th, a date that was an obvious anniversary in the United States and elsewhere. As a bonus, in that year it also fell immediately prior to the beginning of Ramadan.

None of which mattered in America: "A majority of Americans don't trust the upcoming report by the Army's top commander in Iraq on the progress of the war and even if they did, it wouldn't change their mind, according to a new poll." Or as I interpreted it at the time: "I can't hear you I'm not listening I can't hear you I'm not listening I can't hear you I'm not listening yayayayayayayalalalalaldadadadada I can't hear you..."

But the purpose of this post (and those that follow) isn't to relive the past so much as it is to examine the present - and determine what, if anything, has changed. Certainly something has (or some things have) but before identifying them it's worthwhile, says I, to revisit a point in time not long ago - before that change occurred...

*****


THE VIEW FROM THE TUNNEL
Greyhawk / 23 Aug 2007


This NY Times Op/Ed from a group of 82d Airborne NCOs is well written, thought provoking, and worthy of more than a quick read. While I disagree with many of their conclusions, the facts they present in support are indeed fact. The authors are clearly well-informed from personal observation and external sources, but in most cases the therefore that follows many of those facts is where we part company.

We are indeed working to straighten out a hell of a mess in Baghdad, and any number of things can foil our objectives. In fact, failure is easier and quicker than success, our failure can bring success to others (is, in fact, prerequisite to their success as they currently envision it) and not all of these "others" are ready to develop new definitions of personal or group success more compatible with ours. (Or at least, definitions of "success" that can be achieved following our success rather than only after our failure).

But, in fact, that's exactly what's happened in most of al Anbar, and during the bloody campaign to get there such an outcome was far from obvious. (Such an outcome is far from a done deal now, too, but at least it can be mentioned without drawing sneers.) It's entirely possible that all hell may still break lose there. But it seems (at best) that the general population has had enough of al Qaeda and their ilk and are willing to cast their lot with us, or (at worst) have finally realized that the best way to get rid of us is to let us finish and leave - after gaining whatever edge they can against their future rivals from us before our departure. (Said edge being training, money, weapons, and perhaps a bit of thinning of the rival herd before we depart.) One can't rule out some middle ground between those two possibilities.

That being the case, our best hope is that prosperity (or at least being on a recognizable path thereto) will prove incentive to keep the peace without the presence of American guns. Said peace being more conducive to such prosperity, a positive spiral can develop, and we're beginning to see the early indications of that spiral now in Anbar as months of positive developments have at least resulted in people noticing the positive developments and in turn developing at least some semblance of hope.

Again - any number of things can still go wrong in Anbar - but three (or even two and perhaps one) years ago very few people would have been willing to bet on the situation being as favorable as it is today. (It was in fact in August of last year that the Anbar Awakening got the spiral going - though it was the result of events occurring throughout the previous year.)

Which brings us back to Baghdad today. With a larger and more diverse population the problems are magnified. And even something that appears to be the beginning of an upward spiral can in fact turn out to be a complex, chaotic and well-tangled knot. But we have learned from the Anbar experience, and are actively pursuing similar means to ends in the big city. Believe it or not, the people of Baghdad are well aware of what's happened in Anbar too, and don't see that example as a disaster to be avoided at all costs - in fact, the opposite is true. (Perhaps some other time I'll tell you about the debate over whether the term "neighborhood watch organizations" applied to the multiple groups of various size we're working with throughout Baghdad and the belts is appropriate...)

But there are bad guys sprinkled through that population. Which brings us to a passage from the Op/Ed I believe deserves a close look.

In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a "time-sensitive target acquisition mission" on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse -- namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.

That's an ROE (Rules of Engagement) complaint, and I've heard it voiced (usually less eloquently) many times before. Without addressing the validity (it is a valid complaint to a degree, but ROE can be thought of as a system comprised of many components - some of which are human beings with a reluctance to kill other human beings) it's worth noticing the tacit acknowledgment that we are, in fact, waging a war like no other before, and have been since March, 2003. We could have left no two bricks in Baghdad connected even before the tanks rolled into town - instead we elected to execute as precise and surgical a war as military technology allows. The hope, of course, was that a population tired of the oppressive rule of a despotic leader would flourish once that leader was removed, and that we would be able to draw down to a small contingent of American troops within a reasonable time. That first assumption hasn't so much been proven wrong as proven to be still theoretical in the face of an onslaught of thugs from various quarters of the region (including Iraq) bent on sowing enough chaos to keep it that way. The second assumption hinges on the first - and thus we remain in larger force than any would have liked.

As for those years of occupation, no matter how much some folks (for clarity - obviously not the authors of the Op/Ed) would like to believe we are an oppressor, this is not akin to the Roman subjugation of the barbarians of Europe or the French experience in Algeria (the latter - rather than the oft-cited Vietnam comparison - being the true model for the left's desired narrative of America in Iraq) or anything else in the sweep of history between. Thus, ironically, our "soft" (and it isn't soft - we are killing people) approach has earned us accusations of Nazi-like behavior from all the usual suspects.

Will it work? I think the very possibility that it might is what so terrifies those in and out of Iraq who've invested heavily in "no". Their tactics will change (are, in fact, changing) to meet the new realities on the ground. That they will do so is not evidence of our failure - no matter how many people they kill to make their point. (Killing them all and letting Allah sort them out is demonstrably not difficult.)

Likewise, "Killing them all and letting God sort them out" - like simply quitting and walking away - is an undeniably easier path then the one on which we are currently embarked. But for some reason, some Americans love doing things the hard way.


"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory."
- - Orwell

*****


Posted at 1351Z

Marplots

[Greyhawk]

Warren Walker reviews some of the combat scenes described by our guest blogger young Lt Churchill and concludes: "Obviously the British had a simpler set of 'Rules of Engagement.'"

That could be true. But I checked with our guest blogger 30 years later to see what he might have to say about any self-inflicted handicaps on the old campaign, given the benefit of perspective (and freedom - and hopefully wisdom) one gains with time. Here's his response:

ltchurchill.jpg

The Political Officers who accompanied the force, with white tabs on their collars, parlayed all the time with the chiefs, the priests, and other local notables. These political officers were very unpopular with the army officers. They were regarded as marplots. It was alleged that they always patched things up and put many a slur upon the prestige of the Empire without ever letting anyone know about it. They were accused of the grievous crime of 'shilly-shallying,' which being interpreted means doing everything you possibly can before you shoot. We had with us a very brilliant political officer, a Major Deane, who was much disliked because he always stopped military operations. Just when we were looking forward to having a splendid fight and all the guns were loaded and everyone keyed up, this Major Deane - and why was he a Major anyhow? so we said - being in truth nothing better than an ordinary politician - would come along and put a stop to it all. Apparently all these savage chiefs were his old friends and almost all his blood relations. Nothing disturbed their friendship. In between the fights, they talked as man to man and as pal to pal, just as they talked to our General as robber to robber.

We knew nothing about the police vs. the crook gangs in Chicago, but this must have been in the same order of ideas. Undoubtedly they all understood each other very well and greatly despised things like democracy, commercialism, money-getting, business, honesty and vulgar people of all kinds. We on the other hand wanted to let off our guns. We had not come all this way and endured all these heats and discomforts - which really were trying - you could lift the heat with your hands, it sat on your shoulders like a knapsack, it rested on your head like a nightmare - in order to participate in an interminable interchange of confidences upon unmentionable matters between the political officers and these sulky, murderous tribesmen. And on the other side we had the very strong spirit of the 'die-hards' and the 'young bloods' of the enemy. They wanted to shoot at us and we wanted to shoot at them. But we were both baffled by what they called the elders, or as one might now put it, 'the old gang,' and by what we could see quite plainly - the white tabs or white feathers on the lapels of the political officers. However, as has hitherto usually been the case, the carnivorous forces had their way. The tribes broke away from their 'old gang' and were not calmed by our political officers. So a lot of people were killed, and on our side their widows have had to be pensioned by the Imperial Government, and others were badly wounded and hopped around for the rest of their lives, and it was all very exciting and, for those who did not get killed or hurt, very jolly.

People sure talked funny back then, didn't they?

I wasn't sure what a 'marplot' was so I looked it up. I found "A meddlesome person whose activity interferes with the plans of others" and "one who frustrates or ruins a plan or undertaking by meddling." The closest example I can think of used in our modern, enlightened age is "cockblock."

And the "crook gangs in Chicago" reference was to the then-growing mobs led by thugs like Al Capone and Bugs Moran - current events at the time of Churchill's reflection (1930) and obviously notorious even on the other side of the world. It remains to be seen whether a "Chicago-style" approach would work in Afghanistan today, but the modern reader would be well advised to examine closely Churchill's bottom line - the achievements made possible by the failure of the elders and marplots.

Next: The Attack on the Malakand



Posted at 0918Z

July 5, 2010

The Malakand Field Force

[Greyhawk]

"Diplomatists looked wise, economists anxious, stupid people mysterious and knowledgeable..."

pashtunattack.jpg

Below: a special guest dispatch, from a young lieutenant in combat on the Afghan frontier.


Posted at 1750Z

First Lt. Richard Winters Leadership Project

[Greyhawk]
wintersschilling.jpg

A project you'll be hearing more about - for an introduction, click the graphic above.



Posted at 1230Z

Standing with Mark Dolfini

[Greyhawk]

A report from Laughing Wolf, who spent his 4th of July doing just that.

It was not a lonely vigil.

When Mark started at midnight, other Marines showed up. Two in particular stood out to me, as both are -- I suspect -- at least into their 70s. These men stayed most of the night, and then were back after a couple of hours to do more. Contrary to popular belief, Marines do have to make pit stops, especially when other veterans and friends are making sure they stay hydrated. When that happened, these two gentlemen formed the core of a group that stood in for Mark. One of them disappeared for a bit around 1330 hours, and returned with hot dogs, hamburgers, sides, and desserts for all from a nearby grocery deli.

They were not alone. A member of the Air Force, in the area on leave, pulled out his uniform and joined in for a couple of hours. A member of the Army also on leave in the area did the same. They stood with a brother in arms for all those who could not stand, and stayed in the sweltering heat in honor of them.

Read the whole thing.



Posted at 1134Z

Tata to Eikenberry

[Greyhawk]

Don't be shy, General, tell us what you really think:

...Lastly, and most importantly, General Petraeus should have a heart-to-heart with Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, a man wholly unqualified for the position, and convince him to step down. Eikenberry should do the honorable thing and quit his post on his own accord, but he's just not that kind of a guy. He's an angry man, bent on his own self-aggrandizement at the expense of others.

My experience with Eikenberry in Afghanistan showed him to be clueless when it came to situational understanding and deferential when it came to the enemy...

Brigadier General (Ret) Tata bio here.



Posted at 1000Z

July 4, 2010

Gerneral Petraeus Assumption of Command Ceremony, Kabul

[Greyhawk]

July 4, 2010 - Kabul, Afghanistan:

Part one:

Part two:

Part three

Part four:

General Petraeus' speech can be viewed in video part three and four above. The text of his remarks follows:


Posted at 1729Z

"The thing I love so much about today is the irony..."

[Greyhawk]

Yeah, I couldn't help noticing the irony myself.

US Forces Iraq Naturalization Ceremony - Baghdad, 4 July 2010

Part 1:


 

Part 2:


B-Roll of Vice President Joe Biden speaking at a naturalization ceremony to Soldiers who are becoming U.S. citizens on the 4th of July.. Additionally there is footage of the Vice President eating with troops and having his picture taken with the troops and the staff of the dining facility. US Forces Iraq courtesy video.

To all the men and women serving this nation on the anniversary of its birth, our thanks today and always.



Posted at 1107Z

American History - lesson one

[Greyhawk]

It's hard to write it in advance:

The Second Day of July 1776, will be the most memorable Epocha, in the History of America. -- I am apt to believe that it will be celebrated, by succeeding Generations, as the great anniversary Festival. It ought to be commemorated, as the Day of Deliverance by solemn Acts of Devotion to God Almighty. It ought to be solemnized with Pomp and Parade, with Shews, Games, Sports, Guns, Bells, Bonfires, and Illuminations from one End of this Continent to the other from this Time forward forever more.

Mostly right though, says I.



Posted at 0926Z

July 3, 2010

Sounds like a plan...

[Greyhawk]

Pentagon Tightens Interview Rules.


Posted at 1958Z

The Forgotten War

[Greyhawk]

Beyond any doubt that term applies to Iraq.

But yesterday I took the opportunity to join in a roundtable with 3ID's Colonel Thomas James. His introduction, from the transcript:

"I was in Operation Iraqi Freedom 1 as part of 1st Armored Division as a battalion commander and operations officer. That was on the tail of the 3rd Infantry Division as they attacked up into Baghdad. And I worked battle space just north of -- northern portion of Baghdad, and then I was a G-3 out of BIAP for just over a year. And then I came back as a brigade commander, 4th Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division during the surge. And I was in Babil, Najaf, Karbala and west Wasat provinces as a brigade commander. And then I'm currently here as the chief of staff of 3rd Infantry Division in the north."

Colonel James mentioned there are some 50 members of the headquarters staff on their fourth rotation with the division in Iraq. As if they hadn't already accrued enough time in country, this week they got the news their current deployment has been extended by one month.

Audio and transcript of the interview is here.

And this wasn't my question - but damned if it wasn't one I was going to ask.

I'm just curious if you could kind of have your wish list right now, what do you need the most to complete this part of your mission?

COL. JAMES: Yeah, I'm thinking through the wish list right now, and nothing really comes to mind. As I talked through it, I think we're in really good shape at this point in time. I think, if I could wish for anything, it would be weather. I would like for there not to be any dust so that we could fly our aviation assets, and if we could crank the temperature down from about 120 to roughly 75 during this time of the year, we would really enjoy that, running around in our IBA with our Iraqi partners.

And that answer took care of another question I'd have asked. It's dust storm season in Iraq right now, and the northern stretches get more than their share.

On the upside, at least the extra 30 days they just had tacked on to their tour this fall will be cooler ones...

But there's talk of other things than weather at the link.



Posted at 1055Z

Congratulations Greta!

[Greyhawk]

Our friend Greta Perry - Southern Living Mama Blogger of The Week July 4 Edition. Congratulations!

It's just step one - soon comes "global mama blogger of the decade," yet another step on the path to "pan-galactic mama blogger of the century," and beyond!.

(If she wants.)


Posted at 0914Z

July 2, 2010

Battle Company

[Greyhawk]

A story from not long ago...

Around midnight, 1st Platoon filed into the KOP, eyes bulging, drenched in sweat, river water and blood. They were hauling the belongings of Mohammad Tali, a high-value target. Specialist Sal Giunta had killed him.

The next day I climbed up to the KOP and found Specialist Giunta, a quiet Iowan lofted into a heroism he didn't want. His officers were putting him up for a medal of honor. Giunta told me the story of that night, how they'd barely moved 300 yards before they were blasted. Giunta was fourth in the file when it happened, and he jumped into a ditch. He couldn't figure out why they were getting hit from where Joshua Brennan and baby-faced Franklin Eckrode should have been leading up ahead. He knew it must be bad, but as he leapt up to check he got whacked with a bullet in his armored chest plate. It threw him down. They were taking fire from three sides. He grabbed some grenades: "I couldn't throw as far as Sergeant Gallardo. We were looking like retards and I decided to run out in front of the grenades." He found Eckrode with gunshot wounds. "He was down but moving and trying to fix his SAW" -- a heavy machine gun -- "so I just kept on running up the trail. It was cloudy. I was running and saw dudes. Plural."

He couldn't figure out who they were. Then he realized they were hauling Brennan off through the forest...

Elizabeth Rubin's story of events in the Korengal in the fall of 2007 is a must-read, one of the finest examples of long-form frontline journalism I've ever seen. (And from start to finish it provides insight to events of today - in many ways.)




Posted at 1449Z

First photos from the front

[Greyhawk]

From Bill Ardolino:

I'm currently embedded with the 1-2 Marines in Musa Qala, Helmand province, Afghanistan. My trip has taken me through Kabul, Camp Leatherneck, Delaram, the Musa Qala District Center, and Patrol Bases Habib, Griffin, and Panda Ridge on the northern lines of Marine territory in the Musa Qala District. The following slideshow features random pictures from my travels to date. Personal favorites and asides:

It's always fun playing 'camera hide and seek' with kids like the little girls in the Musa Qala District Center (picture 7).

Note the power lines behind the man building a mud wall (picture 10). Marines hired a local contractor to wire the village of Karamanda, and I'm told it's the first time the community has enjoyed centralized electricity.

And Sergeant Leslie Stauch (featured in picture 5) is one of the most inspiring Marines I've met. Though an insurgent's bullet took his left eye during a 2006 tour in bloody Ramadi, Iraq, Stauch has recovered and returned to combat duty. He currently serves as a mortar section leader on Panda Ridge, the most spartan outpost I've ever seen, and the site of some of the heaviest fighting since Marines took responsibility for Musa Qala. Stauch rotates a series of decorative glass eyes, including the skull and crossed swords shown in the picture, and a Hurricanes hockey logo. Remarked another Marine: "Guys like that make proud to be a Marine. That guy is a warrior."

Pictures here. What's "good photography?" I think the answer to that is "don't really know - but I know it when I see it." And I see it there.




Posted at 1353Z

"Write like Osama and your mama are readers"

[Greyhawk]

Greyhawk makes policy:

osamaandyomama.jpg

Because, PowerPoint=Policy, right? And yes, Greyhawk's rules can be expanded beyond blogs to the entire internet.

And it's a simple enough policy to grasp, yes? Now, when supervisors understand that when milblogs are outlawed only outlaws will have milblogs, then all will be right with the world. Those two rules are inseparable.


Posted at 1102Z

Cooking With the Troops

[Greyhawk]

Planning a 4th of July barbecue? Me too.

cookingwithtroopslogo.jpg

And planning is good - but if you haven't heard of Cooking With the Troops, you aren't ready.

That's the new logo - created by Tyler Stout and chosen from submissions from around the world:

"Stout's design was chosen the winner by a distinguished panel of judges consisting of Chris Muir, author of the Day-By-Day comic strip, Damon Shackelford, author of the Delta Bravo Sierra comic strip, and John Cox, of John Cox Art. Each of the judges noted the quality of the submissions to the contest, which made selecting the winner no easy task."

They're just getting started, but it's a great start - check out Cooking With the Troops here.



Posted at 0848Z

July 1, 2010

Living Medal of Honor recipient (part 2)

[Greyhawk]

"The name as yet unreleased (and don't look for it here)..."

Look here instead.


Posted at 1953Z

Applied CounterZombie Theory

[Greyhawk]

From Afghanistan, J.D. Johannes:

Just back inside some more civilized wire. I haven't seen much war out there, but that doesn't surprise me. The wars always seem worse on CNN than they are in real life because CNN and the rest of the media don't report on things that do not go boom.

For the past few days I've been with the Afghan Army and a couple teams of Americans that have a unique role in the fielding of the Afghan National Army. There is a lot to report and even more for me to study and research, for now I'll hit some of the high-lights.

Not much bang bang kapow - which can be frustrating for those looking for a bang bang kapow kind of war. (Unless they're actually guys who can make the bang bang kapow - but that's another story...)

But that doesn't mean you can't be ready for the Zombie Apocalypse - so check out J.D.'s report on The Commander and the Zombie Killers.

Posted at 1123Z

Living Medal of Honor recipient?

[Greyhawk]

The name as yet unreleased (and don't look for it here) - but folks under 50 might be surprised to learn there could be such a person...

The soldier, whose nomination must be reviewed by the White House, ran through a wall of enemy fire in Afghanistan's Korengal Valley in fall 2007 in an attempt to push back Taliban fighters who were close to overrunning his squad. U.S. military officials said his actions saved the lives of about half a dozen men.
<...>
The nomination comes after several years of complaints from lawmakers, military officers and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates that the Pentagon had become so cautious that only troops whose bravery resulted in death were being considered for the Medal of Honor. Gates "finds it impossible to believe that there is no one who has performed a valorous act deserving of the Medal of Honor who has lived to tell about it," said Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell, who declined to comment on specific nominations.

"It is possible that the White House could honor the soldier's heroism with a decoration other than the Medal of Honor," we are told. That somehow seems less likely now...

But here's something for the unfortunate quote* file:

"We should be stationing our troops in places where they won't be earning the Medal of Honor because the population and terrain favor us and we have quick access to air support," said John Nagl, one of the authors of the Army's counterinsurgency doctrine and president of the Center for a New American Security, a defense think tank.

I can speak from experience: that's certainly a great description of Germany today.

On a somewhat related note: "The Battle of Wanat was a hard fought victory." Meant to link that last week, but other events intruded.

(*As others have noted, I'm being diplomatic these days. But I sure can't blame anyone not so inclined.)



Posted at 0955Z

From (hostile) fire to Brinestone

[Greyhawk]

Brinestone president, Matt Bernard served in the active Army from 1995-2000 and reenlisted in the Reserves and National Guard following the attack of 9-11. In 2005, Matt volunteered for a tour in Iraq, he was hit not once but twice within a week's time and was severely injured from a road-side bomb. He would later be awarded two Purple Hearts for service and wounds in Iraq.

Bernard's transition home to Milford was "too quick" he says and he didn't receive the services he now realizes he needed for the adjustment...

In the video below you'll journey with Matt, from combat in Ramadi to his return home. After producing a documentary film on homeless vets he launched his own company - Brinestone.


More here. Matt (who was also a milblogger) staffed his company with other vets. You'll see an ad for Brinestone here on Mudville - that's one we've provided at no charge. Click through, take a look around, and bookmark 'em. Next time you're in the market for a computer (Mac or PC), software, or game system you'll know where to start.

And spread the word.



Posted at 0818Z

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