On being shown the door

Well, take this Voice Of America story:

U.N. officials say the top American serving in the U.N. mission to Afghanistan will not return to his post, following a dispute over how to handle fraud allegations in the country's disputed presidential election. ...in an e-mail to the BBC, Galbraith said he has not been fired as far as he knows.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon fired the top American official at the U.N. mission in Afghanistan on Wednesday after a widely publicized dispute with his boss over how to deal with widespread fraud charges in the country's presidential election.

...and you've got a glimpse of the delicacy involved in international relations as practiced in war zones. Back to the AP:

Galbraith told the Associated Press he was "surprised" by the decision and worried "insufficient attention was given to how this might impact in Afghanistan, or on the reputation of the United Nations."

"I find it quite astonishing that the U.N. would remove an official for being concerned about fraud in a U.N.-supported and U.N.-funded election," he said.

In a statement, Ban thanked Galbraith "for his hard work and professional dedication" and recognized his "important contributions."

Who advocates what? Answers to that are even less clear. If election runner-up Abdullah Abdullah is to be believed "Galbraith was pushing for things to move quickly and pushed for ballot papers to be ordered for a runoff, if needed". By itself that doesn't seem to rise to a firing offense requiring the attention of the Secretary-General - unless the UN is even more unforgiving and authoritarian than even its harshest critics would claim.

From all indications, however, on-going corruption as immediate concern seems to weigh heavier on the minds of the Obama administration than it does on the United Nations or people of Afghanistan - who would certainly like it stopped but express a much more urgent need of attention to issues like 30 Afghan civilians killed as packed bus hits bomb outside Kandahar. Perhaps connecting them to the services provided by their government might be more doable from their point of view once that sort of thing is less so.

And while we can declare corruption our own exit door, perhaps we'd do well to remember that our real options aren't to support Hamid Karzai or not, but whether to let those who set that bomb once again become the Government of Afghanistan.

From what I've heard, at least they don't tolerate corruption. (Perhaps they'll even make the buses run on time.)

(All links via the Dawn Patrol.)

Update: Well then, here's another detail -

The United Nations fired its No. 2 official in Afghanistan on Wednesday after the diplomat, Peter W. Galbraith, wrote a scathing letter accusing the head of the mission here of concealing election fraud that benefited the campaign of the incumbent President, Hamid Karzai.

The story adds "With American officials increasingly accepting the idea that Mr. Karzai will be the next president despite a large number of well-documented irregularities in the election, Mr. Galbraith's stance put him at odds with both the Obama administration and the United Nations."

But we can add wrote angry letter to threw down napkin and left dinner party in a huff on the list of things we've done to fix corruption in Afghanistan.

And: could we add "went through a big scary show of 'rethinking our strategy' immediately after the elections by way of applying pressure"? Could be, I suppose. I can't be the only one who's entertained thoughts that many of the various events of the past couple of weeks are primarily intended to send Karzai a message. Whether reason #1 or not, that's certainly part of it and would explain a lot. Maybe that's worked to a degree - maybe that's why American officials are "increasingly accepting". Negotiations would be very delicate indeed if that were the case. Such times are when men of admirable, unimpeachable, and uncompromising moral certainty are best utilized elsewhere.

And another thought... would Galbraith tell "the Associated Press he was "surprised" by the decision" if he had actually been fired for writing "a scathing letter accusing the head of the mission here of concealing election fraud"? Or is the New York Times adding an extra dash of drama to the story?

Here's an excerpt from the letter the NYT has decided the public can see. What I find interesting is that according to Galbraith "Ambassadors from the US, UK, EU and NATO" all were made aware of "the greatest risk to the Afghan elections" the month prior to the elections - but any action they may have taken to prevent it is not included in the excerpt.

In coordination with the Ambassadors from the US, UK, EU and NATO, I pressed the Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior either to secure these polling centers or to close them. The Afghan Ministers, whose continued tenure in office was to depend on the fraud, complained about my intervention and Kai ordered me to drop the matter.

What happened to the ambassadors? They were there at the start of the paragraph.

Here's an account of Galbraith's initial assignment to Afghanistan. My take away? It's a good thing the world loves us now.

Final quote from the letter:

Shortly after the elections, Kai told President Karzai that "I am biased" in your favor and that "those who are out to get you are also out to get me." When I asked Kai about this, he explained that being biased did not mean he was supporting Karzai and I accept that explanation. But, I am not sure President Karzai sees it that way. Kai also told me the "those" referred to Ambassador Holbrooke.

Maybe more civilian help isn't what we need after all.

Update - More here

Eggs

...are fragile: "...the odds of looking back with regret on a decision to put all our eggs in any one basket remain high."

Advocates of super secret/super sexy stand-off warfare as stand-alone warfare would do well to read this with that in mind.

Too Easy (2)

"If a military coup does occur here it will be civilized. That it has never happened doesn't mean it wont. Describing what may be afoot is not to advocate it. So, view the following through military eyes..."

...requests the excreter of this bit of bile. Since my 24 years of active duty includes dealing with the occasional whack job that slipped through the cracks and can never rise to the positive side of a cost/benefit ratio I think I'm qualified to respond. Results may vary based on individual and unit, but if some variation of STFU was deemed insufficient for the particular case then some variation of the following would play out:

1. Said individual would be informed that the commander would like to see him.

2. While he's in front of the commander's desk with heels locked (silent or responding "yes sir" as required) the remaining members of his unit would be sorting his personal belongings from his issued gear, bagging it all and piling it outside the door to save him the trouble of entering their facilities ever again.

3. Someone would escort the individual from the commander's office to collect his stuff, and from there to some location where he would await further instruction.

In short, he'd be gone faster than you can hit the unpublish button. But then again, sometimes a simple STFU will suffice.

Hope that helps.

Heavy Decisions

Previously: The war the times forgot.

The times may have forgotten Iraq, but The Times has not: General Says Iraq Troop Reductions May Quicken. General Ray Odierno, that is - the man who's been there pretty much full time since late 2006:

The senior American commander in Iraq said Tuesday that he could reduce American forces to 50,000 troops even before the end of next summer if the expected January elections in Iraq went smoothly.
<...>
"Between now and May, I could accelerate the drawdown," he said. "If we get through successful elections, and you seat the government peacefully, that provides another level of stability. That will help to reduce tensions."

Hopeful news, that. Left unanswered is the what if violence increases question, but perhaps that answer would be too hard to bear.

But let's welcome the news that additional troops might be available for the Afghan campaign in time to react to the Taliban's annual "Spring Offensive" (and associated news fixation on rising death tolls) and still have six months or so left on the hypothetical (but always tightly-wound) congressional clock. The Iraq surge demonstrated that those willing to shoulder great burdens can accomplish much in short order when the sense of urgency is real and a few key leaders are willing to stand against the perceived tide of public opinion - perhaps that's repeatable.

But certainly these comments from the General are thought provoking:

He did caution that if the Iraqi government and military were not able to shoulder the entire burden of responsibility by that deadline, the ministries in Baghdad would have to rely for support on civilian United States agencies, in particular the State and Treasury Departments.

"We failed the first time in 2003, when things were fairly calm and we didn't have a plan to transition what we had done militarily over to a civilian-led solution to help solve these problems," General Odierno said.

He was there in '03, too, so again he offers a uniquely qualified perspective.

"What are the enduring functions that have to be transitioned over that will continue to build Iraqi civilian capacity and continue to improve their ability to provide security? We are very focused on that." There's a lesson learned that's most definitely applicable to Afghanistan, and one that needs more attention than it gets. The idea that the military alone can't solve all the problems remains a concept that's always acknowledged, much discussed, and rarely acted on in meaningful ways.

...and rumors of war

The world appreciates us more now, "...because of the new image that has been projected by Obama". I actually hope that's true. I know it's true of Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi - I heard him announce as much to the entire world just the other day, immediately following a speech to the world by the (probably unappreciative) subject of his adoration. And hell, I was actually on active duty when we dropped a surgical strike on that maniac, just to send a message and reduce Libya's ability to support and train terrorists. He got that message loud and clear - along with everyone else with a radio or a TV. We wanted to kill him, too - but you can't win 'em all.

But that's ancient history anyway, and not the topic of this post. The world loves us now. I'd like to believe that. I'd love to see it demonstrated some day. It's a happy thought - but I wouldn't bet my life on it. I hope the guy who spoke to the United Nations before Kadafi did feels the same way, no matter what he said on the campaign trail. So even when I see reports from a "senior administration official" that indicate otherwise I remain skeptical. But good PR stuff, that.

Except when those reports are part of a supposedly serious discussion of the foundation of our national security I start to think unhappy thoughts.

Recent claims of significant success against al-Qaeda have become part of White House deliberations about U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, centering on a request by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top American and NATO commander there, for an expanded counterinsurgency campaign that will require more U.S. troops. Discussions began in earnest Tuesday as senior national security and military officials met with President Obama

Those within the administration who have suggested limiting large-scale U.S. ground combat in Afghanistan, including Vice President Biden, have pointed to an improved counterterrorism effort as evidence that Obama's principal objective -- destroying al-Qaeda -- can be achieved without an expanded troop presence.

There's certainly much good news in this report regarding our ability to infiltrate, track, target, and "surgically strike" al Qaeda (or other terrorist groups, we presume). Obviously such efforts should be carried on. But regardless of the degree of faith we want to put in those efforts (even if it's enough to overlook annoying and certainly explainable details like "Barrett's remarks stood in contrast with an assessment he made in June...") nothing here stands as an argument against full commitment to other concurrent efforts. Confidence is a good thing (I've learned not to underestimate American soldiers, for example) but the odds of looking back with regret on a decision to put all our eggs in any one basket remain high.

But what an amazing cultural shift is described here:

Barrett, in a speech Tuesday to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said that al-Qaeda is "losing credibility" among potential supporters and recruits because its recent efforts "have not awed people" and are "not up to the standard of 9/11." As the years have passed since the 2001 attacks, he said, al-Qaeda "hasn't really made a connection to a new generation" of young Muslims who have little recollection of the events and are less interested in religion.

How nice if that were true. But the majority of young Muslims actually aren't attracted to life as suicide bombers and mujahideen - and never have been. But enough were motivated by the US tendency to withdraw from direct conflict and rely on "surgical strikes" throughout the 1990s to make al Qaeda look like an attractive winner with a hellagood game plan - a group that could pull off 9/11. It is our post-9/11 behavior that has changed that perception, it's our demonstration of resolve that has directly undermined their attraction. And while we've certainly killed many of them on battlefields that don't require much travel on their part, it's our commitment to the humanitarian side of the mission - even if it has to be accomplished by men with guns, even as that's used against us, and even as we suffer casualties, too - that gives the would-be jihadist pause. Call it war, call it counterinsurgency, call it nation building, call it armed humanitarian work or an attempt to respond to the question why do they hate us - call it what you will, but think deeply before calling it quits. The motivational speech required to flip that switch back to 'on' had best be a damned good one, the need for it is predictable.

The desire to free up defense funds for other purposes is undeniable, too - health care advocates and champions of other domestic social causes share that motivation with manufacturers of F22 components, cruise missiles, and other big ticket items. Certainly enough of the latter are dispersed in enough congressional districts to draw the attraction of a broad coalition of elected officials. (For the rest of you: thanks for your support. Next term - promise.) Outside of specific interest groups of varying degrees of influence, arguments to quit the bloody field of battle (and return to the strategy that created al Qaeda in the first place) have broad popular appeal in the United States - and will contribute much to an already intense desire that overwhelms our ability to acknowledge that last parenthetical aside as exactly what's being discussed here. Arguments that "we're really much better at it now" should be received with equal amounts of appreciation and skepticism. "Keep up the good work" is exactly the right response.

And as attractive as a brief respite from all that soldiering on might seem - regardless of your political persuasion, exactly how much are you willing to bet on this:

The senior administration official said that more "surgical" missile attacks on terrorist leaders in their inaccessible Pakistani mountain sanctuaries and elsewhere had been increasingly successful and had largely avoided the civilian casualties that had been a source of anti-American sentiment...

The official also pointed to "progress we've made in other places," particularly in Somalia, where U.S. Special Forces conducted a raid this month...

But he maintained that other governments and intelligence services "have been much more amenable to cooperating with Washington because of the new image that has been projected" by Obama. "I don't want to criticize the previous administration, because they were equally motivated," he said, "but cooperating too closely with Americans at that time tainted them."

..."Over the last nine months . . . the environment has been much more conducive to cooperation."

For me, not that much. I'd like it to be true, I wish it was, but hope is not a strategy.

Two previous discussions on this topic here and here, and reproduced below.

Too Easy

Maybe you should read the Wall Street Journal. Or just look at the pictures.


Update: Or the LA Times. Hey, why bother with getting family permissions and paying a photographer for new pictures of one coffin when you can re-run older, much more dramatic public domain photos of multiple coffins (obtained without family consent) for free?

On Honor

From John Donovan:

Busy day for the Medal of Honor. While not rising to the level of 101 Medals, like 5 August, today was still a day of fire, thunder, and blood in the history of the Medal, with 68 Medals of Honor marking actions on this day - including that of Navy SEAL Mike Monsoor, who earned his Medal in Iraq on this day in 2006.

Details here.

The war the times forgot

Whether you support or oppose the effort, whether you believe we've won or lost, one thing is certain about Iraq: it's a country with 130,000 U.S. troops who aren't in Afghanistan, and plans are for it to stay that way. "Why is that so," you may wonder, "with Afghanistan falling apart and only half that many troops there?"

A short answer yesterday: You'd think the battlefield with the greatest number of U.S. troops would get the most attention, but the one with the greatest need for troops has made everyone forget Iraq altogether. But not "everyone" has forgotten Iraq. Those who decide where troops go know exactly where they are.

And those of us who've been there find it harder to forget.

John Burns, on Iraq: "As for where the balance lies in all this -- whether it has in any sense been worth it -- that's an issue for history..." And that is certainly true. Somewhere in that history should be an acknowledgment of Burns' contribution to its documentation.

There are lessons to be learned from his experience. In the earliest days of the war he was involved in developing and propagating one of it's most enduring myths - the museum looting story. Even though his original story warned that "what officials told journalists today may have to be adjusted as a fuller picture comes to light" that didn't stop his paper from running an op/ed declaration within days: "The American and British forces are clearly to blame for the destruction and displacement of its cultural treasures." The fuller picture did "come to light" (mostly due to the efforts of one Army Colonel), but was deemed less newsworthy than the stunning original story, and for most Americans few adjustments have been made to the preliminary reports to this day.

But by late 2003:

The Times reporter, John Burns, says that he changed the more conservative figure after talking that evening to reporters in the hotel who had spent the day witnessing terrible scenes of chaos. "We were disposed to believe the worst," he recalls. "We were tremendously distraught, and passion got the better of us." Other reporters on the scene have sympathy with his decision. "A lot of us got swept up," says Glauber. "There was an emotional punch to it all because the looting [in Baghdad] was indiscriminate and indescribable." To Burns's credit, both versions of the story warned lower down that "a full accounting of what has been lost may take weeks or months."

In February 2007, Burns' earliest days of the surge commentary on Iraq was extraordinary for the times:

And his commentary today is (as ever) worthwhile.

As for where the balance lies in all this -- whether it has in any sense been worth it -- that's an issue for history, and for the peoples most deeply impacted by the war: Iraqis, first of all, and Americans, who will no doubt come to a more settled view over the longer term, once we have a clearer sense of Iraq's future trajectory. That, of course, remains profoundly uncertain. What does seem fair to say is that America, by deposing Saddam and opening the way for Iraq's fractious ethnic, sectarian and political groups to settle their differences not by the gun and the garrote but through the give-and-take of parliamentary democracy, has opened the door to a better future than was in prospect before 2003. Whether Iraqis will walk through that door is now a matter for them; American influence, though far from spent as long as 130,000 United States troops remain the guarantor of last resort against any near-term return to dictatorship, is waning by the day, and the government of Nuri Kamal al-Maliki has shown, in numerous ways in recent weeks, that it feels ever more at liberty to ignore American advice and urgings on hot-button political and security issues.
<...>
Earlier this month, in a speech to a blue-ribbon audience in London, General Petraeus repeated what he has told Congress repeatedly, that the stunning improvements in the security situation in Iraq in the past 24 months remain "fragile and reversible." Decoded, what that means is that there is still a real risk of backsliding in the security gains that began with the 2007 troop "surge," and of Iraq heading back toward the murderous sectarianism that General Petraeus faced when he took command in Baghdad in early 2007. What Mr. Obama would do if chaos set in as the American troop withdrawal gathers momentum next spring and summer could be one of the most testing moments in his presidency, all the more so for the evident fact that most Americans and most American legislators -- not to mention many in command ranks in the armed forces with lengthy on-the-ground-experience in Iraq, to judge from my e-mail correspondence -- seem to have decided that America has already borne the burdens of Iraq for too long and needs to shift its priorities to Afghanistan.

That's an excerpt, much more to consider in the full piece.

But a few points worth noting - "In any case, America's choice has effectively already been made -- to withdraw from Iraq on the Obama schedule, by the end of 2011, and refocus the American effort in Afghanistan." It may be the Obama schedule in the sense that he "owns" it now, but like the entirety of the Iraq war it is a legacy from his predecessor. From all indications, Obama is determined to stay the course.

So "130,000 United States troops remain the guarantor of last resort". This is not a figure established by the SOFA, which required only that combat troops leave the cities by June 30 and all troops depart the country by the end of 2011 - and leaves those sorts of specifics to be determined. As for what makes a "combat troop" a combat troop - well, that's got less to do with whether or not they engage in combat than most might think.

But given that gains are indeed fragile and reversible, it seems certain that should the U.S. reduce troop levels in Iraq prior to the January elections, then that action could be seen as questionable in light of any violence occurring with those elections. Conversely, it's unlikely that any lack of violence should be credited to the continued presence of 130,000 U.S. troops - But to whatever degree it might be, "credit" will not be the term used.

The reality will likely fall in the middle, and be reported as some violence in spite of US troops. But what if violence were extreme - that in spite of the efforts of US troops (who, it might be imagined, would be performing some sort of election-day "quick reaction" role in conjunction with Iraqi forces rather than a visible presence of Stryker vehicles ringing polling centers) violence reaches a point where the elections are discredited - or worst case voting in meaningful numbers becomes impossible? That seems unlikely, but what, exactly, would the US response be to "backsliding in the security gains that began with the 2007 troop "surge""? The argument that "we're here to prevent violence" becomes absurd if followed by "and if violence occurs we'll leave."

The reality is and always has been that resolution of the Iraq war - other than the initial invasion and toppling of Saddam Hussein - has always been a combination of military and political. Counterinsurgency doctrine calls that an 80/20 ratio - with military on the low side - but that doesn't mean there aren't days when the military must contribute 100%. The 80/20 rule is a point Harry Reid famously misused to undermine support for the surge in its earliest days - but regardless of the ratio (which in those days was probably 90/10 with the military on the big side - if not 100%) by the Fall of 2007 the trajectory of the military part was clear. By the summer of 2008 that should have been obvious to anyone - but no one was paying attention.

Likewise no one is paying attention to Iraq now - as Afghanistan dominates the headlines. But with each Brigade Combat Team (actually, they're called "Advise and Assist Brigades" now) that deploys to Iraq this Fall and Winter a strong and clear message will also be sent about which battlefield matters most.

And that "central" doesn't mean "important" after all.

Postscript: Earlier this year you may have heard that President Obama had diverted brigades originally tapped for Iraq to deploy to Afghanistan instead. That's true, but what didn't make the news was that a few days later other brigades replaced them in the Iraq rotation. Amazing, the sorts of things that don't make the papers these days, isn't it?

Getting up to speed...

They should have plenty to talk about:

10:10AM President Obama meets with senior advisors

11:30AM President Obama meets with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen

4:30PM President Obama and Vice President Biden meet with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

Gates on Afghanistan: corruption, troops, and other strategies, foreign and domestic

George Stephanopoulos' interview with Robert Gates (video here) provides significant insight to developments (or lack thereof) on the issues of strategy and troop numbers. A careful listen requires an acknowledgment that the Secretary is rightfully cautious when describing what others might be thinking (especially when others include combat commanders or the President of the United States) but clearly he's in a better position than most to access and understand that thinking.

There's much here of note. But this brief excerpt:

STEPHANOPOULOS: But did -- but didn't General McChrystal take these problems of the election into account? He didn't even deliver his report until August 30th, which was after the elections. Dennis Blair, the head of National Intelligence, said back in February or March that we could foresee that there would be problems with this election.

GATES: Well, I think -- I think that the potential magnitude of the problems in the election really didn't become apparent until the vote count began in early September. So -- so I think it was really after he submitted his -- his assessment.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So now we have a real dilemma.

Does that mean that the United States is re-thinking whether it can even -- whether it can bolster President Karzai's government or whether we have to give up on it?

GATES: Well, I -- you know, the Afghan people have gone to the polls and we have the two election commissions, one internal and one international, that could still come to conclusions, even if they throw out some fraudulent ballots or a number of fraudulent ballots, that there was a clear winner.

The key is whether the Afghans believe that their government has legitimacy. And everything that I've seen in the intelligence and elsewhere indicates that remains the case.

...has obvious applicability to this discussion.

This, on the other hand, addresses something I've been hearing repeatedly and avoiding mentioning:

STEPHANOPOULOS: And, as you said, you hope to have this done in a few weeks and you want to avoid failure, as well. But the president has not made any -- any decision at all on resources?

Has he -- has he ruled it out?

GATES: No, I haven't even given him General McChrystal's request for resources. I have the -- I -- I'm receiving the -- the report. I'm going to sit on it until I think -- or the president thinks -- it's appropriate to bring that into the discussion of the national security principles.

The idea that the strategy can be discussed independent of resource requirements seems absurd - like debating what new car you're going to buy without any idea of cost - initial or long term.

But usually those who comment on the "not delivered" issue very specifically state it's the "request" they're talking about. So certainly the President actually knows the numbers (and hopefully everything else) contained in that request, right? Damn but if I was interviewing Gates I sure would have asked that follow-on question.

Because either:

1. The President knows full well what's needed and hasn't gotten it in the form of a question - thus if he says "no" it's not a denial of his commander (at least, in a "let's pretend" kind of way - a denial of reality).

2. The President is going to pick a car based on its looks alone. (Unfortunately "car" in this case is actually a war.)

There is no good answer - the question comes down to "is this horseshit or bullshit"? I think the answer is 1, but the length of time this has already been dragged out is stunning and inexcusable, no matter what sort of spin anyone puts on it. MChrystal's report - complete with resource requirements - was due on the President's desk in mid August, those who will be involved in this discussion with the President ("within the next few weeks") say they're going to develop questions to fire back at the General - that he has to "prove it" to them. In short, the only plan in Washington right now is a plan to hold meetings to further delay decisions while troops in Afghanistan keep on keeping on.

But that's mere dishonesty, certainly not as bad as corruption, right?

Gates: success in Iraq?

There's an overlooked gem of a quote in George Stephanopoulos' interview with Robert Gates (video here).

STEPHANOPOULOS: That's what -- General McChrystal says we have to have more troops to avoid failure. Where we've had a lack of clarity on what success means in Afghanistan, you pointed out at the beginning of this year what it was. And he said we're not - we shouldn't expect a Valhalla in Afghanistan.

The president's special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, was asked for his definition of success last month and here's what he said.

AMB. RICHARD HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL ENVOY, PAKISTAN & AFGHANISTAN: I would say this about defining success in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the simplest sense, the Supreme Court test for another issue, we'll know it when we see it.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Is that good enough?

GATES: Well, I think -- I think we know it when we see it and we see it in Iraq.

Not since Biden declared we were "securing victory" there has such a noteworthy statement gone so unnoticed. You'd think the battlefield with the greatest number of U.S. troops would get the most attention, but the one with the greatest need for troops has made everyone forget Iraq altogether.

Update: On the other hand, it's never too late to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. I mean, success.

Update 2: Yes, he said some things about Afghanistan, too.
And next here: The war the times forgot

Tracking

(updated/bumped)

May:

And in May you received an invitation to meet with President Obama. Tell me about that.

Very short meeting. He simply described this as a difficult mission, but he thought that I was qualified for it. And that was about the extent.

How many minutes?

Just a few, probably three or four minutes.

Was that a surprise to you?

Not particularly. I had been, of course, talking to Secretary [of Defense Robert] Gates and [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Adm. [Mike] Mullen. And so I was brought up, and I think the president just wanted to look into my eyes and see whether I was the right choice.

(From a 1 August interview)

June:

August 10:

...Gen. McChrystal's coming report won't include any specific requests for more U.S. troops. Those numbers would instead be detailed in a follow-on document that is set to be delivered to Washington a few weeks after the assessment.

The timing of Gen. McChrystal's primary assessment remains in flux. It was initially due in mid-August, but the commander was summoned to a secret meeting in Belgium last week with Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and told to take more time. Military officials say the assessment will now be released sometime after the Aug. 20 vote.

Late August:

September 25:

Gates and other administration officials have stressed that the president needs time to decide the strategy for Afghanistan before focusing on whether to commit more U.S. troops, and they will hold McChrystal's troop request until the strategy review is completed.

"There's no sense in complicating a discussion about strategy with the resource request. We want to do them in order," Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said this week.

The report adds "the administration has stressed patience". Truer words may never have been written.

October:

2009-09-26 11:08:03

Chicago

Somehow people must be free
I hope the day comes soon
Won't you please come to Chicago
Show your face
From the bottom to the ocean
To the mountains of the moon
Won't you please come to Chicago
No one else can take your place
We can change the world -
Re-arrange the world
- Chicago, Graham Nash

Any story with a headline that begins with "Obama reverses course..." is noteworthy. But that headline ends with "says he will attend IOC vote" - so probably a bit of interest there for sports fans (and I like sports!) - but for those with other priorities, not so much.

Byron York, for example:

With growing pressure for decisions on life-or-death issues in Afghanistan and Iran, this morning the White House announced that President Obama will soon travel to...Copenhagen. Obama will be in Denmark for just a few hours -- he leaves this Thursday and returns Friday -- which is just enough time to make a pitch for Chicago's bid for the 2016 Olympic Games.

But shame on him for ignoring the President's (now-reversed) stated reason for not going: "Obama had said for weeks that he would not make the trip to Denmark, citing his pursuit of health care reform as the main reason."

Clearly what's at work here is is another example of xenophobic racism - the thought of thousands of foreigners descending on Chicago for friendly competition when they ought to be waiting in their own countries for us to get around to sending the Third Infantry Division over to democratize them is too much for some to bear.*

I for one, hope Chicago does get the Olympics. As my contribution to the effort, I note that every good PR campaign needs a theme song. I think any advertising firm worth it's salt could do a hellalot with this one:

Here's an updated remake, just to show the possibilities:

Broad, cross-generational demographic appeal there. Obviously new video will have to be shot to go along with the music, but that shouldn't be too hard to do. Hell, if the NEA would drop a few hints the whole thing could probably be done and viral on YouTube within hours without costing a cent.

*Yes, I'm being a sarcastic SOB here.

(Hat tip to Instapundit.)

Hanky Panky

According to senior administration officials, the Afghan war plan that President Barack Obama announced in March -- which called for a comprehensive and manpower-intensive counterinsurgency strategy -- was built around the assumption that Mr. Karzai would emerge from last month's elections with new legitimacy
<...>
"Forget even the McChrystal report," said a senior administration official, referring to the grim assessment of the war effort submitted three weeks ago by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan. "Every counterinsurgency is built on one credible partner." [Link]

Foreign policy evolution, or revolution?

Dining on platters of rice and lamb at the heavily fortified presidential palace in Kabul, Biden and his colleagues grilled Karzai about reports of corruption and the growing opium trade in the country, which the president disingenuously denied. An increasingly impatient Biden challenged Karzai's assertions until he lost his temper. Biden finally stood up and threw down his napkin, declaring, "This meeting is over," before he marched out of the room with Hagel and Kerry.

It was a similar story nearly a year later. As Obama prepared to assume the presidency in January, he dispatched Biden on a regional fact-finding trip. Again Biden dined with Karzai, and, again, the meeting was contentious. Reiterating his prior complaints about corruption, Biden warned Karzai that the Bush administration's kid-glove treatment was over; the new team would demand more of him.

Fair enough. We won, as the saying goes, and you better get used to a new sheriff in town - one who knows what fancy napkins are for.

So what, exactly, has been done beyond napkin toss and stompaway? Let's move a few weeks forward to February, for Karzai's point of view:

Kabul: Afghanistani President Hamid Karzai admitted on Friday that he had not spoken to Barack Obama since the new US president assumed office last month and conceded that he had become increasingly isolated as American support drained away.

Quite a sad story for Valentines Day. But if the President was otherwise engaged, other specialists were available:

MUNICH -- The war in Afghanistan will be "much tougher than Iraq," President Obama's special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan said at a security conference here on Sunday.
<...>
Mr. Holbrooke was part of a high-level American delegation at the annual Munich Security Conference over the weekend. The group, led by Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and including Gen. James L. Jones, the national security adviser, and Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of the United States Central Command, did not paint a rosy picture of the situation in Afghanistan.

The American view of Afghanistan's problems differed from that of the country's president, Hamid Karzai, who also spoke Sunday.

While Mr. Karzai acknowledged the security problems, he said that great progress had been made, from roads to schools to health services. In an address that at times sounded defensive, he said Afghanistan was neither a "narco-state" nor a "failed state," as critics have labeled it.

Who's "right"? Well certainly some corruption is present in any government - this is no excuse for whatever level may exist anywhere - but certainly one measure of excess is the opinion of the governed. That said, these February, 2009 poll results ("jointly commissioned by the BBC, ABC News of America and ARD of Germany") from Afghanistan are worth a look:

In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? And after that, what is the next biggest problem?

How much progress do you think ____ is making in providing a better life for Afghans in the future?

How would you rate the work of:

Obviously different answers could be found in different areas (what government? in some) but it's worth noting that efforts to "connect the people to the government" - difficult as those may be when pursued by those viewed slightly less favorably - wouldn't be starting from zero.

Days later, the Times unveiled the year-old napkin story:

Between platters of lamb and rice, Mr. Biden and two other American senators questioned Mr. Karzai about corruption in his government, which, by many estimates, is among the worst in the world...

In spite of the hanky throwing, stomping, claims, counter claims, finger pointing, accusations, denials, and other diplomatic niceties - within days President Obama announced his "Afghan troops surge":

A new national poll indicates that a majority of Americans support President Barack Obama's plan to send 17,000 more U.S. troops to the war in Afghanistan.

Sixty-three percent of those questioned in the poll say they support Obama's plan to beef up U.S. troops in Afghanistan, with 36 percent opposing the move.
<...>
"Obama's plan for more troops wins twice as much support as the surge in troop levels in Iraq won when George W. Bush first unveiled that plan in 2007," CNN Polling Director Keating Holland said. "The Afghanistan plan is more popular than the Iraq surge because the war in Afghanistan is more popular."

The move made good on a long-time campaign promise:

"Yes, I think we need more troops. I've been saying that for over a year now. And I think that we have to do it as quickly as possible, because it's been acknowledged by the commanders on the ground the situation is getting worse, not better." - October, 2008

And, the White House added, the "17,000 troops would deploy to Afghanistan ahead of the Afghan national elections scheduled for August 20, significantly building up the 38,000 US force battling the spreading insurgency" even though "US intelligence has warned that endemic corruption and the government's inability to deliver services and protect the populace has eroded its legitimacy."

MSNBC:

The new troops could be a down payment on an even larger influx of U.S. forces that has been widely expected this year, and it will get forces in place in time for the increase in fighting that usually comes with warmer weather and ahead of national midyear elections.

The troops will also train Afghan army units.

The military operations will set up a string of bases and smaller combat outposts, allowing the troops to move around and engage in counterterrorism against foreign fighters and counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban and other local enemies, the official said.

The goal is to have enough troops to "seize and hold" territory and maintain basic security, which hasn't been possible under current troop levels, the official said. The Taliban continues to maintain at least half a dozen safe areas inside Afghanistan, which are prime targets for the U.S. military.
<...>
The increased troop levels are expected to last three to four years, the military official said.

Obama last week ordered a strategic review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, headed by former CIA officer Bruce Riedel, Richard Holbrooke, Obama's special representative for the two countries, and Michele Flournoy, the undersecretary of defense for policy.

Meanwhile, back in Afghanistan:

Stepping up a confrontation with his political opponents, President Hamid Karzai agreed Saturday to an August date for presidential elections but said he'll stay in office until then and not resign in favor of an interim administration.

The man widely expected to be tapped as the main opposition party's presidential candidate accused Karzai of trying to extend his term so that he could use his authority over the government to "rig the election."
<...>
Karzai said he accepted the "national consensus" on the Aug. 20 date. But he rejected an opposition demand that an interim administration run the country between May 21 and the election, saying there is no such provision in the Constitution.

He said if the deadline for holding the vote is to be extended by four months, so too should his term in office.

"We have agreed on the Constitution and the Constitution says clearly that there should be a presidential election 30 days to 60 days before the ending of the president's working period," said Karzai, wearing a long black coat and a grey wool hat. "The president stays until the election date."
<...>
Abdullah, a leader of the opposition National Front, told McClatchy the opposition will continue insisting that Karzai step aside in favor of a "transitional mechanism" because he will try to use his office and the perks that go with it to fix the election.

"He thinks this is the only way for him to have an advantage, by using his authority over the process and over the institutions," said Abdullah, who served as foreign minister from 2001 to 2006. "If he is talking about a national consensus, does he think there is a national consensus for him to stay and rig the election?"

That was the first week of March. By the end of that month, the strategic review was complete.

One hour on war

Actually, 13 minutes. But General McChrystal is obviously capable of providing a lot of information in minimum time. No surprise in that. It's a good thing, sez I, that America got a chance to meet the man who's been leading a war they've only heard about from others.

His appointment last May to command U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan was newsworthy - though it drew far less media attention than that of General David Petraeus' selection to lead MNF-I in 2007. But General Stan McChrystal is a quiet professional; he'd probably prefer not have to spend any more time in front of the cameras than he has to.

The claim that McChrystal's assessment somehow "stunned the White House" is TV drama, not news - it reaffirmed what they knew all along. The White House clearly wanted to control the timing of the public release of the report ("after the elections"); whether they succeeded in that or someone else jumped the gun is actually an unanswered question. (Current assumptions on that point certainly overwhelmingly favor the latter.)

Based on McChrystal's comment "...since I've been here the last two and a half months..." it appears this video was recorded sometime before his report was "leaked". McChrystal arrived in Afghanistan in mid-June and hit his three-month point in mid-September. That's a quibble, but given the Sep 21 publication of the report in the WaPo it's a significant one. It's at least worth remembering that 60 Minutes is not the nightly news; this video (or at least the McChrystal portion) is recent and newsworthy but not live from the front.

Another minor quibble - the observation that McChrystal's morning briefing is conducted before a large number of people is accurate, but that's not unusual for those types of briefings. Their function is to get everyone on the same page. If the reporter thought this was an amazing and unique thing, that speaks more to his experience at this sort of thing. TOCs do look crowded on first visits but that doesn't equate to popularity. (Afghan Army remote participation, on the other hand, might be something new. If so it's a great idea long overdue.)

But more notable (although subtle) is McChrystal's response to the assertion that he's under pressure not to ask for more troops. If he refuted that his words didn't make it through final editing.

"Do you worry about security leaks when you have so many people involved in these things?" Martin asked.

"I'm less worried about leaks than I am about the people who don't know what we're trying to, you know, ignorance. So, I think it's a trade off and I think I come down on this side every time," he said.

For all his innovations, McChrystal still is hostage to geography: Afghanistan is bigger than Iraq, yet he has only half as many troops. He plans to double the size of Afghan forces to 400,000, but that will take years.

The only place he can get the troops he needs now is from the United States.

Asked if he's confident he'll get what he is asking for, McChrystal said, "I'm confident that I will have an absolute chance to provide my assessment and to make my recommendations."

"But you're already under pressure not to ask for more. I mean, how's that affect what you do?" Martin asked.

"Doesn't affect me at all. And David, I take this extraordinarily seriously. I believe that what I am responsible to do is to give my best assessment," McChrystal said.

Asked how often he talks to the president, McChrystal said, "I've talked to the president since I've been here once on a VTC."

"You talked to him once in 70 days?" Martin asked.

"That's correct," McChrystal replied.

"Can you imagine ever saying to the president of the United States, 'Sir, we just can't do it,'?" Martin asked.

"Yes I can," McChrystal said. "And if I felt that way, the day I feel that way, the day I'm sure I feel that way, I'll tell him that."

Once is not enough.

Update: on the other hand, I see the attraction but honestly that detail isn't the big deal in this discussion. President Bush didn't do a whole lot of direct chatting with Petraeus, either. (But he did have Jack Keane.) What that no-contact is supposed to prove (arms-length or greater disinterest, presumably) could be true enough, but this is not solid supporting evidence of it and doesn't make the case. The big deal is that this isn't news, it's just more evidence of foot dragging that's been going on for weeks with no end in sight. (The report was due 10 August, it will soon be "outdated".) Obama knows what's going on but doesn't believe it to be urgent.

And here's more from the guy who does talk to McChrystal. (He has some good one-liners, too.)

More: On the third hand, group discussion ain't the same as one-to-one (the first couple of comments point out most of the errors in the argument presented). Yes, Bush was more directly "plugged in" to the war in Iraq (and Afghanistan for that matter) than Obama is to any military action anywhere. No, that is not a violation of the sanctity of chain of command that Obama has restored. And yes, it is a reminder that Iraq '07 was a bigger issue than Afghanistan '09 - a reality Obama advisers are trying hard to downplay, at least. (Jones: "the challenges Obama faces in the Afghan war are more "complex" and "bigger than the surge" decision President George W. Bush faced..." - Holbrooke: "The war in Afghanistan will be "much tougher than Iraq,"...) True or not, the whole comparison issue sounds petty on one level - and that case certainly isn't bolstered by Obama's "restoration of the chain of command".

Want some really deep end stuff? Try here and here. (If you really want to send a message that you have no business discussing military issues, point out how little you know about chain of command by adding the Joint Chiefs to it.)

From the above examples comes the sad conclusion that those who put their own political ideologies above other considerations when the urge to pontificate strikes (or who let that ideology overwhelm their knowledge that they really are better off not delving into issues they either aren't qualified for or have been ignoring for a very long time) will just as likely defeat their own arguments. The sad part is it won't matter, the choirs tend to forgive and forget - rapidly. After all, tomorrow brings another sound bite.

Previously: Tracking

German Elections

Analysis from Spiegel Online. (Losers examined here and "biggest winner" here)

Moving parts (2): in the Wiggle Room

(Part one here.)

This quote...

Asked why al-Qaeda, which is comparatively safe in its current sanctuaries in Pakistan, would want to return to Afghanistan, where more than 100,000 U.S. and NATO troops are stationed, Jones said, "That's a good question. . . . This is certainly one of the questions that we will be discussing. This is one of the questions, for example, that one could come back at with General McChrystal."

...from Woodward's WaPo story prompts this response from Spencer Ackerman: "It is a great question."

I agree, which is why it should be answered once again sooner rather than later. Back to Spencer:

...it's complacent to predicate a strategy on al-Qaeda being cozy in Pakistan. The whole goal of the strategy is to disrupt that Pakistani safe haven in the first place. If the strategy is working, then al-Qaeda will try to move in response to increased harassment. I don't know where they'll move, and it's not necessarily the case that they'll move back to Afghanistan, but we should want them to feel the need for getting out of where they are.

Actually, a strategy - no matter how long-debated or carefully considered - must be based on certain assumptions - and if those developing it attempt to account for every possibility they'll achieve a state colloquially called analysis paralysis, in which decisions are never made. As for whether it's better to keep them "in place" or "moving", arguments can be made for either option (with full knowledge that they get a vote, too - but again, analysis paralysis).

But in "big picture" strategy - the sort developed at the National Command Authority level, which is much of what we're really discussing here - big picture stuff is important. Here's an example from our now six-month old Af/Pak strategy:

The United States must overcome the 'trust deficit' it faces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where many believe that we are not a reliable long-term partner. We must engage the Afghan people in ways that demonstrate our commitment to promoting a legitimate and capable Afghan government with economic progress. We must engage the Pakistani people based on our long-term commitment to helping them build a stable economy, a stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society.

That "reliable" message should be heard in Islamabad, Kabul, Baghdad, Mogadishu and Timbuktu. (Did you know that last is an actual city? I did...) But because we're in Af/Pak (because al Qaeda is in Af/Pak) it's phrased for Af/Pak - and includes a pledge to the people - not their governments. It's critical to deny safe havens, among other reasons so that we don't wind up doing the same in-force stuff elsewhere - and that's another component of our current strategy beyond Af/Pak, thus it does not appear in Af/Pak-centric White papers. This process is carried out by diplomacy, aid, and other means - not all of which "make the papers".

The 'trust deficit' where many believe that we are not a reliable long-term partner is true wherever we may be now or in the future. Since we're in Afghanistan (and in a different sense and to a much lesser degree Pakistan) now it is critical there. If we fail in that regards it becomes highly unlikely we'll be able to convince future partners that no, we really mean it this time.

Unfortunately for any public debate on the topic, few people will have taken the time to read the brief white paper framing the strategy released last Spring, and fewer still will have a background to grasp the limits, depths, and necessary ambiguities therein. Whatever they may know of it they get from media coverage - including this:

The United States must look for a way out of the war in Afghanistan, President Obama said, in a signal that the military build-up in Afghanistan will not be open-ended and will lead to the eventual withdrawal of American and NATO troops from the country.

"There's got to be an exit strategy," Mr. Obama said in a wide-ranging interview shown Sunday on "60 Minutes" on CBS.

Which is also true, and certainly saying it helps "shore up the base" (and perhaps "The Base"). But it's a goes without saying sort of thing (outside of diplomatic channels when used to coax action from a "reluctant partner"), not covered in the White Paper and probably not the best choice for a key global message to be sent by the President of the United States on a publicity tour immediately prior to its release. (But admittedly useful if your goal is to "distance yourself from your predecessor" in the minds of the public.)

Again, because it is "big picture" there are necessary ambiguities in the big picture plan, details which are left to lower-level planners including commanders in the field. (But which can be used for other purposes, too - we're seeing that this week.) And there are clearly many noteworthy elements to that plan. But the New York Times' headline choice resulting from the pre-release publicity blitz - "Obama Says a Way Out of Afghanistan Is Needed" seems an odd way to announce your plan for dealing with "the central front".

Moving Parts

Bob Woodward, the Washington Post, Today (September 27) "No Deadline Set for Decision on Troops":

President Obama has not set a deadline for determining a new strategy or for committing more troops to the war in Afghanistan, despite an urgent request from his top commander, his national security adviser said Saturday.

The timing of Gen. McChrystal's primary assessment remains in flux. It was initially due in mid-August, but the commander was summoned to a secret meeting in Belgium last week with Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and told to take more time. Military officials say the assessment will now be released sometime after the Aug. 20 vote.

The shift came amid signs of growing U.S. unease about the direction of the war effort. Initial assessments delivered to Gen. McChrystal last month warned that the Taliban were strengthening their control over Kandahar, the largest city in southern Afghanistan.

"I don't think anybody in the allied effort seriously thinks that Afghanistan is about to fall to the Taliban," Jones said. He added that two-thirds of Afghans live in areas that are "completely under government and local control, and are doing reasonably well."
<...>
Jones said the challenges Obama faces in the Afghan war are more "complex" and "bigger than the surge" decision President George W. Bush faced in Iraq three years ago.
<...>
"This is bigger than the surge," Jones said. "This is more complex. There are more moving parts."

I don't think anybody in the allied effort seriously thinks that there are any moving parts on this end. But "the challenges Obama faces in the Afghan war are more "complex" and "bigger than the surge" decision President George W. Bush faced in Iraq three years ago" is most definitely the message being sent here.

July Joe Biden

I wonder if Joe Biden will be on Television today explaining his new plan:

Among the alternatives being presented to Mr. Obama is Mr. Biden's suggestion to revamp the strategy altogether. Instead of increasing troops, officials said, Mr. Biden proposed scaling back the overall American military presence. Rather than trying to protect the Afghan population from the Taliban, American forces would concentrate on strikes against Qaeda cells, primarily in Pakistan, using special forces, Predator missile attacks and other surgical tactics.

This is Joe in July, explaining the current plan:

Some folks just can't get enough of that laborious banging.

Tell me how this ends

There are a number of things wrong (or half right - and the other half matters) with this New York Times narrative, ("General Casey, whose institutional role as Army chief is to protect his force"... "we'll have to assess what that will do in terms of stress on the force," said a Army official" ... "other officers who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan ...privately expressed doubt") but this in particular stands out:

His decision to send 21,000 more troops to Afghanistan early this year, which will bring the number of American troops there to 68,000 this fall, was made hurriedly within weeks of coming into office to stanch the tactical erosion on the ground and provide security during Afghan elections.

The young and impulsive last February defense is unbecoming, and an historical re-write. In fact that action fulfilled long-standing campaign pledges to do just that. ("Yes, I think we need more troops. I've been saying that for over a year now. And I think that we have to do it as quickly as possible, because it's been acknowledged by the commanders on the ground the situation is getting worse, not better." - October, 2008)

And this: "Mr. Reed, Democrat of Rhode Island and an Army veteran, has not ruled out supporting more troops but said "the burden of proof" was on commanders to justify it" - is downright insulting to anyone in Afghanistan carrying out the President's orders to implement the strategy defined in March, not just the man selected in May to lead them. Those few are familiar enough with their world via 24/7 immersion in that hostile environment, no additional burdens are required.

I have no doubt the President knows full well his burdens and feels the attraction of retreat, and certainly some of the advisers named in the New York Times piece have shown him graphs of poll results detailing Bill Clinton's popularity post-Mogadishu (or will when the time comes to discuss strategy). But amidst all those partial quotes and half truths, when the New York Times informs us that "the liberal base of his party [is] increasingly vocal in its opposition to the war" we do well to note that's one claim they saw no need to support with quotes from outside experts.

Evaluated in conjunction with yesterday's news one sees a well developed narrative indeed.

Name a river that doesn't flow

NPR, September 20: 'Civilian Surge' Plan For Afghanistan Hits A Snag:

When Obama unveiled his administration's strategy for Afghanistan in March, he emphasized that civilian experts were just as critical as the tens of thousands of additional U.S. military personnel he was sending at that time.
<...>
"We have to remember that decisions were made in the spring, funds were appropriated in July, programming is being implemented, you know, August/September," says Jacob Lew, deputy secretary of state for management and resources. "We're just now seeing the program go into place."

Lew says the administration expects to reach its target numbers by the beginning of next year. Other State Department officials, and analysts, say that's optimistic -- because it's difficult to find enough people who have the right skills and who are willing to stay in Afghanistan for a yearlong deployment.

While "tens of thousands of additional U.S. military personnel he was sending" is an unusual way of describing 17 thousand, there was certainly no doubt they would go. On the other hand, the civilian numbers were problematic from the start.

Here's a report from April:

WASHINGTON -- The Obama administration is having trouble finding the hundreds of civilians it wants to bolster its troop buildup in Afghanistan, so military reservists might be asked to do many of the jobs.

In announcing the new strategy for the war last month, the administration said it would send several hundred civilians -- such as agronomists, economists and legal experts -- to work on reconstruction and development issues as part of the military's counterinsurgency campaign.

Defense Department press secretary Geoff Morrell said Thursday that the military is trying to find ways to fill the gap. That would likely be with reservists, who often have the necessary skills because of the experience they have in their civilian lives, officials said.

If "decisions were made in the spring, funds were appropriated in July, programming is being implemented, you know, August/September," and "We're just now seeing the program go into place" is an explanation, fair enough.

Hopefully they won't run up against this 2007-sort of thing:

Keane said that Crocker needed some help. "None of his new people have arrived."

"They're going to be due there in summer," Hadley said.

That was because the State Department still had a policy of not transferring its people during the school year, Keane explained. He noted that the military moved people when the military needed them, period.

There were still difficulties when fall rolled around, too - with reports of State Department members "likening [Iraq duty] to a 'potential death sentence.'"

Small wonder, given the news of the day - which sounds remarkably like the news of Afghanistan today. Until the guys with guns can make things safe enough for those without them, those without them will wait. And if there aren't enough guys with guns to do that - well, waiting can be sustained. There's certainly some conventional wisdom in that.

But not everything about Afghanistan makes the news today.

We are clearly failing by any unit of measurement and it now appears we are faltering too as the National Command Authority waffles about why we are here and what we are supposed to do.

To validate my claim I have to rely on my personal experience. My colleagues and I are finishing up a six month cash for work program focused on Kandahar, Jalalabad, Gardez and Lahska Gar. Not easy places to work (except Jalalabad which is a great place to work) and Tim the Canadian had over 5,000 people working in Kandahar, Ranger Will over 2,000 in Lashka Gar - I had 4,002 working in Jalalabad and over 2,000 in Gardez. Compare those numbers to the performance of the massive PRT's located in those towns - it is not even close. I think the Canadians in Kandahar reported a total of 136 cash for work recipients for 2009. We get results because we live and work in the community and operate in close coordination with the municipal authorities who we see almost daily. Plus we control the cash which allows us to use my favorite saying "No - you have time; I have a watch."

Look at the diagram above and contemplate the fact that there are several large multi-million dollar contracts out to bring internet connectivity to Afghanistan. But nobody can figure out how exactly to do it. You do it by doing it. The Fab Folks surged in here last month from both Cambridge England and Cambridge Mass (and Iceland) moved the entire FabLab to a better location downtown and installed a bunch more links to schools and NGO's. They are able to come here and work because they are outside the artificial security bubble which has completely disrupted our efforts in this country. J.D. Johannes did an excellent job of describing the Afghan security bubble in this post. He has great pictures on his follow up post.

The Fab Folk have discovered something which the military may know and the State Department hasn't a clue about and that is the center of gravity in Afghanistan...

I would argue that the right men with guns are needed to make Afghanistan a place where things as described in the full post quoted above (and linked below) are possible - and clearly that country is a place where both exist now in insufficient numbers. Read this and this - but go fully prepared to have your perceptions challenged, perhaps changed. Certainly there's much to ponder, among other things that what works in practice is often worth trying regardless of theory, and that conventional and wisdom are found together more often in the written word than in reality.

And you can't cross the same river twice.

Attractors (and their detractors)

There's been much speculation lately about drawing back from a "big footprint", boots-on-ground approach to war (if that term is still permitted) to a more stand-off position, relying on air strikes and secret squirrel "snatch and grab"-type operations. There's much obvious attraction in that (as discussed here) - it's actually "popular" among friends and foes. Americans get the occasional Team America sort of news report that reassures them we are the baddest sunsabitch in the valley without having to experience the outrage over the quality of paint used in the hospital rooms of wounded combat vets. The world is safe at minimum effort and cost. (Or "blood and treasure", as those who've generally donated the least of either prefer to call it.)

Most of what we believe makes that attractive is every bit as illusory as the resulting favorable opinion polls are real. The effortless part, for example, is true only in the mind of the message receiver who is quite content with the knowledge that someone else has things under control. The other side of that coin is the enemy response - their calls to "do something" increase, as do their resonance. Add in accusations of cowardice and lack of will on our part and they get a recruiting boom - something a bit more tangible than our sense of security. But again, that strategy is popular among friends and foe alike.

That's not a prediction for the future (though it is a direction we could take), it's a description of American strategy throughout the 1990s. And it's also not a description of something we aren't doing now - all that is an integral part of current strategy. The question we are confronted with today is will we properly resource the other components of that strategy required to make it work? It is not an easy question.

And as desirable as it may seem to make such stand off efforts the centerpiece (or only piece) of our efforts, it's worth noting there are those who would prefer it be very much restricted:

...attached copy of the amicus curiae brief which we filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on behalf of the Special Operations community on Monday evening.

We believe that this unique brief has the potential to play an important role in the Court of Appeals' consideration of Maqaleh v. Gates. We are especially optimistic that the Court will value the insight that only veterans of Special Operations can offer as to the extremely adverse operational consequences that would flow from upholding the District Court's decision.

The rule of law is certainly preferable to the sort of chaos that makes it necessary.

Smoke signals

(A delayed part three in a series...)

Rajiv Chandrasekaran's September 14 report from Afghanistan in the Washington Post details the deteriorating situation in Kandahar:

The slow and quiet fall of Kandahar, the country's second-largest city, poses a complex new challenge for the NATO effort to stabilize Afghanistan. It is factoring prominently into discussions between Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the overall U.S. and NATO commander, and his advisers about how many more troops to seek from Washington.

"Kandahar is at the top of the list," one senior U.S. military official in Afghanistan said. "We simply do not have enough resources to address the challenges there."

I began this discussion last weekend, with part one here and the second installment here. This concluding segment was planned for Monday morning, but into my inbox popped an email from the Washington Post - it seemed they were publishing a copy of General McChrystal's report...

But as you can see from the quote above, this discussion was headed somewhere very close to that anyway. The remainder of this post will be in a form only slightly different than originally intended.

Shortly after he took over as the overall U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, McChrystal asked his subordinates why more than half of the 21,000 troops deployed this spring were sent to neighboring Helmand province instead of Kandahar. The implication was clear, according to a person familiar with the discussion: Kandahar requires more forces.

The question itself is actually one any new commander would ask about anything and everything: why are we doing it this way? Certainly on a topic of that import - why are our troops here and not there - he would want to know the reason - whether he agreed with it or not. As with so many other stories about General McChrystal this week we are left with the reporter's description of what some unnamed individual says about something the General said. Assuming all is as described, all we know is that a question was asked - whatever answer the General was given, and any response he might have offered in turn, is not included.

There are good reasons to put troops in Helmand, not the least among them the consideration that it's where the poppies grow - a significant source of insurgent funding. And there were good reasons not to immediately put troops in Kandahar; among them the potential to have control over what could swiftly become an isolated fortress - but only after a likely battle with high numbers of civilian and military casualties. ISAF forces would find themselves on an (admittedly densely populated) island in a sea of badlands and no-go zones. Meanwhile the trade in the cash crop helping to fuel the Taliban could thrive. I'm not privy to the actual decision process, but I offer that as a quick glance possibility of what could be a small part of the larger answer to the question why here and not there. Aside from that, at this point a review of part two may be worth the reader's while.

But what have we here? - Three days after Chandrasekaran's story Joe Klein presents what amounts to a re-write (right down to the anecdote about Dand) of Chandrasekaran's WaPo piece in Time. However, the tone is different - Klein describes what he calls the "Kandahar screwup":

Upon his arrival in Afghanistan as McKiernan's replacement last June, General Stanley McChrystal was pretty much presented with a fait accompli: the troops were arriving in Helmand. "The ship was moving in that direction," a military expert told me, "and it would have been difficult to turn it around." Indeed, it would have taken months of planning to change course. The additional troops were needed immediately to blunt the momentum of the Taliban and also to provide security for the Afghan elections. The trouble was, the troops would have been better deployed in Helmand's neighbor to the east -- Kandahar province, especially in Kandahar city and its suburbs.
<...>
What can be done now? The military will want more troops to paper over its strategic mistake.

Again, the similarities in the stories are remarkable, but Klein's takes a markedly different tone, and infers (or outright draws) conclusions that aren't evident from the earlier report. This is not, however, a case of plagiarism - it appears more like a response to a perceived challenge. As noted in part one, Chandrasekaran has been in Afghanistan covering the military, and Klein in America covering politics.

Josh Foust, an experienced and knowledgeable Afghan hand, says Klein's effort "reflects the same old bad assumptions about Afghanistan I've almost given up trying to correct" - but somehow draws this conclusion from it too:

But shame on McChrystal, for stealing another man's thunder, then playing a victim of circumstance when things didn't break his way. That's pathetic.

Except that neither Klein or Chandrasekaran (whose earlier piece Foust might not have seen) cite McChrystal (beyond second- or third-hand quotes) at all. That said, I can see how someone could get that impression from Klein's effort. But why, one might wonder, would a guy like Klein, who is as close to a well-connected, experienced political insider ("my predilictions are obvious") as you're likely to find in journalism today, want to create that impression of McChrystal?

Or was he sending a signal that there is an easy way out (if you're willing to blame the last guy)?

*****

*****

*****

And that's where I was with that story when news of the McChrystal report broke. Frankly, if it seems at first glance to have answered any of the above questions, on longer review it does not. Coincidences can have many explanations - including coincidence.

But a few more loose ends remain to be tied down. Herschel Smith makes the case for Helmand first by way of a critique of Klein here, and takes note of Klein's use of a John Nagl quote re: Kandahar - "It is as important now as Fallujah was in Iraq in 2004." Mr Smith's response is that Fallujah was much worse - but bad is different than important. In fact Kandahar is important - and allowing it to become as bad as Fallujah in 2004 is undesirable to say the least. But because Helmand is also important, this puts ISAF in an obvious bind. The earlier decision that Kandahar can wait may have been correct - but no one should have any illusions that anyone thought the claim would be true forever. (And McKiernan, we should recall, requested more troops than he got. While it's less clear, McChrystal did have time - admittedly minimum - to redirect forces if he had significant misgivings - agreement here.) Regardless, with each passing day of status quo, Kandahar approaches Fallujah - the Fallujah of the day before we went in (some argue it is there).

Mr Smith has never noted a problem whose cause couldn't be traced to insufficient numbers of Marines - and fixed by more. That last part has a kernel of truth, but there are other considerations.

Kandahar has not been completely ignored. Kandahar is the name shared by a city, a province, and an air base in Afghanistan - located near the city. (That last by way of saying if you hear a GI say he spent a tour in Kandahar make sure you understand what he means.) Generally media reports from the area will quickly point out the proximity of the big FOB to the failing city, but that's simply a known and painful truth - ISAF forces are a rare presence in the city. But the Canadians have been in the area for some time - and more recently they've been augmented by U.S. troops. They operate in areas around the city (as Chandrasekaran makes clear and Klein does not) though still in fewer numbers than required for effective results (beyond where they are at the moment).

The Canadian milblog The Torch is an excellent source for a lot of information on Kandahar and the Canadians (and Americans, too). And for a very sharp POV from someone who's been there, check out BruceR's site flit. Of particular interest to our current discussion, note this post from before the "release" of the McChrystal report, and this one from after.

NEXT: Smokescreen

All done!

NYT Adjective Watch

"Fighting since the summer months to shore up the fight" - as we await the latest word on troop requests, here's the latest on the war in Afghanistan - as seen via the New York Times.

First paragraphs:

KABUL, Afghanistan -- A roadside bomb and assault-rifle fire killed four United States soldiers and a Marine in three different attacks in southern Afghanistan, where new American brigades are pressing offensives against a resilient and dug-in Taliban and other insurgents.

The attacks on Thursday in Zabul and Nimruz Provinces pushed the number of American military deaths in Afghanistan to 218 this year, already 41 percent more than in all of 2008. The soaring toll, coupled with the Taliban's growing strength and fears that the Aug. 20 Afghan presidential election may have been rigged in favor of President Hamid Karzai, have stirred increasing opposition in the United States to further troop deployments.

British forces, who have also faced fierce Taliban resistance in Helmand Province, have suffered 80 deaths already this year...

That's an excerpt, here's what I got from the whole story:

American soldiers and Marines: Killed (by bombs and guns in attacks), shot, fighting, "fighting since the summer months to shore up the fight", killed, hit, shot and killed

British forces: suffer, death

Other ISAF/Afghan forces: not in this story

Coalition death toll: soaring

Taliban: resilient and dug-in, growing strength, fierce, enlarged their influence

Other insurgents: also resilient and dug-in, strengthening

Afghanistan: dominated by the insurgency, Taliban heartlands, opium-rich badlands

Stryker vehicles: fast and agile armored vehicles, three soldiers killed after theirs was hit by a roadside bomb

Roadside bombs: basic construction, rudimentary ingredients found on many farms, kitchen ingredients, powerful enough to rip open more lightly armored coalition troop carriers, most frequent cause of troop deaths

President Hamid Karzai: election may have been rigged

Americans: increasing opposition

Unattached, presumably us: fears

Did I miss any?

Added: To fully appreciate how all that comes together in prose, here's another full sentence: "To the east, in the Taliban heartlands of Zabul and Kandahar, an American Army Stryker brigade, so named because of its fast and agile armored vehicles, has been fighting since the summer months to shore up the fight against a strengthening insurgency."

Mullen/McChrystal meet - five o'clock Friday feature follows?

Probably not.

But shhhh... Fox News reports they met at Ramstein. It's a secret. We're told there could be three possible requests - a large number, a medium number, and a small number. (Really, that's what Fox said on the Tee Vee. Nothing online yet.)

Note: Ramstein is NOT pronounced Ramsteen. Been there. Pet peeve.

And here's the online story. Don't tell anybody.

Update - it's another WTF moment from the Washington Post:

The purpose of the meeting was not to deliver the troop request, which Pentagon officials said was to be submitted to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates by the end of this week. However, officials said they expected that Mullen would return to Washington with a copy of the request.

Double shhh update: the story of this meeting is sooper sekrit. In fact, do not click this link - or else.

Never let them see you sweat

Some observations on General Petraeus, here, here and here - perhaps best read in reverse order. From my perspective, from this I conclude nothing more than that people are worried and watching, and as stated previously, everyone is having a wtf moment this week.

If you'd like something a bit more fiery, try this.

If you'd like to see some flames doused, here's Spencer Ackerman (who accounts for most of the previous links) Correcting Andrea Mitchell's Afghanistan Troop Figures. Not having seen the report I'm not sure how right Spencer is, but I'm fairly certain the point against which he argues is indeed very wrong.

That troops figures theme, apparently, was today's breathtaking silliness. Silliness, like worry, is viral this week. For the most part the two are mutually exclusive, one affects those who haven't been paying much attention to war lately (or those who can't see military goals as sometimes more important than political) - while worry (or concern) has gripped those who don't meet that description - but there's overlap. (And the first contributes to the second.)

Update: Here's Lex with a different perspective on that 500k number. This (100k troops x five years) is actually the first explanation that crossed my mind when I heard the figure - but again, I haven't seen a classified version of the report. The 100k US troops figure is pretty damn low, considering what we had in Iraq. It's also (what we have now) + (what everyone expects McChrystal to request, @40k +/-).

A worthwhile read

(Update: bad link corrected. See below...)

This New Yorker profile of Richard Holbrooke - our man for Afghanistan and Pakistan - has been noted here and there, including in this video (that you've hopefully already seen).

And it's more than worth the read - a lengthy overview of the man's career with a focus on the last several months in Af/Pak. Unfortunately, you have to be a subscriber to read it.

Although it misses a few items worth noting (later, perhaps) I'd say it's worth the cost. However, I'll also direct you to this point of entry, where you can get a free trial subscription and save yourself that fee. (Although once the next issue comes out it will be too late.)

Update: First link originally went to wrong location here, now fixed. But this is a worthwhile read, too - and no registration required.

Other Voices Raised

A message from the U.S. State Department:

The Department of State alerts U.S. citizens that Al Qaeda has threatened it will conduct terrorist attacks in Germany immediately prior to and following the federal elections on September 27. This Travel Alert expires on November 11, 2009.

Al Qaeda recently released a video specifically warning Germany of attacks. German authorities are taking the threat seriously and have taken measures to enhance the level of security throughout the country.

We noted reports on the al Qaeda chatter - coming on the heels of the Konduz bombing - earlier this month. Friends in Germany have expressed their concerns.

Is this the same video?

Al-Qaida on Tuesday released a new 106-minute long video predicting President Barack Obama's downfall at the hands of the Muslim world.

The Arabic-language video, entitled "The West and the Dark Tunnel," is part of series of messages by the organization marking the eighth anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks. Bin Laden released a short message of his own on Sept. 14.

Whether it is or isn't, clearly certain American politicians and scholars aren't the only ones feeling neglected on the topic of war.

And from descriptions and screen captures, al Qaeda has had some success in turning this plan into reality. If nothing else, the call for "other desirable recruits" including "computer graphics experts, with experience in Photoshop, 3d Studio Max, and other programs" hasn't gone unanswered. These guys don't quit, you've got to credit them with that.

And they know "good stuff" when they see it.

The message included a lengthy section on U.S. prisons and torture facilities and showed footage of what appeared to be an American torturing an Afghan for information by dunking his head into a bucket of water.

The SITE Intelligence Group, which monitors extremist Web sites, identified the person conducting the torture as Jonathan Keith Idema, who also appeared in last year's al-Qaida video.

The story doesn't explain exactly who Idema is - but you can learn about him here. I thought the story hardly worth noting back in 2004 - lesson learned.

A man for all seasons

Summer turned to autumn this week - though some refer to it as fall. Soon enough temperatures on our various battlefields will begin to drop, and only the rare days will see triple digits. Air temperatures, I mean - and I'm speaking from experience. Trust me on this: those who are there are looking forward to that cooling off.

A succinct explanation of heat from downrange:

Which brings us to the third problem with blaming the tactical guidance. Afghanistan is a war of sneak attacks, of snipers armed with rifles or rocket-propelled grenades and, especially, of the improvised explosive device in its many forms. There are a few things you can do when being attacked from cover. You can destroy the cover, except the "cover" in Afghanistan is composed of innocent people. You can move out of range, which in this case means withdrawing from the country. Or you can cause the attacker (the insurgent) to move from the cover (the people). This last option isn't an option unless the people reject the insurgents. They're not going to do that if they think that they are more likely to be killed by their would-be protectors. This is the logic of counterinsurgency. Over time, restraint saves more lives than excessive firepower--and not just Afghan lives.

Along with the first two problems, this is a restatement of points made here last week - but done in a manner better than my own by someone on-the-scene.

You remember last week - last summer - when McChrystal was being depicted as a lackey to his civilian masters, willing to sacrifice his troops on the alter of appeasement via his new ROE in order to promote his own career, right?

This week, of course, we've learned he's the exact opposite of that - he's the guy who's going to resign by way of standing up for his troops. Except - as seen in the quote above - this week he's both.

At least, in the narrative - the narrative he's expected to counter while he's leading troops at war. The narrators wouldn't have it any other way.

We all scream for ice cream

Our friend Old Blue, writes from Afghanistan: "GEN McChrystal's assessment has now been "leaked." Now what?"

I was recently thanked by a foreign officer for something I said to a group of American officers. I told the American officers that the rest of the world views us as the big fat rich kid on the world playground. We want everyone to like us, and are heartbroken to discover that a few don't. We are easily aroused and like to throw our weight around. We think that what we think is going to be the most important thing on everyone's agenda. We are not afraid to fight, and we have heavy hands. God help you if we catch you with a punch; few can withstand a beating from us. But, we are clumsy. We can be hurt, and we have no stamina; no real will. If we can be made to bleed a little, and if we can be run in circles for more than a little while, we tire easily. We have the propensity, when things get tough and we get a little winded, to take our ball and go home. We are prone to quitting. We have quit before, and we are more than likely to quit again. The Taliban know that, and the Afghan people know that. It is part of the insurgent song to the people, a message designed to keep them on the fence, unsure of which way best suits their interests. If they commit to the government being helped the by the fat kid, and the fat kid runs away to mope, they can die.

Personally I'm tired of listening to the drone of the experts who feel their opinions don't matter - but who somehow are paid more attention than the guys on the front lines. Perhaps it's because they're more accessible to those who need a quick quote and have them on speed dial

But righting that wrong is what milblogs are for.

"This is a long, steep hill," the voice in his head tells the fat kid, "you can quit any time you want. Let's go have some ice cream. You know it's hard, and you're sweaty, and you're tired. Your head hurts. This wasn't all easy like you thought. It's too hard. Ice cream sounds good. Let's go get some ice cream...

There is much more, and it's all more than worth your time.

Unkind of War

Another timely report from David Wood, who's been writing great stuff from Afghanistan for some time.

BAGRAM AIR BASE, Afghanistan -- Soaring across the velvet black sky on a night mission over Afghanistan, F-15E fighter pilot Steve Kwast peered through his high-resolution, infrared targeting pod. He had spotted insurgents running across open ground toward a line of trees. As he swooped down for a closer look, Kwast watched one of the men slip behind a tree - and as his fighter roared past, he could see the man's hands on the tree as he inched around to stay behind it. "All I could see were his fingertips - I could see him moving around the tree as I flew by,'' Kwast, a brigadier general and wing commander here, told me later.
<...>
In the sputtering debate about Afghanistan and what to do about the war, I haven't heard anyone advocate surrendering to the Taliban. What I have heard are lots of thoughts about how to make the war less painful, at least for us. Force the allies to do more. Train the Afghans to fight in our place. Cut back our own forces, just a bit. Find a cheaper way to fight, one that doesn't involve so darned many American troops. I particularly like this last one, because it feeds into the fantasy that superior American technology can overcome any adversary almost bloodlessly, especially the bearded primitives of Afghanistan.

As he suggested, there are risks with working with Americans. "If Afghans want to work with us, they and their families become targets,'' said Lt. Col. Cindra Chastain, an officer with the Indiana National Guard's agricultural development team. "Only the brave are going to do it.''

Even American-sponsored development is targeted, such as girls' schools. In Charikar, a town north of Kabul, about 90 girls were hospitalized after a suspected poison gas attack, part of a national wave of such violence aimed at schoolgirls. "But the reaction of the parents was telling - they pitched to help police and investigators, the minister of education came from Kabul and met with the parents and within a couple of days the girls were coming back to classes,'' said Col. Scott A. Spellmon, who recently finished a 15-month tour as a task force commander in the region.

One reason parents felt confident is that security there has improved dramatically. Why? "Last summer we had 70 U.S. riflemen in all of Kapisa Province; today, we have 700,'' said Spellmon. "Troop numbers do matter.''

Increasingly, there are Afghans, like the parents in Charikar, who are willing to stand against the Taliban. But their courage, it seemed to me, is fragile. People will take a principled stand when they know they are not alone. "They are as scared of us leaving as we are,'' said an American officer.

Read both.

I'm not sure if I agree completely with Livio Caputo's commentary following the deaths of six Italian soldiers in Afghanistan: "Those who, succumbing to shock, have been calling for an exit strategy do not realize that even simply talking about one is tantamount to admitting that we cannot win" - but I'm certain that such talk doesn't strike fear into enemy hearts, nor enable them to see how very reasonable we are.

Wood again:

That was the lesson some learned from a horribly bloody conflict half a century ago. "[Y]ou may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life,'' T.R. Fehrenbach wrote in his classic history of the Korean War - "but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.''

Yes, and yes again. (And worthy of more detail.)

The Big Picture

As you can see from the screen capture, the Wall Street Journal has a story detailing how "The Pentagon is rebuffing congressional calls for the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan..."

Oh, wait - you probably can't make that out from the screen capture. It's much too small to provide that level of detail. Here's the link.

Oh by the way...

...what Lex said.

Jimbo plays a bit rougher.

Wait - warfare-knowledgeable civilian voice needed. Here's Jules Crittenden.

As for me, I was writing about this last week. No change to previous comments required.

Update: Okay, even though we've linked him before, there's balance needed in this post - a POV from someone who thinks like Joe. So once again, part of our ongoing efforts to ensure no one feels left out, here's Russia Today's military analyst Evgeny Khrushchev, reporting from Moscow:

Shocking behind the scenes revelations

...that will cause no end of uproar and consternation in the halls of power!!!! (/sarc). In the Washington Post, Howard Kurtz explains (while still leaving blurry) the paper's close work with the White House and Pentagon prior to releasing the McChrystal report. "The result was that The Post agreed to a one-day delay in publicizing the report by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan..."

One could also infer that meant a delay until after the President's appearances on five Sunday talk shows. The level of surprise in that, when added to the surprise level in the content of the assessment, still equals zero.

[Woodward] said he was given the McChrystal report for use in a book about the administration that he plans to publish next year, but he realized that its blunt assessment of Afghanistan, as President Obama is deciding whether to send more troops, "would have been overtaken by events."

"I went back to the source or sources and said, 'This definitely belongs in the newspaper,' and they agreed," Woodward said. Likening the report to the classified study of the Vietnam War that was leaked to the New York Times, The Post and other newspapers, Woodward said: "The Pentagon Papers, in 1971, came out eight years too late. . . . I've been in the trenches before, going back to Nixon" and efforts to withhold material during Watergate on national security grounds.

Eight years too late for what, exactly? I mean in Woodward's opinion, as obviously answers will vary.

And speaking of shocking surprises, now that Woodward has revealed his willingness to use material prior to his book release, will folks stop giving him material "for the book"? Golly, I sure hope he thought that statement through. (/sarc again)

Late Night Insight

A late night talk show worth watching, from Charlie Rose:

General Stanley McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan warns we will fail if our U.S. military strategy doesn't change. We look at the precarious situation in the region with Washington Post reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran.

For clarity - whoever wrote that blurb is somewhat mistaken, McChrystal is not urging any strategy change, he has been implementing the President's strategy for the region. Charlie Rose, as you'll see from the video, is well aware of this. Academics argue endlessly over what strategy is, but "something you can change every few weeks or so in Afghanistan" is most definitely something it is not.

Chandrasekaran's reporting from Afghanistan has been some of the finest war zone reporting we've seen, and his characterization of the current scenario is dead on. ("Spot" on does not apply here.) Rose asks all the right questions, and seems to be having his own WTF moment with regards to Obama's position on Afghanistan. In fairness, after the Sunday talk show performances, everyone is.

Now would be the time for the Taliban to double down, as they no doubt are aware.

Watch the whole thing - this is a half hour well spent.

Expert Analysis

As part of our ongoing efforts to ensure no one feels left out, here's Russia Today's military analyst Evgeny Khrushchev, reporting from Moscow:

Chariots Afire

It should surprise exactly no readers here that Andrew Exum, (along with "about a dozen talented and good-natured co-authors") contributed to General McChrystal's (aka to Ex: "the world's most intense lead author") assessment. That was certainly no secret, Mr Exum announced it some time ago.

It should likewise surprise no one that among his co-authors are those who could be described as having distinctly different political and professional affiliations from his own.

And it should surprise no one that those who were left out of that group would feel... well, left out, and that they might sound ominous warnings like this one:

Mr. President, there is serious disagreement among scholars and policy experts on the way forward in Afghanistan. Many of those urging you to deepen U.S. involvement in that country are the same people who promised we would encounter few difficulties in Iraq and that that war would solve our problems in the Middle East, neither of which proved to be the case.

A brief look at leaks

This is interesting:

One Pentagon source said that the leak of the assessment probably came from McChrystal's staff and represented an increased effort by counterinsurgency-focused officers in theater to pressure the administration to raise troop levels, in light of what they see as Obama's wobbling on the issue.

"The secretary of defense does not believe that General McChrystal or his team was responsible for leaking this sensitive information," Morrell continued. "Nor are we wasting our time playing Washington parlor games trying to figure out who did it. ... We have better things to do."

Which reinforces this point from an actual named source actually close to General McChrystal: "This story is not about an argument between two powerful men. It is about an argument between two or more sets of strategic assumptions concerning the mission and desired end state in Afghanistan."

And it also fairly swiftly gets to a point I was only approaching here, and offers one answer to the question "is everyone at work your friend?".

And while it's somewhat unrelated, this quote from the earlier story brought me to a dead stop:

The Senate Appropriations Committee recently reduced the administration's request for growing the Afghan forces by $900 million in its version of the bill, saying that the Defense Department simply can't spend all the money it has requested in the designated time period.

Because there really aren't many historical examples of failure to exhaust the budget - somehow folks seem to find a way.

A source close to General McChrystal speaks

More accurately, writes.

The thing that annoyed me most about the dozen or so reporters who called today chasing stories on the assessment (aside from the fact that it was clear that only a couple had even bothered to skim the document before calling) is that most of them are intent on forcing this story into the tired journalistic formula of the military man versus the politician. Did McChrystal leak the assessment himself to force the President's hand? Will he resign if the President rejects the approach recommended in the assessment? Questions like these show a reflexive craving for controversy and a bewildering ignorance of the fact that civil-military relations in the United States have matured in the 58 years since General MacArthur's arrogant public confrontation with President Truman. More importantly, they show a blatant disregard for how such a narrative could be exploited by partisans who would accuse General McChrystal of exceeding his military authority or President Obama of not supporting American troops.

Read the whole thing - but this quote is key "This story is not about an argument between two powerful men. It is about an argument between two or more sets of strategic assumptions concerning the mission and desired end state in Afghanistan." (I rarely use bold emphasis - but in this case I added it.)

It's always easier to tell the story as mano a mano than to explain the complexities and introduce the cast of thousands, but in some regards that's the difference between fiction and non-fiction. (Or maybe intended reader/audience age level is the more appropriate consideration.)

Re: Resignation

Somehow this actual quote from McClatchy:

Three officers at the Pentagon and in Kabul told McClatchy that the McChrystal they know would resign before he'd stand behind a faltering policy that he thought would endanger his forces or the strategy.

According to McClatchy, military officers close to General McChrystal said he is prepared to resign if he isn't given sufficient resources (read "troops") to implement a change of direction in Afghanistan.

I know Bill Roggio - this means any reporter could quote me regarding Roggio just as the McClatchy reporters did "officers at the Pentagon and in Kabul" on McChrystal.

My exit question: is everyone at work your friend?

McChrystal to resign if not given sufficient resources?

Via Bill Roggio - Threat Matrix:

Within 24 hours of the leak of the Afghanistan assessment to The Washington Post, General Stanley McChrystal's team fired its second shot across the bow of the Obama administration. According to McClatchy, military officers close to General McChrystal said he is prepared to resign if he isn't given sufficient resources (read "troops") to implement a change of direction in Afghanistan...

More here.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed "respect" for McChrystal's assessment...:

..."But I can only tell you there are other assessments from very expert military analysts who have worked in counter-insurgencies that are the exact opposite," she said.

This is the Enemy

Anti-Afghan Forces detonate a rocket on a convoy in Afghanistan with children in the immediate area. The 951st EN Sapper Co, attached to Task Force Spartan, treat Afghan children wounded when they are conducting a routine patrol near Charkh Afghanistan and their convoy is struck by a rocket. Spc Chris Baker of Task Force Spartan, 10th Mountain Division, reports.

This horrific act was captured on video by a camera mounted on a coalition vehicle. Eyewitnesses report the triggerman had full line of sight to the child standing just several feet away from the hidden rocket - but he detonated it anyway. You can see the child stagger out of the dust cloud resulting from the explosion. (Not shown: His injuries were treated by US soldiers on the scene and he was brought to a US medical facility for further treatment.)

Not the first time this has happened, but a shocking reminder of the nature of the enemy. This is why we fight, and why we must prevail.

Exit question: Has anyone seen this story covered in the media?

My exit question: ...and why not?

Milbloggers respond:

Castle Argghhh!

BlackFive

Little Drops..... Into the pool of life.

Boston Maggie

More Good Soldiers

At the Washington Post:

Washington Post staff writer David Finkel was online Monday, Sept. 14, at 11 a.m. ET to discuss his book, "The Good Soldiers," which chronicles the 15-month deployment of the 2-16 Infantry Battalion in Baghdad during 2007 and 2008...

I could have sworn that was scheduled for this Monday - but here it is. (Fortunately it's not exactly a time-sensitive item.)

Also fortunately I had submitted my question well in advance: Book excerpts here and Amazon reader have convinced me to purchase, however I regret telling my wife to read the excerpt here without warning her what she was in for. (That mistake was all mine, not yours.) What sort of feedback have you gotten from members of the unit and their family members who've read the book?

Answer here (though I should make clear I was referencing the graphic nature of the description of the aftermath of violence), book here:

And previous entries on this book here and here.

Other recent "book" posts include "Where men win glory" - two thumbs down here and here, and an early and enthusiastic thumbs up for Jeremiah Workman's Shadow of the Sword here.

A beginner's guide to time (and other news)

I may have alluded to this in an earlier post, but it's worth restating. General McChrystal's report is in the news, but not news. He was selected to command the mission in Afghanistan with the full approval of President Obama; his mission (in simple terms) was (and is) to execute the President's plan.

One of his first orders was to evaluate the situation and report back - the commander's assessment. This is routine at virtually any level of command anywhere; a commander is an "owner" responsible to his commander - upon accepting ownership he takes stock of what he owns. He evaluates his available resources (people and materiel) compared to the requirements of his mission and reports shortfalls in hopes they'll be corrected.

That's a generic description. For the specific case at hand, most of what the General has requested is no surprise, at least to anyone paying attention to the situation in Afghanistan. Those shortfalls have been identified elsewhere (and repeatedly) , in many cases by reporters (and others with other expertise) on the ground making independent judgment, so they are well known.

Less well known but still very much presumed a safe assumption is that the President would not like his field commander's report. Returning to generic terms - there is not much likable in a list of requirements. (Consider getting an estimate for costly home or car repair work and you'll be close enough to the reality of this - and the realization that any shock at the experience is most likely relative to the experience of the owner holding the estimate.)

Also presumed is that the issue was in negotiation - the President's Press Secretary has been fielding questions from reporters (in a very professional manner) on that topic for some time now. Likewise, that said negotiations were delicate is near certain, a concern leading to not only a close-hold on the report but a removal of the actual cost (any actual number of troops) from it to a separate report. One could draw several conclusions from this, among them that the assessment was thereby "leakable" - and perhaps could be done as a sort of inoculation (or trial balloon) against later revelations.

The unexpected (if not completely) angle is that said negotiation is not ongoing - or is at least insufficient given an as-yet unmentioned (in this discussion) resource: time. That story is found here, along with strong indications that patience - at least on the part of someone in the DoD (though a White House source can't be ruled out) - is rapidly diminishing. That may be justified, the amount of time available for negotiations (which is part of a finite but unknown "total time") - even if perceived differently between the parties involved - is undeniably something over which neither has control or certainty. In short, it can be negotiated but is subject to numerous third party input and controls - and most of those parties don't play fair. (This is one reason why time is a luxury the experienced soldier is generally safe in assuming he lacks in any great quantity - and a resource of which he harbors no illusion of control.)

Can the President find time for discussion this week? This story says it's "a possible problem" in a very busy week, with the "Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the drive of "rogue" nations toward nuclear power and uncertainty in the U.S. relationship with Russia" already on tap - not to mention an address to the U.N. on global warming. (Strike that - climate change. Oh, and Letterman tonight.)

Mercifully President Obama isn't distracted by Iraq. In overlooked news, the Third Infantry Division, veteran of the Thunder Run, a second tour in 2005, and the surge in 2007, is about to ship out for its fourth tour there. Combined with other units scheduled to deploy, the 30,000 total troops will enable pre-surge force levels to be maintained in Iraq.

As mentioned previously, much still to come on this topic, to be sure.

Running for office

My friends Matt Burden - aka Blackfive

and

Scott Ott of ScrappleFace fame.

Fortunately they're not running for the same office - so you can help both without dividing your loyalties. Check the links.

(And this is not a paid political advertisement, because they are my friends.)

Smoke and Mirrors

(Second in a series, part one here.)

RAMADI, Iraq, Oct. 21 -The American military and the interim Iraqi government are quickly losing control of this provincial capital, which is larger and strategically more important than its sister city of Falluja, say local officials, clerics, tribal sheiks and officers with the United States Marines.

- From a New York Times report prior to the second assault on Fallujah in 2004. Perhaps I was mistaken to consider that story as implying that what we are actually doing is wrong and that what we should be doing is a very specific something else. The story may have simply been intended to remind us of an obvious truth: that any battle fought at one location can be declared an avoidance of battle at another. But that article doesn't come out and say that (perhaps NYT reporters understand their readers to be sharp enough to figure such things out for themselves), nor does it explain other obvious points. In war, for example, one evaluates available resources (time, material, manpower...) and develops strategy to achieve goals. The result can be called a campaign (campaign -- A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign plan.)

And if you'd like an example of a well-executed campaign, consider MacArthur's "island hopping" in the Pacific. Having been relegated a lower priority for men and materiel than the European front, allied forces simply bypassed several Japanese strongholds on their way to Tokyo, any one of which could have been accurately described as critical. In hindsight, well, all's well that ends well.

McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'

This isn't "new" - it's the McChrystal report the Obama administration has attempted to keep from public view since its late-August delivery. And frankly, it contains no surprises for those who've been paying attention to Afghanistan. But if it isn't new, it most definitely is news, and most definitely is big: the day following President Obama's appearance on five Sunday news talk shows, in which he expressed his concerns over "mission creep" in Afghanistan, Bob Woodward publishes a declassified copy of General McChrystal's commander's assessment along with this report in the Washington Post:

The top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan warns in an urgent, confidential assessment of the war that he needs more forces within the next year and bluntly states that without them, the eight-year conflict "will likely result in failure," according to a copy of the 66-page document obtained by The Washington Post.

More:

And that's the way it is

We've been checking the White House video archive for the addition of the video of the Medal of Honor ceremony for Sergeant First Class Jared Monti held last Thursday - as yet it is not there. Obviously not everything the President says and does merits inclusion, and lag time should be expected for those events that do. Certainly the staff is to be commended for their ability to get video posted immediately (other events from that day and later are up) and forgiven for whatever unfortunate delay is evident in this case.

For something to watch while we're waiting, here's the President's eulogy for Walter Cronkite, from the White House video collection:

Excerpt:

"In an era where news that City Hall is on fire can sweep around the world at the speed of the internet, would he still have called to double check? Would he have been able to cut through the murky noise of the blogs, and the tweets, and the sound bites to shine the bright light on substance? Would he still offer a perspective that we value? Would he have been able to remain a singular figure in an age of dwindling attention spans and omnipresent media?

"Somehow we know that the answer is yes. The simple values Walter Cronkite set out in pursuit of - to seek the truth, to keep us honest, to explore our world the best he could - they are as vital today as they ever were. Our American story continues. It needs to be told. And if we choose to live up to Walter's example, if we realize that the kind of journalism he embodied will not simply rekindle itself as part of a natural cycle but will come alive only if we stand up and demand it and resolve to value it once again, then I am convinced that the choice between profit and progress is a false one, and that the golden days of journalism still lie ahead.

"Walter Cronkite invited a nation to believe in him, and he never betrayed that trust. That's why so many of you entered the profession in the first place. That's why the standards he set for journalists still stand."

Very nice.

Postscript/FWIW: The White House videos are fed from the White House YouTube channel. (However, on the White House page the YouTube logo is removed from the video.) There are many videos there that don't appear on the official White House page, but the ceremony for SFC Monti is not yet among them, either.

And it should be noted we had the news of SFC Monti's award here (and local news coverage was available from Massachusetts) a day before the White House announced it - at that time the DoD was (understandably) unable to respond to a request to verify the report until after the White House statement. (Unlike Cronkite, we ran with it anyway.) In that respect the delay in posting video is neither unusual or unprecedented.

Hands full of smoke

Two accounts of something from within two separate reports of Afghanistan.

The first, from Rajiv Chandrasekaran's September 14 Washington Post story:

The effort in Dand district has shown promising signs, in part because of what some Canadian development specialists regard as a mistake: The district chief hired his brother to administer a Canadian-funded public works project aimed at generating employment, and the brother gave most of the jobs to fellow members of his Barakzai tribe. That nepotism, however, wound up encouraging Barakzai elders in Dand to write a letter to the local Taliban commander telling him to "stay away," according to Canadian officials. Young tribesmen also have mounted informal security patrols in the area.

An American with long experience in the country told me this story: a member of the Barakzai tribe was recently installed as a district leader in a Pashtun area. He was told to hire his top staff by merit. Instead, he hired only Barakzais -- which caused the tribe's leaders to switch sides from the Taliban to the government ... and caused most of the other tribes in the district to switch from the government to the Taliban. Afghanistan, it turns out, befuddles even Afghans. And for foreigners, "victory" there is a handful of smoke.

Which could be true? One possible (if unsatisfying) answer is both. Nothing in either directly refutes the other. Both are sourced to unnamed experts - "Canadian officials" and "an American with long experience in the country". Chandrasekaran is in Afghanistan (ironically he could be described as "an American with long experience in the country" - "long" being relative) covering the military, Klein is in America covering politics.

And if Chandrasekaran's account appears "rosy", one should consider its next sentence: "But what occurred in Dand may be hard to pull off elsewhere..." and that which follows it. From Chandrasekaran one can conclude (as I do) that any claims that "Afghanistan is difficult" are understatement, from Klein we gather the effort is nothing short of impossible. The difference in the two interpretations leads us to different conclusions regarding the benefit of any continued presence there - though both indicate clearly that current troop levels are not enough.

And both accounts are excerpts from larger stories, to which additional attention is due.

Home

Look - here's our man Joe, just back from distant lands long absent from our thoughts. What news bring you forth, good sir?

Certainly not enough to trouble the otherwise engaged. Well done then, sir - press onward!

President delivers on campaign promise

...but it's "Ecuador's leftist president, Rafael Correa":

QUITO, Ecuador, Sept. 18 -- The last 15 U.S. troops in Ecuador left the country's Manta air base Friday, officially closing the American military post in what Ecuador's government calls a recovery of sovereignty.

The small U.S. mission flew anti-narcotics flights meant to help catch cocaine smugglers close to the point of production.

That sort of promise seems easier to make good on than subjective pledges like "restore America's standing in the world". (But since that is subjective, perhaps this will help.)

If you want blood you've got it

- but you get sweat and tears, too.

In the mail: Shadow of the Sword: A Marine's Journey of War, Heroism, and Redemption.

You'd probably have to be at least my age to recall this post's title as one from the first live album by an obscure Australian rock band - or this song from that vinyl:

I saw them on tour before that - an unknown warm up act for Kiss.

Silly shit, that was.

Jeremiah Workman isn't my age - but he's old enough to know very well that hell is a very shitty place to be.

How old enough is that? Whatever age you pass through hell. Children do it every day.

You'd probably have to be at least my age to have forgotten how long ago you first read Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five, the Vietnam-era World War Two "science fiction" (heh) novel that really gets going with these odd words:

Listen:

Billy Pilgrim has come unstuck in time.

...but can recall its original title in full: "Slaughterhouse-Five or The Children's Crusade".

You'd probably have to be at least my age to remember seeing this scene of a crash in theaters:

But you don't have to be my age to read Shadow of the Sword - the book that brought all those images to mind as it reeled back and forth with its hero from his nightmares to his Parris Island breakdown to the streets of Fallujah in 2004 - where the seeds of those nightmares and breakdown were planted - along with several enemy and a few friends. And that's chapter one.

It comes at you full auto - and that's how I was turning pages.

You don't have to be my age to believe in heroes and in ghosts.

And now this kind of war

"...only those who will admit defeat can be defeated. ... Or, conversely, when the populace admits defeat, the forces in the field might just as well surrender or withdraw."

Ancient history, that. Hardly news by any definition.

General Dave Petraeus, London, September 17:

The challenges in Afghanistan clearly are significant. But the stakes are high. And, while the situation unquestionably is, as General McChrystal has observed, serious, the mission is, as he has affirmed, still doable. In truth, it is, I think, accurate to observe that, as in Iraq in 2007, everything in Afghanistan is hard, and it is hard all the time.

I'd tell you to read the whole thing, but I believe you long ago determined whether or not this man's words were worth a read.

Perhaps this voice is less familiar:

The new head of the British Army, General Sir David Richards, also warned last night that Nato had yet to find the right formula for success in Afghanistan. General Richards also warned that defeat for the international coalition would have an "intoxicating impact" on extremists around the world. Failure for an alliance as powerful as the Nato presence in Afghanistan would convice terrorists that "anything might be possible".

The two generals were speaking after a soul-searching summer marked by a rising number of casualties. Since 2001 Britain's death toll has reached 216 and America's 830. But both men insist that the mission is achievable.

I was in Iraq in 2007, so I had first-hand knowledge of the difference between reality there and its perception at home - and how close that came to bringing about an end that would have had consequences for our efforts in Afghanistan, that would have tipped the scales towards hopeless there, too. After all, we weren't the only ones who would have turned our attention to just one battlefield - but we would have been the only ones to demonstrate (yet again) how easy it is to quit. Sadly, conflicts continue until both sides do.

I seem to recall efforts at home to declare failure back in 2007 - back when the fighting and dying were at their worst - and to ensure the blame for that failure didn't rest with the troops but was passed on to the Generals who had sacrificed their soldiers' lives on the altar of appeasement to their civilian masters. Some might recall "Betrayus" - a disgusting trope that made its way from certain web sites (more concerned with winning elections than battles with guns) to the pages of the New York Times - at a discount.

You need no reminder of that, I am sure. Of days when scant available facts (and abundant fallacies) in initial reports were augmented with the assumptions of those who were most likely to be wrong, whose motives and commitment would require them to ignore or dismiss follow-on reports from on-scene (from those whose every word had mere days before been unimpeachable Gospel truth) and moveon to the next preliminary report, the new outrage of the day.

Those were grim days on the battlefield. The initial results from changes in our tactics and an increase in troops were predictable enough: more violence and death. Equally predictable were efforts by those near and far who would use that for their own gain. Less foreseeable were the medium- to long-range results - which anyone opposed to how we got there could insist were pointless or more easily achieved in other ways regardless... and so on.

Enough of that. We've learned those lessons, and those days are gone. What we have inarguably reached is a long awaited point where we can focus more on Afghanistan. As we take that which worked in Iraq and adapt it to that very different land so near it (where we've other lessons learned) we are much more interested in stories like these:

When I got up to leave, Shakar Khan gripped my hand and held it. My friend, he said. Do not go. Behind a trim black beard, his sun-beaten face crinkled into a broad smile. He cast an eye around the room, as if to find something to tempt me to stay. The shabby, one-room police office held a bed, a few cushions on the concrete floor, and two battered cooking pots. Outside, several of his men, Afghan National Police, bantered with American infantrymen, talking about joint training they'd be doing in the coming week.

It is the why are we there, what are we doing, and what if we didn't sort of report - the answer to questions others insist are unanswered, the answers still others will insist are not good enough.

Because the answers to hard questions are hard, and hard all the time.

Perhaps it's something new but like so many things these days it all seems hauntingly familiar (and predictable) to me.

True Friendship, a Promise is a Promise

"If I die in Afghanistan - you have to wear a dress to my funeral."

IT WAS a pact that only a true friend would keep.

Before one of them was sent to fight in Afghanistan for the British Army they made a deal: If one of them died, the other had to wear a dress to the funeral.

So when Barry Delaney turned up to the graveside funeral of best friend Private Kevin Elliott, he did so wearing a tight fluorescent dress, The Times reports:

Private Kevin Elliott and his friend, Barry Delaney, had agreed that whoever survived the other should wear a dress to the dead man's funeral. Mr Delaney duly fulfilled the pledge as a tribute to Private Elliott, who was killed aged 24 while on foot patrol in the southern province of Helmand on August 31.

Mr Delaney wept on his knees at the graveside in Dundee as shots were fired during the military funeral. His dress plans are believed to have been known about in advance by other mourners.

18 SEP 2009 is POW/MIA Recognition Day

National POW/MIA Recognition Day is one of the six days specified by law on which the black POW/MIA flag shall be flown.

From the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office:

A Pentagon ceremony for National POW/MIA Recognition Day will be held on Friday, Sept.18, 2009. This ceremony will feature troops from each of the military services. The President is expected to issue a proclamation commemorating the observances and reminding the nation of those Americans who have sacrificed so much for their country.

Observances of National POW/MIA Recognition Day are held across the country on military installations, ships at sea, state capitols, schools and veterans' facilities. This observance is one of six days throughout the year that Congress has mandated the flying of the National League of Families' POW/MIA flag. The others are Armed Forces Day, Memorial Day, Flag Day, Independence Day and Veterans Day. The flag is to be flown at major military installations, national cemeteries, all post offices, VA medical facilities, the World War II Memorial, Korean War Veterans Memorial, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the official offices of the secretaries of state, defense and veterans affairs, the director of the selective service system and the White House.

We will not rest until we account for every American missing in service to our country.

You are not forgotten.

Charge!!!

Here's a story about a widow and child of a Marine who are being deported. U.S. immigration refuses to acknowledge the marriage, they are saying her marriage is not valid because it was not consummated -- despite the fact that they have a child together. However the U.S. Military recognizes the marriage.

Sgt. Michael Ferschke was killed in Iraq in 2008, he had planned on spending his life with his wife and child. Now that can never happen. He died for his country, you'd think the country could honor his marriage.

Robert Stokely sent us this story with this message:

I can not add to what this story says except to say where I come from you don't mess with our women and you don't mess with our children. How can our government possibly, even remotely, do this. We must fight, and I mean literally fight if need be, for this wife and child, for a Hero died to give us not only the right, but the duty to do so.

My boy was a CAV Scout; my great great grandaddy was a cavalryman himself. I am not. But, I can yell charge and will fight. CHARGE!!!!

Join me.

Robert Stokely
proud dad SGT Mike Stokely
KIA 16 AUG 05 near Yusufiyah Iraq
USA E 108 CAV 48th BCT GAARNG

UPDATE: BlackFive has more

A Tribute to Michael can be found here

Constitution Day

Most definitely noteworthy: "On September 17, 1787, the U.S. Constitution was signed by thirty-nine brave men who changed the course of history."

And the Constitution Day web page is most definitely worth a visit. Although I'm a citizen by birth, I'm off to take the Naturalization Test there right now.

Sample question: Name one war not fought by the US in the 1900s.

World War I
World War II
War of 1812
Korean War
Gulf War
Vietnam War

Okay - others aren't so easy. (But I passed.)

We Americans prefer independence as a cause for celebration, but the Constitution (or the ideals it defines) is the document many of us took oaths to support and defend.

(Via Instapundit)

Presentation of Medal of Honor: Sergeant First Class Jared Monti

Scheduled for 2:05 PM ET. When the event begins, it should be streaming live here:

Transcript of President Obama's comments here.

Official Army site here.

A very low-key event, no front-page notice on the White House web site, little attention paid thus far beyond local (Boston area, in this case) and military media.

Update: Perhaps this event received more attention than I thought. Here's coverage from MSNBC's Rachel Maddow:

Where men win glory

Ironic last words:

"I began to pray out loud," he said. "I was sure I was going to die.... Pat then asked me why I was praying, he asked me what it could do for me."

- as related by the man who survived, in the new best-seller, "Where Men Win Glory".

There's much irony in the release of a book on Pat Tillman at the beginning of a new NFL season, though maybe the publishers never considered that as a publicity boost. Fall is a time for the release of best-sellers, after all, and perhaps any time is the right time to feed a hungry public this message:

WSJ: You end the book with a gloomy visit to Afghanistan in early 2007. What did Mr. Tillman's sacrifice mean?

Mr. Krakauer: It didn't mean anything. It speaks to the mythology of war and how we glorify it for our national interests. There is nothing glamorous or romantic about war. It's mostly about random pointless death and misery. And that's what his death tells us. It reminds me that the good aren't rewarded, there's no such thing as karma. Maybe it says something about the dangers of any sort of idealism that isn't tempered by pragmatism or experience.

Damn - now you know how it ends.

Perhaps Pat Tillman was an idealistic young man lacking in experience who didn't know that the glory he was signing up for wasn't the equal of what he left behind, that whatever rewards he was seeking wouldn't come at any cost that he could ever call worthwhile.

Perhaps the young fool didn't know that glory is what men win on stages, on screens, and in stadiums - and if they're big enough and quick enough and good enough to convince other Americans to pay them money to watch them play football on weekends that glory has no bounds. To me that sort of thing seems obvious, as obvious as the lack of same in the life of a soldier. And I'm not old but it seems one of those things I've always known. I'm certain the number of people who don't know that is lower than that of those who believe that this sort of simple truth is actually some astounding earned wisdom that the foolish masses lack. I think Pat Tillman knew that, too.

If the book somehow makes clear that stadiums - not battlefields - are where America seeks its heroes, it isn't apparent from Dexter Filkins' New York Times review - but he finds other failures in the tale:

The best-selling author Jon Krakauer has now told the full story in "Where Men Win Glory." The combination of Krakauer and Tillman seems hard to resist: Krakauer is a masterly writer and reporter; "Into Thin Air," his account of a disastrous climbing expedition on Mount Everest, is as riveting and harrowing a book as I've ever read. With Tillman, you would think he'd have all he needed to fashion an epic narrative. Unfortunately, he fails to pull it off.

The biggest problem with "Where Men Win Glory" is that nearly all the drama and import -- Tillman's death and the cover-up -- are saved for the last hundred pages. The first two-thirds covers Tillman's early life, his ascent into the National Football League and his decision to quit and enlist. Tillman doesn't arrive in Afghanistan until Page 230.

In short, it is too long. "Unfortunately, too many of the details of Tillman's life recounted here are mostly banal and inconsequential..." - and we are given a brief list of some of Tillman's high school antics, apparently explained in depth on some of the superfluous pages. It seems he got "drunk and threw up", "beat up a guy", etc.

It feels like padding, and so do Krakauer's long digressions about Afghanistan and Iraq and the Bush administration, most of which are only tangentially related to his subject's life (and some of which are inaccurate: Hamid Karzai, the president of Afghanistan, was not a major mujahedeen commander during the war against the Soviets; Ismail Khan is not a leader of the Hazaras). This would have been a better book had it been a hundred pages shorter.

In describing the battlefield actions, Krakauer does not appear to understand light infantry combat as well as he does mountaineering. He comprehends enough to know that the Ranger officers in Bagram probably made a mistake in overruling a decision by the platoon leader on the ground in Khost province. But incredibly, he tries to claim that this situation was driven not by poor and independent decision-making by field-grade officers but rather by Donald Rumsfeld's insistence on strict timelines.
<...>
As a former officer in the 75th Ranger Regiment -- an elite unit whose leadership Krakauer skewers -- I might be expected to rise to the defense of the officers who made the decision to initially withhold the details of Tillman's death from his family and the public. But given the available evidence in both Krakauer's account and in numerous investigations, it appears that the otherwise competent commanders of the 75th Ranger Regiment and 2nd Ranger Battalion did indeed make a series of disastrous and incomprehensibly stupid decisions.

In fact, you can read the final military review of all that right here, or a much shorter (but certainly bleak) account of Tillman's experience (and that of his friends and family) from Sports Illustrated here.

So what have we here? It would seem we have an account of the life of Pat Tillman, riddled with errors and inaccuracies and released for profit - cash and otherwise:

But the story here isn't Tillman's unexceptional death, or exceptional life for that matter, but what Krakauer sees as a political crime committed by the Bush administration's propaganda machine...

Perhaps, then, with a bit more time and effort he could have gotten his facts right. Or perhaps facts don't matter - none of that has kept the book from being a top ten best seller.

It is football season, after all, a time of year when men win glory.

Is birther the new gay?

Local news:

U.S. District Court Judge Clay Land tossed out on Wednesday a complaint by an Army captain fighting deployment to Iraq by questioning the legitimacy of President Barack Obama.

Land also put attorney Orly Taitz, who represents Capt. Connie Rhodes and is a leader in the national "birther" movement, on notice by stating that she could face sanctions if she ever again files in his court a similar "frivolous" lawsuit -- a document that at one point the judge states that a middle school student could find irony in.

"(Rhodes) has presented no credible evidence and has made no reliable factual allegations to support her unsubstantiated, conclusory allegations and conjecture that President Obama is ineligible to serve as president of the United States," Land states in his order. "Instead, she uses her complaint as a platform for spouting political rhetoric, such as her claims that the president is 'an illegal usurper, an unlawful pretender, [and] an unqualified imposter.'"

The case was filed in the Columbus Division of U.S. District Court.

We discovered fairly early on that Major Cook (the last guy to try this stunt) was a true blue birfer nutbag, and not just a garden variety trashbag trying to get out of a deployment eight years after the beginning of a war. But regardless, he got out of his deployment. (More accurately, his downrange commander decided he could find someone competent to fill the crucial position he didn't need a Cook-type for.) That bottom line has to be attractive to folks who don't want to suddenly discover their homosexuality, become Quakers or pregnant, get diagnosed with an identified mental disorder, a debilitating injury or illness, or otherwise make themselves non-deployable. (This is not intended as a slur to those who authentically experience something from that list.)

What's the case here? Who cares. I hope this doesn't become a problem for the military, and I pity anyone who might have to spend time in Iraq with "Cpt" Rhodes. Being there is bad enough.

I love the end of this story though:

The judge specifically addresses Rhodes' "birther" arguments, including allegations that Obama might have used 149 addresses and 39 Social Security numbers before becoming president and the existence of what Taitz claims is Obama's Kenyan birth certificate.

"Finally, in a remarkable shifting of the traditional legal burden of proof, plaintiff unashamedly alleges that defendant has the burden to prove his 'natural born' status," Land states. "Any middle school civics student would readily recognize the irony of abandoning fundamental principles upon which our country was founded in order to purportedly 'protect and preserve' those very principles.

"Unlike in 'Alice in Wonderland,' simply saying something is so does not make it so," Land says.

Land ordered that the defendants -- who include Obama, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Col. Thomas MacDonald, Fort Benning garrison commander -- will recover any costs from the complaint from Rhodes.

"Cpt" Rhodes doesn't want to be discharged or relieved from her two-year obligation, we are informed. Well of course not, it's a paycheck.

More:

Doug Mataconis at Below the Beltway (who also was all over the Cook story) has the Dismissal Order - and OBAMA'S KENYAN BIRF CERTIFICATE submitted as evidence - copies of which are available on ebay!!!! (Must read - great laugh.)

"Will this finally put a stop to the Nirther nuts and their crack-brained conspiracy theories?" Asks Charles Johnson, "Don't hold your breath."

Good advice, because...

And if Rhodes is open to continuing the fight, would Taitz go along?

"Oh absolutely, absolutely," she said. "Listen, Nelson Mandela stayed in prison for years in order to get to the truth and justice."

Footnote: Original Alice in Wonderland illustrations by John Tenniel, all but two retain their original captions.

This kind of war

You may have heard...

Witnesses said foreign troops swept into the town on helicopters, fired missiles from an attack helicopter, killed Nabhan and another terrorist, and captured two others after wounding them, Mareeg reported. Nabhan's body was recovered, ABC News later reported.

...or you may not have heard. Apparently Kanye West chose that moment to seize a microphone, prompting a brief quip from the president that was twittered to the public by a reporter while congress voted to censure a politician who called a politician a liar and expert panels were formed for on-camera discussions of racism in America as news of the suppression of the news about ACORN was... well, you get the picture.

And frankly, those involved in that page 3 sort of story shun the spotlight others seek anyway. But much (perhaps more than many would be comfortable with...) is revealed in this account:

Navy Seals from US Special Operations Forces conducted a raid in southern Somalia on Monday that killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, one of 4 co-conspirators wanted in the 2002 bombing of an Israel owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, two senior U.S. military officials told Fox News.

Ten days ago President Obama signed the Execute Order for Nabhan, who since 2006 was on the FBI's list of most wanted terrorists. He was also wanted for the attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Kenya in 1998.
<...>
Intelligence operatives had been monitoring Sabhan prior to the attack. The helicopters passed once, firing on the vehicle, and then circled back around to retrieve the body so they could make a positive identification, according to an official.

One wonders at the source of such detail.

It's the stuff that a decade ago would be found in a Hollywood blockbuster. Drama: young, determined president sanctions action (perhaps determining after deep internal debate that sometimes the needs of the many trump many other considerations - but even so he harbors doubt) and men of action handle the rest. (One of them is a comedian of a sort, cracking jokes all the way and keeping spirits high...) We cut back to the home front from time to time to depict the experience of the wives and kids of our men of action, but that may be cut in final. Will Smith has reached an age where he can play the leader of such men. Is he available? Phone his agent, let's do lunch...

That's the sort of movie the very real, spotlight-shunning men of action would join their fellow Americans in viewing, perhaps afterward confiding that while the movie was great it ain't really like that.

Beyond entertainment for the masses, it's also the sort of activity that many scholars and men-at-arms agree would make a fine approach to prosecution of what we used to call the war on terror. "Off shore" (on land or sea) - occasional strikes based on good, solid intel from our boys on the scene and eyes in the sky; sometimes carried out by men who pull triggers at short range (the secretary will not confirm or deny) and often by those who use more remote controls. (We can match our capabilities to your time requirements. We can discuss the risk involved with each of the available options - but if you're busy a simple "get it done" will do.) No photos of flag-draped coffins or of soldiers in their dying moments to trouble the minds of those who pass the newsstands on their way from here to there or on the internet or cable TV. For that and other reasons such an approach is tempting, we must admit. And regardless of what any may say, we harbor thoughts at various depths wherein such men who do such things are admired, and we wonder could we do the same?

Perhaps we should try fighting only that sort of long range, off shore war. It is the kind of war that makes heroes, not the sort that wears down armies, chews up soldiers and spits them out.

The sort of war that inspires stories - like this recent one from Pakistan:

Former prime minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on the orders of the special death squad formed by former US vice-president Dick Cheney, which had already killed the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafique Al Hariri and the army chief of that country.

The squad was headed by General Stanley McChrystal, the newly-appointed commander of US army in Afghanistan. It was disclosed by reputed US journalist Seymour Hersh while talking to an Arab TV in an interview.

And it's the kind of war that in the more distant past simply inspired...

First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.

If some people have in the past argued about the fact of the occupation, all the people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged it. The best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using the Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their territories being used to that end, but they are helpless.

Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 million... despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation.

...Osama bin Laden's call for jihad against America in 1998. From his view, that sort of war was evidence of failure at others, a weakness that could be exploited - if nothing else at least as a recruiting tool:

After our victory in Afghanistan and the defeat of the oppressors who had killed millions of Muslims, the legend about the invincibility of the superpowers vanished. Our boys no longer viewed America as a superpower. So, when they left Afghanistan, they went to Somalia and prepared themselves carefully for a long war. They had thought that the Americans were like the Russians, so they trained and prepared. They were stunned when they discovered how low was the morale of the American soldier. ...America assumed the titles of world leader and master of the new world order. After a few blows, it forgot all about those titles and rushed out of Somalia in shame and disgrace, dragging the bodies of its soldiers.

We, of course, thought we were on a humanitarian mission at the time - not some sort of war. We know what war is - war takes two sides, ours gets to debate it, vote on it, - and not one of us had voted for that kind of war.

Given the chance, many of us would vote no war - and others perhaps for trying out this kind of war: "And finally, your recommendation is sound," retired Marine Corps General Chuck Krulak recently wrote to George Will, responding to the noted pundit's announcement that it's "Time to Get Out of Afghanistan". Here's the recommendation he meant:

America should do only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, airstrikes and small, potent Special Forces units, concentrating on the porous 1,500-mile border with Pakistan, a nation that actually matters.

I would put "hunter-killer teams" along the borders and in suspected al Qaeda strongholds. I would support them with intelligence, logistics thru use of parasail's, responsive airpower (needs to be close), armed and unarmed (fitted with cameras, infrared, etc) drones,"reach back" capability for cruise missiles, and other capability as needed. The H-K teams should be given minimal rules of engagement... when they identify the bad guys, they need to be empowered to take them out.

They are wise and learned men.

And here's a letter to the President of the United States from (by my signature count) 38 other wise and learned men. While they don't offer the level of detailed alternative expected from a Marine (perhaps each would have his own advice on that, against which others might argue) they unanimously support an anything but this kind of war:

Today, we are concerned that the war in Afghanistan is growing increasingly detached from considerations of length, cost, and consequences. Its rationale is becoming murkier and both domestic and international support for it is waning. Respectfully, we urge you to focus U.S. strategy more clearly on al Qaeda instead of expanding the mission into an ambitious experiment in state building.

These men, we are told, are Realists.

Perhaps we should remove ourselves from that useless patch of dirt we call Afghanistan, to more welcoming places nearby. Perhaps we should send in the occasional drone or HK team. Obviously (at least, if you haven't forgotten the Somalia story we started with) we do that now, but perhaps only that is better. Maybe we could provide them some humanitarian assistance, too. Or maybe not even that. Perhaps we should bring all the troops home to be with their families. They deserve that, don't they?

We don't need that kind of war. We don't need any kind of war. We don't need American mothers crying over the graves of their sons or bereaved American fathers outraged that we aren't acting tough enough... let's turn away so that we never have to see such things again.

We're safe enough over here. And besides, we have our own problems - our own differences to resolve.

And plenty of candles.

See also: This new kind of war

Rapidfire: Iraq News

Washington Post:

FIVE YEARS AGO, Sen. John F. Kerry argued during his presidential campaign that the United States had dangerously neglected the war in Afghanistan. On Thursday, when he convened a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hear a status report on Iraq from U.S. Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, only five of the panel's 19 members showed up long enough to ask a question. "Iraq today . . . has become the now-forgotten war," Mr. Kerry rather ruefully concluded.

Still plenty of troops there, however. (Via the Dawn Patrol, where Iraq is not ignored.)

Columbia Journalism Review has found the responsible party for this loss of interest - the U.S. military:

In a country with 130,000 U.S. troops fighting a war that still costs tens of billions of dollars a month, the military might as well be invisible. And for the most part, it seems to want it that way.

This wasn't the case a short time ago. From early 2007 to late 2008, when Colonel Steven Boylan, the public-affairs officer at the U.S. Army's Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was General David Petraeus's spokesman in Iraq, part of his job was to lay down a more realistic scenario for the American public. Faced with the certainty of more American casualties as the U.S. launched offensive operations as part of its military "surge," the generals told their officers to engage with the media.

Actually I think "invisible" - or as close as possible to it, is exactly what the U.S. military in Iraq wants to be. If that means they're "invisible" in newspapers and television then perhaps that's a measure of success. Honestly I'd like to hear a bit more about what exactly all those troops are doing outside the cities, too, but generally it takes death and destruction to make even a brief headline. I'm a bit confused by the confusion apparent in the quote above.

Meanwhile, in Baghdad:

Four mortar shells landed in the Green Zone as Vice President Joe Biden arrived in Iraq Tuesday on a previously unannounced mission to help the country resolve its differences ahead of America's military withdrawal.

Perhaps his boss wanted Joe to get a break from all the reporters.

At least he's in familiar territory.

Hazardous duty

A new book by a Washington Post reporter provides a graphic, second-by-second description of the U.S. military's 2007 killing of two Reuters journalists in Baghdad, an incident that the news organization says it cannot investigate fully because the Pentagon has withheld key records of the event.

From the Washington Post.

At the time, this was the early report:

"When we reached the spot where Namir was killed, the people told us that two journalists had been killed in an air attack an hour earlier," said Ahmad Sahib, the Agence France-Presse photographer, who had been traveling in a car several blocks behind Mr. Noor-Eldeen but was delayed by the chaos in the area. He said he was in touch with Mr. Noor-Eldeen by cellphone until his colleague was killed.

"They had arrived, got out of the car and started taking pictures, and people gathered," Mr. Sahib said.

According to Finkel's account, Noor-Eldeen and Chmagh arrived in Baghdad's east Al-Amin neighborhood during a morning of clashes between insurgents and the U.S. military. Working independently and without the knowledge of the U.S. ground unit or Apache crews operating in the area, Noor-Eldeen and Chmagh were walking along a street with seven other Iraqi men, two of whom appeared to be holding a rifle and a grenade launcher. The photographer and driver initially were both carrying cameras, which the Apache crew mistook for weapons.

I bought the book for its account of one battalion's year at war (and the aftermath), but my copy of The Good Soldiers is still inbound. (Read this before ordering yours).

Colonel Tim Donovan, Someone You Should Know

Over at the Castle, John shares his father's life's story.

...and what a life it was. He was an amazing man.

War Games (II)

The reporter who broke the story of how our rules of engagement in Afghanistan endanger the troops has a detailed follow up:

The lack of timely air support - it took about 80 minutes by a reporter's watch for helicopters to arrive, despite assurances that they'd be five minutes away - was a consequence of the manpower and equipment shortages bequeathed by the Bush administration's failure to secure Afghanistan against a resurgence of the Taliban, al-Qaida and allied groups before turning to invade Iraq.
<...>
The denial of heavy artillery fire to those trapped in Ganjgal also has roots in the Bush administration's decision to divert resources to Iraq and the resulting stress on the U.S. military.

New rules limiting the use of artillery imposed by U.S. Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal after he took command of the U.S.-led international force in Afghanistan this summer are intended to curb civilian casualties caused in part by his contingent's reliance on artillery barrages and air strikes to compensate for their shortage of ground troops.

Nothing in that changes my initial reaction to the first report.

We do have some Congressional and Pentagon attention on this issue, though. After all, what war couldn't use a few more Generals?

Meanwhile, someone in Afghanistan is probably a bit sleep deprived, spending time explaining to different angry mobs that:

1. We don't offer our troops up for slaughter in order to protect the population.

2. We do not slaughter the population in order to protect the troops (or reporters).


Update: And now this kind of war.

A gathering of friends and family

Friend:

Charlie Witkus needed a good role model when he joined the Army in high school, and he found Jared Monti.

Witkus, now 35 and living in Brockton, said he was hanging out with the wrong crowd at the time and enlisted to straighten his life out.
<...>
On Thursday, Witkus will be heading to Washington, D.C., with his wife, Andreia, his mother, Karen, his sister, Melissa, and his niece, Cassidy. They will be among those attending the Medal of Honor presentation by President Obama that afternoon.

And family.

Previously:

Sergeant First Class Jared Monti: Medal of Honor

Pride of Raynham

Next: Presentation of Medal of Honor: Sergeant First Class Jared Monti

Jack Mouths Off

It's funny, in a way, what's "newsworthy" at one time is hardly mentioned at others:

For Murtha, his aversion to increased troops levels relates to his ongoing battle with Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates regarding the overall way forward for the armed forces.

Gates and Murtha stand on opposite sides of a growing divide in the defense community over how to deal with a military facing budgets that are leveling off after years of huge increases. For Murtha, every dollar spent on personnel is a dollar taken away from the procurement programs he works to protect.

Murtha has resisted several of the major changes Gates announced this year for large Pentagon procurement programs such as the F-22 fighter, the alternative engine for the F-35, the VH-71 presidential helicopter, and many more.

I remember when you never saw a story about Murtha that didn't mention his chest full of medals - now he's a war profiteer. (Hey - perhaps he always has been?)

He ain't the only one - it's an odd world indeed when the "anti-war" crowd and the members of the evil military industrial complex are aligned. Some great potential funding opportunities are developing for the really sharp "peace group" folks.

By the way, the authors of the linked story chose to ignore that pesky "c" word when explaining other Democratic leaders' positions on Afghanistan, so maybe Murtha used it, too. Who knows?

Last word from Jack:

"At the same time, the American people are supporting this and the Europeans aren't supporting this," Murtha said, "The Europeans aren't doing a damn thing."

Gosh - why would he want to insult our allies? Wouldn't that be counter-productive to our goals? Or maybe he thinks that somehow appeals to the bible thumping racists - as he calls his base.

Whatever the case may be, you stay classy, Jack

Update: While it has nothing to do with the Murtha story, this seems an appropriate place to append something I stated elsewhere - in fact, in response to a comment from someone writing from one of those NATO countries on the receiving end of that cheap shot from Jack Murtha.

That comment (prior to and unrelated to Murtha's jab):

I have still to see a consequence-analysis put forward by the opponents of COIN as to what would happen if NATO pulls out rapidly at this point. You are right that I dont know the US Army like most of you folks do, but Im not sure it would be exactly good for morale if the order came to cut and run tomorrow. You speak of a hollow army post Vietnam, how would it look if you have to evac Kandahar as the natives close in? I know some would see it as an act of treason to all the locals that "we" have promised our protection. And I still fail to see how letting Taleban conquer Kandahar will weaken the memetic idea that AQ is turning into. Or how the ensuing refugee-stream back into the camps in Pakistan will help that country.

That wasn't directed at me, but it was one of those things worth some thought; here's the result of mine:

I'm not an opponent of COIN, but you've certainly got me thinking. In broad terms I believe certain things could be anticipated. Among them, "peace" and "a region engulfed in flames" - both of which have their proponents who I find unconvincing. In fact, I don't anticipate precipitous withdrawal in the first place, but as a thought exercise I offer the following:

One - no more reports of Afghan suffering caused by NATO action (as in the Guardian piece).

Two - reports of Afghan suffering caused by our invasion and subsequent withdrawal (and demands to "do something").

Three - a new "battlefield" opening somewhere else. My impression of certain elements within certain communities is that they desire to fight us. As to what form(s) that campaign may take were we to absent ourselves from any of the current conflict zones, your guess is as good as mine. The real central front of what we used to call the war on terror is - we now know - everywhere from the halls of government and financial institutions to deep within the heart of every citizen of Earth. We must remain vigilant and prepared for swift and appropriate response.

Three sub-a - should that new battlefield prove to be one wherein large numbers of conventional troops are required, it will take a hella good motivational speech (one that translates well into the various remaining NATO languages) to rouse the boys just back from A'stan. Henry V had a good one, perhaps "once more into the breach" will suffice.

Three sub-b - if that doesn't happen, we can certainly devote a larger portion of our military budgets to areas many feel are being neglected under current circumstances. I would specify, but it's easier to gain support for the "anything but this" argument; everyone gets to imagine their own personal neglected item.

I could be wrong on all counts. For instance, regarding item two a news "blackout" seems equally likely, reports of rainbows and butterflies less so - with other outcomes along the scale suggested thereby.

But the truly bloodthirsty (regardless of religion, national origin, skin color, etc) could derive many gains from a withdrawal from Afghanistan, all of which I see as more likely than any outcome desired by those of more pure motive calling for the same.

More from the front

A (13 September) update on LTC Col Tim Karcher, from LTC Tim Karcher.

Background here:

LTC Karcher was riding in an MRAP just before noon on Sunday, June 28th. The MRAP is considered the Army's heaviest and safest personnel carrier. But the multiple and powerful EFPs (explosively formed penetrator), those Iranian made shaped charge that penetrate metal, struck the door near where Karcher was seated. His legs were gone. Normally a medevac helicopter would be called, but the soldiers were socked in by a dust storm, and nothing was flying.

From the front:

My friend and fellow Iraq vet CJ Grisham, in the news and talking about PTSD, depression, and suicide prevention. This war at home, like the wars on foreign soil, is difficult, real, and deadly.

Others may live

...but few will live this life: Mike Yon provides a photo documentary of a mission with the PJs.

Coupled with this well-written account from Noah Shachtman, I would conclude that someone somewhere has decided to raise the profile of USAF members "in the fight" in a way few in the public might be aware.

The PJs aren't the only such example, and there are good reasons why their contributions (and that of their combat controller brethren) have been somewhat low profile in the past.

Here's the Pararescue homepage. Here's an 'unofficial' site ("Hosted by PJs in Vietnam" - but not that narrowly focused) well worth a visit, too.

Days Like This

"Well, you guys keep up the terrific work," Petraeus said a few minutes later, when everyone stood outside posing for photographs; and when one of the world's most famous people put his left arm around Kauzlarich's shoulder, Kauzlarich looked the happiest he'd looked in a long time.

Away went Petraeus, to his helicopter.

"It's all good," Kauzlarich said a few hours later, standing outside in the late afternoon, and he was starting to say something else when he was interrupted by an explosion.

He swiveled his head, unsure of what it was.

It had been close by, near the main gate. It had sounded like a bomb.

One Day at War, an excerpt from The Good Soldiers, David Finkel's account of one battalion's deployment to Baghdad for the surge. A warning from me: if you read that excerpt you will indeed be exposed to what they were exposed to. I made the mistake of pointing my wife to the story without warning her what she could expect.

"I spent a total of eight months with the 2-16 in Iraq and made additional reporting trips to Fort Riley, in Kansas; Brooke Army Medial Center, in San Antonio, Texas; the National Naval Medical Center, in Bethesda, Maryland; and Walter Reed Army Medical Center, in Washington, D.C." Finkel writes in the book, "my intent was to document their corner of the war, without agenda. This book is that corner, unshaded. I feel privileged to have been its witness, and to write the story of what happened."

Thirty dollars well spent elsewhere

On April 22, 2004, I was standing in an operations center in Bagram, Afghanistan, watching two firefights on the monitors and screens in front of me. A platoon of U.S. Army Rangers and a special operations reconnaissance force were both under fire and in possible need of assistance. As the leader of a 40-man quick-reaction force of Rangers, I asked my squad leaders to gather our men while I awaited orders.

My platoon was dropped onto a 12,000-foot mountain at night to reinforce the small reconnaissance team that had been battling men they believed to be al-Qaeda fighters, killing two combatants. On the way south from Bagram, I listened on the radio to the U.S. casualty report from the other firefight: One killed in action, two wounded.

After a truly miserable night spent at high altitude near the Pakistan border, I arrived back in Bagram to learn the name of that Ranger killed in action: Spec. Patrick Daniel Tillman.

- from Andrew Exum's Washington Post review of Jon Krakauer's book "Where Men Win Glory - The Odyssey of Pat Tillman".

As for elsewhere, take the money you aren't going to waste on this book (though Exum's review is a must-read, as it addresses why other things besides this book are wrong) and order The Good Soldiers - more on that later. (However, be forewarned, this book spares no combat detail.)

HUGE TROOP SUPPORTER!!

Soldiers' Angels entered Prudent Publishing into a contest. We need to have 50 endorsements ASAP for us to go into the judging catagory. Please click on this link and click on the SUPPORT THIS STORY NOW: ENDORSE NOW on the upper left hand side of the story.

Check out the great story on what they do for the troops

Pakistan Rocks

That headline means what it says. Click and listen.

The simple life

Non-fiction from Orwell:

The English intelligentsia, on the whole, were more defeatist than the mass of the people - and some of them went on being defeatist at a time when the war was quite plainly won - partly because they were better able to visualize the dreary years of warfare that lay ahead. Their morale was worse because their imaginations were stronger. The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory.

Orwell may be writing for intelligent and imaginative people here, but he isn't writing about them. Hence his chosen term intelligentsia - inferring the mass of those who believe themselves to be intelligent or who are accepted as such by acclaim (some of whom may be). Had Orwell used a more obviously pejorative term (something akin to the Lenin-attributed "useful idiots", perhaps) for the sort of people he's actually referencing here their sense of self-worth would have led them to turn away, and he would have lost any chance of convincing them - or at least the somewhat intelligent members of that group - of the obvious: that imagining victory was also an act of imagination.

Orwell was of a different generation, but to this day his subtle point may serve as a valid discriminator, lost on one sort of person but obvious to others: imagining a future different from the now is the actual distinction. While it's reliable, predicting that outcome which is easiest to achieve - or that tomorrow will be like today - is hardly the definitive output of a boundless imagination. But Orwell was nothing if not Orwellian, and here he describes a people perhaps lacking imagination by praising them for an abundance thereof.

Compared to Orwell's era, victory in the sorts of conflicts in which we're engaged today is significantly harder to define in comfortable, familiar terms. For instance, there is no opposing general to sign a document of surrender - part of that concept which the undeniably intellectual President of the United States and I both recognize. But perhaps this, at least, remains consistent through the years: only the losers get to determine when a war is over.

Though that seems anti-intellectual, somehow.

'Bullet Magnet'

5 Bullets in 5 years all before age 25.

Washington wrote: "Let it be known that he who wears the military order of the Purple Heart has given of his blood in the defense of his homeland and shall forever be revered by his fellow countrymen."

So, by Gen. Washington's standards, Camacho has earned reverence five times over.

Unbelievable, I would hate to be this boys mother.

HT: Lynnis

UPDATE: MaryAnn wrote about him after receiving his fourth Purple Heart

That others may live

KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, Afghanistan - After they helped save the soldier's life, the rescue team was pissed. Yeah, they were able to roll out from their plywood hooch, jump on their helicopters, fly to the middle of minefield, do a quick medical and security assessment, get the soldier on a stretcher, and bring the guy into a military trauma center - all in less than half an hour. But the members of the team, part of the Air Force's 55th Expeditionary Rescue Squadron, couldn't believe the save had taken that long. If they were really on their game, they figured, they could've cut that time by five, 10 minutes, maybe more.

"I'm gonna take a lot of heat for this one," said Staff Sergeant Scott Dowd. "That was dogsh*t. We could've gone a lot faster. That was dogsh*t on me."

Each of these pararescue jumpers, or PJs, was not only trained as a kind of airborne emergency medical technician, stabilizing patients and offering basic trauma care. They could also perform battlefield surgery -- inserting chest tubes, removing fluid from around the heart, even performing amputations, if need be. And they could do all that after parachuting into hostile territory to rescue a downed pilot, or scuba diving into murky waters, or squeezing underneath a wrecked vehicle, or rappelling from the helicopter into a free-fire zone. That's what the sliding bar along the ceiling of the Black Hawk's cabin was for.

Noah Shachtman got to fly along with them on an mission to save a British soldier in Afghanistan. Yes, you can go, too - click here.

Click and listen

CJ and Troy:

On tonight's show we are so honored to welcome as a guest Mr. Garry Trudeau. Garry is the acclaimed satirist and comic artist of Doonesbury.

And if you don't know why Gary Trudeau belongs on a podcast with a pair of walkin', talkin' GI Joe milbloggers then you've all the more reason to follow the instruction in the headline.

Here's where you click - it's recorded, you can listen anytime.

Codependence

The Military-Media Relationship: A Dysfunctional Marriage?

(Codependence is a pattern of detrimental, behavioral interactions within a dysfunctional relationship which is regarded as an emotional disorder, and by some as a psychological disease.[1] In the relationship, the codependent person is controlled or manipulated by another who is affected with a pathological condition, such as drug addiction.[2] The codependent's life gets more and more out of hand and at the end, they might become as sick as the one they are codependent on. Perhaps I was a bit harsh in my headline choice. But click the link above and decide for yourself.)

New News

A New York Times headline from today: Obama Faces Doubts From Democrats on Afghanistan. Here on the eighth anniversary of the attacks that precipitated the war he faces doubts from Republicans, too - but that's dog bites man in the news business.

Underscoring the increasing unease, the House speaker, Nancy Pelosi, said earlier on Thursday that the president would face opposition if he sought to fulfill an expected request from Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, for more American combat troops.

"I don't think there is a great deal of support for sending more troops to Afghanistan in the country or in Congress," Ms. Pelosi told reporters, emphasizing that she was eager to see a report due from the White House in two weeks on benchmarks to measure the success of the administration's six-month-old strategy.

Support? In this case she may be right (and bi-partisan, in a way). To keep the discussion purely on political terms (not military), Democrats are certainly gazing longingly at various exits, and Republicans increasingly at others (even as they insist they will only be forced out). There appear to be several tantalizing ways out, but without getting into the finer details, a sign above one door says "Blame Bush", while another reads "Obama". Once we've gotten outside we'll begin an earnest discussion of which one we took, with each side denying the existence of a second door.

We'll be out, though. Of course, we'll just be in the next room. It will look exactly as everyone expected, with everyone else proven wrong. As much as we'd like to deny it, we are combative by nature - but combat can't be denied.

By that bold final phrase I mean many things, including the word combat used here: "...Nancy Pelosi, said earlier on Thursday that the president would face opposition if he sought to fulfill an expected request from Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, for more American combat troops."

And here:

The leading Senate Democrat on military matters said Thursday that he was against sending more American combat troops to Afghanistan...

"I just think we should hold off on a commitment to send more combat troops..."

Mr. Levin acknowledged that more American trainers would be needed to meet that goal, but he said that he did not know how many.

In counterinsurgency operations, there are sometimes few distinctions between trainers, support troops and combat forces, a fact that Mr. Levin said he recognized.

Old News

Rumsfeld's Burden: Stilling Echoes of the Grisly Raid in Somalia, by Michael Gordon, The New York Times, March 7, 2002.

A United States Navy Seal had fallen out of his helicopter earlier this week in the rugged mountains of Afghanistan and by some accounts had been dragged away to his death by a battle-hardened enemy.

Six more commandos were killed and almost a dozen wounded before the body of the American was retrieved 12 hours later.

As indicated by the headline, concern was expressed that such a grisly event might result in retreat:

The episode was eerily reminiscent of the disastrous raid in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993 that led to the death of 18 American soldiers, prompted the American withdrawal from Somalia, badly wounded the Clinton presidency and inhibited Washington from intervening in other trouble spots.

That didn't happen in Afghanistan. In fact,

Faced with the largest number of combat deaths since the war in Afghanistan began, the Pentagon response has not been to pull back but to send more forces to the fight.

The story recounts the initial force levels from a few months prior:

Even as the Pentagon leadership insisted that the American military was prepared for the risks of combat in Afghanistan it sought to limit the involvement of American forces by relying primarily on Afghan proxies, who were assisted by small teams of Special Operations forces.

"Risk aversion" may have been part of the consideration, but a better too-short explanation for our initial Afghanistan approach was/(is) sense of urgency. The Northern Alliance, having lost their overall leader to a suicide assassination and having their backs against the proverbial wall, most likely didn't have time to wait for American heavy armor or even "light" infantry support; as it turned out, a response that may have been perceived initially as a minimal stop gap at best may have exceeded expectations.

Regardless, by the time of the above article, those initial forces were augmented by additional American troops, and the war was beginning to look more like war as you see in war movies - or war you could make a movie about. One of the then-latest examples of big-screen combat was Blackhawk Down - a film that was still in theaters at the time of that NY Times story. (The movie itself is not mentioned therein, although there is a vague reference: "Mr. Rumsfeld was at pains to discourage the notion that his new Afghan offensive had become ''Black Hawk Down'' in the snow.") Gritty and realistic - and unflinching in the depiction of what happens after sharp, fast things meet human flesh - the film grossed almost $30 million on opening weekend and ultimately $173 million in theaters worldwide.

This Afghanistan movie has not yet ended; turns out it was more than a two-hour popcorn feature and certainly less predictable than many critics might prefer. Fast forward to this past week and we have the AP bringing us a photo of a mortally wounded Marine - newsworthy over the wishes of his family, we are told, because it reminds Americans of the grim reality of war.

That seems familiar, somehow.

(Update: two additional quotes from the article have been added to the original version of this post for clarity.)

10:28

BBC

10:06

NBC News

09:59

CNN

09:43

NBC News

09:03

CNN

08:46

CBS News

08:00

Live to tell

Stephen Farrell's first hand account: 4 Days With the Taliban.

And

The Ministry of Defence has named the soldier killed during the rescue of a journalist kidnapped in Afghanistan.

A spokesman said the dead man was Corporal John Harrison, 29, who served with the Parachute Regiment.
<...>
In a statement, Cpl Harrison's family said they were "absolutely heartbroken".

They added: "John was a wonderful son, brother and a dedicated soldier who was greatly loved and cherished by all his family and friends."

His commanding officer described him as "immensely capable, self-effacing and highly likeable soldier with an irrepressible humour".

Mr Brown had given the impression on Wednesday that he was at the centre of the decision-making process, describing how he had been woken in the night to be given news of the rescue, and saying: "This operation was carried out after extensive planning and consideration... when British nationals are kidnapped, we and our allies will do everything in our power to free them."

But on Thursday morning, as controversy over the raid grew both here and in Afghanistan, Mr Brown took steps to distance himself from any responsibility for it.

His spokesman said the decision had been taken by the Defence Secretary, Bob Ainsworth and the Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, following a meeting of the Government's crisis committee, Cobra, with Mr Brown merely being "consulted".

An Afghan hostage negotiator has told Sky News the talks to free the hostages had been going well and he believed they were on the brink of being freed.

A Western official who did not want to be named also told me: "These guys could have been freed without a single bullet being fired.

"The British lost patience and did not want to have a protracted hostage situation involving a British national, but they showed little respect for the local traditions or the culture."
<....>
His wife Najiba told Sky News: "We were so certain he was going to be freed, especially after the last phone call.

"He said he was being well looked after and they were being treated well."

However, Farrell's account includes descriptions of his captor's abusing Munadi: "I did not think they were going to kill me, I did think they were going to kill him."

Other complaints include:

Afghan police and other journalists say they advised Farrell that the area was under Taliban control and there was a strong risk he, as a foreigner, would be kidnapped.

"He got caught and he knew full well that people would have to risk their lives in order to save him," Andy McNab, a former member of British special forces, wrote in the Sun newspaper.

"That is irresponsible -- it is not a game out there. I don't care if he puts his own life at risk, but he put other peoples' lives at risk -- and they are dead."

Colonel Tim Collins, a former SAS officer, told the Daily Telegraph that Farrell had "a big thank you to give to the people who gave their lives to make up for his mistakes."

There were some celebrations among the mainly British soldiers on the aircraft home, which soon fell silent. It later emerged that one of the rescue party was also dead, mortally wounded during the raid. His blood-soaked helmet was in front of me throughout the flight. I thanked everyone who was still alive to thank. It wasn't, and never will be, enough.

"It was totally heavy-handed." A "Western official" said earlier. "If they'd showed a bit of patience and respect they could have got both of them out without firing a bullet. Instead, they ended up having one of their own killed, the Afghan killed and civilians killed. There's a lot of p****d-off people at the moment."

And one alive to tell the tale. Such things are often even tougher for all involved than they might seem.

And in this corner...

The American Legion has a blog, and on that blog there is a post.

It is a tale of two wishes: the wishes of a humble family in a time of grief, and the wishes of a powerful news giant in a time of crisis. The global news organization, the Associated Press (AP), was put in the position of making a choice between those wishes twice within the past week. In one case, it chose to honor the wish, in the other, it did not.

Elsewhere, Tom Ricks asks: "...a question for the Times and other media outlets: It is fair to ask people not to report the kidnapping of reporters when the kidnapping of other defenseless people, like NGO workers, is routinely reported? "

While he doesn't address the photo issue in that post, Ricks had previously weighed in on the issue (What the hell was the AP thinking?). He had also commented on Bill Roggio's post regarding the Stephen Farrell kidnapping: "I wish you would take it down." (In both cases, Mr Ricks had more to say than what I'm quoting.)

Andrew Exum, on Bill Roggio: "I happen to agree with Tom Ricks and others that the AP's decision to display that that picture was reprehensible. How that then justifies some kind of tit-for-tat retribution, though, is beyond me. The other two objections are something else. Personally, I still consider the blogger's decision to leave his post up on his website to have been at best foolish and at worst morally irresponsible."

Ex cites NY Times' Times executive editor Bill Keller's explanation for not reporting: "the kidnapping had been kept quiet by The Times and most other news media organizations out of concern for the men's safety."

According to Ex, he received an email reply from Roggio to his request to take down his post.

His [Bill Roggio's] counter-logic to Keller's was as follows:

1. It's either news or it isn't. It's not the job of a blogger to protect the media or soldiers or anyone else, and this was news.
2. You cannot prove that a blog post is going to further endanger the life of the captive.
3. The press hardly respects soldiers in the same way. Just look at the AP and the way they broadcast the image of that dying Marine.

If those are Bill's reasons for choosing to keep his post up, he does not state so in his post-rescue report:

Last weekend The New York Times requested the report of Farrell's kidnapping be removed from Threat Matrix. We did not honor the request.

The New York Times was able to successfully suppress media reports of reporter David Rohde's kidnapping for more than seven months. The newspaper was even successful in getting Wikipedia to suppress the reports of Rohde's kidnapping.

The Times has not afforded the same media blackout to Coalition soldiers, Afghan nationals, NGO workers, and contractors kidnapped in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Over at Editor and Publisher, Greg Mitchell on their lack of reporting on the Farrel kidnap: "The Times did not formally ask E&P to not report," he explains. However, "E&P's Joe Strupp contacted Times executive editor Bill Keller, and as before, Keller confirmed the kidnapping, asked for restraint, and explained that the paper was in the midst of trying to deal with the situation." The nature of a formal request is left to the reader's imagination.

As are the identities of foreigners and "not prominent blogs":

I saw some indications that Farrell had been snatched in my regular Web searches for media scoops over the weekend. As in the case of Rohde, a handful of not prominent blogs, along with very scattered media abroad (in their original language) reported that something was up, but confirmation was slight, given the silence of the Times and U.S. military.

We can probably identify one of those not prominent blogs (maybe two), and I can add that one language that reports appeared in was English (at least one English translation of a previously published German report was published in a South African online media site prior to Roggio's report) and that the situation was well known in Afghanistan - quotes from the governor and Farrell's Taliban captors appeared in that report. While Mitchell's understanding may indeed have been limited to "something was up", those reports clearly indicated exactly what that something was.

And while he chooses not to contrast this issue with that of the AP photo in that explanation, Mitchell had not only previously published that photo but had chastised those media outlets who hadn't: "Going back to 2002, I have been writing about the shameful reluctance, even refusal, of U.S. media outlets to carry graphic images of the true cost of our wars, to Americans, in Iraq and Afghanistan -- fatally wounded U.S. soldiers and Marines."

And now back to Long War Journal - more specifically, Threat Matrix - the new blog on the site. There we find this post by Bill Ardolino, wherein we find "A partial list of reports by the The New York Times on kidnappings". Eight, in fact, ranging from 2002 to "20 hours ago".

This list could go on, of course. None of Roggio's critics have adequately addressed this question of a double standard, and many simply ignored it as they pressed their case.

Surely much is being ignored all around - the actual words of John Bernard and Sultan Munadi for two examples.

For my part (for now), immediately before this discussion began I had said this

I can offer you a well thought out, intellectual argument supporting that statement. It would be full of undeniable supporting facts, numbers, and statistics. I can reference experts throughout history to buttress my points. I can appeal to your better emotions, too. I can describe atrocities - better yet, I can show you pictures and video and save myself the effort. I could crush any argument that anyone would dare to present in a feeble attempt to refute my irrefutable point...

The statement - the irrefutable point I was making (and had used to title that post), was war sucks. I could appeal to your intellect on that with words and to your emotions with pictures.

Later that day the picture story "broke" (in no small part due to the efforts of Mrs G) and I haven't yet gotten back to my planned follow up to that particular post.

Time being what it is.

The VA Answers

Alex Horton gets answers to questions on problems related to the new GI Bill.

Satisfying answers? Alex says "no".

Is explaining why things are screwed up anything new or commendable? Or is that business as usual?

Damn, now I've asked more questions.

Update/Related: Waging war with VA leaves veteran battle-weary

Rapidfire: quote unquote

"Now, add it all up, and the plan I'm proposing will cost around $900 billion over 10 years -- less than we have spent on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and less than the tax cuts for the wealthiest few Americans that Congress passed at the beginning of the previous administration."
- President Barack Obama

"One became enraged when I urinated standing up, deeming it an offense to local families. He then calmed down and asked me to teach him how to count to 10 in English."
"When they finally found a house with electricity two youngsters produced a tape recorder and began blaring hours of religious sermons, praising Osama bin Laden, the mujahedeen of Chechnya, Somalia, Helmand, Kandahar and anyone fighting the Americans."
"I did not think they were going to kill me, I did think they were going to kill [Sultan Munadi]"
- Stephen Farrell

"It was totally heavy-handed. If they'd showed a bit of patience and respect they could have got both of them out without firing a bullet. Instead, they ended up having one of their own killed, the Afghan killed and civilians killed. There's a lot of p****d-off people at the moment."
- A Western official

An Afghan official appointed by President Hamid Karzai to examine Friday's attack said his best estimate of the death toll was 82, including at least 45 armed militants.
- Frank Jordans /The Associated Press

"It's very complicated," Mr. Ocampo said. "War crimes are under my jurisdiction. I cannot say more now because we are just collecting information."
- Luis Moreno-Ocampo, International Criminal Court chief prosecutor

"Taking the widespread reports of fraud and violations during the election it is very necessary and is a must that everybody shall agree on giving more time and resources to the ECC to look at all these complaints, concerns and allegations seriously and thoroughly and then come with the final result."
- Ahmad Nader Nadery, chairman of the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan

Last Words

This was linked as part of a very long post earlier but it deserves more attention, I hope you'll agree.

I have passed the very darkest times of my country, when there was war and insecurity. I was maybe four or five years old when we went from my village into the mountains and the caves to hide, because the Soviets were bombing. I have passed those times, and the time of the Taliban when I could not even go to Kabul, inside my country. It was like being in a prison.

Those times are past now.

A final report from Sultan Munadi, published on 2 September, 2009 - a few days before he was killed during the raid to rescue him and fellow reporter Stephen Farrell.

Something well worth reading in its brief entirety, here, followed by a bit of reflection, perhaps. (Maybe even more passing along.)

Let's play war games

This is what war is, and a reminder that "embedded" does not mean safe.

And like any story from a war zone - be it a bombing raid, exchange of gunfire, or other violent event, early reports are to be greeted with skepticism, at best. This one raises several questions, all of which have no doubt already been asked by those on the scene, most of which will be answered, many of which will be rightfully classified, some of which will be obvious, and few (if any) of which will be resolved to the satisfaction of all.

This we know: four Marines died. Perhaps that fact renders it easy for outsiders to accept this quote as fact, too:

U.S. commanders, citing new rules to avoid civilian casualties, rejected repeated calls to unleash artillery rounds at attackers dug into the slopes and tree lines -- despite being told repeatedly that they weren't near the village.

Outrageous! At least if we pretend for a moment that two things actually preventing anyone from making a reasonable comment about this are true:

1. We know everything about the Rules of Engagement - which are actually both variable (to a degree) and classified (beyond vague publicly released terms). In this case we must further assume that the targets were "legitimate" within those ROE, as implied by the quote above.

and

2. Everything else in the above quote is accurate.

Number two is more likely, but neither of those requirements are satisfied here. For a moment, however, we will pretend they are.

If so, then the above is a description of the mis-application of the Rules of Engagement, something that in spite of efforts to the contrary is as inevitable (and regrettable and unfortunate and unacceptable) as the use of force that (after the heat of battle) is determined to exceed those limits. In neither case are the Rules of Engagement therefore "bad". There is no case to be made to the contrary here.

I'd rather not go deeper into that discussion, as at this point (I repeat) a larger truth overwhelms the small details - we distant observers don't know if the case is as described and we don't know the ROE. In short: we don't know enough. But I suppose I could restate it this way: if you absolutely insist on jumping to a conclusion based only on the insufficient data points available, at least jump to the conclusion supported by those insufficient data points, not one they refute.

Better still, wait for additional details. Even better: remember that the guys on the ground, who will ultimately resolve the situation (see second paragraph in this discussion) are actually there, and might even be more interested in their own well being than you are.

More: War Games (II)

Hungry?

CNN:

If you've ever wanted to eat dinner with Sarah Palin, now's your chance.

With bids starting at $25,000, eBay is auctioning off a dinner for five with the former Alaska governor and her husband, Todd. The proceeds will go to "Ride 2 Recovery," a charity that provides wounded veterans with bicycles and organized rides to help in their mental and physical recovery.

If you can't spare the $25,000 but you find yourself near Hapeville, Georgia this Friday you can still get a good lunch or dinner and help a wounded hero. Click here for details - including an address you can send a donation to if Hapeville's a bit out of your way.

Reporter freed, captivity reported

NY Times: Seized Times Reporter Is Freed in Afghan Raid That Kills Aide

Stephen Farrell, whose captivity Western media refused to acknowledge (and news of which the New York Times actively suppressed), was rescued today by men whose deaths must be photographed and displayed worldwide to show Americans the true cost of war.

A British commando was killed in the raid, The Associated Press quoted a military official as saying.

In fact, this detail from the AP should come as no surprise:

Two military officials told The Associated Press that one British commando died during the early morning raid. They spoke on condition of anonymity because the death had not been officially announced.

Even in reporting the rescue of a reporter whose captivity they'd helped cover up they couldn't resist announcing the death of one of the rescuers before the families had been notified. I guess they know a "scoop" when they see one; it's been repeated, with credit to the AP, in every other report on this story - including the New York Times.

Farrell told the New York Times "he had been "extracted" by a commando raid carried out by "a lot of soldiers" in a fierce firefight with his captors."

In a second phone call to a New York Times reporter in Kabul, Mr. Farrell gave this account of what happened when he and his captors heard the thump-thumping of approaching helicopters.

"We were all in a room, the Talibs all ran, it was obviously a raid," Mr. Farrell said. "We thought they would kill us. We thought should we go out."

Mr. Farrell said as he and Mr. Munadi ran outside, he heard voices. "There were bullets all around us. I could hear British and Afghan voices."

At the end of a wall, Mr. Farrell said Mr. Munadi went forward, shouting: "Journalist! Journalist!" but dropped in a hail of bullets. "I dived in a ditch," said Mr. Farrell, who said he did not know whether the shots had come from allied or militant fire.

After a minute or two, Mr. Farrell, who holds dual Irish-British citizenship, said he heard more British voices and shouted, "British hostage!" The British voices told him to come over. As he did, Mr. Farrell said he saw Mr. Munadi.

"He was lying in the same position as he fell," Mr. Farrell said. "That's all I know. I saw him go down in front of me. He did not move. He's dead. He was so close, he was just two feet in front of me when he dropped."

Apparently Farrell left his colleague's corpse at the scene (see Reuters report in update below).

"Last night in a US special forces operation in Chardara district, they managed to free Stephen Farrell but the Afghan journalist Sultan Mohammad was killed by Taliban during the operation," said Kunduz governor Mohammad Omar.

Although the story of Farrell's capture by the Taliban was well known and widely reported in the region, the New York Times had effectively suppressed reporting in the Western media. "We feared that media attention would raise the temperature and increase the risk to the captives," said Bill Keller, the executive editor of The Times.

In spite of those efforts, however, the news was reported outside central Asia. A South African news source had an English language report on the situation by Saturday evening, although that report has subsequently been deleted from the web. (Google cache here.)

"The journalist, who works for New York Times, and his translator were blindfolded by the militants and taken to unknown location" the governor said, adding that Afghan security forces have began a search operation in the area to track down the kidnappers.
<...>
A Taliban commander in Chardarah district confirmed to dpa that their fighters caught the journalist along with his translator in Easakhel village of the district on Saturday morning.

According to reports from Afghanistan, New York Times reporter Stephen Farrell and his driver/interpreter have been kidnapped while attempting to cover the story of the NATO airstrike on the two Taliban-hijacked tankers in Kunduz, Afghanistan.
<...>
Multiple sources in Afghanistan tell me that The New York Times is attempting to suppress the reporting on Farrell's kidnapping.

We've been reporting the situation here, too. (Links below.)

Even as they successfully kept the American public ignorant of Farrell's captivity, the New York Times did publish an AP photo of the death of 21-year old U.S. Marine Lance Cpl. Joshua M. Bernard on their web site, under the (obviously answered) headline: "Behind the Scenes: To Publish or Not?." Corporal Bernard's father had requested the photo not be used (audio interview with John Bernard here).

And credit yet again the great work of those rough men, who once more rode while America slept.

The final word (for now) goes to the New York Times:

An Afghan journalist who spoke to villagers in the area said that civilians, including women and children, were also killed in the firefight to free the journalists.

Update: The New York Times report of children killed may be premature - see Reuters report below. (Update to update - the New York Times has now changed their story to read "..said that civilians were also killed..." - "women and children" have been deleted.)

Bill Roggio reports "Last weekend The New York Times requested the report of Farrell's kidnapping be removed from Threat Matrix. We did not honor the request."

And at Patterico's Pontifications, a reminder that PFC Bowe Bergdahl didn't get quite the same consideration from the press that a NYT reporter did.

This certainly seems worth revisiting:

Moderator: Colonel Connell, I can see the venomous reaction you are having in hearing all this.

Colonel Connell: (Angrily) I feel utter contempt. Two days later they (the reporters - Jennings and Wallace) are both walking off my hilltop and they get ambushed and they're lying there wounded. And they're going to expect I'm going to send Marines up there to get them. They're just journalists. They're not Americans. Is that a fair reaction? You can't have it both ways. But I'll do it. And that's what makes me so contemptuous of them. Marines will die going to get (grippingly) a couple of journalists.

Read the whole thing.

"We regret to announce that a British soldier has been killed on operations in Afghanistan," an MoD spokesman said.

The number of British troops killed in Afghanistan since the start of operations in 2001 now stands at 213, with 41 having died in July and August.

A spokesman for Gordon Brown said the prime minister had spoken to the UK's leading military commander in Afghanistan, General Jim Dutton, "to thank the [rescue] team for the tremendous effort".

In a statement, the prime minister paid tribute to the courage of the British soldier who was killed in the raid. "His family has been informed, and our immediate thoughts are with them. His bravery will not be forgotten," said Brown.

More:

Farrell describes how he survived his previous capture in Iraq - by revealing he was a journalist:

"There is just no point in panicking in those circumstances. You deal with them one at a time.

"You hope you don't say the wrong thing for the next eight hours, two weeks, whatever you're facing."

He said they told the truth about who they were, and "became slightly nuisance journalists".

"Fortunately, as we were able to turn the kidnap into an interview and ask them what message do you have for [former US President George] Bush, what message do you have for [former UK Prime Minister Tony] Blair.

"They seemed to think they could use us this way and gave us an interview and let us go."

NY Times At War blog: Hell No. I Won't Go (by Sultan M. Munadi)

I was maybe four or five years old when we went from my village into the mountains and the caves to hide, because the Soviets were bombing. I have passed those times, and the time of the Taliban when I could not even go to Kabul, inside my country. It was like being in a prison.

Those times are past now. Now I am hopeful of a better situation. And if I leave this country, if other people like me leave this country, who will come to Afghanistan? Will it be the Taliban who come to govern this country? That is why I want to come back, even if it means cleaning the streets of Kabul. That would be a better job for me, rather than working, for example, in a restaurant in Germany.

The BBC:

Some reports from Afghanistan suggest that British special forces were involved in the rescue.

But a UK defence ministry spokeswoman told the BBC: "It was a Nato operation, we do not comment on special forces."

Reuters:

Mohammad Nabi, a resident of the district, said Taliban fighters holding the two captives had stayed at his house Tuesday night after demanding shelter. He said NATO forces arrived by helicopter and killed his sister-in-law during their raid.

The troops left with Farrell, but not his Afghan colleague, whose body was found outside the house in the morning, Nabi told Reuters.

"Last night, a group of Taliban in two vehicles came to my house saying they needed shelter. We took them to our guest house. There was a foreign journalist and an Afghan translator with them," Nabi said.

"At midnight, U.S. helicopters came, dropping off soldiers. A clash broke out and then the soldiers blew open the door of my house, killing my sister-in-law, and took the reporter away with them."

If that's the full story, it would appear the New York Times report of children killed could be premature.

The Guardian:

The kidnap and deaths underscore the increasing danger of reporting in Afghanistan, where another New York Times journalist, David Rohde, was kidnapped last November.

Others:

Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama: A Freed Reporter -- and Blogging Ethics

Josh Foust, Registan Excellent News

Nathan Hodge, Danger Room Of Kidnapping, Milblogs and Blackouts

In other news from Afghanistan not making the major papers:

Kabul, Afghanistan - An Afghan-international security force killed Taliban militants in Kandahar Province near the village of Hajji Mohammad Karam, southwest of Kandahar City.

During the operation, the joint force received hostile fire from a nearby building, identified as a mosque, and returned fire, killing one enemy militant. The force called upon the militants to exit the mosque peacefully. However, the militants remained non-compliant and continued in their unlawful use of the mosque as a fighting position, and an Afghan National Security Force member was wounded by hostile fire.

Left with no option, the force used escalation of force measures to remove the entrenched militants from the mosque. A militant charged from the mosque and displayed hostile intent - he was engaged and killed. The dead militants were found with AK-47s and chest racks.

The force contacted a village elder and explained the situation to him. The elder did not recognize the militants and confirmed that they were not from the village. The force compensated the elder for minor damages done to the mosque as a result of the militants' engagement with the joint force.

No local Afghan civilians were injured during this operation.

KANDAHAR AIR FIELD, Afghanistan (Sept. 8) --In 1995, it took two tons of ammonium nitrate to destroy the Oklahoma City Federal building. On Sept. 8, Afghan Commandos, assisted by Coalition forces, found more than five tons of the explosive material during a search near Kandahar.

In total, the joint forces found and destroyed 820 pounds of opium and 1,080 pounds of poppy seeds; 24 rocket-propelled-grenade rounds and seven mortar rounds; and IED components including bulk electronics, 25 ball bearing pressure plates, 800 pounds of aluminum powder, 150 pounds of bulk explosives and over five tons of ammonium nitrate.

The search was conducted over several hours in the Ghorak district. The 3rd Kandak Commandos first searched a bazaar seeking insurgents known for storing weapons, bomb-making materials and drugs. At the bazaar, the Commandos discovered nearly 600 lbs of opium and over 1,000 lbs of poppy seeds.

Several hours into the search, the forces observed armed men moving around the compound, and a truck approached the joint forces at a high speed. After many attempts to get the driver to halt, Commandos engaged the truck with small arms fire, disabling the truck and killing the driver. Commandos inspected the truck and found 264 pounds of opium stored in the back. While inspecting the vehicle, both Commandos and Coalition forces took small arms fire from several armed men. Commandos returned fire, killing one enemy fighter.

Searching the village, Commandos and Coalition detained several men who tested positive for explosive residue. In addition, the force discovered three caches of ammonium nitrate, which totalled 5,000 pounds, and fifteen RPG rounds.

Commandos also discovered a bunker in a graveyard containing radios and money. Additional weapons were discovered in another location.

All confiscated materials were destroyed on site. No civilians were harmed in the operation.

KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 9)--An Afghan-international security force killed a group of eight Taliban militants in Zabul Province today during a search of a compound known to be used by a Taliban commander responsible for ambushes and improvised explosive device attacks in the region.

The joint force searched the compound near the village of Gagezi Kalay in the Qalat District after intelligence reports indicated the presence of militant activity. During the search, the force engaged a small militant element, killing several.

The force continued its search of the compound without further incident and recovered four AK-47s.

An element of the joint force that remained outside of the compound interdicted and killed several other militants who attempted to escape by motorcycle and displayed hostile intent. The force recovered one PKM machine gun, one Soviet light machine gun, two AK-47s, ammunition and communication gear.

Previous reports:

A chance to listen

Revisiting Ethics in America (and elsewhere)

Echoes from the blast

News and No News

NYT reporter kidnapped in Afghanistan

Quick response - and otherwise

Our friend Exum has assembled an update on reactions to the latest airstrike in Afghanistan, contrasting the response of the Afghan locals with that of the volk in Germany (until recently the location of my home).

I had to read this twice to make sure I understood it: "Regardless of whether most of those killed in the bombing were civilians or Taliban fighters, there was genuine shock among many Germans that one of their military commanders could have been responsible for an attack that killed so many people." I understand (or thought I did) and admire German reluctance for war, but there's a degree of pacifism expressed there that surprised me; perhaps the use of the vague "many" renders the statement factual. (And a blinding stroke of the obvious - "many" no doubt feel differently about the Taliban, it's a big country.)

As a long time advocate of swift response I see what's happening as a result of just that. On their homefront our German friends are surprised by the action, in Afghanistan they seem caught off guard by the reaction. But our Afghan friends remain friendly - for now. (And perhaps would prefer even more action on the part of their German allies than the German public would prefer to know. Fighting back does indeed present us with an untidy moral quandary or two.)

Certainly an even swifter response would have spared the German defense minister the embarrassment of having denied civilian casualties in the first place, a mistake others of us have come to recognize as such from years of fighting this kind of war. We've seen one partial explanation for that delay, but today the Times (of London) offers another:

After a Nato airstrike killed as many as 125 people last week, General Stanley McChrystal was keen to get the situation under control -- fast.

When he tried to contact his underlings to find out what had happened, however, he found, to his fury, that many of them were either drunk or too hungover to respond.

Complaining in his daily Commander's Update that too many people had been "partying it up", General McChrystal, head of International Forces in Afghanistan (Isaf), banned alcohol at his headquarters yesterday, admonishing staff for not having "their heads in the right place" on Friday morning -- a few hours after the deadly attack.

As much as I might have enjoyed a cold one from time to time in Iraq, another learned experience is that sometimes the enemy gets to decide whether you get a day off or not. So the explanation (from "one insider") that "Thursday nights are the big party nights, because Friday's a 'low-ops' day" impresses me as a bit over confident - at best.

Closer to the bottom of the story we are reminded that

US troops are banned from drinking and British troops are allowed to drink only at official functions with special permission. Soldiers from the rest of the 42-nation alliance are governed by divergent national guidelines on alcohol consumption.

Many of the civilian staff, who are free to leave the base, were not concerned. "It's only on HQ that they've banned it. All the other bases that served it, still do," one said.

Party on, Garth.

Update: Does al Qaeda sense weakness?

Jihadists close to al-Qaeda explicitly warned in new communications that Germany will be the target of the next 9/11-scale terrorist attack. The timing of the strike, they say, will be within the next few weeks.
<...>
The writer of the chilling message notes that this is the Muslim month of Ramadan and that "we pray that it will indeed be in this month."

After referring to a previous boast by Osama Bin-Laden, that the enemy is afraid and unable to prevent the next attack, the communication says:

"And the Germans, grandchildren of the Nazis, know more than everyone else that they will be the first ones to taste [the nightmare]. It is just a matter of time - that is, days or weeks - and God willing you'll see things that you've never heard of before."

Remembering Mike Stokely

Last month Robert Stokely held a memorial for his son Mike Stokely. He does this every year on the anniversary of the day Mike was killed in Iraq. Friends, family and comrades gather to exchange memories of Mike and to honor him. Some knew Mike personally, some came to know Mike thru Robert. This year, Jimbo, McQ, Kat, Greyhawk and I were there and it was an honor to be a part of keeping Mike's memory alive.

Robert has been an inspiration to many and importantly to other gold star families, helping them in their difficult gold star journey. Supporting them while sharing their grief, memories and ways to heal.

Jimbo of BlackFive recorded the ceremony.

This year, however, someone special could not be at Mike's memorial. Sergeant First Class Mark Allen, who served with Mike in Iraq as part of E 108 CAV 48th BCT GAARNG and now with the unit from Robert Stokely's community, Bravo 2 / 121 INF 48th BCT GAARNG. SFC Allen was seriously injured in Afghanistan on July 8th.

Robert Stokely, a member of the Family Readiness Group for Bravo 2/121,
has stepped up to help Mark Allen's family, who have been so close to Mike, who have been at Mike's previous memorial ceremonies, but could not be there this year.

In C / O MIKE STOKELY FOUNDATION, INC., the Wounded Warrior SFC Mark Allen Fund has been established. Special thanks also goes to David Pruiksma of Chick-fil-A for his contribution.

The benefits are to provide money for the family's other expenses, and to help Allen's parents, brothers, and other family members be near him. "When you've got someone in a long-term care situation like this, it really eats into your pocketbook," Robert said.

Friends and neighbors of the Allens have been very helpful, Robert said, but "this is going to be a long haul for them."

If you can't make it to the fundraiser, you can also send donations to the 501(c)3 charitable foundation at:
Wounded Warrior SFC Mark Allen, 100 Fountainhead Way, Sharpsburg, GA 30277.

As we approach the eighth anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks on America, the event that brought us into these wars, let us remember those sacrificing, those lost, and those left behind.

Godspeed.

You will never be forgotten.

Urban (combat) legends

Dramatic video: US Marines Huge Firefight Iraq 2009

But there's one thing wrong with it - the battle depicted was in 2005. The above is the LiveLeak version, and here's one from YouTube. Both are recently posted, have been viewed by thousands, and both say 2009. Both are wrong.

Here's a memorial for Corporal Andre Williams, here's one for Lance Corporal Christopher Lyons, both fell on July 28th, 2005. Here's the source of these video clips: Combat Diary - The Marines of Lima Company - a video from 2006.

There are probably thousands of such videos all over the web, not to mention uncountable urban legend emails. Why bother pointing that out? Because it's a reminder that Iraq is a different place, in no small part due to the efforts of men such as these. (And that unless we do many will never know.)

Another chance to listen

...to Mrs G - along with several other lovely ladies (and a couple of thugs) "on the air" tonight:

September 7, 2009 - 9:00pm EST

LISTEN LIVE And Later 24/7 At: http://www.talkshoe.com/tc/19487 Episode 112

Shelle Michaels, Greta Perry, MAJ Charles and Carren Ziegenfuss, Mrs. G, Matt Burden, Boston Maggie, and Carrie Constantini talking about Soldiers' Angels' (www.soldiersangels.org) Valor IT Program for Wounded Warriors.

More details here and here.

Teams are forming for the annual VALOUR-IT fundraiser, and the folks listed above are leading the effort. Listen in for more information, or email mrsg (or greyhawk) at mudvillegazette dot com to join.

A chance to listen

You've heard of him, now you can hear from him: an (audio) interview with John Bernard, father of Marine LCPL Joshua Bernard.


Update: The full interview is here. (Thanks, Jim Bennett.)

Revisiting Ethics in America (and elsewhere)

In light of News and no news I'm reminded that no matter how dramatic the story, it's nearly true that nothing's new.

The following discussion was televised back in 1987. Video is available here, part of a series on Ethics in America you can find here.

(In the video, before you get to this segment you'll hear other interesting and still topical issues discussed.)

I did a longer post about this in February, 2005, right after I got home from my first Iraq tour.

In the excerpt below, "Jennings" is Peter Jennings, "Wallace" is Mike Wallace.

Echoes from the blast

(Previously: Tic tic tic...)

From Afghanistan, conflicting reports on why the civilians were there:

One survivor, convalescing from abdominal wounds at a hospital in the nearby city of Kunduz, said he went to the site because he thought he could get free fuel. Another patient, a 10-year-old boy with shrapnel in his left leg, said he went to gawk, against his father's advice. In Kabul, the Afghan capital, relatives of two severely burned survivors being treated at an intensive-care unit said Taliban fighters forced dozens of villagers to assist in moving the bogged-down tankers.

"They came to everyone's house asking for help," said Mirajuddin, a shopkeeper who lost six of his cousins in the bombing -- none of whom, he said, was an insurgent. "They started beating people and pointing guns. They said, 'Bring your tractors and help us.' What could we do?"

I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force entails risks to our troops - and we must work to mitigate that risk wherever possible. But excessive use of force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater risks. We must understand this reality at every level in our force.

I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit the use of force like close air support (CAS) against residential compounds and other locations likely to produce civilian casualties in accordance with this guidance.

Downing Street pushback

News from a distant island:

Downing Street has hit back at Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton for attacking the decision to release the Lockerbie bomber.

President Obama and the US Secretary of State fuelled a fierce American backlash against Britain, claiming Abdelbaset Al Megrahi should have been forced to serve out his jail sentence in Scotland - but a senior Whitehall aide said their reaction was 'disingenuous'.

British officials claim Mr Obama and Mrs Clinton were kept informed at all stages of discussions concerning Megrahi's return.

News and No News

Is this story true? I haven't found any other reports:

Kunduz, Afghanistan - A New York Times journalist visiting the site of the deadly Nato airstrike in the northern Afghan province of Kunduz was kidnapped along with his Afghan interpreter on Saturday, the provincial governor said.

The journalist, who went to talk to villagers in Omarkhel village in the Chardarah district was kidnapped by Taliban militants, Mohammad Omar, the provincial governor, told the German Press Agency dpa.

"The journalist, who works for New York Times, and his translator were blindfolded by the militants and taken to unknown location" the governor said, adding that Afghan security forces have began a search operation in the area to track down the kidnappers.

No word on that in the American media - generally for a major story that's an indication the report might not be completely trustworthy. However, in the past these types of stories have been suppressed, so no similar conclusion can be drawn here.

Bill Roggio reports:

Multiple sources in Afghanistan tell me that The New York Times is attempting to suppress the reporting on Farrell's kidnapping. The New York Times did the same thing when journalist David Rohde was kidnapped in eastern Afghanistan late last year. Rohde was released earlier this year after escaping from a Haqqani Network compound in North Waziristan.

If the story is true, as Bill points out, "The kidnapping of Farrell serves only to highlight the deteriorating security situation in the northern province of Kunduz (and neighboring Baghlan)"

On the larger matter of suppressing news, the New York Times does have this letter from Secretary Gates to Thomas Curley, President and CEO of the Associated Press:

Mr Thomas Curley President and Chief Executive Officer Associated Press 450 West 33rd Street New York, NT 10001

Mr Curley:

Today I leaned that the Associated Press plans to publish a graphic photograph of Lance Corporal Joshua M Bernard taken shortly after he received mortal wounds. I understands that you have decided to do this over the objection of Lance Corporal Bernard's grieving father. Out of respect for his family's wishes, I ask you in the strongest of terms to reconsider your decision.

I do not make this request lightly. In one of my first public statements as Secretary of Defense, I stated the media should not be treated as the enemy, and made it a point to thank journalists for revealing problems that need to be fixed - as was the case at Walter Reed. I have long been committed to more transparency with regard to media access - even when that means showing war's terrible human cost. Earlier this year I lifted the ban on images of the return of the fallen at Dover Air Force Base. I did so with one overriding thought in mind: to give families the opportunity to honor their fallen however they saw fit and for the American people to understand, to see, and to appreciate the enormity of their sacrifice.

The American people understand that death is an awful and inescapable part of war - a fact driven home to me in a very personal way each time I write a condolence letter. Those of us who have not lost loved ones in war can never know what it feels like. All we can do is pay tribute to those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, and respect the wishes of their families. Publication of this image will do neither and will mark an unconscionable departure from the restraint that most journalists and publications have shown covering the military since September 11th.

I cannot imagine the pain and suffering Lance Corporal Bernard's death has caused his family. Why your organization would purposefully defy the family's wishes knowing full well that it will lead to yet more anguish is beyond me. Your lack of compassion and common sense in choosing to put this image of their maimed and stricken child on the front page of multiple American newspapers is appalling. The issue here is not law, policy, or constitutional right - but judgment and common decency.

Sincerely
[Signed]

Greg Mitchell, editor of Editor & Publisher responds at the Huffington Post:

Going back to 2002, I have been writing about the shameful reluctance, even refusal, of U.S. media outlets to carry graphic images of the true cost of our wars, to Americans, in Iraq and Afghanistan -- fatally wounded U.S. soldiers and Marines.

Earlier today, the Associated Press -- bucking the wishes of the Pentagon and the victim's family -- decided to go ahead and transmit such a photo.

It was not a one-off bit of "sensationalism" but part of a tasteful and remarkable tribute package profiling the dead Marine...

"Top papers such as The New York Times, Washington Post and L.A. Times carried the AP story, but not the image." Mitchell tells us - but what he doesn't say (because he wants you to get your snuff porn fix learn about the true cost of wars at his web site) is that the New York Times published the photo on their web site - under the absurd headline "Behind the Scenes: To Publish or Not?".

By Mitchell's logic, did Rohde's "shameful reluctance, even refusal" to allow his captors to use him as the star in a snuff porn video deny the media a chance to "show the true cost of our wars to Americans"?

Did he fail as a reporter?

Back to you, Greg.

While we wait for further understanding of the stories above, here's something to ponder. Back in late March, 2004, "video was obtained" by the media of the killing and mutilation of American contractors in Fallujah, Iraq. The story then:

WASHINGTON - Every war or disaster contains moments that become defining images: a napalmed girl or a gun to the head in Vietnam, the body of a U.S. soldier dragged through a Somalian street.

It is not clear whether the 80 seconds of video Wednesday showing images of charred American bodies being beaten and dangled from the steelwork of a bridge over the Euphrates River will come to define the war in Iraq.

But once again, broadcasters and news executives were torn between a question of taste and the demand to give viewers and readers information that could affect the course of history.

"War is a horrible thing. It is about killing," ABC News "Nightline" Executive Producer Leroy Sievers said in an unusual message to the program's e-mail subscribers discussing the issues posed by Wednesday's killings.

Every news organization that shared the video or still clips with their viewers or readers had their own reasons for doing so. "While showing the images could erode support for the war, not showing them could have an opposite effect", the LA Times explained. Other professionals weighed in, too.

Tom Rosenstiel, director of the Washington-based Project for Excellence in Journalism, said "the pictures from Wednesday's attack could anger viewers or engender disenchantment about the war."

John Schulz, dean of Boston University's College of Communications and a former faculty member at the National War College: "These are the kinds of pictures that will linger, they'll be there in November when people go to vote."

That November, people reelected George Bush.

But here's the Brookings Institute's graph of American casualties in Iraq from 2003-2007, I've placed a vertical line on March, 2003:

The two peaks are the battles in Fallujah, but aside from those there's an obvious "before and after".

Update: Revisiting Ethics in America (and elsewhere)

Previously: AP is 'truly appalling' - UPDATED

A sampling of related posts:

Choice

The Fallen

Dover

The Return

Tic tic tic...

More bad press

Even more bad press

A combination of blurring and smearing

Lying Times

Media, Military, and Professional Ethics

Targeting Journalists

Target: Media

Sites

NYT reporter kidnapped in Afghanistan

Bill Roggio reports:

The local Afghan press is reporting on Farrell's kidnapping; however, the international press and the wires services have been silent on this issue.

Multiple sources in Afghanistan tell me that The New York Times is attempting to suppress the reporting on Farrell's kidnapping. The The New York Times did the same thing when journalist David Rohde was kidnapped in eastern Afghanistan late last year. Rohde was released earlier this year after escaping from a Haqqani Network compound in North Waziristan. While Rohde's kidnapping was not publicized, his escape was the subject of abundant reporting. The media has not afforded the US military the courtesy of a news blackout when US troops have been captured in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I'm seeing a lot of double standards from the press lately.

Best Fight Movie Ever

Chocolate.

Even Mrs G wants to own this one. I had to resist the urge to constantly stop, rewind, and switch to slow motion. I'll try that on the second or third time I watch it.

Or click here to download and view on your computer.

Tic tic tic...

That title is the sound a clock makes. Or a bomb.

Something I've been writing about for a while - or at least since November 2008...

Contra McCain ("I'd rather lose an election than a war"), the motto of the US military might be "we'd rather lose a war then release a statement before we've had several months to investigate the issue and clear it with our attorneys."

It's frustrating, but there are good reasons for slow response. First among them is a real desire to get the facts and a knowledge of "the fog of war". While this may seem quaint and charming to a reporter whose job is to sell papers or attract viewers (and who may or may not be motivated by a desire to shape opinion), and is certainly an exploitable weakness by an enemy who wants to recruit suicide bombers, it's still a worthy goal. There are reasons for that beyond whatever value one places on "truth". Among them, "the Army" (as opposed to the enemy or a reporter) while portrayed as "the accused" in any such story is actually the agency that must investigate and possibly prosecute any incident. This task is taken seriously, and public statements can infringe on rights of the actual (or potential) accused. Factor in that anything "wrong" in an initial response will make headlines for days ("coverup" "incompetence" etc. etc.) and the case for accuracy over speed becomes unbeatable.

But this doesn't eliminate a need for speed, and thus far "the Army" ain't gettin' it done.
<...>
Meanwhile, according to the BBC "Mr Karzai called on Barack Obama to prevent civilian casualties when he takes over as US president." That would go a step beyond the President-elect's statement (pledge?) implying that he favors doing more than just air raiding villages and killing civilians (the U.S. has "gotta get the job done" in Afghanistan which "requires us to have enough troops that we're not just air raiding villages and killing civilians which is causing enormous problems there). However, some have interpreted that as a pledge to stop air raiding villages and killing civilians, so it's possible that once he's in office we'll no longer see these types of reports.

But we did keep seeing them.

And while I thought this a fine idea...

Although the Tactical Directive has been classified for the protection of our own forces, portions of the directive are being made public in order to ensure a broader awareness of the intent and scope of General McChrystal's guidance to ISAF and USFOR-A forces.

What follows are the releasable portions of the Tactical Directive:
<...>
This is different from conventional combat, and how we operate will determine the outcome more than traditional measures, like capture of terrain or attrition of enemy forces. We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories - but suffering strategic defeats - by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people.

While this is also a legal and a moral issue, it is an overarching operational issue - clear-eyed recognition that loss of popular support will be decisive to either side in this struggle. The Taliban cannot militarily defeat us - but we can defeat ourselves.

I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force entails risks to our troops - and we must work to mitigate that risk wherever possible. But excessive use of force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater risks. We must understand this reality at every level in our force.

I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit the use of force like close air support (CAS) against residential compounds and other locations likely to produce civilian casualties in accordance with this guidance.

Given the goal of be first with the truth and a perception that responses are released weeks later at 4PM on a Friday - what's a desired response time (beyond "we're investigating") for a hypothetical headline-making event with Army involvement wherein civilians are killed?

The answer - "immediately" - is certainly ambitious. He provides a much more detailed response. I'll add only that Lt Gen Caldwell has indeed done a great job of focusing training efforts in this area. (I'm looking forward to seeing operational results.)

And I'm still looking forward to that.

Because...

Why do we suck at I.O and P.R?

1. Because we take more than 24 hours to respond to negative media accounts. "Be first with the truth" is a damn fine goal, but needs a time limit. Four weeks later on Friday at 5PM is wrong. We can win every damn COIN battle and lose the war on this point alone. (Reference the "American public won't give us more than x months" talking point that's starting to catch on these days.)

2. We have to overcome a culture predisposed to think of us as the bad guys. That ain't gonna be easy. Fortunately most members of the tribe in question speak English, some as the native tongue. (Actually, that works against us, too.) I'm only half joking here.

Not to say "teh MSM iz teh sux" (because I respect the hell out of reporters who get it right, whether the news is good or bad) but anyone who thinks all bad press is a result of us doing bad things is in for a shock. Atrocity tales will not stop just because we modify our tactical directive - but we will be under even more pressure to answer questions quickly. I've seen no evidence of a plan for that, or even thinking beyond saying "be first with the truth". Maybe next year the idea of some sort of a high speed "IO QRF" will catch on.

Or maybe not. Really guys, take your time. No need to rush.

After all, it's vitally important we do this right.

Dear Abby

I'm an energetic young man with a problem. I've been called dynamic and intellectual, but I admit I'm stumped, and I hope you or your readers can help.

I was recently elected President of a major Western power. As you might expect I've got a lot on my plate (and a lot of great advisers) but I thought I might reach out for some outside advice on a sticky situation I find myself in.

During my predecessor's term we invaded a nation that harbored the leadership of a terrorist group that had repeatedly attacked our country, ultimately striking a blow against us one September morning long ago that many citizens are unwilling to forget. I don't want to belabor the point, but besides providing a base for the guys who attacked us the group governing that nation had stunned the world by destroying ancient religious statues, believed in public execution (often of women!) as spectator sport, and generally ran one of the most oppressive regimes in the modern world. I could go on, but I think you get the picture.

Years later when I ran for President I pledged to not only carry on our mission there, but promised to increase our efforts. Frankly, I taunted my opponents for their failure to do enough. Really, the guys we took out were so loathsome that I could get incredible support for my platform years after the fact. I mean, these guys wouldn't even allow young girls to attend school. I mean, c'mon, seriously, I consider myself a very tolerant man, I embrace diversity, I'm well educated, I like to present a positive message - but you couldn't ask freaking Hollywood to come up with a villain whose defeat would be more loudly cheered.

Sorry - I'm getting a bit off track, but it's hard to think of these guys without emotion coming into play. Anyhow, I was elected. Within months I made good on my promises. We ordered 17,000 additional troops to this country I'm talking about, and polls indicated both support for the effort and my own popularity were high. We declared a new strategy and named a new commander. We decided to focus on protecting the population, minimizing civilian casualties by putting new limits on use of force - all sorts of efforts to ensure we (and the world) wouldn't get confused over exactly who were "the good guys" in this fight. It is a war, however, (though we've tried using the term "overseas contingency operation" it really hasn't caught on) and people are dying. A lot of other nations from around the world are sharing the burden with us.

Our overall goal is to transfer security responsibility to Afghan forces - one of my added Army brigades just arrived to participate in that training effort. Meanwhile, once our Marines arrived in country we set them to work fighting that previously mentioned enemy group and securing an area that's the source of almost half of the world's opium, from which heroin is derived. (Can you imagine the lives that stuff ruins?)

Okay, enough background details. I'll pose my question in a moment, but first (and I hope this doesn't sound like bragging, I'm just trying to be honest) here are some personal and professional details that might help you help me: I'm acknowledged as a fairly good public speaker, and a lot of folks are willing to follow my lead. (Many tell me I'm inspirational.) I was elected with a comfortable majority, and my political party controls both houses of our nation's legislature. The opposing political party supports our efforts in this war.

So now here's my question: it's only been a few weeks since the additional troops I ordered into the country actually arrived, but suddenly polls indicate support for the effort has plunged. Is there anything I can do to turn that around?

I know, it's a tough predicament, but I'd certainly appreciate whatever advice you or your readers could provide. Thanks.

Sign me,
The Leader of the Free World

Okay, I wrote that - just pretending to be the president of an unnamed Western power. So, if anyone wants to pretend to be "Dear Abby" feel free to respond.