More Tunnel Vision

Newsflash: restrictive ROE are getting our troops killed. Here's a report from NCOs on the front:

In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a "time-sensitive target acquisition mission" on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse -- namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.

Of course, that's not a newsflash - it's a blast from the past. Not the ancient past - it's not a complaint against the marplots of 1897 - in this case the front was Baghdad, and the year was 2007. We (I was there, too) were in the middle of a long, hot summer (in more ways than one). General Petraeus' scheduled brief to Congress on progress was a few short weeks away - planned for sometime around September 11th, a date that was an obvious anniversary in the United States and elsewhere. As a bonus, in that year it also fell immediately prior to the beginning of Ramadan.

None of which mattered in America: "A majority of Americans don't trust the upcoming report by the Army's top commander in Iraq on the progress of the war and even if they did, it wouldn't change their mind, according to a new poll." Or as I interpreted it at the time: "I can't hear you I'm not listening I can't hear you I'm not listening I can't hear you I'm not listening yayayayayayayalalalalaldadadadada I can't hear you..."

But the purpose of this post (and those that follow) isn't to relive the past so much as it is to examine the present - and determine what, if anything, has changed. Certainly something has (or some things have) but before identifying them it's worthwhile, says I, to revisit a point in time not long ago - before that change occurred...

THE VIEW FROM THE TUNNEL
Greyhawk / 23 Aug 2007

This NY Times Op/Ed from a group of 82d Airborne NCOs is well written, thought provoking, and worthy of more than a quick read. While I disagree with many of their conclusions, the facts they present in support are indeed fact. The authors are clearly well-informed from personal observation and external sources, but in most cases the therefore that follows many of those facts is where we part company.

We are indeed working to straighten out a hell of a mess in Baghdad, and any number of things can foil our objectives. In fact, failure is easier and quicker than success, our failure can bring success to others (is, in fact, prerequisite to their success as they currently envision it) and not all of these "others" are ready to develop new definitions of personal or group success more compatible with ours. (Or at least, definitions of "success" that can be achieved following our success rather than only after our failure).

But, in fact, that's exactly what's happened in most of al Anbar, and during the bloody campaign to get there such an outcome was far from obvious. (Such an outcome is far from a done deal now, too, but at least it can be mentioned without drawing sneers.) It's entirely possible that all hell may still break lose there. But it seems (at best) that the general population has had enough of al Qaeda and their ilk and are willing to cast their lot with us, or (at worst) have finally realized that the best way to get rid of us is to let us finish and leave - after gaining whatever edge they can against their future rivals from us before our departure. (Said edge being training, money, weapons, and perhaps a bit of thinning of the rival herd before we depart.) One can't rule out some middle ground between those two possibilities.

That being the case, our best hope is that prosperity (or at least being on a recognizable path thereto) will prove incentive to keep the peace without the presence of American guns. Said peace being more conducive to such prosperity, a positive spiral can develop, and we're beginning to see the early indications of that spiral now in Anbar as months of positive developments have at least resulted in people noticing the positive developments and in turn developing at least some semblance of hope.

Again - any number of things can still go wrong in Anbar - but three (or even two and perhaps one) years ago very few people would have been willing to bet on the situation being as favorable as it is today. (It was in fact in August of last year that the Anbar Awakening got the spiral going - though it was the result of events occurring throughout the previous year.)

Which brings us back to Baghdad today. With a larger and more diverse population the problems are magnified. And even something that appears to be the beginning of an upward spiral can in fact turn out to be a complex, chaotic and well-tangled knot. But we have learned from the Anbar experience, and are actively pursuing similar means to ends in the big city. Believe it or not, the people of Baghdad are well aware of what's happened in Anbar too, and don't see that example as a disaster to be avoided at all costs - in fact, the opposite is true. (Perhaps some other time I'll tell you about the debate over whether the term "neighborhood watch organizations" applied to the multiple groups of various size we're working with throughout Baghdad and the belts is appropriate...)

But there are bad guys sprinkled through that population. Which brings us to a passage from the Op/Ed I believe deserves a close look.

In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a "time-sensitive target acquisition mission" on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse -- namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.

That's an ROE (Rules of Engagement) complaint, and I've heard it voiced (usually less eloquently) many times before. Without addressing the validity (it is a valid complaint to a degree, but ROE can be thought of as a system comprised of many components - some of which are human beings with a reluctance to kill other human beings) it's worth noticing the tacit acknowledgment that we are, in fact, waging a war like no other before, and have been since March, 2003. We could have left no two bricks in Baghdad connected even before the tanks rolled into town - instead we elected to execute as precise and surgical a war as military technology allows. The hope, of course, was that a population tired of the oppressive rule of a despotic leader would flourish once that leader was removed, and that we would be able to draw down to a small contingent of American troops within a reasonable time. That first assumption hasn't so much been proven wrong as proven to be still theoretical in the face of an onslaught of thugs from various quarters of the region (including Iraq) bent on sowing enough chaos to keep it that way. The second assumption hinges on the first - and thus we remain in larger force than any would have liked.

As for those years of occupation, no matter how much some folks (for clarity - obviously not the authors of the Op/Ed) would like to believe we are an oppressor, this is not akin to the Roman subjugation of the barbarians of Europe or the French experience in Algeria (the latter - rather than the oft-cited Vietnam comparison - being the true model for the left's desired narrative of America in Iraq) or anything else in the sweep of history between. Thus, ironically, our "soft" (and it isn't soft - we are killing people) approach has earned us accusations of Nazi-like behavior from all the usual suspects.

Will it work? I think the very possibility that it might is what so terrifies those in and out of Iraq who've invested heavily in "no". Their tactics will change (are, in fact, changing) to meet the new realities on the ground. That they will do so is not evidence of our failure - no matter how many people they kill to make their point. (Killing them all and letting Allah sort them out is demonstrably not difficult.)

Likewise, "Killing them all and letting God sort them out" - like simply quitting and walking away - is an undeniably easier path then the one on which we are currently embarked. But for some reason, some Americans love doing things the hard way.