Rules of Engagement in the Age of Obama

Rules of engagement: Are the lives of American soldiers being sacrificed on the altar of political correctness in the age of Obama? Stories implying (or outright stating) as much are certainly appearing with increasing frequency these days. You're about to read two examples that I think will answer the question - if not settle the debate. I've redacted some identifying information, but can assure you these people are who they claim to be, and both can be considered expert witnesses on the topic. I expect a lot of people will be pissed at what they're about to read, or ignore the truth, or eagerly dismiss them as 'isolated incidents.' They are not - they are typical, and these aren't the only examples I can provide.

The first comes from a soldier who found himself confronted with a potential 'troops in contact' situation and had to make a quick decision - even though he was back in headquarters, and not on the scene. "I have recently been temporarily assigned to the post of battalion 'battle captain,'" he reports. "For nonmilitary readers, that means from 0100 to 1300 hours every day I am the battalion commander's representative in the TOC, and basically run all routine operations in the absence of the battalion commander or executive officer. If this were Star Trek, I'd 'have the conn.'"

I guess that makes the guys who were about to call him for help the "redshirts" - the ones when you see them beam down to the planet with Kirk and Spock, you know they ain't coming back. Except this wasn't TV - they were someone's kids - and here's what the real life 'recently assigned, temporary battle captain' did in response to a request from an outnumbered combat team operating outside the wire:

At about [redacted time/date], we received word from a [redacted - military unit] at the government center that a demonstration had formed, and a slogan-chanting mob of about 200 people had come from the east, and was throwing rocks at Americans and local police inside the compound. [The military unit] wanted permission to fire a warning shot.

I hate to be the guy sitting in a safe place on a radio and a room full of maps denying a request to someone in a tight spot in the field. But on the other hand, I had to weigh the immediate needs of the guy on the ground against the broader mission: long term stability.

He adds that the crowd threatening the soldiers was chanting "By our lives, by our souls, we will preserve Islam!"

If you were in that situation and had time to check the Tactical Directive issued by General McChrystal last summer you'd find this guidance: "This is different from conventional combat, and how we operate will determine the outcome more than traditional measures, like capture of terrain or attrition of enemy forces. We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories - but suffering strategic defeats - by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people."

You might be shocked to hear that a unit in the field had to ask permission just to fire a warning shot - but to make a long story short, the young battle captain back at the TOC didn't authorize it anyway, citing concerns for the locals among his reasons. Instead he advised them to abandon their position! Fortunately they did so with just a couple of local policemen sustaining "minor injuries from the rocks" as the only acknowledged casualties. "Everyone on both sides made it home alive," he claims, "as far as I know." It could have turned out differently.

But here's more guidance from General McChrystal:

The Taliban cannot militarily defeat us - but we can defeat ourselves.

I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force entails risks to our troops - and we must work to mitigate that risk wherever possible. But excessive use of force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater risks. We must understand this reality at every level in our force.

Here's what our narrator (a bit more blunt than the General, to be sure) reports as a 'lesson learned' from his experience: "You're not a dog," he explained. "Firing your weapon isn't like licking your balls. It's not one of those things you want to do just because you can."

Okay - if you're getting hot about it take a deep breath before proceeding, this next story won't help you cool down. Again, it takes place in a TOC, and once again we'll see troops denied support. But there are significant differences - this time they weren't requesting permission to fire a simple 'warning shot' to scare the bad guys away - they'd already come under fire! They needed air support - and time was of the essence, as you'll see.

This account comes to us from a reporter, not a soldier. "A Tactical Operations Center (TOC) is the headquarters for a unit," he explains, "packed with communications and monitoring equipment, radios, and video screens." Obviously it's a chaotic environment, with multiple actors adding to the potential confusion. "The radios are for communication between the different companies, as well as helicopters and jets. Battalion-level TOCs also communicate laterally with other battalions and vertically up to the brigade. Usually some ten soldiers will sit in front of the screens. One soldier will be the S-2, or intelligence. Another will monitor counter-battery radar. Another will communicate with those who operate the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)..."

And so on. Here's his report - again, identifying details are redacted, but in my mind, it's a perfect example of many others I've seen like it, usually explaining why we're going to lose in Afghanistan:

I entered the TOC about 3:20 A.M., and there was a video feed coming from an F-16. Crosshairs were steady on a house the pilot was circling.

"What's up with he house?" I asked.

"An element took SAFIRE (small-arms fire) and the enemy ran into that house."

"What're you going to do?"

"Trying to decide. Probably bomb it."

Sounds simple. Question is, bomb it with what? The commanders had myriad options. Some weapons were within their direct authority to use, while other weapons required higher permission. Rules of Engagement (ROE) changed constantly. For the early days of [the operation] the ROE were relaxed, giving robust options further down the chain, with the caveat to mitigate civilian deaths... [but now] commanders made avoiding civilian casualties a primary part of the battle plan.

...the battle captain asked the Air Force experts (the JTACS or Joint Tactical Air Controllers) what weapons the F-16 was carrying... Now was option time. Which weapon to use? There were many choices...

They discussed dropping a JDAM, (Joint Direct Attack Munition) from one of the jets. A JDAM is a smart bomb with a GPS-based guidance system. But a JDAM might cause too much collateral damage. The idea of a strafe run came up, but that would likely cause even more collateral damage, so that was also nixed. The F-16 was carrying at least one concrete bomb - literally just a bomb made from concrete, like throwing a boulder at people - but a JTAC said, "We are not dropping a concrete bomb." For some reason he didn't want to just throw a rock...

While the TOC crew and the Air Force guys were discussing how best to kill the enemy, the F-16 was running low on fuel. So in the end the jets just flew low in a show of force and then rumbled away.

I walked to breakfast while they were still plotting their next move. I have no idea if they killed the enemy and if they did what method they finally settled on.

I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit the use of force like close air support (CAS) against residential compounds and other locations likely to produce civilian casualties in accordance with this guidance. Commanders must weigh the gain of using CAS against the cost of civilian casualties, which in the long run make mission success more difficult and turn the Afghan people against us.

So - if you're like me, you aren't surprised by claims that radical changes implemented by our military leadership demonstrate the "politically correct" mindset forced on them by President Obama, that those changes are putting troops at needless risk, and might even cost us the war. Are they right? As noted at the outset, you've just read two examples that I think answer the question.

BAGRAM AIRFIELD, Afghanistan: U.S. President Barack Obama receives a briefing from U.S. Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, during his first visit to the country as President, March, 2010. Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Mark O'Donald.

And the answer is "No."

Shocked? Take another deep breath - and read on.

You see, both examples are from Iraq. The first happened in 2003, a few months after the ground invasion. The second is from 2007, the summer of the surge. Sorry if showing how they fit in with General McChrystal's current Tactical Directive made you think I was citing recent events in Afghanistan, but the real point is that the guidance isn't quite as new or different or radical as many would like you to believe.

I used only selected quotes from Jason Van Steenwyk's December, 2003 blog post from Ramadi, and added my commentary designed only to piss you off - just as anyone wanting to influence your opinion would regarding any issue today. His full account explains his actions in detail, I simply cut it down to the point where it appeared thoughtless, knee-jerk, and inconsiderate of the lives of the team outside the wire - it was anything but. (For instance, he sent a QRF out to support them. And here's his full list of Leadership Lessons from Iraq prompted by that event - "you're not a dog..." is just the one I ripped from context for effect.) I chose his post because he was the first long-term, frequently updated milblog from Iraq, there is no better way to demonstrate how not new this issue is. Read the whole thing - what he describes is exactly the right response to the situation confronting him, and in it he also describes another event from a few months before:

I didn't consciously thought about it at the time, but one of my NCOs on duty reminded me that we'd seen this happen before, in July, at the very same location. We had most of a company stationed at the government center at that time. A bunch of kids started throwing rocks at the compound. A crowd gathered. The compound started taking small arms and RPG fire from across the street. To the west, a man was skipping around behind a bunch of kids handing hand grenades to children and encouraging them to throw them at our troops behind the compound.

Our soldiers couldn't get a shot at him without endangering the children. So they returned aimed fire at the RPG shooters and small-arms fire to the north, but they held their fire to the west, and just took the grenades.

Emphasis added to that bottom line. Wicked hard problems requiring wicked hard decisions - but many of the same folks who would have applauded the courage of Americans to do the right thing back then - who would have expressed admiration for their courageous restraint - are screaming the loudest about ROE today.

The second event was from Baqubah, in 2007, and can be found in Mike Yon's Moment of Truth in Iraq. Here's a non-edited version of one of the paragraphs I quoted:

Sounds simple. Question is, bomb it with what? The commanders had myriad options. Some weapons were within their direct authority to use, while other weapons required higher permission. Rules of Engagement (ROE) changed constantly. For the early days of Operation Arrowhead Ripper, the ROE were relaxed, giving robust options further down the chain, with the caveat to mitigate civilian deaths. In all, there were seven known fatalities. A number that low - and five of those deaths were from a single explosion that locals had said had come from a U.S. bomb - is almost unbelievable, considering the amount of firepower that had been used. Our commanders made avoiding civilian casualties a primary part of the battle plan.

I walked to breakfast while they were still plotting their next move. I have no idea if they killed the enemy and if they did what method they finally settled on. But I know there was careful deliberation in the TOC, combined with excellent combat soldiers on the streets. That was how civilian casualties, as well as our own losses, were kept so astonishingly low.

Shocker - "civilian casualties, as well as our own losses, were kept so astonishingly low." There's that pride in our boys again - which for many people is what really changed in January, 2009. Now, of course, Obama and his generals are turning them into pussies - and getting them killed.

One more quote from the Tactical Directive:

This directive does not prevent commanders from protecting the lives of their men and women as a matter of self-defense where it is determined no other options (specific options deleted due to operational security) are available to effectively counter the threat.

Rules of engagement: Are the lives of American soldiers being sacrificed on the altar of political correctness in the age of Obama? Stories implying (or outright stating) as much are certainly appearing with increasing frequency these days. You've just read two examples that answered the question - no. But while that won't settle the debate, at least the next time someone tries to convince you otherwise, you can wonder how stupid they think you are.