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April 17, 2010

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Tribal Engagement - Afghanistan

By Greyhawk

Looking for some weekend reading? Are you interested in the future of our efforts in Afghanistan? Try the Tribal Engagement Workshop at Small Wars Journal. From Dave Dillege:

The Small Wars Foundation (Small Wars Journal's non-profit 501(c) parent organization), the Joint Irregular Warfare Center, the U.S. Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare, the U.S. Army / U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, and Noetic hosted a two-day Tribal Engagement Workshop (TEW) focusing on Afghanistan, March 24-25, 2010, in Fredericksburg, VA. The workshop was designed to address conceptual issues associated with tribal engagement and explore the considerations that operators and planners would have to address in order to implement a tribal or local engagement program.

A group of subject matter experts, all with firsthand experience with tribal engagement, or local operations in Iraq or Afghanistan were invited to participate. The group deliberately included individuals with significantly differing opinions on how to undertake tribal engagement or whether it should be undertaken at all. The ensuing discussion covered a variety of topics from strategic, operational and tactical perspectives.

Participants were tasked with evaluating the value and feasibility of a tribal engagement approach in Afghanistan; assessing what secondary effects adoption of a tribal engagement strategy would have on the political and military situation; and identifying the operational components of a tribal engagement approach in Afghanistan.

A 6-page summary report captures the key themes and ideas covered in the workshop, but is not intended to (nor could it) capture the rich debate participants engaged in. The major sections of this report include TEW findings, tribal versus community engagement, connecting Afghans to their government, addressing corruption, building Afghan capacity, transition, information operations and strategic communications, U.S. unity of effort from the strategic to the tactical, and how community engagement might fail.

TEW participants largely agreed that focusing efforts at the sub-national level could potentially provide a necessary game changer to the current ISAF mission, with some important caveats: (1) Tribal engagement must be recast as community - or local - engagement in order to reflect the wide variety of local social and power structures across the country. (2) Community engagement must be accompanied by reinvigorated efforts to link the national with district level governments - in essence , a "top-down, bottom-up" strategy must be employed or the international community risks further balkanization of Afghanistan. (3) The focal point for the engagement must be at the district level, as this is the level at which the interface between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the Afghan population occurs. (4) Government accountability and transparency must be improved at the district level, either through actually conducting district elections or by holding local community jirgas to appoint district representatives. Afghan communities will have little to no desire to reach out and interface with their local GIROA leadership unless District leadership is credible, legitimate and accountable.

Concerning tribal vs. community engagement it was agreed that the U.S. and the GIRoA should undertake tribal engagement, participants next considered the nature of those interactions. The general consensus was that engagement should occur with a variety of entities (alternately referred to as local or community, this document will refer to "community engagement"), not just tribes. Consensus was also broadly achieved on the need to simultaneously undertake 'top down' and 'bottom up' approaches in Afghanistan. TEW participants also addressed corruption, building Afghan capacity, transition, information operations and strategic communications, U.S. unity of effort from the strategic to the tactical, and how community engagement might fail.

Concerning how community engagement and how it might fail TEW participants identified four groups whose action - or inaction - could result in the failure of a community engagement program: the enemy, the U.S. government, the Government of Afghanistan and the Afghan people.

The resource is growing, integrating additional commentary and papers from participants in the project. The entry page is here.

For a introduction to the thinking that sparked the effort, try this.

It's worth noting that in many regards the "tribal engagement" strategy (at least a military component thereof - the current vision incorporates many non-military aspects) was used in 2001 - seen then as a quick, relatively low-resource (dollars, American troops and equipment) approach to toppling the Taliban. It was successful - insofar as Kabul and Kandahar fell much faster than the most optimistic predictions suggested* - but we rather swiftly turned our focus to creating and sustaining a strong federal government in Kabul. That, too was a decision prompted by economy of force considerations, as all such use of available resource decisions (in the military, government, or your household) are - and will be. So, as noted at the beginning of this post, those interested in the future of our efforts in Afghanistan will certainly want to spend some time here.


* For two recent, well researched, and highly accessible books on the Special Forces/boots-on-ground perspective of those first weeks in Afghanistan see The Only Thing Worth Dying For and Horse Soldiers.



Posted by Greyhawk / April 17, 2010 8:00 AM | Permalink
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November 26, 2010


America@war
[Greyhawk]
I think anyone who's ever pondered the "comment" option - once only available on blogs and bulletin boards, now ubiquitous on almost any web site - will appreciate this:
The so-called faculty of writing is not so much a faculty of writing as it is a faculty of thinking. When a man says, "I have an idea but I can't express it"; that man hasn't an idea but merely a vague feeling. If a man has a feeling of that kind, and will sit down for a half an hour and persistently try to put into writing what he feels, the probabilities are at least 90 percent that he will either be able to record it, or else realize that he has no idea at all. In either case, he will do himself a benefit.

That's wisdom from the past, captured for posterity at the US Naval Institute, shared via the web on the institute's 137th anniversary.

From their about page:

The Naval Institute shall remain

INDEPENDENT - A non-profit member association, with no government support, that does not lobby for special interests;

NON-PARTISAN - An independent, professional military association with a mission, goals and objectives that transcend political affiliations; and shall encourage

IDEAS - Through its respected journals Proceedings and Naval History, its conferences, its books and its online content, in support of those who serve.

"The Naval Institute has three core activities," among them, History and Preservation:

The Naval Institute also has recently introduced Americans at War, a living history of Americans at war in their own words and from their own experiences. These 90-second vignettes convey powerful stories of inspiration, pride, and patriotism.

Take a look at the collection, and you'll see it's not limited to accounts from those who served on ships at sea, members of the other branches are well-represented.

I'm fortunate to have met USNI's Mary Ripley, she's responsible for the institute's oral history program (and she's the daughter of the late John Ripley, whose story is told here). She also deserves much credit for their blog. ("We're not the Navy nor any government agency. Blog and comment freely.") We met at a milblog conference - Mary knew (and I would come to realize) that milbloggers are the 21st-century version of exactly what the US Naval Institute is all about. Once that light bulb came on in my head, I mentioned a vague idea for a project to her - milblogs as the 21st century oral history that they are.

"Put that in writing," she said (of course - see first paragraph above!) - and here's part of the result.

Shortly after the first tent was pitched by the American military in Iraq a wire was connected to a computer therein, and the internet was available to a generation of Americans at war - many of whom had grown up online. From that point on, at any given moment, somewhere in Iraq a Soldier, Sailor, Airman or Marine was at a keyboard sharing the events of his or her day with the folks back home. While most would simply fire off an email, others took advantage of the (then) relatively new online blogging platforms to post their thoughts and experiences for the entire world to see. The milblog was born - and from that moment to this stories detailing everything from the most mundane aspects of camp life to intense combat action (often described within hours of the event) have been available on the web...

And et cetera - but since you're reading this on a milblog, you probably knew that. And you know that milblogs aren't just blogs written by troops at war, that many friends, family members, and supporters likewise documented their story of America at war online in near-real time, as those stories developed.

The diversity in membership of that group is broad, the one thing we all have in common is the impulse to make sense of the seemingly senseless, and communicate the tale - for each of us that impulse was strong enough to overcome whatever barriers prevent the vast majority of people from doing the same. Everyone at some point has some vague idea they believe should be shared - we were the people who, from some combination of internal and external urging, found and spent those many half hours persistently trying to write it down.

*****

But where will all that be in another 137 years? Or five or ten, for that matter. That's something I've asked myself since at least 2004 - when I wrote this:

Closing Blogs is nothing new. So many site's owners just give up on their own. They come and go, you know, these MilBloggers do. Like any other sort of blogger. Many post in the lonely down hours far from home, spill their guts for the world, then abandon their spots when the tour of duty is up. They have lives again somewhere in the world, and no need to share the details. So it goes.

Many are truly gone - no site left at all. "The page cannot be found." Other blogs remain, like abandoned defensive positions in shifting desert sands.

Membership in the ghost battalion has grown in the years since, and an ever growing majority of those abandoned-but-still-standing sites are vanishing. Have you checked out Lt Smash's site lately? How about Sgt Hook's? If you're a long-time milblog reader you know the first widely-read milblog from Operation Iraq Freedom and the first widely-read milblog from Afghanistan are both gone from the web. If you're a relative newcomer to this world you may never even have heard of them - or the dozens upon dozens of others who carried forth the standard they set down.

If you have a vague notion that something should be done about that, (a notion I've heard expressed more than once...) then you and I and the good folks at the US Naval Institute are in agreement. Preserving the history documented by the milbloggers is just one of the goals of the milblog project, the once-vague idea that we're now making real.

And it's a big idea, if I say so myself - too big to explain in one simple blog post, so stand by for more. Likewise, it's too big a task to be accomplished by just one person. So if you're a milblogger (and exactly what is a milblogger? is a topic for much further discussion on its own) I'm asking for your help. All I'll really need is just a little bit (maybe just one or two of those half hours...) of your time, and your willingness to tell the tale.

We've already made history, it's time to save it.

(More to follow...)




Posted 4:02 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) |

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The Mudville Gazette is the on-line voice of an American warrior and his wife who stands by him. They prefer to see peaceful change render force of arms unnecessary. Until that day they stand fast with those who struggle for freedom, strike for reason, and pray for a better tomorrow.
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The Mudville Gazette is written and produced by Greyhawk, who recently retired from 24 years of active duty in the US military, but will maintain this disclaimer: Unless otherwise credited, the opinions expressed are those of the author, and nothing here is to be taken as representing the official position of or endorsement by the United States Department of Defense or any of its subordinate components.

Furthermore, I will occasionally use satire or parody herein. The bottom line: it's my house.

I like having visitors to my house. I hope you are entertained. I fight for your right to free speech, and am thrilled when you exercise said rights here. Comments and e-mails are welcome, but all such communication is to be assumed to be 1)the original work of any who initiate said communication and 2)the property of the Mudville Gazette, with free use granted thereto for publication in electronic or written form. If you do NOT wish to have your message posted, write "CONFIDENTIAL" in the subject line of your email.

Original content copyright © 2003 - 2011 by Greyhawk. Fair, not-for-profit use of said material by others is encouraged, as long as acknowledgement and credit is given, to include the url of the original source post. Other arrangements can be made as needed.

Contact: greyhawk at mudvillegazette dot com

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*****

Tending Distant
Fires


Far from hearth and home, watching
Cold alone but not alone
On distant shore and only wanting
Safe return and little more

What tales we'll tell
When that time comes
When tales can be told

When things grim
Seem far away
When other fires go cold

Some distant sunset, vision fading
Memories remain
And tired eyes gaze 'pon folded flags
While distant drums beat their refrain

Saluting fallen friends whose names
And youth will never fade
Here's to those on other shores,
for them live well, the price is paid

- Greyhawk,
Baghdad,
December 2004