The wicked game (part two)

Part one here.

CNN: Karzai accepts Afghanistan election runoff. "Afghan President Hamid Karzai bowed to Western pressure Tuesday, agreeing to take part in a presidential runoff vote in two weeks." Not exactly the solution the Obama administration was hoping for; however, "Abdullah told CNN on Monday he was prepared to participate in a runoff, but said "the door is open" to other alternatives." Karzai is widely expected to win any runoff election.

Previously, Zalmay Khalilzad:

"The international community and the Obama administration appear to favor the unity government rather than an election," said Khalilzad. "But you could get a government which is weak and divided and it would not have strong legitimacy," cautioned Khalilzad, who met both Karzai and Abdullah during his trip.

For now, at least, that position appears to have won the day. From the White House, President Obama announced "I welcome President Karzai's statement today accepting the Independent Electoral Commission's certification of the August 20 election results, and agreeing to participate in a second round of the election."

Karzai's decision was immediately hailed by U.S. Sen. John Kerry, one of several Western representatives who appeared alongside the Afghan president at Tuesday's delayed news conference.
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Obama is considering sending more troops to Afghanistan, and Kerry has said the results of the country's election should be settled before the United States makes any decision on troop levels.

It's admirable that President Obama, a product of the Chicago political machine, can't tolerate dealing with foreign governments tainted by corruption - as Karzai's government most assuredly is. Perhaps in Afghanistan he intends to establish the first government in world history to be free of accusations of criminal activity, greed or abuses of power. Or perhaps reality is close to that described last week, here:

But it's the real story on what's been going on in Washington. Karzai, you see, aint' showin' the proper respects. Maybe he's even skimming off the top, and you let someone get away with stuff like that right under your nose, you look weak. And sometimes in cases like that you obviously got to lean on a guy. If he thinks you need him more than he needs you, then you got to send him a message, remind him who's boss. It's strictly business, see?

Or perhaps the truth lies somewhere else entirely. Whatever the case, the first strong indication that the Obama administration was going to enlist the aid of the U.S. military as pawns in a game of leverage over Karzai came not with the "leak" of General McChrystal's report, but with a slight change in timing of the due-date of the report a month prior:

The timing of Gen. McChrystal's primary assessment remains in flux. It was initially due in mid-August, but the commander was summoned to a secret meeting in Belgium last week with Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and told to take more time. Military officials say the assessment will now be released sometime after the Aug. 20 vote.

And the displeasure of "military officials" for their part in the plan could be clear from the leak of that story before the elections - or Secretary Gates' pushback hidden within other comments made regarding those elections shortly after the general's report was "leaked".

STEPHANOPOULOS: So now we have a real dilemma. Does that mean that the United States is re-thinking whether it can even -- whether it can bolster President Karzai's government or whether we have to give up on it?

GATES: Well, I -- you know, the Afghan people have gone to the polls and we have the two election commissions, one internal and one international, that could still come to conclusions, even if they throw out some fraudulent ballots or a number of fraudulent ballots, that there was a clear winner.

The key is whether the Afghans believe that their government has legitimacy. And everything that I've seen in the intelligence and elsewhere indicates that remains the case.

In fact, the corruption question regarding the Karzai government was of greater concern to the Obama administration than it was to the people of Afghanistan, who routinely expressed other concerns as far more significant problems for their country:

In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? And after that, what is the next biggest problem?

...and preferred local solutions to those imposed by foreign powers:

How much progress do you think ____ is making in providing a better life for Afghans in the future?

How would you rate the work of:

But the "leak" of the McChrystal report, and subsequent "leaks" of alternatives to a counterinsurgency mission as part of the military package in Afghanistan (complete withdrawal - or even a substantial reduction of U.S. forces - was never seriously an option on the table) set the stage for pressuring Karzai to deal. Give us what you need and we'll use our troops to keep the country from descending into chaos; otherwise, we'll just stick around to occasionally kill terrorists and see what happens.

And while they initially gave hope to those who would prefer to exit Afghanistan and angered those who would prefer to "complete the mission" there, each and every leak and news report - from Woodward's scoop on the McChrystal report to "officials" describing the "Biden alternative plan" can be viewed now for what they always were - messages to Karzai: we don't need you.

But more recently, real leaks have also occurred, providing glimpses behind the scenes. Klein: "Several of the principals involved in Obama's strategy review have told me that their ultimate position on troop levels will depend on whether a plausible government, newly committed to reform, emerges when the Afghanistan election process is finally completed." And a few days later, George Stephanopoulos reported "key questions tied to any troop recommendation" passed to him by administration officials - and all but one were tied to Karzai's responses to American demands:

- How to ensure effective civilian follow-on to any military surge?

- Can Afghan government be fixed?

- Is run-off necessary, or can Karzai achieve credibility by broadening his coalition?

- The Afghan government is far from perfect - can it be made "good enough?

- Are there ways to "work around" the Karzai government?

Part three is here.