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 Greetings! You are reading an article from The Mudville Gazette. To reach the front page, with all the latest news and views, click the logo above or "main" below. Thanks for stopping by! September 26, 2009 Name a river that doesn't flowBy GreyhawkNPR, September 20: 'Civilian Surge' Plan For Afghanistan Hits A Snag:
While "tens of thousands of additional U.S. military personnel he was sending" is an unusual way of describing 17 thousand, there was certainly no doubt they would go. On the other hand, the civilian numbers were problematic from the start. Here's a report from April:
If "decisions were made in the spring, funds were appropriated in July, programming is being implemented, you know, August/September," and "We're just now seeing the program go into place" is an explanation, fair enough. Hopefully they won't run up against this 2007-sort of thing:
There were still difficulties when fall rolled around, too - with reports of State Department members "likening [Iraq duty] to a 'potential death sentence.'" Small wonder, given the news of the day - which sounds remarkably like the news of Afghanistan today. Until the guys with guns can make things safe enough for those without them, those without them will wait. And if there aren't enough guys with guns to do that - well, waiting can be sustained. There's certainly some conventional wisdom in that. But not everything about Afghanistan makes the news today.
I would argue that the right men with guns are needed to make Afghanistan a place where things as described in the full post quoted above (and linked below) are possible - and clearly that country is a place where both exist now in insufficient numbers. Read this and this - but go fully prepared to have your perceptions challenged, perhaps changed. Certainly there's much to ponder, among other things that what works in practice is often worth trying regardless of theory, and that conventional and wisdom are found together more often in the written word than in reality. And you can't cross the same river twice.
Posted by Greyhawk / September 26, 2009 5:17 PM | Permalink 5 Comments |
November 26, 2010America@war [Greyhawk]
I think anyone who's ever pondered the "comment" option - once only available on blogs and bulletin boards, now ubiquitous on almost any web site - will appreciate this:
The so-called faculty of writing is not so much a faculty of writing as it is a faculty of thinking. When a man says, "I have an idea but I can't express it"; that man hasn't an idea but merely a vague feeling. If a man has a feeling of that kind, and will sit down for a half an hour and persistently try to put into writing what he feels, the probabilities are at least 90 percent that he will either be able to record it, or else realize that he has no idea at all. In either case, he will do himself a benefit. That's wisdom from the past, captured for posterity at the US Naval Institute, shared via the web on the institute's 137th anniversary. From their about page:
"The Naval Institute has three core activities," among them, History and Preservation: The Naval Institute also has recently introduced Americans at War, a living history of Americans at war in their own words and from their own experiences. These 90-second vignettes convey powerful stories of inspiration, pride, and patriotism. Take a look at the collection, and you'll see it's not limited to accounts from those who served on ships at sea, members of the other branches are well-represented. I'm fortunate to have met USNI's Mary Ripley, she's responsible for the institute's oral history program (and she's the daughter of the late John Ripley, whose story is told here). She also deserves much credit for their blog. ("We're not the Navy nor any government agency. Blog and comment freely.") We met at a milblog conference - Mary knew (and I would come to realize) that milbloggers are the 21st-century version of exactly what the US Naval Institute is all about. Once that light bulb came on in my head, I mentioned a vague idea for a project to her - milblogs as the 21st century oral history that they are. "Put that in writing," she said (of course - see first paragraph above!) - and here's part of the result. Shortly after the first tent was pitched by the American military in Iraq a wire was connected to a computer therein, and the internet was available to a generation of Americans at war - many of whom had grown up online. From that point on, at any given moment, somewhere in Iraq a Soldier, Sailor, Airman or Marine was at a keyboard sharing the events of his or her day with the folks back home. While most would simply fire off an email, others took advantage of the (then) relatively new online blogging platforms to post their thoughts and experiences for the entire world to see. The milblog was born - and from that moment to this stories detailing everything from the most mundane aspects of camp life to intense combat action (often described within hours of the event) have been available on the web... And et cetera - but since you're reading this on a milblog, you probably knew that. And you know that milblogs aren't just blogs written by troops at war, that many friends, family members, and supporters likewise documented their story of America at war online in near-real time, as those stories developed. The diversity in membership of that group is broad, the one thing we all have in common is the impulse to make sense of the seemingly senseless, and communicate the tale - for each of us that impulse was strong enough to overcome whatever barriers prevent the vast majority of people from doing the same. Everyone at some point has some vague idea they believe should be shared - we were the people who, from some combination of internal and external urging, found and spent those many half hours persistently trying to write it down. But where will all that be in another 137 years? Or five or ten, for that matter. That's something I've asked myself since at least 2004 - when I wrote this:
Membership in the ghost battalion has grown in the years since, and an ever growing majority of those abandoned-but-still-standing sites are vanishing. Have you checked out Lt Smash's site lately? How about Sgt Hook's? If you're a long-time milblog reader you know the first widely-read milblog from Operation Iraq Freedom and the first widely-read milblog from Afghanistan are both gone from the web. If you're a relative newcomer to this world you may never even have heard of them - or the dozens upon dozens of others who carried forth the standard they set down. If you have a vague notion that something should be done about that, (a notion I've heard expressed more than once...) then you and I and the good folks at the US Naval Institute are in agreement. Preserving the history documented by the milbloggers is just one of the goals of the milblog project, the once-vague idea that we're now making real. And it's a big idea, if I say so myself - too big to explain in one simple blog post, so stand by for more. Likewise, it's too big a task to be accomplished by just one person. So if you're a milblogger (and exactly what is a milblogger? is a topic for much further discussion on its own) I'm asking for your help. All I'll really need is just a little bit (maybe just one or two of those half hours...) of your time, and your willingness to tell the tale. We've already made history, it's time to save it. (More to follow...) Posted 4:02 PM | Permalink |
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The Mudville Gazette is the on-line voice of an American warrior and his wife who stands by him. They prefer to see peaceful change render force of arms unnecessary. Until that day they stand fast with those who struggle for freedom, strike for reason, and pray for a better tomorrow.
 
 
 Furthermore, I will occasionally use satire or parody herein. The bottom line: it's my house. I like having visitors to my house. I hope you are entertained. I fight for your right to free speech, and am thrilled when you exercise said rights here. Comments and e-mails are welcome, but all such communication is to be assumed to be 1)the original work of any who initiate said communication and 2)the property of the Mudville Gazette, with free use granted thereto for publication in electronic or written form. If you do NOT wish to have your message posted, write "CONFIDENTIAL" in the subject line of your email. Original content copyright © 2003 - 2011 by Greyhawk. Fair, not-for-profit use of said material by others is encouraged, as long as acknowledgement and credit is given, to include the url of the original source post. Other arrangements can be made as needed. Contact: greyhawk at mudvillegazette dot com  Tending Distant Far from hearth and home, watching What tales we'll tell When things grim Some distant sunset, vision fading Saluting fallen friends whose names - Greyhawk, Baghdad, December 2004 |
Sounds like the old "Catch-22". But with the corruption in A'stan, *everybody* has serious questions. The questions are *not* just for the People of A'stan, but also here. What are we learning?
That corruption has been there longer than Barack Obama has been in Washington.
The problem is, we've made no effort to do anything about that particular problem - just as we've done nothing to maintain public support for the overall effort in the US. At the time Obama announced the troop surge (when corruption was long-entrenched in A'stan and Karzai was predicted to win re-election because there were no viable challengers) domestic support was polling almost 70% favorable on Afghanistan. After the new strategy was announced President Obama maintained silence on the issue - one might conclude he wanted to see which way the winds would blow. By the time the surge troops were actually in place (Jul/Aug) support had fallen to just @50%. Since then he's been sending mixed messages and declaring no commitment to anything. It could be he's waiting for opposition to the war to hit 60% then he'll boldly lead that pack.
Back to A'stan: I would almost say the only thing we've done about corruption is wish it would go away - but I'm not sure we've even done that much. Just as it has always been part of the equation, it has also been a waiting excuse for the moment knees started going wobbly.
Much of that can be blamed on the ineffective State Department/civilian side contribution to the effort. But less important than the past is the future.
Do we
1. Maintain status quo and see what happens (what happens in addition to continued drop in American public support)
2. Reduce our level of support and watch a slow bleed of Afghans and America military personnel and an even faster plunge in American public support
(We can call both of the above "slow bleed" strategies - more here, nothing new)
3. Get serious about straightening out the mess (via civ/mil action)
Whichever we choose, Karzai won't be in charge forever. Someone is going to replace him sooner or later, via the next election, a coup, or revolution/civil war. Option three is the only one with much hope of an outcome favorable to the U.S.
When debating Afghanistan with the Karzai question on the table it's important to make sure it's the REAL question - much uglier than "do we support corruption": "Do we support Karzai or the Taliban (or corruption that could be reduced or medieval brutality), and if there's an option three to this question, what is it?"
I was not being sarcastic in my comment, but factual for the whole Af/Pak, Persian Gulf Region. This is particularly true in reference to corruption, in fact, it has been true since the beginning of time for the tribes in the region. In fact, all of the issues are tribal based, not geo-political. I don't think people get it, WE ARE THERE! We'll be there for a long time. In my view, Karzai is nothing more than a phart in windstorm. But that does not equal "slow bleed". I came from the 'Nam era and this is nothing like it.
Greyhawk, this is not our choice, we can not just pick up our marbles and come home. This is the real lesson of 9/11.
V/R Grumpy
I didn't think you were being sarcastic. You posed a great question (corruption in A'stan) that I hadn't gotten around to addressing here yet (it's on my list) and got me to focus a bit of my thinking.
"we can not just pick up our marbles and come home" - agree 100%.
"I came from the 'Nam era and this is nothing like it." - agree again. I was too young for Nam but old enough to remember the last five years of it. I remember being in 6th grade and thinking it would be there waiting for me when I turned 18. By the time I did join everyone mid-high rank was a Vietnam veteran. One thing I learned from them was that everything I thought I knew about that war was wrong - or at least highly questionable. (That's one reason I started this site years later.)
Back to "you posed a great question": thanks for that.
Thank you, for your answer and your willingness to deal with some *VERY TOUGH* questions. But, unless you ask the right questions, you can not expect right answers. This is exactly what I see you doing.
"One thing I learned from them ('Nam Vets) was that everything I thought I knew about that war was wrong - or at least highly questionable. (That's one reason I started this site years later.)" This is an extreme step of courage and honor. Sadly, many can not find that very same courage and honor. Only as things come into the light, can we understand them.
I see you looking at an imaginary table with a pile of perceptions (what you now call facts). It does not mean you will always change them, but it does mean you will freely allow them to be tested in the context of time. This will sort the perceptions, those that pass the test of time will only become stronger. As you know, so well, yes, some will wither and die. There will times when things will be hard to explain, do not try to oversimplify. There will be some "absolutes" that will not pass the test of time, they too shall wither.
Thank you, for continual service to this GREAT NATION.