The Red Pill (III)

"The main mission has instead shifted almost entirely from combat to stability operations, from fighting insurgents to rebuilding Iraq’s services and shattered economy in a way that could offer a better chance for the country to succeed, making America’s exit more like a victory than a retreat."
- - The New York Times front page, on Iraq today

MAHMUDIYA, Iraq — As he returned to base here after a day patrolling a place once called the Triangle of Death, Capt. Landgrove T. Smith of the First Battalion, 63rd Armor, summarized the war in Iraq in a way that would once have been unthinkable.

“We’re in the endgame now,” he said.

The story was written in 2007 and told here a year ago - but now we've reached the point where even the New York Times can acknowledge - on the front page, no less - that there has not been a combat death in the region in the past year:

In most of Iraq, Captain Smith’s patrol that day last month has become the norm, not the exception.

He and his soldiers stopped by an Iraqi Army headquarters to discuss a proposal to train sergeants. They visited the market to check on a furniture maker who had received an American grant. They intended to pick up a receipt for a sign they had made announcing the reopening of highway next to the American base, but Captain Smith’s lieutenant had forgotten the necessary paperwork.

“Iraq is safe,” Colonel Wassin Saedi of Iraq’s 25th Brigade told Captain Smith. “This is the right time for you to leave.”

Increasingly, the Americans are doing so. Until last fall, six American battalions — more than 5,000 soldiers — patrolled the region southwest of Baghdad that stretches from Mahmudiya to the Euphrates. One battalion does now.

The Americans have already closed a dozen bases around Mahmudiya, leaving 1,000 soldiers at the main base, just north of the city.

Memorials around the base honor soldiers who died serving here, but there has not been a combat death in the region since last March. At a recent staff meeting, the only casualty reported was a sergeant who had twisted his ankle playing basketball.

Previous Mudville coverage:

April 19, 2007 - Beyond the Surge, The Strategy: Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) said yesterday that the Bush administration's "surge" strategy in Iraq is doomed to fail and criticized Gen. David H. Petraeus for offering what he called an overly optimistic assessment of the situation on the ground... "While violence against Iraqis is down in some Baghdad neighborhoods where we have "surged" forces, it is up dramatically in the belt ringing Baghdad. The civilian death toll increased 15 percent from February to March. Essentially, when we squeeze the water balloon in one place, it bulges somewhere else."

August 07, 2007 - Meanwhile, in the Belts: The shooting death of the soldier July 17, the killing of an imam who had cooperated with U.S. forces in Qaraghul a few days earlier, and the beheading of a local man who had shown support for the U.S. presence underscore the perils that remain in the region.

August 29, 2007 - Wearing the Black Flag: All those previous operations I talked about -- Marne Torch, Marne Avalanche -- drove these bad guys out of areas like Arab Jabour and Iskandariyah. And now we're pursuing them, not letting them resettle and regroup. Because if they don't have the time to breathe, they don't have time to attack the Iraqi people or our troops. This is tactical momentum and it's in our favor. And we're pressing our advantage around Baghdad, and that's a good position to be in.

Residents of former al Qaeda safe havens have flipped to the side with the coalition forces against the enemy. And with the security that's resulted, we've seen the Iraqi people benefit from a window for reconstruction and the growth of local leadership. Overall attacks are down by 26 percent in Multinational Division-Center. Civilian casualties have decreased by 36 percent.
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And that's what's happening as we work these surge operations. We get to an area, the locals there, the first question they ask is, "Are you staying?" And once they're convinced we're staying, the question then becomes, "How can we help?" What we see as a result of that commitment is Iraqi citizens are coming forward and they're indeed saying, "What can we do to help?"

November 09, 2007 - Chatter (and numbers that matter): But few people are paying attention to what those of us who are here fighting this war might have to say. Everyone is focused on the death metrics, and everyone is wrong. Call it "hearts and minds" or people fighting for their lives and futures who do not fear turning to us for help and helping us in return without fear of retribution from an enemy falling fast - these are the numbers that tell the tale. These are the numbers that indicate something worthwhile. These are the numbers that will drive the death metrics further down and keep them there.

May 26, 2008 - Mike Stokely Foundation makes changes in Yusifiyah: PATROL BASE YUSIFIYAH, Iraq - Students and teachers had looks of joy - and bewilderment - as Soldiers handed out school supplies and toys at the Mullah Fayad School in Yusifiyah, Iraq, March 27.

Children grinned ear-to-ear as they looked over the treasure. When teachers asked who had sent the truckload of goods, they were surprised by the answer. Everything had been donated in the name of Sgt. Michael Stokely, who was killed Aug. 16, 2005 in Mullah Fayad.

June 03, 2008 - This was the Surge: This remarkable series of before and after pictures documents the rebuilding efforts of Task Force Marne, aka Multi-National Division Center, aka "the surge" Division in Iraq, 2007-2008. The Division's area of responsibility included some of the most violent areas on the southern edge of Baghdad (the "Baghdad belts") and in addition to peacemaking efforts in the region the Division's mission included halting the flow of "accelerants" into the city. Areas such as Salman Pak, Yousifiyah, Arab Jabour, Jisr Diyala, Mahmudiyah, and Iskandariyah may not be familiar to Americans (they were generally - and erroneously - referred to as "Baghdad" in many press reports) but they were the scenes of some of the most intense combat of the past year - and years before.

July 17, 2008 - While America Slept: [video] By June [2007] all surge Brigades (sub-components of the Division, each with an assigned battlespace within the MND-C AO) were in place, and full spectrum combat operations began in earnest. As noted previously, by the end of the year - after much blood and sweat equity - the need for combat ops had fallen significantly. MND-C was thus able to shift its focus to "non-lethal operations" - assisting in rebuilding Iraq. The early results of that effort can be seen in the video above.

December 03, 2008 - The Red Pill: October 23, 2006 - before "the surge" began. That's from the post-deployment "wrap up" by Colonel Mike Kershaw, commander of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division ("Commando"). Its become all too common these days to approach declaring everything before the surge as "failed" in Iraq - in spite of the fact that all of the tactics used during the surge were tried and proven in the years prior, in Tal Afar and Qaim and Ramadi and other locations throughout the country, and nowhere had American troops surrendered the battle.

"We initially looked at this is a classic counterinsurgency, and we moved in and secured the people. We had several examples we were able to follow and studied the counterinsurgency doctrine that our Army has been pushing to the forefront and were able to apply that immediately upon getting here." Colonel Kershaw wrote, and added praise to the previous unit in the AO.

December 06, 2008 Air Assault!: The Army possesses and develops better leaders than the aid community. As an institution the US Army relies on national service academies, Officer Training Courses, leadership schools such as Ranger School, and real-world experience, to develop leaders. Aid organizations as well as the US Department of State need to reevaluate how they prepare their staff for austere environments and the rigors of nation building or consider military exchange programs.

January 11, 2009 - Tightening the Belts: ...or "Apocalypse not Now". Another entry from the Jan/Feb Military Review: "Thickening the lines: Sons of Iraq, a combat multiplier" (pdf), Major Andrew W. Koloski, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel John S. Kolasheski, U.S. Army.

And from December, 2006: "Mike"