The reader will kindly forgive any tendency to rough language or behavior on the part of the site owner...
TMGlogo2006-2007phs-copy.jpg
"Good people sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf."
TMGbloglabel1 copy.gif

TMGbloglabel3 copy.gif
TMG MONTHLY ARCHIVES
[-]



TMGbloglabel10 copy.gif

TMGbloglabel2 copy.gif
The Mudville Gazette Feeds

 

Add to Technorati Favorites
Technorati Profile
add.gif
Add to Google
addtomyyahoo4.gif
ngsub1.gif sub_modern5.gif

xml.gif rdf.png atom feed.jpg

digg.jpg

Find the best blogs at Blogs.com.

pl-news.gif

tvc_logo_small.png

Mrsg- Greyhawk's Profile
Mrsg- Greyhawk's Facebook profile
Create Your Badge
TMGbloglabel5 copy.gif
TMGbloglabel6 copy.gif
350.jpg
Greetings! You are reading an article from The Mudville Gazette. To reach the front page, with all the latest news and views, click the logo above or "main" below. Thanks for stopping by!
« Retirement Looms... | Main | Shine on, you pale, crazy beacon »

October 3, 2008

greyhawk copy sm.png

A Surge by any other name

By Greyhawk

Yesterday the Senate confirmed General David D. McKiernan as Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. General McKiernan was already serving as Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) there. In what some might view as needless complexity, there are some U.S. forces in Afghanistan independent of the international (NATO) coalition that also includes U.S. forces. McKiernan's new position reflects an effort to reduce that complexity, solidify and clarify the command structure and improve coordination of efforts, as explained in this brief White House statement:

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
October 2, 2008

Statement by the President on Senate Confirmation of General David D. McKiernan as Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan

Today, the Senate confirmed General David D. McKiernan as Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. This newly created position and realignment of the command structure provides General McKiernan authority over nearly all U.S. forces in Afghanistan, ensuring greater coordination in operational planning and execution. General McKiernan will continue to serve as Commander of the International Security Assistance Force.

General McKiernan's new responsibilities will strengthen both U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan. I congratulate General McKiernan on his confirmation and commend the Senate for its quick action on this important nomination.

The General was in D.C. for confirmation and meetings with the President, and gave a press conference while in town in which he stressed - among other things - the need for additional U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan. That led to headlines like this one from the L.A. Times: "More U.S. troops needed in Afghanistan 'quickly,' general says", and stories like this one from the AP:
General: Urgent need for troops in Afghanistan now

WASHINGTON (AP) — The U.S. and its allies should rush more troops "as quickly as possible" to Afghanistan, the top American commander in that country said Wednesday, warning that the fighting could worsen before it get better.

The International Herald Tribune chose to use "the 'S' word" in their coverage:
U.S. general urges troop surge in Afghanistan

WASHINGTON: The top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan said Wednesday that he needed more troops and other aid "as quickly as possible" in a counterinsurgency battle that could get worse before it gets better.

...but the Washington Post reported McKiernan would rather not use that term - "The word I don't use for Afghanistan is 'surge' ".

Some less charitable observers might question that semantic argument (old school reporters would have hammered the General for that), but I can't pretend to know why the general wants to avoid the exact word. Immediately after the announcement of the Iraq "surge" congressional Democrats began debates in which they exclusively used the term "escalation" for the president's proposal (a term that harkened back to the Vietnam-era but didn't catch on in this century), so one could infer the mere choice of simple terms - usually agreed to as expediant for expressing an idea - is now politicized to the point the general isn't comfortable using one that could potentially lead to accusations of political bias. On the other hand (and more likely) the General could be trying to avoid giving the impression that fixing Afghanistan is simple - we just do exactly what we did in Iraq over the past year and a half. No one is making that argument, but likewise the general consensus is that we do need more troops in Afghanistan, and their primary mission will initially be (as in Iraq) counterinsurgency.

Which brings us to the Vice Presidential debate - an event that occurred within hours of McKiernan's Senate confirmation and press conference.

CNN's transcript:

PALIN: OK, I'd like to just really quickly mention there, too, that when you look back and you say that the Bush administration's policy on Afghanistan perhaps would be the same as McCain, and that's not accurate.

The surge principles, not the exact strategy, but the surge principles that have worked in Iraq need to be implemented in Afghanistan, also. And that, perhaps, would be a difference with the Bush administration.

Now, Barack Obama had said that all we're doing in Afghanistan is air-raiding villages and killing civilians. And such a reckless, reckless comment and untrue comment, again, hurts our cause.

That's not what we're doing there. We're fighting terrorists, and we're securing democracy, and we're building schools for children there so that there is opportunity in that country, also. There will be a big difference there, and we will win in -- in Afghanistan, also.

IFILL: Senator, you may talk about nuclear use, if you'd like, and also about Afghanistan.

BIDEN: I'll talk about both. With Afghanistan, facts matter, Gwen.

The fact is that our commanding general in Afghanistan said today that a surge -- the surge principles used in Iraq will not -- well, let me say this again now -- our commanding general in Afghanistan said the surge principle in Iraq will not work in Afghanistan, not Joe Biden, our commanding general in Afghanistan.

McKiernan wants an increase in troops, but doesn't want it called a "surge". Since neither campaign is arguing against additional troops in Afghanistan, the argument apparently comes down to what exactly they will be doing there - or what exactly a "surge principle" is. Palin's explanation is "not the exact strategy but the surge principles that have worked in Iraq". Biden offered no additional clarification. A debate moderator could have pressed both for details, but that opportunity slipped away last night. One thing is certain - now that the issue is "politicized" we're not likely to hear General McKiernan explain which candidate is correct.

But we do have the transcript of McKiernan's press briefing. Here are his comments regarding how the additional troops would be used and additional strategies that may be adopted:

It's not just additional boots on the ground. It's enablers to go with them. But at the same time, I would tell you that it's not just a question about more soldiers. It's a question about more governance, about more economic aid, about more political assistance for the government of Afghanistan, as well as military capabilities.
<...>
But what we need is additional military capabilities to provide security for the people in Afghanistan. And until we get to what I call a "tipping point," where the lead for security can be in the hands of the Afghan army and the Afghan police, there's going to be a need for the international community to provide military capability.
<...>
Q Thank you. This is actually a follow-up to Jennifer's question. Secretary Gates last week expressed some skepticism about whether more U.S. troops were really the answer in Afghanistan. He said that the answer may be -- in his mind was building up the Afghani army rather than having more U.S. troops. Is there a gap in thinking between you and the secretary?

GEN. MCKIERNAN: No, I don't think there's a gap at all. I think we're totally in agreement that ultimately what we want to do -- winning this campaign -- is about building Afghan capacity and capability. So recently there's been a -- an international support to increase the size of the Afghan army. We need to increase the size of the Afghan police. We need to continue to reform the Afghan police. But until such time as we get to a capable Afghan security organization that can provide security for the people, there's going to be a reliance on international forces. So I don't think the idea is incompatible at all.
<...>
Q General, President Karzai has spoken in recent days about the fact that he's reached out to Mullah Omar, he's enlisted the Saudis as mediators in that, and called on him basically to try and work to create a stable Afghanistan. How do you judge those efforts? Is that compatible with the NATO or U.S. objective, to reach out to someone who gave shelter to Osama bin Laden?

GEN. MCKIERNAN: Well, the idea of reconciliation certainly needs to be a government of Afghanistan-led effort. What I have said -- as a military officer, I've said that the -- ultimately the solution in Afghanistan is going to be a political solution, not a military solution. We're not going to run out of bad guys there that want to do bad things in Afghanistan.

So the idea that the government of Afghanistan will take on the idea of reconciliation, I think, is appropriate, and we'll be there to provide support within our mandate. It won't be a military-led operation.
Those "principles" - securing the population first, developing the indigenous security forces to take over, and "reconciliation" issues, all of which are the needed first step to enable the Afghan government to become fully functional (because the solution isn't 100% militay) - are exactly the playbook used for "the surge" in Iraq. Specific application to Afghanistan will vary, but these are the fundamentals of counterinsurgency operations.

So where does the General's conops for Afghanistan diverge from the Iraq lessons of the past two years? He's actually clear on that point in the briefing:

Q Thank you, sir. I'm wondering if any thought was being given to migrating the lessons of the Iraq Awakening to Afghanistan to get some of these tribal leaders to have their fighting forces work with you, either because it's the right thing or just for the money, or is the situation so different that that's not applicable?

GEN. MCKIERNAN: Well, I think the similarity is the fact that we need to leverage the tribal system in Afghanistan as was done in Iraq, as -- for a community, bottom-up based approach to security and connection with the government. That part's the same.

What I find in Afghanistan, however, is a degree of complexity in the tribal system which is much greater than what I found in Iraq years ago.

And I also find that of the over 400 major tribal networks inside of Afghanistan, they have been largely, as I said earlier, traumatized by over 30 years of war, so a lot of that traditional tribal structure has broken down.

But the question and the need to engage the tribes, to engage tribal authorities and use those values at a local level to enhance security, governance, needs of the people to be able to express grievances with the government of Afghanistan, I think, is an important concept and one that we have to continue to work in support of the government of Afghanistan.
<...>
Q And are you considering or looking into a program that would be similar to the Sons of Iraq, where you would actually start paying some of the tribes, that the U.S. money would go to some of the tribes to get --

GEN. MCKIERNAN: No, the difference in Afghanistan is that needs to be an Afghan-led effort to engage the tribes. And there is a program called the Afghan Social Outreach Program which President Karzai is -- tasked one of his ministers to lead. But one of the real differences, again, between Afghanistan and Iraq was, if you recall, Afghanistan was in the midst of a civil war when we intervened. And that potential is still there, so this needs to be an Afghan-led effort on how to engage the tribes and what the incentives are and how to use the traditional tribal authorities to help with community security and community assistance.
<...>
Q General, a question on this concept of some sort of Afghanistan awakening.

You said that the goal in this would be getting the Afghan government to empower these local tribes. But to some extent too, when you talk to folks they say, well, this is a strategy that was to some extent rejected early on because, you know, how would this impact the central government, empowering these local tribes; would that lead to decentralization. And, I mean that gets into issues of governments, and you said you're more of a security guy, too. So I guess the security question is, you know, would that be a security issue?

GEN. MCKIERNAN: First of all, I've never used the term "Afghanistan awakening." So don't -- please don't ascribe that to me.

What I've said, though, is that there is a traditional tribal structure in Afghanistan out in the rural areas, and that's 70 percent of the population. And it seems to me that with the lead of the government of Afghanistan engaging those tribes and connecting them to governance, whether it's at the provincial level or the district level, seems to be a smart thing to do to assist with the security of a huge country. But that has to be, again, a -- we are in support of the government of Afghanistan doing that. We don't do that. ISAF doesn't do that.
So there you have it. But while the awakening movement was critical to progress in Iraq, it wasn't a planned component of the "surge" -related strategy. It was an independent development begun by shieks but facilitated by U.S. forces in Anbar in late 2006, then adopted by the additional troops deployed in other areas as a result of the surge.

In fact, Democrats have been arguing that the Awakening Movement is the only reason for reduced violence in Iraq. Biden's argument ("the priciples won't work") in the debate might be based on his Party's interpretation of the cause of our success in Iraq, though he might be a bit confused as to what that has to do with the surge (Party line: nothing whatsoever).

Update: Facts is facts ...but these are opinions, passed off as "fact checks" in mainstream media reviews of the VP debate.

The Washington Post:

Sarah Palin on Afghanistan
Showing off her foreign policy credentials, Sarah Palin jumped into an argument with Biden about a recent statement by the commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, suggesting that an Iraqi-style surge would not work in that country. Palin referred to the Afghan commander three times as "General McClellan," when, in fact, his name is General David McKiernan. (There was a Civil War general named General George McClellan, who was fired by President Lincoln for not taking the fight to the enemy.) McKiernan called for an increase in U.S. troops in Afghanistan, but argued that the key to victory lay in a long-term counter-insurgency effort "that could last many years" followed by a political solution. Biden summed up the general's statement more accurately than Palin.
CNN:
The Statement:
Sen. Joe Biden said at the Oct. 2 vice presidential debate that "our commanding general in Afghanistan said the surge principle in Iraq will not work in Afghanistan."

The Facts:
Gov. Sarah Palin, who lauded the successes of the "surge strategy" in Iraq, asserted in the debate that "the surge principles, not the exact strategy, but the surge principles that have worked in Iraq need to be implemented in Afghanistan."

But Sen. Joe Biden disagreed, saying "our commanding general in Afghanistan said the surge principle in Iraq will not work in Afghanistan. … He said we need more troops. We need government-building. We need to spend more money on the infrastructure in Afghanistan."

Gen. David McKiernan, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, was quoted on Oct. 2 in The Washington Post as saying that "no Iraq-style 'surge' of forces will end the conflict" in Afghanistan, even though more U.S. troops are needed to take on a growing insurgency.

"Afghanistan is not Iraq," McKiernan said in Washington on Oct. 1. He also said "the word I don't use for Afghanistan is 'surge.' " He called for a "sustained commitment" leading to a political and not just a military solution.

He said Afghanistan is a "far more complex environment than I ever found in Iraq." The newspaper paraphrased him as citing the country's "unique challenges" — "the mountainous terrain, rural population, poverty, illiteracy, 400 major tribal networks and history of civil war."

The Verdict: True.

So, McKiernan says he wants three additional brigades, associated aviation (including UAV's) and suport assets in Afghanistan ASAP - but doesn't want to call it a "surge". Biden claims the General said the surge principle wouldn't work in Afghanistan, and CNN and the Washington Post declare those two statements mean the same thing.

Not only is that wrong, but in his D.C. press conference that day McKiernan very carefully spelled out how the principles of the surge would be applied in Afghanistan, too - though the specific applications would vary to meet the unique requirements of that country. Not only that, but he also carefully explained (three times) why one of the Democrats' favorite talking points on the "real" reason for success in Iraq would not work there. Admittedly you've got to be sharp enough to spot a "principle of the surge" when you see (or hear) one, but In short - pretty much exactly what Governor Palin described.


Posted by Greyhawk / October 3, 2008 10:49 AM | Permalink

1 Comment

The "surge" has become a political buzz word meant to make the dems look bad on foreign policy. McKiernan is probably miffed that he's been injected into partisan politics and trying to remain in the apolitical role.

350.jpg
Mrs G copy.png

November 26, 2010


America@war
[Greyhawk]
I think anyone who's ever pondered the "comment" option - once only available on blogs and bulletin boards, now ubiquitous on almost any web site - will appreciate this:
The so-called faculty of writing is not so much a faculty of writing as it is a faculty of thinking. When a man says, "I have an idea but I can't express it"; that man hasn't an idea but merely a vague feeling. If a man has a feeling of that kind, and will sit down for a half an hour and persistently try to put into writing what he feels, the probabilities are at least 90 percent that he will either be able to record it, or else realize that he has no idea at all. In either case, he will do himself a benefit.

That's wisdom from the past, captured for posterity at the US Naval Institute, shared via the web on the institute's 137th anniversary.

From their about page:

The Naval Institute shall remain

INDEPENDENT - A non-profit member association, with no government support, that does not lobby for special interests;

NON-PARTISAN - An independent, professional military association with a mission, goals and objectives that transcend political affiliations; and shall encourage

IDEAS - Through its respected journals Proceedings and Naval History, its conferences, its books and its online content, in support of those who serve.

"The Naval Institute has three core activities," among them, History and Preservation:

The Naval Institute also has recently introduced Americans at War, a living history of Americans at war in their own words and from their own experiences. These 90-second vignettes convey powerful stories of inspiration, pride, and patriotism.

Take a look at the collection, and you'll see it's not limited to accounts from those who served on ships at sea, members of the other branches are well-represented.

I'm fortunate to have met USNI's Mary Ripley, she's responsible for the institute's oral history program (and she's the daughter of the late John Ripley, whose story is told here). She also deserves much credit for their blog. ("We're not the Navy nor any government agency. Blog and comment freely.") We met at a milblog conference - Mary knew (and I would come to realize) that milbloggers are the 21st-century version of exactly what the US Naval Institute is all about. Once that light bulb came on in my head, I mentioned a vague idea for a project to her - milblogs as the 21st century oral history that they are.

"Put that in writing," she said (of course - see first paragraph above!) - and here's part of the result.

Shortly after the first tent was pitched by the American military in Iraq a wire was connected to a computer therein, and the internet was available to a generation of Americans at war - many of whom had grown up online. From that point on, at any given moment, somewhere in Iraq a Soldier, Sailor, Airman or Marine was at a keyboard sharing the events of his or her day with the folks back home. While most would simply fire off an email, others took advantage of the (then) relatively new online blogging platforms to post their thoughts and experiences for the entire world to see. The milblog was born - and from that moment to this stories detailing everything from the most mundane aspects of camp life to intense combat action (often described within hours of the event) have been available on the web...

And et cetera - but since you're reading this on a milblog, you probably knew that. And you know that milblogs aren't just blogs written by troops at war, that many friends, family members, and supporters likewise documented their story of America at war online in near-real time, as those stories developed.

The diversity in membership of that group is broad, the one thing we all have in common is the impulse to make sense of the seemingly senseless, and communicate the tale - for each of us that impulse was strong enough to overcome whatever barriers prevent the vast majority of people from doing the same. Everyone at some point has some vague idea they believe should be shared - we were the people who, from some combination of internal and external urging, found and spent those many half hours persistently trying to write it down.

*****

But where will all that be in another 137 years? Or five or ten, for that matter. That's something I've asked myself since at least 2004 - when I wrote this:

Closing Blogs is nothing new. So many site's owners just give up on their own. They come and go, you know, these MilBloggers do. Like any other sort of blogger. Many post in the lonely down hours far from home, spill their guts for the world, then abandon their spots when the tour of duty is up. They have lives again somewhere in the world, and no need to share the details. So it goes.

Many are truly gone - no site left at all. "The page cannot be found." Other blogs remain, like abandoned defensive positions in shifting desert sands.

Membership in the ghost battalion has grown in the years since, and an ever growing majority of those abandoned-but-still-standing sites are vanishing. Have you checked out Lt Smash's site lately? How about Sgt Hook's? If you're a long-time milblog reader you know the first widely-read milblog from Operation Iraq Freedom and the first widely-read milblog from Afghanistan are both gone from the web. If you're a relative newcomer to this world you may never even have heard of them - or the dozens upon dozens of others who carried forth the standard they set down.

If you have a vague notion that something should be done about that, (a notion I've heard expressed more than once...) then you and I and the good folks at the US Naval Institute are in agreement. Preserving the history documented by the milbloggers is just one of the goals of the milblog project, the once-vague idea that we're now making real.

And it's a big idea, if I say so myself - too big to explain in one simple blog post, so stand by for more. Likewise, it's too big a task to be accomplished by just one person. So if you're a milblogger (and exactly what is a milblogger? is a topic for much further discussion on its own) I'm asking for your help. All I'll really need is just a little bit (maybe just one or two of those half hours...) of your time, and your willingness to tell the tale.

We've already made history, it's time to save it.

(More to follow...)




Posted 4:02 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) |

TMGbloglabel7copy.gif
The Mudville Gazette is the on-line voice of an American warrior and his wife who stands by him. They prefer to see peaceful change render force of arms unnecessary. Until that day they stand fast with those who struggle for freedom, strike for reason, and pray for a better tomorrow.
TMGrecentcomments.gif
TMGbloglabel2 copy.gif
The Dawn Patrol Feeds

 

Add to Google Reader or Homepage Subscribe in NewsGator Online Add to netvibes Add to Plusmo myaol_cta1.gif

xml.gif rdf.png atom feed.jpg

TMGbloglabel8copy.gif

TMGbloglabel9 copy.gif
Blah Blah Blah
me220.JPG

The Mudville Gazette is written and produced by Greyhawk, who recently retired from 24 years of active duty in the US military, but will maintain this disclaimer: Unless otherwise credited, the opinions expressed are those of the author, and nothing here is to be taken as representing the official position of or endorsement by the United States Department of Defense or any of its subordinate components.

Furthermore, I will occasionally use satire or parody herein. The bottom line: it's my house.

I like having visitors to my house. I hope you are entertained. I fight for your right to free speech, and am thrilled when you exercise said rights here. Comments and e-mails are welcome, but all such communication is to be assumed to be 1)the original work of any who initiate said communication and 2)the property of the Mudville Gazette, with free use granted thereto for publication in electronic or written form. If you do NOT wish to have your message posted, write "CONFIDENTIAL" in the subject line of your email.

Original content copyright © 2003 - 2011 by Greyhawk. Fair, not-for-profit use of said material by others is encouraged, as long as acknowledgement and credit is given, to include the url of the original source post. Other arrangements can be made as needed.

Contact: greyhawk at mudvillegazette dot com

andsm.jpg

*****

Tending Distant
Fires


Far from hearth and home, watching
Cold alone but not alone
On distant shore and only wanting
Safe return and little more

What tales we'll tell
When that time comes
When tales can be told

When things grim
Seem far away
When other fires go cold

Some distant sunset, vision fading
Memories remain
And tired eyes gaze 'pon folded flags
While distant drums beat their refrain

Saluting fallen friends whose names
And youth will never fade
Here's to those on other shores,
for them live well, the price is paid

- Greyhawk,
Baghdad,
December 2004