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Greetings! You are reading an article from The Mudville Gazette. To reach the front page, with all the latest news and views, click the logo above or "main" below. Thanks for stopping by! September 25, 2008 Points and PointingBy GreyhawkJimbo weighs in on on Mackubin Thomas Owens' Wall Street Journal piece, and takes issue with statements therein. Boil it down to simplest terms, and the central argument becomes (per Jimbo) "whose fault our choice of the wrong strategy to start with was and who to blame for the failure to change it after several years of simply staying the course", with options limited in this discussion to America's military leaders or their civilian leadership. Jimbo's answer: "it was Rumsfeld" counters Owens: If Mr. Woodward's account is true, it means that not since Gen. McClellan attempted to sabotage Lincoln's war policy in 1862 has the leadership of the U.S. military so blatantly attempted to undermine a president in the pursuit of his constitutional authority. It should be obvious that such active opposition to a president's policy poses a threat to the health of the civil-military balance in a republic.I urge you to read the full links above for background. But recognize that Owens is presenting an opinion piece that's fundamentally a book review - for Bob Woodward's The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008 Case in point, his treatment of Donald Rumsfeld. On page 129 Woodward describes a September 19, 2006 meting between the Secretary of Defense and retired General Jack Keane: Few had more command experience than Keane. He had led a full corps of 50,000 soldiers. He'd become a Rumsfeld favorite among the generals - no small feat, given the mutual contempt between Rumsfeld and many of his military officers.And so he does - and in fact he provided a fine explanation of what was "wrong" with the strategy then in place, and presented a description of what we should do differently - a change in strategic focus combined with "an escalation of forces to gain security" - an approach that would be adopted the following year and refered to by the shorthand term "the surge". But from Woodward's description we are left with little doubt that Rumsfeld was not too keen on the idea - and we can anticipate from Woodward's selection of adjectives ("abrasive, mutual contempt, dismissve, distrustful") exactly what sort of reception the Secretary would provide that (now proven correct) advice. Or we can infer from that same selection that Woodward doesn't think too highly of Donald Rumsfeld. That argument is reinforced later in the book. By November 2006, various groups were completing studies of "the way forward" in (or out of) Iraq. The groups independently compiled a wide variety of options and the anticipated results of executing each. The Pentagon's "Council of Colonels", for example, offerred a range of considerations from "go big/full court press" (perhaps several hundred thousand additional troops) to "swift withdrawal", and Woodward presents those options to the reader without editorial comment. Immediately following that passage, however, he describes a (November 6, 2006) memo sent by Rumsfeld to the White House, listing possible options for Iraq (presumably independent of the Colonels - but Woodward is silent on Rumsfeld's degree of approval, interaction, or even awareness of the group). "In my view it is time for a major adjustment", he [Rumsfeld] said... He listed some possible options: "an accelerated draw-down"; a withdrawal of U.S. forces from vulnerable positions and patrols; or providing money to key political and religious leaders, as Saddam had done.As were all those groups - from the Pentagon's colonels to the Iraq Study Group and others. But only for Rumsfeld does Woodward break from objective presentation and inject his own critical analysis. Why? I can't pretend to see into the author's mind. But I would argue that the media hated Donald Rumsfeld, to the point where objective reporting on the man was impossible. (One could argue he was a victim of Alinsky's rule #12 - a tactic applied at one time or another with varying degrees of success to every member of the Bush Administration.) More to follow... Posted by Greyhawk / September 25, 2008 10:41 AM | Permalink 2 Comments |
November 26, 2010America@war [Greyhawk]
I think anyone who's ever pondered the "comment" option - once only available on blogs and bulletin boards, now ubiquitous on almost any web site - will appreciate this:
The so-called faculty of writing is not so much a faculty of writing as it is a faculty of thinking. When a man says, "I have an idea but I can't express it"; that man hasn't an idea but merely a vague feeling. If a man has a feeling of that kind, and will sit down for a half an hour and persistently try to put into writing what he feels, the probabilities are at least 90 percent that he will either be able to record it, or else realize that he has no idea at all. In either case, he will do himself a benefit. That's wisdom from the past, captured for posterity at the US Naval Institute, shared via the web on the institute's 137th anniversary. From their about page:
"The Naval Institute has three core activities," among them, History and Preservation: The Naval Institute also has recently introduced Americans at War, a living history of Americans at war in their own words and from their own experiences. These 90-second vignettes convey powerful stories of inspiration, pride, and patriotism. Take a look at the collection, and you'll see it's not limited to accounts from those who served on ships at sea, members of the other branches are well-represented. I'm fortunate to have met USNI's Mary Ripley, she's responsible for the institute's oral history program (and she's the daughter of the late John Ripley, whose story is told here). She also deserves much credit for their blog. ("We're not the Navy nor any government agency. Blog and comment freely.") We met at a milblog conference - Mary knew (and I would come to realize) that milbloggers are the 21st-century version of exactly what the US Naval Institute is all about. Once that light bulb came on in my head, I mentioned a vague idea for a project to her - milblogs as the 21st century oral history that they are. "Put that in writing," she said (of course - see first paragraph above!) - and here's part of the result. Shortly after the first tent was pitched by the American military in Iraq a wire was connected to a computer therein, and the internet was available to a generation of Americans at war - many of whom had grown up online. From that point on, at any given moment, somewhere in Iraq a Soldier, Sailor, Airman or Marine was at a keyboard sharing the events of his or her day with the folks back home. While most would simply fire off an email, others took advantage of the (then) relatively new online blogging platforms to post their thoughts and experiences for the entire world to see. The milblog was born - and from that moment to this stories detailing everything from the most mundane aspects of camp life to intense combat action (often described within hours of the event) have been available on the web... And et cetera - but since you're reading this on a milblog, you probably knew that. And you know that milblogs aren't just blogs written by troops at war, that many friends, family members, and supporters likewise documented their story of America at war online in near-real time, as those stories developed. The diversity in membership of that group is broad, the one thing we all have in common is the impulse to make sense of the seemingly senseless, and communicate the tale - for each of us that impulse was strong enough to overcome whatever barriers prevent the vast majority of people from doing the same. Everyone at some point has some vague idea they believe should be shared - we were the people who, from some combination of internal and external urging, found and spent those many half hours persistently trying to write it down. But where will all that be in another 137 years? Or five or ten, for that matter. That's something I've asked myself since at least 2004 - when I wrote this:
Membership in the ghost battalion has grown in the years since, and an ever growing majority of those abandoned-but-still-standing sites are vanishing. Have you checked out Lt Smash's site lately? How about Sgt Hook's? If you're a long-time milblog reader you know the first widely-read milblog from Operation Iraq Freedom and the first widely-read milblog from Afghanistan are both gone from the web. If you're a relative newcomer to this world you may never even have heard of them - or the dozens upon dozens of others who carried forth the standard they set down. If you have a vague notion that something should be done about that, (a notion I've heard expressed more than once...) then you and I and the good folks at the US Naval Institute are in agreement. Preserving the history documented by the milbloggers is just one of the goals of the milblog project, the once-vague idea that we're now making real. And it's a big idea, if I say so myself - too big to explain in one simple blog post, so stand by for more. Likewise, it's too big a task to be accomplished by just one person. So if you're a milblogger (and exactly what is a milblogger? is a topic for much further discussion on its own) I'm asking for your help. All I'll really need is just a little bit (maybe just one or two of those half hours...) of your time, and your willingness to tell the tale. We've already made history, it's time to save it. (More to follow...) Posted 4:02 PM | Permalink |
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The Mudville Gazette is the on-line voice of an American warrior and his wife who stands by him. They prefer to see peaceful change render force of arms unnecessary. Until that day they stand fast with those who struggle for freedom, strike for reason, and pray for a better tomorrow.
![]() Furthermore, I will occasionally use satire or parody herein. The bottom line: it's my house. I like having visitors to my house. I hope you are entertained. I fight for your right to free speech, and am thrilled when you exercise said rights here. Comments and e-mails are welcome, but all such communication is to be assumed to be 1)the original work of any who initiate said communication and 2)the property of the Mudville Gazette, with free use granted thereto for publication in electronic or written form. If you do NOT wish to have your message posted, write "CONFIDENTIAL" in the subject line of your email. Original content copyright © 2003 - 2011 by Greyhawk. Fair, not-for-profit use of said material by others is encouraged, as long as acknowledgement and credit is given, to include the url of the original source post. Other arrangements can be made as needed. Contact: greyhawk at mudvillegazette dot com ![]() Tending Distant Far from hearth and home, watching What tales we'll tell When things grim Some distant sunset, vision fading Saluting fallen friends whose names - Greyhawk, Baghdad, December 2004 |
I've been curious about the Rumsfeld critics from all across the political spectrum that look back in 20-20 hypothetical vision and declare that "more boots on the ground" from the start would have won sooner.
None of those critics have been questioned about the staying power of that large force beyond year two... if the insurgency had simply hunkered down for those big early years, moderate ist activity to keep casualties up (more troops = more targets). Since we have been hardpressed to maintain troop rotations and that the military is "broken" under the lower troop commitments we did make wouldn't we have had to abandoned Iraq due to over-stretched resources after two years?
By or design the Rumsfeld approach allowed the US to commit to an open ended strategy without an obvious line. That forced the insurgency into an "act now" strategy that turned the population against them and set-up a change in tempo and tactic via the "surge" for better success after a kind of war of attrition that the insurgents were clearly losing.
Any thoughts from military folks out there as to what we would have done after two years of maximum troop presence (250,000+ ? troops)? How many troops and how oppressive would that force have had to be to erradicate the insurgence completely within that time frame? Also, obviously, we wouldn't have had the time to get enough Iraqi troops trained up within that period.
Another issue I've wondered about was the proposal that no de-Baathification... How could we or any Iraqi gov't won the trust of the majority Shiites when the whole enforcement / power of the military was basically Sunni - Baathists? It has been tough enough as is to train an independent military and break tribal ties... if all the important positions, officers and trained non-coms were the old Sunnis how would that have been perceived?
I've seen lots of Monday morning QB analysis of the Iraq operation - but the "obvious" mistakes to have been avoided and the "obvious" winning strategies never acknowledge or address the potential dangers of alternate tactics. The successful hypotheticals are viewed through rose colored glasses...
Thanks all for your thoughts... Stan
Stan, you've anticipated one point I was going to make later in this series. We chose action X, which set in motion a series of other actions, some by insurgents. Had we chosen action Y, a different series of events would have ensued. The possibilities are indeed endless.
The hindsight argument is that Rumsfeld wanted to prove we could win a war "on the cheap" - and that Iraq was to be the proof of concept for his version of a lean, mean fightin' machine. While that may be partly true (Rumsfeld isn't really the father of downsizing, but that's another story), it wasn't the foundation of our strategy in Iraq post-Saddam (it's just a handy rhetorical club). Right or wrong, our desire was to not be seen as an occupier (which is what the opposition in Iraq, the U.S., and elsewhere were very loudly proclaiming that we indeed were at the time) and to succeed in that we wanted to keep our force levels minimized and turn things over to the Iraqis ASAP.
To anyone who insists we stuck to that strategy too long I ask (and say by all means, use the benefit of hindsight in formulating a reply) exactly when should we have changed it, and to what?
I think there are several worthwhile answers to that question - but without them further discussion is somewhat pointless.