The Battle of Sufia

Here's another version of "The Battle of Sufia" - a section of the Anbar Rising video that originally had some audio problems. (My bad...) This 5 minute bit is both the dramatic center of the longer video series and a recreation of what I believe will be known as one of the (if not THE) crucial battles of the Iraq war. Because it was unlike so many other history-changing battles, very few people noticed at the time.

To embed (and please do) on your site, copy and paste the following code (change dimensions to fit your layout):

<embed src="http://blip.tv/play/AcaLcwA" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" width="300" height="212" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true"></embed>

In November, 2006, what would come to be known as the "Awakening Movement" was still growing and still tentative, as two groups (US and local Iraqis) were just discovering whether they could actually work together. In the States, Democrats had just won the congressional elections in part on promises of a "new direction" in Iraq. Nothing whatsoever was certain about the future of that nation or the US presence there.

AQIZ (al Qaeda in Iraq) was not yet defeated in Ramadi (much less all of Anbar) and were determined to impose their will on the citizens there. A promise of "amnesty" for the sheiks who had turned against them had expired at the end of Ramadan, and they were about to make an example of one tribe on the outskirts of Ramadi.

As Major Niel Smith (writing in tandem with his commander, Col Sean MacFarland) explains briefly, at the time of the discovery of the attack an American unit (Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ferry's 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry) was about to deploy on another mission. They turned on a dime and headed for Sufia (this is no easy task - one could spend longer explaining the difficulties to those unfamiliar with the process than it took the Army to overcome them) even as air assets were called in for support.

And that's what caught my eye back in November, 2006 when I said "this is big." That was based just on the MNF-I press release, the media wouldn't have recognized this for what it was, and they were quite busy ignoring the greater awakening movement anyway. Those who've spent any time in a TOC in Iraq (yeah, that's a great number, I know...) will grasp this for what it was: Risk with a big cap "R" and HIGHLY "successful COIN" in all regards. The payoff was commensurate with that risk; the awakening survived and thrived, the surge helped it spread beyond the confines of Ramadi, and there are thousands of Americans and Iraqis alive today because of the decisions made then and there.

I was amazed to discover the Military Review article a few months back that detailed the events of that day, and confirmed much of what I suspected regarding this story. Text from that article forms the script I used in the video above, and follows below.

MilBlogs TV is funded by readers like you. Please help MilBlogs TV grow.

The Battle of Sufia (From Ambar Awakens: The Tipping Point - by Major Niel Smth and Colonel Sean MacFarland)

AQIZ did not sit idly as it slowly lost its dominance of both the terrain and the populace. Attacks remained high through October 2006 (Ramadan) inside the city limits while SVBIED attacks against and harassment of new COPs and stations located outside the city occurred regularly. These attacks often inflicted casualties on the nascent security forces. Casualties were not enough to slow the Awakening, however, and support continued to expand for the movement.

AQIZ long counted on a secure support base on the east outskirts of town in the Sufia and Julaybah areas. These rural tribal areas were some of the most dangerous in the Ramadi AO, and intelligence indicated they harbored a large support network for the insurgents operating inside the city. AQIZ learned that one of the major sheiks of the area was considering supporting the Awakening and that he had erected checkpoints to keep out insurgents. Facing a threat to its vital support areas outside of town, AQIZ acted quickly to maintain its grip there.

On 25 November, 30 to 40 gunmen in cars drove into the Albu Soda tribal area and began murdering members of the tribe. AQIZ forces took the tribal militiamen attempting to defend their homes by surprise, killing many while looting and burning their homes. A group of civilians fled in boats across the Euphrates River and reached an Iraqi Army outpost where they breathlessly described what was happening. The IA battalion relayed the information
to our brigade TOC, where the operations staff reallocated ISR platforms and immediately called for Captain Patriquin to provide an Iraqi account of the situation.

Within an hour, had gained an understanding of the situation through phone calls to the local sheiks. The brigade headquarters quickly made a crucial decision--we would support the Albu Soda tribe in defending itself. BCT commanders and staff cancelled a planned battalion-sized combined operation in east Ramadi that was just hours from execution.

The battalion commander who was responsible for that area, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ferry of 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchus), quickly diverted his force away from the planned operations to assist the Soda tribe in defending its homes. decision was immediate and the response rapid, underscoring the brigade's flexibility in recognizing and adapting quickly to take advantage of opportunities, rather than following plans in lockstep.

.S. Marine Corps aircraft arrived overhead to perform "show of force" sorties designed to intimidate the insurgents and convince them that air attack was imminent. Next, a ground reaction force from Task Force 1-9 Infantry began preparations to move to the area and establish defenses for the Albu Soda tribe. Because we were viewing the area using aerial sensors, our vision of the fight was indistinct, and we were unable to separate insurgents from the friendly tribesmen. We did not want to attack the friendly tribe by mistake, so we undertook actions to intimidate the insurgents by firing "terrain denial" missions. Explosions in empty nearby fields raised the possibility of suppressive artillery fire in the minds of the enemy. Complemented by the roar of fighter jets, the startled AQIZ forces became convinced that massive firepower was bearing down on them. They started to withdraw, separating themselves from their victims.

As AQIZ gunmen began fleeing the area, they loaded into several cars, three of which our sensors identified. Our UAV observed a body dragging behind one of the cars, evidently an Albu Soda tribesman. The insurgents obviously meant to terrorize and insult the tribe through this act of mutilation, but they also triggered a boomerang reaction by clearly identifying themselves. The eady First TOC coordinated F-18 attacks that overtook and destroyed the fleeing vehicles in a blazing fury as M1A1 tanks maneuvered to engage. Armed Predator UAVs and tanks in ambush positions finished off others attempting to escape. In the end, the Al Qaeda forces suffered far more casualties than the Albu Soda tribe. By nightfall, several companies of infantry and some M1A1 tanks had reinforced tribal defenders, further demonstrating coalition commitment.

Once again, AQIZ's intimidation attempt spectacularly backfired: tribes joined the Awakening movement at a rate that proved difficult to keep up with, even expanding into the neighboring Fallujah and Hit AOs. Within two months, every tribe in Sufia and Julaybah had declared support for the Awakening, and four new combat outposts had been constructed to secure the populations. An area previously deemed high threat and used as a staging ground for AQIZ mortar attacks became almost completely secure. Tribal members inside Ramadi began supporting the Awakening as well, and security rapidly improved. Once a tribal area joined the Awakening, enemy contact in those areas typically dropped to near zero, as IP, IA, and U.S. forces provided security. Bases once under daily mortar and small arms attacks became secure areas and transitioned to IP control, freeing forces to pursue AQIZ elsewhere.

Overall, by February 2007, contacts with insurgents dropped almost 70 percent compared to the numbers in June 2006, and they had dramatically decreased in complexity and effect. combination of tribal engagement and combat outposts had proved toxic to AQIZ's efforts to dominate Ramadi.

Those who haven't read the full document yet should do so now.

And finally, anyone who recognizes the riffs I borrowed for the background music to this video will likely get a chuckle out of it. (Especially since I left a subtle clue here last weekend.) It fits, doesn't it?