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Greetings! You are reading an article from The Mudville Gazette. To reach the front page, with all the latest news and views, click the logo above or "main" below. Thanks for stopping by! March 19, 2006 The War that Wasn'tBy Greyhawk"In the Middle East, you get further with a tank and a kind word than you do with just a kind word." An interesting comment from this interview with Col. Douglas Macgregor (U.S. Army-Ret.) : We rip through Afghanistan in whatever it was, four weeks, and start heading inevitably, inexorably toward at least serious planning for war in Iraq. What role do you play in the preparation for that war?Two of the most often uttered claims of poor planning in the Iraq war are that we had too few troops on the ground, and we shouldn't have "disbanded" the Iraqi military. Macgregor's plan would have used even fewer US forces than we actually did, and counted on a functioning Iraqi army securing the nation after the fall of the Hussein government. If Rumsfeld was the all-powerful authority many would have us believe he is, this likely would have been the script for OIF. All water under the bridge now, but an interesting point of departure for "what if" speculation. Posted by Greyhawk / March 19, 2006 9:31 PM | Permalink 2 TrackBacksI'm still draggin'. I'm going to have to settle for another Read these list for now: Greyhawk: Operation Swarmer Greyhawk: The War that Wasn't John Hinderaker: Eureka, I Think Jim Lindgren: Grim Milestone Reached: US Deaths in Iraq Surpass Worst Read More With over 2,000 American service men and women perished, the Iraq War is closing in on its third anniversary. The situation in that nation has not gone as well as many of us had expected it to. War began on shaky, perhaps faulty foundations. Victory,... Read More 2 Comments |
November 26, 2010America@war [Greyhawk]
I think anyone who's ever pondered the "comment" option - once only available on blogs and bulletin boards, now ubiquitous on almost any web site - will appreciate this:
The so-called faculty of writing is not so much a faculty of writing as it is a faculty of thinking. When a man says, "I have an idea but I can't express it"; that man hasn't an idea but merely a vague feeling. If a man has a feeling of that kind, and will sit down for a half an hour and persistently try to put into writing what he feels, the probabilities are at least 90 percent that he will either be able to record it, or else realize that he has no idea at all. In either case, he will do himself a benefit. That's wisdom from the past, captured for posterity at the US Naval Institute, shared via the web on the institute's 137th anniversary. From their about page:
"The Naval Institute has three core activities," among them, History and Preservation: The Naval Institute also has recently introduced Americans at War, a living history of Americans at war in their own words and from their own experiences. These 90-second vignettes convey powerful stories of inspiration, pride, and patriotism. Take a look at the collection, and you'll see it's not limited to accounts from those who served on ships at sea, members of the other branches are well-represented. I'm fortunate to have met USNI's Mary Ripley, she's responsible for the institute's oral history program (and she's the daughter of the late John Ripley, whose story is told here). She also deserves much credit for their blog. ("We're not the Navy nor any government agency. Blog and comment freely.") We met at a milblog conference - Mary knew (and I would come to realize) that milbloggers are the 21st-century version of exactly what the US Naval Institute is all about. Once that light bulb came on in my head, I mentioned a vague idea for a project to her - milblogs as the 21st century oral history that they are. "Put that in writing," she said (of course - see first paragraph above!) - and here's part of the result. Shortly after the first tent was pitched by the American military in Iraq a wire was connected to a computer therein, and the internet was available to a generation of Americans at war - many of whom had grown up online. From that point on, at any given moment, somewhere in Iraq a Soldier, Sailor, Airman or Marine was at a keyboard sharing the events of his or her day with the folks back home. While most would simply fire off an email, others took advantage of the (then) relatively new online blogging platforms to post their thoughts and experiences for the entire world to see. The milblog was born - and from that moment to this stories detailing everything from the most mundane aspects of camp life to intense combat action (often described within hours of the event) have been available on the web... And et cetera - but since you're reading this on a milblog, you probably knew that. And you know that milblogs aren't just blogs written by troops at war, that many friends, family members, and supporters likewise documented their story of America at war online in near-real time, as those stories developed. The diversity in membership of that group is broad, the one thing we all have in common is the impulse to make sense of the seemingly senseless, and communicate the tale - for each of us that impulse was strong enough to overcome whatever barriers prevent the vast majority of people from doing the same. Everyone at some point has some vague idea they believe should be shared - we were the people who, from some combination of internal and external urging, found and spent those many half hours persistently trying to write it down. But where will all that be in another 137 years? Or five or ten, for that matter. That's something I've asked myself since at least 2004 - when I wrote this:
Membership in the ghost battalion has grown in the years since, and an ever growing majority of those abandoned-but-still-standing sites are vanishing. Have you checked out Lt Smash's site lately? How about Sgt Hook's? If you're a long-time milblog reader you know the first widely-read milblog from Operation Iraq Freedom and the first widely-read milblog from Afghanistan are both gone from the web. If you're a relative newcomer to this world you may never even have heard of them - or the dozens upon dozens of others who carried forth the standard they set down. If you have a vague notion that something should be done about that, (a notion I've heard expressed more than once...) then you and I and the good folks at the US Naval Institute are in agreement. Preserving the history documented by the milbloggers is just one of the goals of the milblog project, the once-vague idea that we're now making real. And it's a big idea, if I say so myself - too big to explain in one simple blog post, so stand by for more. Likewise, it's too big a task to be accomplished by just one person. So if you're a milblogger (and exactly what is a milblogger? is a topic for much further discussion on its own) I'm asking for your help. All I'll really need is just a little bit (maybe just one or two of those half hours...) of your time, and your willingness to tell the tale. We've already made history, it's time to save it. (More to follow...) Posted 4:02 PM | Permalink |
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The Mudville Gazette is the on-line voice of an American warrior and his wife who stands by him. They prefer to see peaceful change render force of arms unnecessary. Until that day they stand fast with those who struggle for freedom, strike for reason, and pray for a better tomorrow.
![]() Furthermore, I will occasionally use satire or parody herein. The bottom line: it's my house. I like having visitors to my house. I hope you are entertained. I fight for your right to free speech, and am thrilled when you exercise said rights here. Comments and e-mails are welcome, but all such communication is to be assumed to be 1)the original work of any who initiate said communication and 2)the property of the Mudville Gazette, with free use granted thereto for publication in electronic or written form. If you do NOT wish to have your message posted, write "CONFIDENTIAL" in the subject line of your email. Original content copyright © 2003 - 2011 by Greyhawk. Fair, not-for-profit use of said material by others is encouraged, as long as acknowledgement and credit is given, to include the url of the original source post. Other arrangements can be made as needed. Contact: greyhawk at mudvillegazette dot com ![]() Tending Distant Far from hearth and home, watching What tales we'll tell When things grim Some distant sunset, vision fading Saluting fallen friends whose names - Greyhawk, Baghdad, December 2004 |
Burned into my memory is Lyndon Johnson..."without a substantial increase in ground forces...the war in Vietnam could last 10 more years"
There was a substantial increase in ground forces..the war did last 10 more years..and the US lost not because of military sustainability, but becuase of political sustainability.
Except for the Soldier's and Families of Soldier's, the war in Iraq is a political argument, no more hotly debated than whether TV's should be equipped with a V chip, or whether prayer should be allowed in schools.
No one is being drafted.
So while 500,000 protest in France, over a change in labor law, which affects all French workers. 100's Protest in America against the War in Iraq, because it only effects soldiers and their families.
Somewhere in the calculations, has to be the question of political sustainability.
I think the more interesting question is how we got from there to where we were three years ago.
The key with planning is that you can rough out a CONOPS fairly quickly; but that doesn't mean that is the plan that will come out the other end. If you look at Gen. Franks' history: he likes HIS plan, and wants to stick with HIS plan and does not like anyone to fiddle with HIS plan (go back to '91 with his "fist not fingers" fetish that held up the left hook as USMC and Arab divisions advanced faster than expected on the right....) The "what if" isn't as important as the why.
If the plan/brief shot out of the Pentagon in DEC 2001/JAN 2002 it metastases through the CENTCOM Plans Department through many 05/06 types, endorsed by GEN Franks and sent back to the Pentagon for approval. Somewhere along the line, the planning assumption to use the Iraqi military as described COL Macgregor was thrown to the side - but the mission had to be done, but not with so many troops that we could not sustain and extended deployment (hence the fallacy of the 500,000+ or 250,000 number thrown out by GEN Shinseki - we don't have the military to have that luxury.
BTW, even for a Navy guy, that is why the QDR bothers me. The 90s killed our strength, but we still are not growing enough trigger pullers.
So back to the point. The real story is how many cooks were in that broth that came out the other end as a stew?
The only way the 50,000 plus the Iraqi Army would have happened would be if you put COL MacGregor in charge of CENTCOM. In the end, you have to ask the question, would it have worked, which perhaps is your question. Good question.