A Brief History of a Long War (Iraq, 1990-2003) / 1999

By Greyhawk

Previous:

Introduction (1990-1991)

1991-1997

1998

*****

(Note on sources: Reports of US aircraft attacks on Iraqi positions in this timeline are from US Department of Defense press releases. We include them here verbatim as part of the historical record, the reader should infer no judgment on our part as to the accuracy of the statements. We acknowledge these are one-sided reports.

Excerpts from newspaper articles included here are also simply for the historical record - this was the news of the day. Later events may have proved some information false or cast doubt on some claims, this, however was the news of the day.)

1999

Although no UN weapons inspectors are in Iraq, both humanitarian (oil for food) and military operations continue, with air strikes on Iraqi positions or other incidents in the no fly zones occurring almost daily throughout the year. But in the wake of US and UK attacks in Operation Desert Fox, rifts begin to widen in the UN Security Council regarding sanctions on and monitoring of Iraq. France and Russia break away from the long held consensus position while the US and UK call for continued sanctions - with some modifications. The UN will struggle for a solution throughout the year. In the US, a policy of "containment plus" is the official position, and Iraqi expatriate groups begin to seek aid under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. But even as the rate of air attacks on Iraq increases dramatically military intervention in other areas of the globe dominate the headlines. Meanwhile, in Iraq, Saddam Hussein begins to echo the radical Islamic sentiments of Osama bin Laden. Some media sources begin investigating possible connections between the two.

By early February the stage is set and most of the major players are positioned for events of 2001-2003. One undisputed fact is that the Iraqi people are suffering after nearly a decade of sanctions, internal struggles, and now seemingly endless air attacks from the US.

January 4, 1999: Iraq declares it will not accept any humanitarian workers from the US or UK, and demands the UN withdraw those currently in Iraq, stating they can not guarantee their safety following the December attacks.

January 5, 1999: The UN refuses Iraq's request to withdraw US and UK aid workers.

Saddam Hussein delivers a fiery Army Day address to all Arabs. His speech echoes Osama bn Laden's call to jihad, urging Muslim youth to rise up and overthrow their governments who are supporting the infidel invaders:

We and you are aware that some of those who rule over countries in our nation were brought to office by the foreigners, who also brought their fathers and some of their grandfathers also in accordance with these foreigner's conditions and interests, particularly Britain and the United States, joined by the evil racist Zionism. Therefore, the talk about the possibility of reforming them, now that they have been immersed in evil and have no desire to abandon this evil, is a waste of time. It will give them a chance to further deceive the people and nation.
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Look to see how he who did this is attempting to remove the quality of holiness from the land of your holy places by turning it into a field for the foreigner from which he attacks faithful believers and their land, the land of Abraham, and the land of holy places and good prophets, as well as a great, patient, and mujahid people who are afflicted with them because they reject falsehood and tell the truth.

O male and female Arab youths, O faithful believers of the sons of our faithful nation in places of worship, factories, fields, houses, streets, and the armies of Arab and Muslims, look around you to see how the unjust ones exceeded all limits. Rebel against falsehood and its people. Tell the truth in a loud, firm, and lofty voice. Raise your voices louder to resound in the name of God and the nation. By God, there is nothing more honorable than a stand where right overweighs falsehood and where the people of right defeat the people of falsehood.

O Arabs, Muslims, and believers from various faiths, your Jerusalem is a humiliated captive. The Kaaba in Mecca and the prophet's tomb in Medina are injured by the presence of the foreigner and his spears. 0 people of Mecca and Medina and Najd and Hejaz, 0 Arabs and Muslims, your holy places are being insulted. The aircraft of the aggression took off and its missiles were launched and are being launched against your land, people, and holy places in Iraq, from the water, airspace, and the land of the Gulf.

O sons of Arabs and the Arab Gulf, rebel against the foreigner, his army, and armies. Chase them and expel falsehood and its representatives. Take revenge for your dignity, holy places, security, interests, and exalted values. Rebel against falsehood and its people. Great Almighty God will hear your voice.

The idol rulers will be forced to hear you or depart so as to give chance to the people to say their opinion and adopt their stand. Allahu Akbar [God is great]. Damned be the unjust and infidel ones. Allahu Akbar. Long live our glorious Arab nation, long live Palestine, free, lofty Arab. Allahu Akbar and ignominy to the lowly ones.

In two separate incidents, two F-15s and two F-14s fire a total of six missiles at four Iraqi MiG-25s over the southern no-fly zone. None of the missiles find its target, but Pentagon officials state that one Iraqi aircraft may have run out of fuel and crashed during the battle. This is the first clash between US and Iraqi war planes since 1992. The US also claims eight additional no-fly zone violations involving up to 15 Iraqi planes.

US State Department spokesman James Rubin:

QUESTION: As you've said many times, the fundamental policy of the United States is to - one of the fundamental tenants of the policy - is to contain Saddam. Do you think that this has been further complicated by the absence of inspectors on the ground?

MR. RUBIN: Our policy is a mix of tools to achieve an objective. The policy is to contain the threat he poses plus to promote change in Iraq through working with opposition leaders in as an effective way as possible. On the containment side, as opposed to the change side, there are various tools and each of them has different weight at different times. Certainly the no-fly zone tools remain strongly in effect, and we've seen how effective they are by today's action, which is that when Iraq tries to break out of that part of the box they have to turn tail and go home.

On the inspection side - let's remember that containment isn't just about the weapons capability themselves, but it's also about deterring the threat of using them. What was extremely important was that by using military power last month, the United States provided the kind of credibility to our threat to respond to Saddam's action that can only be provided by action. What he saw was, despite a lot of suggestions around the world or his own suspicions about what we would or wouldn't do, that if he pushes the situation too far, the United States will respond and respond decisively. That is a key component of the credibility of containment that needed to be weighed as against the advantages of having a UN inspection team there.

We have said the best way to deal with the discovery and the destruction of weapons of mass destruction is through UNSCOM. Another way to deal with that is through disarmament by force. That was done to a certain extent and to an additional extent, the credibility of our threat to use force if he were to use such weapons, move to the north, threaten his neighbors, was bolstered in a way that can only be done by that kind of action.

QUESTION: But is the US at all concerned that by saying that sanctions cannot be lifted so long as inspectors aren't on the ground to verify whether or not weapons of mass destruction exists or not, that sanctions will remain in place in perpetuity is a policy that will be difficult to maintain over the long-term?

MR. RUBIN: On that point, let me simply say that that is not our choice; that was his choice. Saddam Hussein made a decision to make UNSCOM ineffective by refusing to cooperate with it. UNSCOM was always a tool that required Iraqi cooperation. UNSCOM was never a tool that could, without Iraqi cooperation, force its way into disarming and discovering weapons of mass destruction. It always required Iraqi cooperation.

The fact that Iraq has decided not to cooperate is a decision we don't have control over. But having done so, they have thrown away the key to unlocking the sanctions regime.

As far as international support for that regime is concerned, we do not see evidence or any significant change in the international support for the sanctions regime. As I indicated yesterday, although we see writing and commentary suggesting that the support isn't there, I've never, in all the years that I've followed this - including four in New York at the Security Council - seen any Security Council member propose an easing of the sanctions regime in the absence of UNSCOM declaring their work completed.

So no country is in favor of easing sanctions right now, because UNSCOM's work is so obviously not completed. So the support for the sanctions regime that has been there - that doesn't mean that everyone likes it. We don't like the fact that we have to put sanctions on Iraq, and we try to ameliorate the effect it has by the oil-for-food program. But we don't see any signs of significance that the sanctions regime is eroding.

January 6, 1999: The Washington Post reports that UNSCOM may have provided intelligence on Iraq to the United States. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan denies having received any credible reports supporting this accusation, and further denies reports that he is seeking the resignation of UNSCOM Chief Richard Butler. The US also denies the allegations.

The US denounces Saddam Hussein's destruction of villages of the Marsh Arabs of southern Iraq

January 7, 1999: At approximately 11:20 a.m. Iraqi time, Saddam Hussein's regime locked a surface-to-air missile radar on to coalition forces. An Air Force F-16CJ acted in self defense, and fired a high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) at a Roland surface-to-missile site 15 miles northwest of Mosul after being targeted by the site's radar to suppress the offensive site.

CENTCOM Commander General Anthony Zinni answers questions regarding the US position on Iraq:

Q I'm Halab Masul (ph) with the Middle East News Agency. There have been several calls for a change on the U.S. policy towards Iraq, either from the far left, by lifting economic sanctions and keeping only military, or from the far right, by overthrowing Saddam Hussein. As the commander of the U.S. forces in the area, do you think that the current containment policy is feasible and sustainable, or do you think changes are in order now, and (where to?)?

GEN. ZINNI: I think, Halab, if you take it from my position, obviously I have responsibilities in the region, military responsibilities. I see our role militarily as one of stability. I would not be in favor of anything that destabilizes the situation in the region.

I think when we look toward a post-Saddam Iraq and one in which the Iraqi people would regain the position they've held before, I would want to see anything that occurs be done in a way that the territorial integrity of Iraq is maintained, that whatever government follows would be one that would be representative of all the ethnic and religious groups in Iraq. And I think that any efforts in this direction should keep those kinds of principles in mind, because the stability of the region is critical here.

And I view our role in this containment, although obviously it's very (difficult?) and it could take time and it does involve at times events like we've seen in Desert Fox in eight years of these kinds of events, it's important that we do it in a way that ensures the stability of the region. We shouldn't only focus on Iraq, but we should focus on the effects and how it affects everything in this region.

This is an important region. The United States and all the countries of the world have vital interests in this region, many of them. And I think we ought to take a regional perspective. And for that reason, I think these principles ought to be kept in mind in anything we pursue in the way of looking at a post-Saddam region or change.
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Q Given that, how long can the U.S. put up with these sort of cat-and-mouse games that are going on right now that could, you know, end up with fatalities in a worst-case scenario? I mean, do you see the U.S. striking air fields or taking some sort of action to make him stand down?

GEN. ZINNI: Well, first of all, obviously every time we fly or have flown into Iraq, either in the north or in the south, for now a period that stretches from 1991 in the north and '92 in the south, we have sent our planes into that area assuming it was a hostile area. We have adequate rule of engagement that allow us to defend ourselves and enforce the no-fly zone.

We go in with the kinds of aircraft, packaged in certain ways, the tactics we use, where we fly, the kinds of procedures we use that are designed to make sure that our pilots are well-prepared for any eventuality. And throughout the past seven or eight years, we have had instances before. We have made adjustments based on this situation -- adjustments in tactics, adjustments in procedures, in the way we do things. I won't go into detail on that, because obviously there's operational security issues involved.

We feel we can handle what we're facing right now. I think that's been evident. You are correct. It is dangerous. Any time we go up there, we assume the risk and danger because of the unpredictability. We do have contingency plans to react if that decision were made to a number of possibilities, and I believe the chairman made that point the other day in his testimony before Congress.

When a decision is made to take further action, of course, that's the president's decision. We feel confident that we're prepared to handle what we have. But I think your point is a good one. This is risky for our pilots. And we do everything to minimize that risk and to make sure they're well-prepared and have everything they need.
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Q Just a follow-up with one short one. Could you capsulize, summarize, the long-term strategy? There's a good bit of criticism inside the Beltway that it hasn't been effectively articulated. Could you, in 25 words or less, just summarize where it is where we're going with this?

GEN. ZINNI: Yeah, I think I can do it in less than 25 words. You know, my mission is to maintain stability in the region. My mission is to ensure the hegemons in the region, including Saddam Hussein, not be allowed to pursue their hegemonic designs. And that can be described in their ability to punish their own people, no-fly, no-drive zones; their ability to threaten their neighbors, move forces to the Kuwaiti border; develop weapons of mass destructions and delivery systems and shoot them.

My mission out there, is to ensure that energy flows, we have access to the region, that our friends in the region are protected and enjoy the stability that we're there as long as there is a threat to preserve.

And what it takes to do that, you know, we are prepared to do it. Is this a short-term, one event, one-threat kind of mission and solution? I think not. I mean, I think that this is an important region of the world. I think we have important friends in this region. I think there's global reliance on things like energy and the markets and access. It is the hinge point of three continents. This will be important for a long period of time.

There is not just one threat out there, or one potential threat. I mean, we see the terrorist and extremist threat out there. We still are wondering which way Iran is going, whether there's moderation or not. I mean, I know you know all the issues and concerns.

Our job is stability. It's easy to look at Iraq, and look at one problem, and look at a short-term solution. And, as you said, everybody in this town and elsewhere in the world, has a short-term solution, which is about one paragraph and sounds easy on paper. As the guy that might have to execute it, it ain't that easy. And containment is hard. It could be long term. But if in the end it's stability and it keeps all the global interests in there protected, and our friends protected in the region, and the people in the region protected, then I think it's worth the price.
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Q Hi. I'm Tony Capassio (ph) with Bloomberg News. When Desert Fox concluded, you and Secretary Cohen said that the preliminary evidence showed that the U.S. set back Iraq's capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction by about a year.

General Shelton yesterday or two days ago, said it was now two years, it looked like. What evidence have you developed in the last couple of weeks, that allows you to make that extension, in terms of the damage?

GEN. ZINNI: Yes. That's a good question, and we have actually upped it from the one to two years. And we've done that by, again, through our intelligence, looking at the assessments of the missile production facilities, the machinery that was destroyed, the kinds of unique capabilities he had that were in the onesies or twosies that we were able to eliminate. And now we have evidence of destruction or significant damage.

The infrastructure damage, and the time it will take to repair and rebuild that -- again, the unique kinds of facilities that he would have to replace from outside Iraq, that don't exist in duplicate somewhere else, and could be easily reestablished.

So, in doing further, more detailed analysis of all these sorts of things, we made the estimate that the initial cut had been one year, and now we feel it's more one to two years.
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Q Campion Walsh (sp), Dow Jones. There have been a number of stories recently on the relationship between U.S. intelligence on Iraq and UNSCOM. Can you say if data gathered through UNSCOM was used in selecting sites to be in the military strikes?
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GEN. ZINNI: On the first part of your question, on the issue that is now in the press about UNSCOM spying, I have no personal knowledge of anything like that or anything that's going on. The targets that we used and the intelligence we used to gain on these were from a variety of sources, fundamentally our own. Obviously just in UNSCOM's routine work we are aware of what UNSCOM does, I think as much as anybody else on the Security Council is aware of what UNSCOM does and goes and what they do and what they attempt to do. Could any of that been part of the targeting? I can't say that it has been directly, but I wouldn't want to say that everything UNSCOM has ever seen or does we have completely no knowledge of. Just by following UNSCOM like any other members of the Security Council we certainly do.
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Q Haran Kazazi (sp) from Turkish Daily News again. General, you eloquently express your objective to the answer of my VOA colleague. My question is: professionally do you honestly believe all that wonderful objective can be achieved from the air? Don't you think at one point there is some kind of ground troops needed to do something -- not necessarily from America, but some kind of ground troops? Obviously they cannot do it all by themselves what they have to do.

GEN. ZINNI: I didn't want to give the impression that I thought something could all be done by one means -- by air or ground or sea, whatever. As a military man I need all those dimensions in my AOR. I mean, I -- and I could bore you with all the different component parts of everything we do there and how it involves all these forces. We are very careful to state what our capabilities are and very careful to state what our mission is and our tasks are and how well or how not so well we may achieve that. We have emphasized that through these attacks, air attacks, that we could degrade and diminish. We never said words like "eliminate." We've been very careful to say that these attacks, the mission was not, nor could I make any guarantees that through an airstrike you could change a regime or anything like that, although people have tried to infer that or tried to push us to at least even implying that. We have been very careful not to say that. There are limitations on military power, and there's limitations on certain parts of military power. There are certain types of military capabilities that bring more to the table. I think anyone who studies the military art knows that to achieve certain things you might have to walk the ground and be there -- you have to occupy ground and you have to control the situation directly, and you might not be able to do that indirectly through the air.

So from my professional view I am always careful to give the limitations and make sure that when I am given a mission that I interpret that into military tasks that are achievable, and that my political masters understand certainly what I can achieve and what I can't achieve. I would not make the case for any one kind of capability achieving anything, and I would not overstate what that capability could achieve.

January 7, 1999: The Senate formally begins the impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton on two charges of perjury and obstruction of justice.

January 8, 1999: UN weapons inspection chief Richard Butler says reports that his commission knowingly helped the United States spy on Iraq are false.

January 10, 1999: The Iraqi Parliament issues an official statement criticizing Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, holding them responsible for the December air attacks on Iraq.

January 11, 1999: US Secretary of Defense William Cohen responds to the statement of the Iraqi Parliament by noting that the United States had over 24,000 troops within striking distance of Iraq should that nation decide to move against its neighbors.

At approximately 10:45 a.m. Iraqi time, an Iraqi SAM radar began tracking Northern Watch aircraft and coalition aircraft were illuminated by multiple Iraqi surface-to-air missile systems. The aircrews acted in self-defense and suppressed one ground-based missile launch site because it posed a threat to coalition forces. A flight of two U.S. F-15Es launched two AGM-130s at an SA-6 site near Mosul and an U.S. F-16CJ fired a HARM at an Iraqi radar site a short while later.

(Media) Newsweek (see also here):

IN THE NO-FLY ZONES OF northern and southern Iraq, Saddam Hussein's gunners blindly fired surface-to-air missiles at patrolling American and British warplanes. In Yemen, terrorists seized a group of British Commonwealth and American tourists, and four of the hostages died in a shootout. In Tel Aviv, the U.S. Embassy abruptly closed down after receiving a terrorist threat. Perhaps it was just a typical week in the Middle East. But in a region where no one puts much faith in blind coincidence, last week's conjunction of Iraqi antiaircraft fire and terrorism aimed at the countries that had just bombed Iraq convinced some that a new conspiracy was afoot.

Here's what is known so far: Saddam Hussein, who has a long record of supporting terrorism, is trying to rebuild his intelligence network overseas--assets that would allow him to establish a terrorism network. U.S. sources say he is reaching out to Islamic terrorists, including some who may be linked to Osama bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi exile accused of masterminding the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa last summer. U.S. intelligence has had reports of contacts between low-level agents. Saddam and bin Laden have interests--and enemies--in common. Both men want U.S. military forces out of Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden has been calling for all-out war on Americans, using as his main pretext Washington's role in bombing and boycotting Iraq. Now bin Laden is engaged in something of a public-relations offensive, having granted recent interviews, one for NEWSWEEK (following story). He says ``any American who pays taxes to his government'' is a legitimate target.

Saddam's terrorism capability is still small-time, according to senior U.S. officials. ``He's nowhere close to the level of the Iranians or Hizbullah,'' says one.

Though it was too early to know for sure, the CIA suspected that bin Laden had a hand in the abduction of 16 foreign tourists in Yemen last week. Four of the hostages--three Britons and an Australian--were killed when the police intervened, and two others, including an American woman, were wounded. Most kidnappings in Yemen are strictly cash-and-carry affairs, in which tribal desperadoes raise money without harming their captives. But these kidnappers, who came from a Yemeni group calling itself Islamic Jihad, demanded that the authorities release two of their leaders, who have ties to bin Laden. And they said they were protesting Western "aggression" against Iraq.

The idea of an alliance between Iraq and bin Laden is alarming to the West (what if Baghdad gave the terrorists highly portable biological weapons?). Saddam may think he's too good for such an association. Jerold Post, a political psychologist and government consultant who has profiled Saddam, says he thinks of himself as a world leader like Castro or Tito, not a thug. "I'm skeptical that Saddam would resort to terrorism," says a well-informed administration official. "He can do a lot of other things to screw with us." But Saddam is famous for doing whatever it takes to stay in power. Now that the United States has made his removal from office a national objective, he knows he is fighting for his life. "The worst thing you can do is to wound him, let him know you meant to kill him, and then let him survive," says an Iraqi Shiite leader in London. As his own people know only too well, Saddam is quite capable of fighting dirty.

January 12, 1999: Five Iraqi jets violated the southern no-fly zone and two entered the north, bringing the total violations in both zones since Desert Fox to more than 70, Pentagon officials said.

January 13, 1999: Iraqi SAM systems tracked and fired on coalition planes over northern Iraq. During the morning, coalition aircraft were illuminated by several Iraqi surface-to-air missile systems. The aircraft were fired upon by at least one surface-to-air missile. The aircrews acting in self-defense suppressed the ground-based missile launch sites because they posed a significant threat to coalition forces. A flight of four U.S. Air Force F-15Es fired two AGM-130s, and an F-16CJ and U.S. Marine Corps EA-6B each fired a HARM against a SAM radar. The incident occurred near Mosul. The two AGM-130s were direct hits on the Iraqi SAM sites.

White House press briefing:

Q: There's now -- we have daily skirmishes now with Iraq. Is the United States effectively at war with Iraq?

LOCKHART: No, the United States is continuing to follow a policy they followed since the end of the Gulf War (inaudible) containing the threat of Saddam Hussein.

Q: I mean, we're having these daily --

LOCKHART: My first answer was really good.

Q: I didn't hear it.

LOCKHART: Okay. Trust me. Let me go through the answer and then you can follow up. We've had a policy of containing Saddam Hussein since the end of the Gulf War, and that policy is based on crippling economic sanctions that have cost him $120 billion at least since the end of the war; degrading his ability to threaten his neighbors and to reconstitute or deliver weapons of mass destruction. And that's the policy we're going to continue to pursue until we see some positive change and some indication that Saddam Hussein is willing to disarm.

Q: But we're seeing it going in the opposite direction, aren't you? Every day he is sort of escalating what is -

LOCKHART: Well, I think the policy towards Iraq has moved back and forth over the last six or seven years. That doesn't mean we're any less resolute. There's a credible and robust threat of force in the region; should we determine that that needs to be used, where our pilots vigorously enforce the no-fly zone and take the necessary steps in order to protect themselves to do that -- it's important work that they do in the region; it's important to the neighbors that are threatened by Saddam Hussein, and to his own people, and we'll continue to do it.

Q: You're going to continue this back and forth where they shoot at a plane, we fire back -- you're going to let that go on without taking any further action?

LOCKHART: You can fully understand why I'm not going to get into what options may or may not be available to our force there. But what I will say is that we will continue to pursue a policy that contains the very real threat in the region and to the world of Saddam Hussein's regime.

January 13, 1999: France submits a proposal to the UN Security Council calling for looser inspections and gradual lifting of sanctions against Iraq

January 14, 1999: The US submits a counter proposal eliminating the ceiling on Iraqi oil exports, provided the proceeds are used for humanitarian relief.

January 14, 1999: During the morning, an F-16CJ fired a HARM at an Iraqi surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system that posed a threat to coalition aircraft over northern Iraq. In a separate incident, an F-15E launched an AGM-130 precision guided missile at a surface-to-air missile system that threatened coalition forces.

January 15, 1999: Russia submits a proposal to the UN Security Council eliminating UNSCOM, establishing a new inspection body less objectionable to Iraq, and lifting the oil embargo. The US rejects the proposal, saying that UNSCOM must be allowed to carry out its duties.

January 15, 1999: "The Račak incident" - 40 to 45 Kosovo Albanians were killed in the village of Račak in central Kosovo. The government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia asserted that the casualties were all members of the Kosovo Liberation Army who had been killed in a clash with state security forces. The international community did not accept this explanation, characterizing the killings as a deliberate massacre of civilians by Yugoslav forces.

January 17, 1999: "Mother of all Battles Day" in Iraq - thousands of Iraqis take to the streets of Baghdad on the 16th and 17th shouting anti-American slogans on the anniversary of the start of the Persian Gulf War. Iraq issues a demand for sanctions to be lifted and no-fly zones ended immediately.

January 19, 1999: The Clinton administration identifies several opposition groups that will be eligible for US aid under the Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998.

January 21, 1999: US military reports Iraqi planes violated the no-fly zone, but no US aircraft were nearby and no shots were fired.

January 23, 1999: At approximately 1:15 a.m. EST, U.S. aircraft flying in support of Operation Southern Watch dropped laser-guided bombs at two Iraqi surface-to-air missile systems that posed a threat to coalition forces in the area.

An editorial attributed o Saddam Hussein appears in Iraqi newspapers condemning Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for keeping the price of oil too low.

January 24, 1999: Between 2:30 and 3:30 p.m. Iraqi time, coalition aircraft were again targeted by Iraqi surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems near Mosul. An EA-6B Prowler and two F-16CJs fired HARMs in self defense. The aircraft responded to being targeted by Iraqi radars used to guide anti-aircraft artillery. Another F-16CJ fired a HARM at an Iraqi surface-to-air missile system. Earlier in the day, an F-15E Strike Eagle scored a direct hit on an Iraqi SA-3 SAM site with an AGM-130, which posed a threat to coalition forces in the region.

The Iraqi Foreign Minister storms out of a meeting of the Arab League, referring to his fellow ministers as traitors and US lackeys in response to their statement calling on Iraq to cease provocative actions aginst its neighbors.

January 25, 1999: The UNSCOM Executive Chairman submits a report (S/1999/94) to the President of the Security Council on disarmament and monitoring.

Between 1:57 and 2:30 p.m. Iraqi time, coalition aircraft were again illuminated and fired upon by Iraqi surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems in several incidents. An F-15E was fired upon by an anti-aircraft artillery system. Two F-15Es then dropped one GBU-12 each on the system. In another incident, an EA-6B launched a HARM at an SA-2 SAM site that posed a threat to coalition forces in the area. An F-16CJ launched a HARM at a different SA-2 SAM site that posed a threat to coalition forces in the area. Coalition forces observed an Iraqi SAM launch in the vicinity of coalition aircraft. Coalition aircraft departed the area and continued operations.

Iraq's news agency says one of the missiles struck a crowded market in Basra, killing civilians. General Zinni says "There is still a need to review the strike. It's possible that we did a have missile that didn't perform as expected."

January 26, 1999: Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister says Iraq no longer recognizes the legitimacy of the country's border with Kuwait.

"We have analyzed yesterday's information and found that an AGM-130 did miss its target and exploded in a residential neighborhood several kilometers away from its target" -- Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon.

National Security Advisor Sandy Berger announces that President Clinton has changed the rules of engagement for US aircraft operating in Iraq, giving them much more authority to attack any part of the Iraqi air defense network. DoD news briefing with spokesman Ken Bacon :

Q: When was this change made, by the way?

A: I think it was made about three to four weeks ago.

Press release: Between 1:25 and 1:50 p.m. Iraqi time, coalition aircraft were targeted by Iraqi surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems in three separate incidents near Mosul. An EA-6B Prowler, acting in self defense after being targeted by Iraqi radar, launched a HARM at an Iraqi radar site. An F-15E dropped a GBU-12 500-pound precision-guided munition in response to an anti-aircraft artillery system which posed a threat to coalition aircraft. In another incident, two F-15Es fired one AGM-130 each at a radar site which had targeted coalition aircraft. In another incident between 3 and 3:30 p.m. Iraqi time, coalition aircraft were again targeted by anti-aircraft artillery systems near Mosul. Three F-15Es, acting in self defense after being targeted by Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery systems, dropped GBU-12 500-pound precision-guided munitions.

Press conference with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan:

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary-General, could you please elaborate to us on your position concerning the position of Iraq for non-recognition of United Nations Security Council resolutions and its borders with Kuwait. The second question: what if the Palestinian authority proclaimed a State next May? What is your position, Sir?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I think Iraq is obliged to comply with all Security Council resolutions. All the efforts we have made in the past year or so was to get them to comply, not only with the disarmament aspects but also with the other aspects of the resolutions, including missing Kuwaitis and return of Kuwaiti property. There is a whole range of issues that Iraq must comply with and that has to be done. There has been no change in that. I would still urge and hope that they will do it. I was surprised by some of the latest statements in the press. There seems to be a sense of desperation setting in. But I hope we can find a way of bringing things back. I know the Arab States are trying, and we are trying in New York, and I hope the Iraqis will also be thinking about the way forward.

QUESTION: Sir, the humanitarian situation in Iraq is deteriorating continuously because of the United Nations sanctions and according to your former assistant, Dennis Halliday, these sanctions are causing genocide. In your opinion, will these sanctions with their humanitarian results ever end, assuming the current Government remains in power. Or does Iraq have to be disarmed as you recently wrote in the world press, neglecting to specify if this meant weapons of mass destruction or total demilitarization of Iraq?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Let me start with your last point. The Security Council resolutions are clear. We are dealing with weapons of mass destruction. The Security Council does not call for total disarmament of Iraq. Iraq is allowed to keep some defensive weapons, but not so lethal as the types that we are seeking to destroy. Even in missiles, they can keep missiles up to 150 miles but not beyond. And so we are not seeking total disarmament, we are seeking to strip Iraq of weapons of mass destruction to ensure that it is not a threat to its neighbours. On the question of your other sanctions, I cannot argue with the fact that the sanctions have had a negative impact on the conditions of the Iraqi population. I think the Council itself, realizing that sanctions are a blunt instrument, immediately offered oil-for-food hoping that it will help alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people. It has not been a perfect scheme and there are discussions going on now, as you know, on the proposals on the table, some are suggesting that we improve the humanitarian oil-for-food scheme considerably, others are suggesting we lift the sanctions. What has also made matters worse is the price of oil which has dropped perhaps to its lowest level in many many years and also the fact that the Iraqi oil industry is in a state of disrepair and has not been able to pump up to the 5.2 billion dollars worth that it is authorized. So one is looking at all these things and looking at ways and means of helping the population and avoiding the kind of suffering they are going through which you refer to.

QUESTION: My question is, recently we have seen the unilateral action by the United States and the United Kingdom in Iraq. Now we see preparation of the NATO Organization for unilateral action in Kosovo. Does it mean, in your opinion, that we are assisting the beginning of the end of the system of international governments established after the Second World War and the end of the role of the Security Council as the global council which is the final instance in the question of the global security?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Well I think that conclusion or judgement would be a bit of an exaggeration. Let me say that on Iraq, obviously there are differences in the Council, the United States and Britain maintain that they have the authority on the existing Security Council resolutions. We also know the views of the other Council members, including Permanent Members. So the best one can say here is that there is a difference of interpretation and I hope the Council will overcome this, find this unity and move forward.

On Kosovo, force may be used as you have indicated. I do not know whether it will come to that or not, but I think this is a question that has exercised quite a few of us. If the Council were to be fully faced with the issue, I am not sure whether there would be vetoes on the table or not. But we have to understand in recent history that wherever there have been compelling humanitarian situations, where the international community collectively has not acted, some neighbours have acted. Here for example I have in mind Viet Nam in Cambodia. And that did not destroy, I hope, the international system, and I think given the nature of the regime and what was happening there, the international community came to accept it. I am not making an analogy of implication here, but what I am saying is that those in the middle of the Kosovo conflict should listen to the appeals that are being made and we should not be placed in a situation which you have referred to where the international community may be divided. In my earlier appeals, I indicated that we should find a way of working together and that when we stand together, and put collective pressure, we almost invariably succeed, and I hope we can in this way.

January 27, 1999: US Secretary of State Madeline Albright:

"Our policy toward Iraq is based on hard experience and sound principle. We seek compliance not confrontation. But Iraq's questioning of Kuwait's sovereignty and call for the overthrow of Arab governments are just the most recent indications that Saddam Hussein seeks only to make trouble.

The United States, the Arab nations and the international community have no choice but to continue to contain his potential aggression. At the same time, we will do more to help the Iraqi people get the food and medicine they need through the oil-for-food program."

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, I know we're here talking about Iraq but if I can just switch the subject for a moment to Kosovo, and ask you about a proposed American plan to try to bring about a negotiated settlement in Kosovo. What can you tell us about any momentum that might be developing now on the political and military front, perhaps even within NATO, to issue, reissue the threat of force if Slobodon Milosevic does not comply with the October agreement?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Let me say that we obviously have been concerned about the deteriorating situation in Kosovo and a need to act quickly. We have been working to try to quicken some political solution here and also keep in mind what can be done through military pressure and the threat of the use of force.

I have spent some time while I was in Moscow talking to my fellow foreign ministers, to try to have some combined action here in terms of a political settlement which would, in fact, be something that would come about rather quickly because I think we are concerned with how long this has been going on and the necessity for coming up with an early solution. We are looking at a variety of ways to make that happen: To try to get the various places into place and to see how actions at NATO with the Contact Group can be combined, but I have not yet made any final decision about attendance to the Contact meeting.

QUESTION: Last question, please. Why is the U.S. destroying the Iraqi defense system while the U.S. declines to interfere in Kosovo? Which means that the U.S. has two criteria over estimating things.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, there are a number of different situations in the world that require a different approach. We have believed, for now seven years, that Saddam Hussein poses a threat to his neighbors and to us, ultimately our forces, and he has acquired and has used weapons of mass destruction against this own people. That is an entirely different situation than an inter-ethnic struggle in the former Yugoslavia and we need to deal with situations in different ways.

I've just described how we intend to be more involved in trying to get a political settlement in Kosovo, again, as we've said before, the potential threat of the use of force. But these are two entirely different situations. The United States is involved in some form or gathering in many situations. If we would (approach) them all exactly the same, we would be considered naive and not useful at all in the way that we operate.

That same day the US announces it endorses a proposal by Canada to create three UN panels to study the Iraq situation.

The proposal by Canada -- one of 10 non-permanent members of the 15-member council -- calls for panels on disarmament, humanitarian issues, and POWs and missing Kuwaiti property and archives, each under the chairmanship of the current council president, Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil. Those three panels would provide an expert assessment of the current situation in Iraq which council members would then use in deciding how to move ahead.

Meanwhile, the Turkish Foreign Minister warns that US warplanes stationed in Turkey are not allowed to take offensive action against Iraqi targets.

January 28, 1999: At approximately 3:45p.m. Iraqi time, two F-15Es observed fire by an anti-aircraft artillery site located north of Mosul. In self-defense, the two F-15Es dropped a total of three GBU-12s on the anti-aircraft artillery site.

US National Security Advisor Sandy Berger in the Washington Post:

If sanctions were lifted, the international community no longer could determine how Iraq's oil revenues are spent. The oil-for-food program would have to be disbanded, not expanded. Billions of dollars now reserved for the basic needs of the Iraqi people would become available to Saddam to use as he pleased. The amount of food and medicine flowing into Iraq most likely would decline.

In contrast, under the current program, we prevent Saddam from spending his nation's most valuable treasure on what he cares about most -- rebuilding his military arsenal -- and force him to spend it on what he cares about least -- the people of Iraq. From Saddam's point of view, that makes the program part of the sanctions regime.

Indeed, Saddam already has rejected our initiative to expand it. He knows that every drop of oil sold to feed the Iraqi people is a drop of oil that will never be sold to feed his war machine. Oil for food means no oil for tanks.

January 30, 1999: At approximately 3 p.m. Iraqi time, coalition aircraft were targeted by Iraqi radars near Mosul. A U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle responded in self defense by launching an AGM-130 at the radar site. A second incident occurred shortly after 3 p.m. Iraqi time. A group of U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles acting in self defense after being targeted, dropped two GBU-12 precision-guided munitions on an Iraqi Skyguard surface-to-air missile site. In a third incident at about the same time, F-15Es acting in self defense dropped two GBU-12 precision-guided munitions on an anti-aircraft artillery system and its associated radar which threatened coalition aircraft. The fourth incident occurred close to 3:30 p.m. Iraqi time, when F-15Es acting in self-defense dropped GBU-12s on another anti-aircraft artillery site. In a fifth incident at approximately 4:30 p.m. Iraqi time, a U.S. Marine EA-6B Prowler fired a high-speed antiradiation missile in response to being targeted by a radar-guided anti-aircraft artillery system. Finally in the sixth incident a minute later, F-15Es responded defensively by dropping GBU-12s on a separate anti-aircraft artillery site.

The UN Security Council approves the three-panel studies in hopes of achieving forward progress on the deadlocked Iraq issue.

January 31, 1999: Iraq rejects the UN three panel reviews, saying they will take too long and amount to continued sanctions.

At approximately 3:20 p.m. Iraqi time today, a U.S. Air Force F-16CJ Fighting Falcon acting in self defense launched a high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM) at a radar system north of Mosul.

Martin S. Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, visits Kuwait:

The Clinton Administration has developed a new approach to Iraq, which Indyk called "containment plus regime change." This policy, he said, follows two basic principles: the change must come from the Iraqi people themselves and from inside Iraq and the U.S. will maintain its commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq.

The Iraq Liberation Act, which became law this past fall, has brought about a change in U.S. policy, Indyk said.

"Our objective is to work for the day when there will be a new government in Iraq. The Congress is going to work with the Administration to try to achieve this objective. Now there is a unique situation," he said. "The Congress and the Administration will be working hand-in-hand in this effort."

February 2, 1999: At 2:20 p.m. Iraqi time, two U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles dropped two GBU-12 precision-guided munitions on an anti-aircraft artillery battery in response to being targeted by Iraqi radar near Mosul. In a separate incident approximately 15 minutes later, two additional F-15Es, also responding after being targeted by Iraqi radar, dropped GBU-12 precision-guided munitions on the same anti-aircraft artillery site. In a third incident at approximately 3:15 p.m. Iraqi time, a U.S. Marine EA-6B launched a high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) at an SA-2 radar site. In a fourth incident at approximately 3:20 p.m. Iraqi time, F-15Es dropped GBU-12 precision-guided munitions on an anti-aircraft artillery site. Finally, in a fifth incident which occurred at approximately 3:30 p.m. Iraqi time, F-15Es dropped GBU-12s on another anti-aircraft artillery site.

February 3, 1999:: Kofi Annan orders all American and British UN workers, including oil-for-food monitors, out of Iraq.

February 6, 1999: The Rambouillet talks (for Chateau Rambouillet, the site of the talks) begin - an attempt at a peace agreement between then-Yugoslavia and a delegation representing the ethnic-Albanian majority population of Kosovo. They were intended to conclude by February 19. When the talks failed to achieve an agreement by the original deadline of they were extended by another month.

February 6, 1999: (media) The Guardian:

Thus the world's most notorious pariah state, armed with its half-built hoard of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, tried to embrace the planet's most prolific terrorist. It was the stuff of the West's millennial nightmares, but United States intelligence officials are positive that the meeting took place, although they admit that they have no idea what happened.

This was not the first time that President Saddam had offered Mr Bin Laden a partnership. At least one approach is believed to have been made during the Saudi dissident's sojourn in Sudan from 1990 to 1996. On that occasion, the guerrilla leader turned the emissaries away, out of a pious man's contempt for President Saddam's secular Ba'athist regime.

But this time round Mr Bin Laden's options have been rapidly diminishing. His hosts, the hardline Taliban militia which rules Afghanistan under Islamic auspices, have vowed publicly to stand by him. But they are at the same time discussing with his worst enemies - the Saudi monarchy and the American government - his eventual departure from Afghan soil.

Mr Bin Laden must surely have felt the noose begin to bite when he heard the news of the Taliban's meeting this week with a US assistant secretary of state, Karl Inderfurth, in Islamabad.

But the most wanted man in the West may be at his most dangerous when cornered. And the increased pressure makes the prospect of a Saddam Hussein-Osama bin Laden alliance, once an improbable marriage of opposites, seem a more credible threat.

And

Saddam Hussein's regime has opened talks with Osama bin Laden, bringing closer the threat of a terrorist attack using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, according to US intelligence sources and Iraqi opposition officials.
The key meeting took place in the Afghan mountains near Kandahar in late December. The Iraqi delegation was led by Farouk Hijazi, Baghdad's ambassador in Turkey and one of Saddam's most powerful secret policemen, who is thought to have offered Bin Laden asylum in Iraq.

February 11, 1999: Between approximately 12:15 and 12:30 p.m. Iraqi time, a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle flight observed Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery fire and was also illuminated by an Iraqi radar system near Mosul. Acting in self-defense, one F-15E dropped; GBU-12s on an Iraqi surface-to-air missile communications site. Two F-15Es launched an AGM-130 and dropped GBU-12s on an Iraqi surface-to-air missile system. At 1:32 p.m. Iraqi time, a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle dropped GBU-12 precision- guided munitions on an Iraqi surface-to-air missile site west of Mosul. Two minutes later, a U.S. Air Force F-16CJ Fighting Falcon launched an AGM-88 high-speed antiradiation missile at an Iraqi radar site northwest of Mosul. Close to 1:38 p.m. Iraqi time, a U.S. Air Force F-15E dropped GBU-12s on a surface-to-air missile communications site east of Mosul.

February 12, 1999 At approximately 1:30 p.m. Iraqi time, an F-15E enforcing the Northern no-fly zone over Iraq was fired upon by an anti-aircraft artillery site north of Mosul. The F-15E dropped a GBU-12 in response to this hostile act.

President Clinton is acquitted of charges in the US Senate.

19 February, 1999 (The Independent):

...Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, the popular leader of the Shia Muslims of Iraq, got into his car to drive to his house, as he did every day, from his office on the outskirts of the holy city of Najaf near the Euphrates, southwest of Baghdad. With him were his two sons, Mustapha and Mu'ammal, who acted as his chief assistants, and a driver.

They never reached home. In the first detailed account of the assassination, The Independent has learnt that when the car entered a roundabout, it was hit by machine-gun fire from one or more positions. Within seconds, the gunmen lying in ambush riddled the car with bullets and the men inside were dead or dying. Relatives say Iraqi security forces immediately sealed off the area and would not allow even an ambulance through.

The assassination was almost certainly the work of agents working for the Iraqi government. Baghdad has always feared the religious leaders of the Iraqi Shia, who make up about 55 per cent of the population, but who for centuries have been denied political power. In the past year, two other prominent Shia clerics have been killed and others attacked by gunmen in and around Najaf.

The government insisted that Mr Sadr be buried immediately with a minimum of mourning. But this was not enough to prevent the most widespread popular disturbances in Iraq since the Shia uprising in 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, which almost overthrew President Saddam Hussein.

The scale of the outbreaks has become clear only in the past few days as witnesses reach Jordan and Iran.

The outbreaks happened because Mr Sadr, who for six years presided over his community with the tacit approval of the government, had gradually acquired a mass following among Shia youth, townspeople and tribal leaders.

Respected for his piety, he had become open in holding the regime - as well as the US and its allies - responsible for the miseries of the Iraqi people.

When his death was announced by the official news agency, demonstrations and clashes erupted throughout southern Iraq, where Shia are in the majority. In Baghdad, worshippers at a mosque in Saddam City, a vast slum, poured into the street, shouting: "God is great". The security forces immediately shot dead two brothers. Iraqi sources in Iran say 13 people died elsewhere in the city.
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The worst violence occurred at a Shia shrine 20 miles from Nassariya. This may have appeared especially threatening to the government, as the shrine is close to the marshlands of southern Iraq, the redoubt of anti- government guerrillas. The security forces opened fire on demonstrators, killing at least five, including two 14-year-olds.

The death toll elsewhere is not known, but security forces are clearly under orders to fire at protesters immediately. Iraqis in exile in Iran say there were clashes in the Shia cities of Kut and al-Amarah on the Tigris, close to the Iranian border. They also report flashes of artillery fire near al-Basrah, the largest city of southern Iraq.
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The well-planned purge suggests the assassination of Mr Sadr was only one element in a plan to break his movement. Laith Kubba, an Iraqi commentator living abroad, says: "After Desert Fox [the bombing of Iraq by the US and Britain] in December Saddam decided to eliminate all potential anti- government leaders in a pre-emptive strike to head off any uprising. Al- Sadr was the most visible of the Shia leaders."

February 24, 1999, CENTCOM: COALITION REACTS TO CONTINUED UNSCR VIOLATIONS

MACDILL AFB, FL - At approximately 10:30 a.m. Eastern Standard Time today, U.S. Air Force F-15E "Strike Eagle," and U.S. Navy F/A-18 "Hornet" aircraft enforcing the Southern No-Fly Zone in Iraq, struck two Iraqi surface-to-air missile sites near Al Iskandariyah, about 30 miles south of Baghdad.

The strikes were in response to an Iraqi aircraft violation of the no-fly zone and Anti-Aircraft Artillery fire directed at coalition aircraft.

In addition to the strikes reported earlier in the vicinity of Al Iskandariyah, U.S. Central Command reports U.S. Air Force F-16C/J aircraft fired two High-speed Anti Radiation Missiles in response to illumination from an integrated air defense radar site near Tallil.

Voice of America:

US WARPLANES HAVE STRUCK IRAQI AIR DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON THE OUSKIRTS OF BAGHDAD. IRAQI AUTHORITIES SAY A NUMBER OF CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED IN THE ATTACK

REPORTS SAY IT WAS THE FIRST TIME AIR-RAID SIRENS WERE HEARD IN BAGHDAD SINCE LAST DECEMBER, WHEN U-S AND BRITISH PLANES BOMBED SCORES OF IRAQI TARGETS DURING A FOUR-NIGHT PERIOD.

FOLLOWING THE AIR STRIKES, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT BEGAN TO CHALLENGE MORE AGGRESSIVELY WESTERN PATROLS IN THE "NO-FLY" ZONES OVER NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN IRAQ. SINCE THEN, CLASHES HAVE OCCURRED ON AN ALMOST DAILY BASIS BETWEEN WESTERN PLANES AND IRAQI DEFENSES.

IRAQ SAYS THE "NO-FLY" ZONES ARE ILLEGAL, AND VIOLATE ITS TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY.
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EARLIER THIS WEEK, DEMONSTRATIONS WERE REPORTED IN SEVERAL CITIES IN SOUTHERN IRAQ, FOLLOWING THE MURDER OF THE COUNTRY'S LEADING SHIITE MUSLIM CLERIC AND HIS TWO SONS, IN THE SOUTHERN CITY OF NAJAF. IRAQI OPPOSITION GROUPS AND SHIITE LEADERS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SAY THE KILLINGS ARE PART OF A GOVERNMENT PERSECUTION CAMPAIGN AGAINST SHIITE LEADERS.

THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT DENIES RESPONSIBILITY, SAYING FOREIGN FORCES ARE MASTERMINDING THE MURDERS IN ORDER TO UNDERMINE IRAQI UNITY. AUTHORITIES IN BAGHDAD SAY THERE HAVE BEEN NO ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS; ON TUESDAY, THEY TOOK FOREIGN REPORTERS TO VISIT A CITY IN THE SOUTH TO SHOW THAT THE REGION IS QUIET.

February 25, 1999, Transcript, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Hugh Shelton press conference:

Q: VOA: General, Baghdad has complained that the latest raid actually took place outside the no-fly zone, in fact was on the outskirts of Baghdad and is calling it a grave escalation. Do you have any comment on that?

SHELTON: Yes, first of all, let me say that anything coming out of Baghdad, I think should be questioned in terms of its veracity since we have seen very little of the truth come from Iraq in recent years. But I think that the United Nations, and indeed the international community in general, have made it very clear that Iraq must comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions, that it must end its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and that it must comply with, for example, the no-fly zone and the no-drive zone. That ties into United States' policy of containment and continued enforcement of United Nations' resolutions and we intend to continue to do that, both the no-fly zone as well as containing them in terms of maritime interdiction operations.

Actions by our coalition aircraft that are in there are taken in self defense, in response to Saddam's acts of provocation, his aggressive acts. As you know, he declared that the no-fly zone would be null and void and consequently has, in recent days, decided to both violate the no-fly zone as well as to fire his anti-aircraft artillery, his surface-to-air missiles and light up our aircraft with radar, which are an offensive action within itself. We subsequently engaged each time that he has made those violations and will continue to do so. We will continue to enforce the no-fly zone. We operate only up to the 33rd parallel, which is basically the boundary for the southern no-fly zone, and we do not go south of the 36th. We have not, and at this point do not intend to do that as an enforcement mechanism. So the report he is running is erroneous. We have not gone across the 33rd nor south of the 36th.

February 27, 1999, CENTCOM: COALITION RESPONDS TO IRAQI AGGRESSION

MACDILL AFB, FL - At approximately 1 a.m. Eastern Standard Time today, U.S. Air Force F-15E "Strike Eagles" and U.S. Navy F/A-18 "Hornets" and F-14 "Tomcats" enforcing the Operation Southern Watch No-Fly Zone struck two Iraqi military communication facilities.

The strikes were conducted near As Samawah, which is approximately 130 miles southeast of Baghdad and Al Amarah, which is approximately 170 miles southeast of Baghdad. The strikes were in response to anti-aircraft artillery fire directed at coalition aircraft on a previous mission.

February 28, 1999: INCIRLIK AIR BASE, TURKEY -- Between 1:55 and 2:15 p.m. Iraqi time, while conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone, and in response to anti-aircraft artillery fire, a flight of U.S. F-15Es launched three AGM-130 air-to-ground guided missiles and dropped three GBU-24 laser-guided bombs on an Iraqi air defense headquarters and radio relay site.

Additonally, between 2:13 and 2:35 p.m. Iraqi time, F-15Es dropped three GBU-12 and three GBU-24 laser-guided bombs on the radio relay site, as well as on an Iraqi surface-to-air missile site.

The Iraqi radio relay site was being used by the Iraqi government to pass targeting data from Iraqi's radars to Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery guns shooting at coalition aircraft.

Coalition forces did not target nor was there damage to an Iraqi pipeline or an Iraqi oil pumping station.

The incidents happened near Mosul, Iraq.

February 28, 1999, US Army Public Affairs: Bush tells Gulf vets why Hussein left in Baghdad

Former President George Bush took the opportunity at the "8th Annual Reunion of Our Victory in the Desert" Feb. 28 to explain his reason for stopping Operation Desert Storm after 100 hours.

The mission was to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, and that mission was accomplished, Bush told more than 200 Desert Storm veterans gathered for dinner Sunday night at Fort Myer, Va. Most of the veterans there had fought with VII Corps in the Gulf War which ended Feb. 27, 1991.

Bush said he didn't get into the business of second-guessing his military commanders when they told him the mission was complete.

Bush said he can understand those who say, "Why didn't you finish the job?" It burns me up, because we tried to finish the job -- peacefully," he explained, adding that he tried to do it with sanctions and by assuring Hussein that the coalition forces didn't want one single soldier sent in harms way.

It was only after all peaceful means failed, he said, "that we had to fight. We ended the war in, you ended it, what was it, a hundred hours."

"I'll never forget," he said, when Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell "came over and said it was time to end the fighting -- mission accomplished. I said, 'Do [Gen. Norman] Schwarzkopf and the commanders agree.'"

Bush said that within 30 seconds Powell had Schwarzkopf on the phone assuring him that the mission had been accomplished.
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Bush said the United States learned in World War II -- and learned it again before Operation Desert Storm -- that you can't appease an aggressor. "And had we gone for Saddam's ploys, had we capitulated to those advocating a more-passive course, had we relied totally on sanctions ... then we would have sent a signal of weakness to other would-be aggressors around the world," he said.

"But we didn't do that," he continued. "We were clear in our purpose from the start. And just for the record, we gave peace a chance. Between August and the time you had to go into battle, we gave it a chance.

"Once it was clear that our diplomacy had failed, that U.N. resolutions would not work, that Saddam had no interest in peace ... we did what we had to do -- no more, no less."

"We said this aggression would not stand," he said, adding that the soldiers kept his word.
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Returning to the issue of Hussein's longevity, Bush jokingly called it "a sore spot with me" to be "out of work while Saddam Hussein still has a job. It's not fair," he asserted.

Still however, "he is no threat to invade another sovereign nation, and pillage its culture, and murder its citizens. He can brutalize his own people, and torment and torture them, but he can no longer pose a threat to his neighbors. And that's just one of the benefits" of Desert Storm.

Later PBS interview with General Norman Schwarzkopf:

Q: Everyone's always said to me "Oh, they had a very clear objective" you know, "Get rid of the Iraqis from Kuwait." Could you explain to me in headline terms, just very briefly, why wasn't that good enough?

Schwarzkopf: Well I think, I think... What has happened since then... is a pretty clear example of why that probably wasn't good enough.

I mean the whole question that we hear over and over again, "Why didn't you go to Baghdad and, and capture Saddam Hussein? Why didn't you inflict greater damage on the Republican Guard?" When the decision was made to end the war, the decision was made, it's because I had accomplished all of my military objectives. The things that now that people are talking about, capturing Saddam Hussein, destroying ... inflicting more damage on the Republican Guard, etc., etc., etc., these are political decisions, far beyond the military realm.

I had to establish my own objectives, and my own objectives frankly turned out to be, you know, number one objective: Iraqis out of Kuwait, number two: inflict as much damage as I could on their armed forces so they couldn't come back another day.

The kick them out of Iraq objective was one that was given to us by United Nations Resolution. But the second part of this thing; inflict maximum damage upon the Iraqi armed forces so that they cannot return, you know, shortly thereafter, was another objective that evolved. But again you'll never find that in writing, anywhere.
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Q: Colin Powell called you at three o clock, and you discussed how much more time was needed. Can you tell me the conversation? What happened?

Schwarzkopf: The exact conversation was-- "What.. what are your plans?" And I told him--"I plan to continue the operation as it was originally designed, and that is to continue with this envelopment movement that went over and drove all the way to the sea and cut off everybody below".

And he then asked me when I thought that would be completed and I told him that I thought that would be completed by the end of the day on the 28th. This was information that I'd asked my Army commander about and he had told by the end of the day of 28th.

And then he asked me-- "Could you stop tomorrow morning?"

And I did a very very quick mental calculation and basically said that we have accomplished all of our military ojectives and if need be we could stop tomorrow morning.

I will confess to you that part of that deliberation had to do with American casualties. We had accomplished what we'd accomplished with so few casualties and another day of the war, more or less, would only cause more people to die that didn't need to die.

So I said yes if he wanted us to stop the following morning I could stop, but I would have to have sufficient advance notice to make sure that the word got out to all of my troops.

And he said "OK fine. I will get back to you".

He then called me back later and we joked, we actually joked at the time about you know, I think I told him-- "If you stop this thing when you do it'll be the four day war or the three day war, or something like that which will then make it the most successful war in history!"

. Q: Well let me ask you about what do you remember saying to him about the five day war?

Schwarzkopf: Well, we had already talked about it in the war room when John Yeosock had told me that he felt that they could accomplish all their objectives by the night of the 28th and I don't know who it was, and maybe it was me who came up with the fact that "Hey, this is a five day war and up until now everybody has said, you know, the Six Day War was the greatest and most rapid victory there was and now, all of a sudden, we have a five day war!"

So it sort of had a good feeling about it and it was a joke and I just said to him I said "I hope you realise that this would be the five, you know, there'd be a five day war!" And he laughed and said "That's right".

He called me back subsequently and said "How about if we shut the war off at ..." midnight I guess it was, Washington time, which would of made it eight o clock in the morning our time or nine o clock in the morning or something like that. And I said "Fine. I once again have to get to my commanders to make sure that they can all do this but I think they can and unless I get back to you that'll be fine".

And then he made the comment "Well that'll make it a hundred hour war!" And I laughed and I said "Terrific!" You know, the whole conversation was a lighthearted one. We were both feeling very good about what was happening at that time.

And I checked with my commanders and they, in fact, assured me that they could meet those time lines and that's what transpired.
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I didn't have any compunctions about stopping and to this day I don't. It was a decision that had to be made at some point and that was as good a point as any.

Q: Did Colin Powell in either conversation.. or the first conversation say to you, as some people have implied to me, that "Hey, you know, the President feels it's time to stop. He's worried about the carnage" and you sort of reluctantly said "Yeh, well, if the President feels that let's do it".

Schwarzkopf: Absolutely not.

Q: Was it the impression given to you that the President wanted it stopped?

Schwarzkopf: Absolutely not. Absolutely not. Colin Powell did say to me at one point that the reporting has turned negative, that there are photographers all over the `highway of death' talking about the innocent people that have been killed on the `highway of death' and there is some concern in Washington about this kind of reportig and implied that that might have been driving the decision to stop when we did. But there was never any implication that the President thinks he wants to stop it now so therefore, you know, we ought to stop it.
<...>
Q: But in your book you talk about.. "Well, if Freddy Franks had moved a bit faster, maybe we would have got at the Republican Guard". His line is "If you wanted to get at them so badly, why did you stop then?" Freddy Franks said "I was poised that night, I couldn't believe it when I was stopped. Tomorrow was going to be the decisive battle".

Schwarzkopf: The answer to that is quite simply that I didn't stop anything!

The President of the United States in Washington D.C. stopped it. It wasn't General Schwarzkopf that stopped anything!

Anybody who knows anything about the military knows that we have our masters and the decision was made in Washington to stop the war when it did. They asked me if I concurred in that decision and I did concur in that decision.
<...>
Q: Let me rephrase this to you..... just for the record I'm trying to establish, did you feel that the driving force was coming from the White House or was it a matter of you saying "No no, we've done everything, let's finish it" or was it, as others have told me who were close to you, that you felt that the White House was saying "Hey, we'd really like to stop this".

Schwarzkopf: Oh there's no question about the fact that this was presented to me as a fait accompli in Washington.

It was Washington had made the decision that they wanted the war to stop at midnight and they were just calling me to find out if I had any violent objections. You know, it was never presented "Well, we'd like to stop it at midnight but if you don't concur with this then we'll let you go on all day tomorrow". That was not the case at all. It was quite the contrary, it was presented to me as a fait accomplit "Do you concur in this decision?"

March 1, 1999: United Nations -- The United Nations has reported that Iraq is not distributing about $275 million worth of medical supplies and a significant quantity of other goods have not been distributed or, in some cases, even ordered under the Security Council program designed to help Iraqi civilians.

In a written report to the Security Council on the "oil-for-food" program, Secretary General Kofi Annan said he is concerned over the long delays between the time supplies arrive in Iraqi warehouses and when the Iraqi Government distributes the supplies to civilians.

March 1, 1999: Coalition forces respond to Iraqi radar threats

INCIRLIK AIR BASE, TURKEY -- Between 2:30 and 3:30 p.m. Iraqi time, while conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone, and in response to several incidents of Iraqi radar targeting coalition aircraft, U.S. F-15Es dropped more than thirty 2,000 pound and 500 pound laser guided bombs on Iraqi communications sites, radio relay sites, and anti-aircraft artillery sites.

The incidents happened near Mosul, Iraq.

There was no damage to coalition aircraft.

Damage to Iraqi forces is currently under assessment.

March 2, 1999, European Stars And Stripes:

More than two months after the four days and 100 targets of Operation Desert Fox, the United States, with help from the British, continues an almost daily string of airstrikes against Iraq at the provocation of President Saddam Hussein's air defenses.

Monday's attacks were the latest, when a group of Air Force F-15Es dropped a total of 30 bombs on anti-aircraft batteries, communications and radio relay sites near Mosul after being targeted by Iraqi radar. No U.S. planes were damaged, and the damage to Iraqi defenses was still under investigation, according to the U.S. European Command.

While Operation Desert Fox was caused by Saddam's refusal to allow United Nations weapons inspectors free access to potential storage sites, the latest attacks are a result of Saddam's challenge of the two no-fly zones set up after the Gulf War.

It's a challenge the United States has been happy to accept -- and one that has allowed pilots to fire missiles and drop bombs on Saddam's military in response, including targeting Iraqi defenses that don't pose immediate threats to them.
<...>
Britain's Sunday Telegraph two weeks ago reported that Russia made a $160 million deal with Iraq to muscle-up its dwindling missiles and upgrade its squadrons of MiGs. Russia denies that.

Air Force Print News:

Coalition forces strike with 'greater flexibility'

WASHINGTON -- The same day they struck Iraqi targets in the largest attack since the end of Operation Desert Fox, coalition forces now have "greater flexibility to attack those systems which place them in jeopardy," the secretary of defense said.

William S. Cohen's remarks at the Pentagon came just hours after Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles dropped more than 30 2,000-pound and 500-pound laser-guided bombs on Iraqi communications, radio relay and anti-aircraft artillery sites.

The secretary of defense said the wider latitude to strike against threats will give coalition aircrews greater protection against the web of ground threats arrayed by Saddam Hussein's forces, including anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles.

"They are not simply going to respond to an AAA site or to a SAM site," Cohen said. "They can go after command-and-control, communications centers as well, that allow Saddam Hussein to try to target them and put them in jeopardy."

Amid reports that this and an earlier coalition strike might have damaged a pipeline carrying oil from Iraq to Turkey, the secretary said civilian sites were not targeted.

"We did in fact target a communications facility, which may or may not have interrupted the flow of oil temporarily going into Turkey," Cohen said. "But we believe the target itself was one that was used for communication purposes to their military.

"I might point out, contrary to the Iraqi claims about this jeopardizing the Oil for Food program, that the United Nations itself has pointed out that there are some $275 million in food and medicine and supplies which are stored in Iraqi warehouses that are not being distributed to the people, to the Iraqi people," Cohen said. "That is the responsibility and obligation that falls squarely on the shoulders of Saddam Hussein."

The secretary also said that, in contrast to widespread broadcast of coalition fighters' gun camera video in January, defense officials have refused to make any recent releases, to protect airmen from being targeted on the ground. Cohen said such videos could provide information to the enemy.
<...>
"There's only one person responsible for whatever is taking place in Iraq today, and that is Saddam Hussein's refusal to comply with the U.N. Security Council resolutions," Cohen said.

March 3, 1999: "Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all of its obligations under Security Council resolutions," President Clinton said in his March 3 report to Congress on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's compliance with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.
<...>
"As long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he represents a threat to the well-being of his people, the peace of the region, and the security of the world," Clinton said. "We will continue to contain the threat he poses, but over the long term the best way to address that threat is through a new government in Baghdad."

March 3, 1999: United Nations -- The United States, along with the other members of the Security Council, wants to see Iraqi oil exports under the "oil-for-food" program "up and running as quickly as possible," US Ambassador Nancy Soderberg said March 3.

Talking with journalists after the head of the UN's Iraq program briefed council members privately, Soderberg said that "there was general agreement that the oil must begin to flow and that we want to get it up and running as quickly as possible."

The Iraqi pipeline "was not hit; the pumping stations were not hit; and we absolutely do not target civilians -- that's absolutely false," the ambassador said, referring to Baghdad's claims that US pilots hit the pipeline, stopping the oil exports.

"The area that was hit was, in our belief, part of the Iraqi air defense system communications area. The Iraq command and control is part of the area that is threatening our pilots," she said.

Soderberg said that she reminded the council that "US forces in the region are acting to protect the vulnerable population of Iraq."

March 4, 1999, CENTCOM: COALITION AIRCRAFT STRIKE TARGETS SOUTH OF AL BASRAH

MACDILL AFB, FL - At approximately 8:15 a.m. Eastern Standard Time today, British Royal Air Force GR-1 "Tornado" aircraft enforcing the Southern No-Fly Zone struck an Iraqi military radar site approximately 15 miles south of Al Basrah near Ash Shuaybah.

The strikes were in response to two Iraqi violations of the Southern No-Fly Zone and aircraft illuminations by Iraqi surface-to-air missile sites.

March 6, 1999, Voice of America:

U-S WARPLANES LAUNCHED NEW ATTACKS ON IRAQI AIR DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS IN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN NO-FLY ZONES OVER IRAQ SATURDAY. THE LATEST CLASHES COME JUST TWO DAYS AFTER IRAQ RESUMED PUMPING OIL THROUGH A PIPELINE DAMAGED IN SIMILAR STRIKES EARLIER IN THE WEEK.

THE ATTACKS ARE THE LATEST IN ALMOST DAILY CLASHES BETWEEN IRAQI AND WESTERN FORCES IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS. LAST SUNDAY, US PLANES STRUCK AN IRAQI COMMUNICATIONS SITE, SHUTTING DOWN A PIPELINE THAT CARRIES IRAQI OIL TO NEIGHBORING TURKEY. THE ATTACK DREW CRITICISM FROM TURKEY, WHICH ALLOWS WESTERN PLANES TO BE BASED IN ITS TERRITORY.

U-S DEFENSE SECRETARY WILLIAM COHEN SAID FRIDAY THAT US FORCES WILL AVOID FUTURE ATTACKS ON THE PIPELINE.

March 8, 1999: UNSCOM CHIEF: SECURITY COUNCIL UNITY ON IRAQI WEAPONS ESSENTIAL

New York -- The major obstacle in ridding Iraq of its banned chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles is a divided Security Council, not allegations that UN weapons inspectors were spies, the head of the UN special Commission overseeing the destruction of Iraqi weapons (UNSCOM) says.

UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler also denied that he approved the use of UN weapons inspection teams as a cover for US spying on Iraq.

14 March, 1999, CENTCOM:

COALITION AIRCRAFT RESPOND TO SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE FIRE

MACDILL AFB, FL - At approximately 2:15 a.m. Eastern Standard Time today, U.S. Air Force F-16CG "Fighting Falcon," and British Royal Air Force GR-1 "Tornado" aircraft enforcing the Southern No-Fly Zone struck two Iraqi military communications sites using precision guided munitions in response to surface-to-air missile fire directed at coalition aircraft.

The strikes were conducted near As Samawah, which is approximately 150 miles southeast of Baghdad, and near Ad Diwaniyah, which is approximately 100 miles south of Baghdad.

14 March, 1999, Voice of America:

US WAR PLANES TAKING OFF FROM A NATO BASE IN SOUTHERN TURKEY POUNDED IRAQI DEFENSES SUNDAY IN THE NO-FLY ZONE OVER KURDISH-CONTROLLED NORTHERN IRAQ. FROM ANKARA, AMBERIN ZAMAN HAS THE DETAILS.

A SPOKESMAN AT THE INCIRLIK AIRBASE SAID THE AMERICAN PLANES MADE AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF ATTACKS AFTER IRAQI ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY TRACKED THEM WITH RADAR. HE SAID THE BOMBINGS WERE CARRIED OUT FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.

15 March, 1999, CENTCOM:

COALITION AIRCRAFT RESPOND TO NO-FLY ZONE VIOLATIONS

MACDILL AFB, FL - At approximately 1:45 a.m. Eastern Standard Time today, U.S. Air Force F-16CG "Fighting Falcon," and U.S. Navy F/A-18 "Hornet" and F-14 "Tomcat" aircraft enforcing the Southern No-Fly Zone struck an Iraqi radar relay site 200 miles southeast of Baghdad near As Salman, and a radar site 290 miles southeast of Baghdad in the vicinity of As Shuaybah.

The strikes were in response to Iraqi aircraft violations of the Southern No-Fly Zone. These hostile acts were the latest of more than 135 Iraqi provocations in the southern no-fly zone since Operation Desert Fox.

16 March, 1999, Air Force Print News:

INCIRLIK AIR BASE, Turkey (AFPN) -- For the third day in a row, coalition forces have attacked Iraqi ground sites that posed a threat to aircraft patrolling the northern no-fly zone.

Between 11:45 p.m. and 12:15 p.m. Iraqi time March 16, Operation Northern Watch aircraft detected Iraqi radar posing a threat to coalition aircraft. Responding in self-defense, Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles dropped GBU-12 laser-guided bombs on several antiaircraft artillery sites northwest of Mosul.

All coalition aircraft departed the area safely.

A DoD news release:

Since the war's end in 1991, U.S. and other allied coalition pilots have enforced U.N.-mandated no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. The zones protect Kurds in the north and Shi'a Muslims in the south from Saddam Hussein's aggression. Along with U.N.-imposed "no-drive" restrictions, the no-fly zones also prevent the Iraqi dictator from marshaling forces to invade neighboring states.

Until mid-December, U.S. and British air patrols encountered little resistance, but in the wake of Operation Desert Fox, Saddam declared the zones invalid. Iraqi aircraft began violating the zones regularly, and Iraqi forces began targeting coalition aircraft with radar. Iraqi fighters tried to lure coalition patrols into surface-to-air-missile ambushes.

At first, U.S. and coalition planes struck back only in self-defense. As Iraqi challenges persisted more or less daily, U.S. defense officials expanded the rules of engagement. Pilots began striking Iraq's integrated air defense system, not just specific sites. A further expansion in February now gives military leaders even more targeting flexibility, allowing strikes on command and control and communications facilities.
<...>
Morale among the American airmen in Kuwait is high, Harvey noted. He attributed frequent contact with home as part of the reason.

"E-mail is the best thing that ever happened to the United States Air Force," said the fighter pilot, whose wife, Connie, and daughters, Anne, 15, and Sarah, 12, live in Columbia, S.C. "We are able to chat with our loved ones back home on a daily basis. That has just been phenomenal for morale. That's the best thing they've ever invented."

Air Force Master Sgt. Eric Farr, also with the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing in Kuwait, attributes the high morale to the wing's real-world mission. The 23-year veteran airman from the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., is a first sergeant with the wing's logistic squadron.

He said the Southern Watch mission provides realism and an awareness that's nearly impossible to achieve during training alone.

"No one likes to see war or be a part of a war. There's no joy in bringing destruction on anyone," Farr said. But putting 10 or 20 years of training to actual use is a kind of validation, he noted. "We've trained hard, and now that training's paying off."

*****

16 March, 1999: A. Elizabeth Jones, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, releases a letter marking the anniversary of the Halabja massacre:

The sympathies of the United States are with the Kurdish people of northern Iraq and with all Iraqis as we commemorate the eleventh anniversary of the massacre at Halabja.

On March 16, 1988 the Iraqi military attacked Halabja, a Kurdish town in northern Iraq, with chemical weapons. An estimated 5000 civilians were killed and 10,000 injured.

This monstrous assault was part of the "Anfal" campaign against Iraqi civilians, directed by Saddam Hussein's regime. Eyewitnesses report that thousands of people were killed in scores of chemical attacks during the "Anfal."

Eleven years later, the people of Halabja still suffer from the effects of the March 16 attack. There is evidence that they experience much higher rates of serious diseases, particularly cancer, neurological disorders, birth defects and miscarriages.

Last November, I was honored to inaugurate a major conference on Halabja at Meridian House. As one outcome of that conference this week we will announce plans to provide significant funding for a feasibility study in northern Iraq on ways to assist the Halabja victims.

As we remember Halabja, we must remind ourselves and the international community that Saddam Hussein's regime must never be permitted to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction programs.

We commend the Human Rights Alliance for bringing to the world's attention the Iraqi regime's infamous human rights record and for commemorating the tragic events at Halabja.

Sincerely,

A. Elizabeth Jones
Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs

USIA 17 March 1999 United States Information Agency

RICHARDSON, PICKERING FAVOR EXPANSION OF OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM

Washington -- Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering and Energy Secretary Bill Richardson testified March 17 that the U.N.'s Oil-For-Food program for Iraq is an essential component of the U.S. Administration's Iraq strategy and is, therefore, key to our national security.
<...>
Pickering emphasized that the Clinton Administration's policy is to contain Saddam Hussein until he is removed from power. He said that the United States would continue to maintain sanctions on Iraq, enforce the no-fly zones in the north and south, and maintain a robust military presence in the region.

"The Oil-for-Food program has not adverselt affected international oil prices to the point where our domestic oil producers should be concerned." Richardson testified. "Iraq is not a swing player. It affects, marginally, world oil."

18 March 1999, UNSCOM:

UNSCOM DISPUTES IRAQI CHARGES ON LIVESTOCK DISEASE

The U.N. Special Commission overseeing the destruction of Iraqi weapons (UNSCOM) March 18 refuted Iraqi charges that the spread of hoof and mouth disease among Iraqi livestock is the result of UNSCOM's destruction of a laboratory that was producing the vaccine to counter the disease.

18 March 1999: The government of Iraq claimed it arrested five people for the previous month's assassination of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadek al-Sadr.

*****

18 March 1999: Albanian, American and British delegations signed what became known as the Rambouillet Accords - a proposed peace agreement between then-Yugoslavia and a delegation representing the ethnic-Albanian majority population of Kosovo. It was drafted by NATO and named for Chateau Rambouillet, where it was initially proposed.

The Serbian and Russian delegations refused to sign.

The accords called for NATO administration of Kosovo as an autonomous province within Yugoslavia; a force of 30,000 NATO troops to maintain order in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory, including Kosovo; and immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law. The American and British delegations must have known that the new version would never be accepted by the Serbs or the Contact Group. These latter provisions were much the same as had been applied to Bosnia for the SFOR (Stabilisation Force) mission there.

While the accords did not fully satisfy the Albanians, they were much too radical for the Serbs, who responded by substituting a drastically revised text that even the Russians, traditional allies of the Serbs, found unacceptable. It sought to reopen the painstakingly negotiated political status of Kosovo and deleted all of the proposed implementation measures. Among many other changes in the proposed new version, it eliminated the entire chapter on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, removed virtually all international oversight and dropped any mention of invoking "the will of the people [of Kosovo]" in determining the final status of the province. Even the word "peace" was deleted.

*****

19 March, 1999. Air Force Print News:

MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, Fla. (AFPN) -- Iraqi aircraft violated the southern no-fly zone March 19, prompting coalition air strikes against radar and communications sites.

At about 2 a.m. EST, Air Force F-16CG Fighting Falcon, and British RAF GR-1 Tornado aircraft struck an Iraqi military radar site near As Shuaybah, about 290 miles southeast of Baghdad, and a military communications site about 230 miles southeast of Baghdad in the vicinity of Muzalbah.

No coalition aircraft were damaged during the incident, and battle damage assessment is ongoing.

Speaking of the no-fly zone violations, a U.S. Central Command statement said, "These Iraqi hostile acts were the latest of more than 140 provocations by Saddam Hussein in the southern no-fly zone since the end of Operation Desert Fox.

*****

(This is a work in progress - more to follow.)

Next:

2000-2003

*****

Posted by Greyhawk / December 6, 2005 11:35 PM | Permalink