Airpower

Question: How long was the air campaign prior to ground operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Answer: Almost 12 years.

And there's no "but...". Air Force operations over Iraq began during Desert Storm and never ended. Over the years, elements of the USAF were continually deployed and flying combat sorties against the Hussein regime.

These forces, based in several Middle Eastern locations but specifically in Saudi Arabia, were among the "humiliations" suffered by Al Queda that led to 911. As a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom, those forces are no longer located in the Saudi "holy land".

Do I need to paint a picture? Pretend you're in charge. You've had forward deployed troops for over a decade with no end in sight. It would be politically expedient to withdraw them, but the reason for their presence is an intransigent regime that refuses to do anything to allay suspicions that it is developing weapons of mass destruction. The same despotic ruler is likely supporting the terrorists that consider the presence of US troops an affront to their manhood. Where do you move that Air Force to?

From Air Force Magazine:

A year ago, as Gulf War II was about to begin, another conflict in Iraq was already at its peak. US forces were engaged in a systematic but undeclared air campaign that set the stage for the coalition's rapid victory over Saddam Hussein's regime. And it, in turn, was aided by almost 12 years of combat air patrols in the Iraqi no-fly zones.

Unlike Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Operation Iraqi Freedom officially began (on March 20, 2003) with a ground campaign. Unofficially, a preparatory air campaign already had taken place. Since the end of the first Gulf War, the US and Britain had flown hundreds of thousands of combat and support sorties over Iraq in two no-fly zones that enforced UN resolutions. Air operations intensified greatly in the final months before the start of the ground war.

As Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the air boss for Iraqi Freedom and now the Air Force vice chief of staff, explained in a wartime press conference, "We've been involved in Operation Northern Watch for well over 4,000 days ... [and] Operation Southern Watch for well over 3,800 days. ... We've certainly had more preparation, pre-hostilities, than perhaps some people realize."

A few days later, Gen. John P. Jumper, USAF Chief of Staff, expanded on Moseley's comments. He said, "We started our work in the air component back in June of last year [2002], and, between June and March, we actually flew about 4,000 sorties against the integrated air defense system in Iraq and against surface-to-air missiles and their command and control."

Jumper added, "By the time we got to March, we think that they were pretty much out of business."

Ironically, this early preparation of the battlefield was aided immeasurably by the near constant Iraqi attacks on US and British aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones. Since 1992, Iraqi military forces had fired anti-aircraft artillery or surface-to-air missiles during almost every coalition aircraft patrol. The aircrews returned fire - sometimes immediately, sometimes a few days later. Over the years, attacks outnumbered responses by a 10-to-one margin, according to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

For most of the "pre-war" period, coalition aircrews routinely responded by targeting individual AAA or SAM sites. Occasionally, they would strike radar and communications facilities to weaken the Iraqi air defense capability overall. In summer 2002, however, air operations intensified dramatically.

Queried at a Sept. 16, 2002, press briefing about a perceived escalation in the number of coalition air strikes, Marine Gen. Peter Pace, the Joint Chiefs of Staff vice chairman, openly acknowledged that tactics had changed.

Pace explained that coalition forces had begun specifically targeting command and control and communications nodes. Pace said, "Instead of going at the specific radar that was involved, which can easily be moved between the time the missile was fired and the time we're able to counterstrike, they're picking on targets that are still part of that continuum of air defense but are not easily moved."

"I directed it [the change in tactics]," Rumsfeld said at the same briefing.

The new target set comprised all elements of the hostile Iraqi system, ranging from the AAA and SAMs themselves to support systems. The latter category included radars that helped gunners zero in on aircraft, communications links that connected those radars to the command and control nodes, and links between the command and control nodes.

Rumsfeld characterized earlier responses against the mobile gun batteries as "only marginally effective," given that Iraq continued to attack coalition aircraft. The benefit, he said, was not "worth putting pilots at risk," so flight operations were changed so that coalition aircraft would sortie in less risky areas.

However, said Rumsfeld, further consideration led Pentagon leaders and theater commanders to see that "there was a way to make the cost-benefit ratio make more sense." Coalition aircraft were sent back into the most risky areas but, explained Rumsfeld, with different orders. If attacked, they could strike more lucrative targets. Thus, said Rumsfeld, their responses "would give us a benefit that would merit the risks that were undertaken."

Saddam had ousted UN weapons inspectors in late 1998, and, in response, in mid-December 1998, President Clinton launched Operation Desert Fox, four days of air strikes that targeted suspected weapons of mass destruction sites, Republican Guard facilities, and air defense systems. After those strikes, the Iraqis became even more aggressive in their attacks on coalition aircraft.

Before Desert Fox, the coalition tended to confine its response to an Iraqi attack to the attack's immediate source. On Jan. 27, 1999, the Clinton Administration revised the rules of engagement (ROE), permitting US aircraft to target a wider range of Iraqi air defense systems and related installations. Pilots could not only defend themselves but also act to reduce the overall Iraqi air defense threat to coalition aircraft.

From 1999 onward, Iraq mounted more than 1,000 AAA attacks, launched 600 rockets, and fired some 60 SAMs. On Feb. 16, 2001, 24 US and British aircraft struck five Iraqi air defense command and control installations. The goal was to disrupt a fiber optic cable network that China was installing for the Iraqi military. On July 24, 2001, Iraqi forces fired a SAM at a U-2 spyplane, narrowly missing.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, there was a brief lull in Iraq's provocations. It lasted just two months. Iraq subsequently resumed full-throttle attacks.

The entire Southern Focus effort gave the coalition a clear advantage once ground troops crossed into Iraq and the air campaign "officially" began.

Just hours before the declared start of the war, Col. Gary L. Crowder, chief of Air Combat Command's strategy, concepts, and doctrine division, estimated that Saddam had, by that date, effectively ceded "about two-thirds of his airspace" to coalition forces. "We are starting off in a significantly better position as a consequence of the northern and southern no-fly zones, which will enable operations that might not otherwise have been able to commence."

After the fact, it was obvious that Day 1 air dominance made it possible for the coalition to escalate the timetable for the ground attack and seize Iraqi oil fields on short notice. By April 5, Moseley could declare: "The preponderance of the Republican Guard divisions that were outside of Baghdad are now dead." As Air Force Secretary James G. Roche pointed out at the conclusion of the war, "During the entire campaign, the Iraqi Air Force didn't fly a single sortie against coalition forces."

At first, many airpower critics called attention to what they saw as the lack of a long air campaign as prelude to the war. Retired Gen. Merrill A. McPeak, a former Air Force Chief of Staff, knew the true story.

In a June 5, 2003, Washington Post article McPeak wrote: "It's incorrect to say that, unlike Desert Storm 12 years before, there was no independent air campaign in advance of the jump off of our ground forces from Kuwait." He continued, "Because of this aerial preparation, Iraq's air defenses stayed mostly silent, and our aircraft were able to begin reducing opposing ground forces immediately. Army and Marine Corps formations, judged by "experts" to be much too small for the job, captured Baghdad in just 22 days and with comparatively light casualties. Not only did coalition airpower systematically disorganize Iraq's ground forces, it did so at small cost."

"We were surprised when they [the U.S. pilots] discovered this place," said Khalidi, 28, a Republican Guard captain from a military family. It was late at night, a strong sandstorm was blowing, the vehicles were hidden under the trees, and the soldiers thought they were safe, he said. But two enormous bombs and a load of cluster bombs hit their targets on a tract of agricultural land in the Sabaa Abkar ("Seven Virgins") area of northern Baghdad, killing six members of Khalidi's unit and destroying much of their equipment.

"This affected the morale of the soldiers, because they were hiding and thought nobody could find them," he said. "Some soldiers left their positions and ran away. When the big bombs hit their target, some of the vehicles just melted.

For those who haven't caught on yet, that airpower is no longer needed in Iraq.